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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons learnt and to provide recommendations 
for future support to decentralisation processes; it covers aid delivery over the period 2000-2009 
taking into account the different entry points used by the EC to delivery its support to decentralisation 
processes. The overall thematic evaluation is partly based on a number of country case studies to be 
carried out during the field phase and the present report is a summary of findings from a field visit to 
Benin.1 
The field visit to Benin had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. This note should by no means be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered foremost at the single country level, but have 
been formulated for use at the global level and are a subset of the findings using the full set of 
collected data from the desk study and the different field phase country case studies. 
The reasons for selecting Benin as one of the field studies were: 
 Importance of EC/EU support: The decentralisation support has increased in importance over 
the evaluation period and constitutes an increasing portion of the overall country portfolio of up 
to 5% under 9
th
 EDF and up to 7-8% under 10
th
 EDF; 
 Aid modality: The period 2000-2009 has seen a focus on area based project support being 
replaced by a more coordinated and systematic support to overall decentralisation process 
and the latest support is given as Sector Budget Support (SBS) for direct investment at 
municipality levels; 
 Geographical specificities: Benin is a francophone West African country that is among the 20
th
 
poorest countries in the world. 
The field visit was undertaken between 09/05 and 16/05/2011 and was carried out by Hans Olsen 
(Team Leader) and Faustin Djagba (National Consultant).  
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research foci 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Benin has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
1. Over the last 10 years, the EC/EU and other donors have pursued a gradual approach to 
working with the decentralisation process by supporting local development planning and 
increased investment at municipal level. The question is how committed the Government of 
Benin is to this process? 
2. Is sector budget support an effective instrument in dialoguing with the Government regarding 
the decentralisation reform process? 
3. What have the outcomes of the EC/EU support been in terms of improved service delivery 
from local councils? 
1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
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development partners, as well as the overall decentralisation process in the country. This review 
concentrated on the EC/EU support to PRODECOM (2003-2006) the follow up programme PACTE 
(2008-2011) and the latest years support to the implementation of PONADEC (MDGLAAT) through 
FADeC. 
In addition to studying the documentation, the team also interviewed key informants with relevant 
knowledge on the chosen interventions, as well as informants offering broader insights into the 
evolution of the decentralisation context in the country. A host of government and donor partners 
where interviewed (full list of people met is included in Annex 1). The Team also had the chance to 
attend the annual sector review of decentralisation and deconcentration and local governance, at 
which meeting all the major national and international stakeholders participated.  
The information deemed of critical importance was subjected to a process of triangulation to ensure 
validity and internal consistency. Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field 
phase, prioritisation was necessary and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ 
reviews/ monitoring missions that had already been undertaken. Rather the team relied extensively on 
the related reports and attempted to extract more general findings, trends and recurring themes that 
are of relevance to a broader audience. The dialogue with informants also centred around distilling 
broader lessons and themes, rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. To 
reiterate, this country note is thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of the 
overall decentralisation and local governance portfolio of the EC/EU. Rather it is an attempt to learn 
from the Benin experience and to encourage wider reflections on how best to structure and focus 
EC/EU assistance to decentralisation processes. 
2 Short description of the country context and EC/EU support to 
decentralisation 
2.1 Short description decentralisation process in the country  
The decentralisation process in Benin has gradually evolved from the early 90’s onwards. In 1993, a 
new administrative division of the country was decided and a Ministry of Local Government and 
Decentralisation was set up and an inter-ministerial committee was tasked with drafting laws on 
decentralisation. In July 1996 the Government adopted various draft decentralisation laws. The Head 
of State later promulgated the following laws:  
 Law No. 97-028 on the organization of local administration of the Republic of Benin, 
 Law No. 97-029 on the organization of Municipalities in the Republic of Benin, 
 Law No. 98-005 on the organization of Municipal Special Status, 
 Law No. 98-007 of Municipal Financial System in the Republic of Benin, 
In 2000, the Head of State promulgated Law No. 98-006 on the communal / municipal electoral 
system in the Republic of Benin, 
In December 2002 and January 2003 the first municipal elections were held and in March 2003 the 
first municipal councils were installed. The second local elections were held in March 2008. 
The legislative provisions for the administration of local government through elected bodies was 
adopted by the National Assembly and promulgated by the Head of State in 2000 and a first round of 
local elections were held. Five laws govern the new administrative organisation of Benin which 
focuses on the general principles summarized here after: (i) has a unique level decentralisation; (ii) 
legal personality and financial autonomy of municipalities; (iii) Prefect of the Department supervises 
the communes/municipalities; (iv) municipalities will have greater powers in matters of development 
and sectoral policy; (v) the law provides for simultaneously transferring skills from the state to the 
common resource transfers to exercise those skills; (vi) municipalities have their own resources; (vii) 
municipalities will be headed by elected municipal council, chaired by a Mayor elected from among its 
members. 
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Table 1 Decentralised Political Structures 
 Structure Number Status Authority Election Process 
Département 
(région) 
12 Circonscription 
administrative 
Préfet (1 Préfet 
manages to regions) 
Conseil des Ministres 
Commune 77 Collectivité territoriale 
décentralisée 
Maire Elected among the 
conseillers communaux 
Arrondissement 546 Unité administrative 
locale 
Chef 
d’arrondissement 
Elected among the 
conseillers communaux 
Village/ quartier 
de ville 
3628 Unité administrative 
locale 
Chef de village ou de 
quartier 
Voted by village/quartier 
The second round of municipal and communal elections was held in January 2003. End of March 
2003, the installation of 77 Municipal Councils took place. The EC/EU supported the community 
project PRODECOM ("Programme Support for start-up of Communes"). PRODECOM aimed to 
improve the living conditions of populations in the context of democratic governance at local level. The 
launch of the project just after the elections and the establishment of Mayors is a strong signal of the 
EC/EU support to the decentralisation process. In 2007 (decree 2007-448 of 2 October 2007 on the 
duties, organization and operation), a ministry was specifically created for devolved and decentralized 
administrations, and the government at the sub national level. In 2008, a "Fonds d’Appui pour le 
Développement des Communes" (FADeC), replacing the Solidarity Fund, was established and the 
missions of the "Commission Nationale des Finances Locales" (CONAFIL) were reformulated. In 
2009/2010, a National policy of decentralisation and devolution was adopted to better articulate and 
operationalise the decentralisation laws. The above-mentioned activities have all been supported by 
the EC/EU.  
According to Law No. 97-028 of 15 January 1999 on the organization local administration in the 
Republic of Benin, "the town is a local authority with legal personality and financial autonomy..." to 
allow the Council to assume its full powers, including that relating to financial independence without 
which it can not achieve the main objective of decentralisation. The Parliament passed Act No. 98-007 
(Municipal Financing) which provides the legal instruments by which local officials can mobilize and 
manage local financial resources/revenues. The central government through the Ministry of Local 
Government and Decentralisation is charged with putting in place any grant transfers mechanism to 
local governments, with the support of the technical/financial donor partners. The most important (or 
only direct grant/subsidy to municipalities) is the FADeC.  
The objective of the decentralisation reform was intended to strengthen democracy and political 
participation to ensure the involvement of people in the process of local development and transfer of 
authority and decision-making power to local authorities in particular in the area of service delivery. 
The decentralisation laws of 1999 created a level of local government and transferred the authority 
and decision-making at this level, particularly in the area of essential services. To support 
decentralisation, the Government has also engaged in a process of devolution of central government. 
In this framework, departments (especially in social sectors) have initiated their own programmes of 
devolution of funds for their activities at the local level. 
The municipality has its own functions as a local or regional authority (specific functions). It also has 
the control of the supervisory authority of other powers under the jurisdiction of the state (shared 
competences). The powers transferred to the municipalities by law cover virtually all aspects of local 
development and include: local development planning, urban development and housing, infrastructure, 
transport and equipment, sanitation and the environment, nursery and primary education, health, 
social and cultural sectors, and finally commercial and economic development. 
There is only one level of devolution, which means that the Department (regional level) has neither the 
legal nor financial autonomy. The number of departments increased from 6 to 12 in 1999. A "prefect" 
who is the representative of the Government in the Region is the head of the Department. The 
Department has a supervisory and regulatory function vis-à-vis the municipalities and the functions 
include:  
 Assistance and advice to the municipality;  
 Support the activities of the municipality and to harmonize its actions with those of the State;  
 Control legality of acts adopted by the council and the mayor and the municipal budget.  
The Prefect chairs the departmental administrative conference that brings together the heads of 
county departments and the county council, which includes representatives of municipalities (the 
mayors and their deputies) and civil society. 
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To guide and ensure close monitoring of the implementation of the decentralisation process, a national 
policy of decentralisation and devolution (PONADEC) was prepared and adopted by the Government 
in October 2009. The PONADEC provides a unique reference and consensus to achieve progress in 
decentralisation and deconcentration, while strengthening their links. It provides a common framework 
of accountability and coordination of all actors of decentralisation: central, local elected officials, 
government at all levels, development partners and local people. Its main objective is to create 
institutional and organisational conditions for a sustainable and balanced development based on 
collaborative local governance and the promotion of local authorities to boost the grassroots 
development. The PONADEC defined a 10 year vision (2009-2019) and focuses on five strategic 
directions: (i) local development is at the heart of public policy, (ii) decentralisation and devolution are 
key drivers of modernization of the state, (iii) the role of the local government is recognized and 
democratic expression is enhanced, (iv) the fight against poverty is part of the decentralisation policy, 
and (v) institutional capacity of actors is strengthened by a better allocation of public resources and 
appropriate support. 
Given the limited resources of municipalities, it is not surprising that financial transfers from central 
government are an important source of revenue for municipalities, especially for small rural 
communities. Over the period 2004-2010, they accounted for nearly 30 percent of total revenue of 
local governments with a range from 10,5 percent for the municipality of Lokossa to 87,8 percent for 
the town of Za-Kpota. For more than 35 percent of municipalities this proportion exceeds 40 percent 
and has tended to increase in recent years with the introduction of the FADeC (Development Fund for 
Municipalities). Transfers and state subsidies to municipalities have more than doubled over the 
period 2004-2009 and total 51 billion FCFA. This means that most local governments depend heavily 
on the state for their resources, which limits their autonomy. Therefore, capacity building of local 
government staff as well as enhancing the local administration of revenue collection is a major 
challenge for the decentralisation process in Benin. 
2.2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions  
The evaluation team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in this specific country 
through a number of interventions. The table below summarises the major EC/EU-funded 
interventions considered. 
Table 2 List of the major EC-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(in mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr. 
Comment 
Appui a la décentralisation et 
développement local 
0,37 
EDF/1999/014-
378 
Direct project funding 
Programme d'appui au démarrage des 
communes - PRODECOM 
8,15 
EDF/2002/015-
861 
Programme support to support 
capacity building of 
municipalities 
Programme d'appui à la 
décentralisation 
13,7 
EDF/2007/019-
049 
Sector budget support to the 
decentralisation policy 
implementation  
Projet de développement local et 
d''accompagnement au processus de 
décentralisation dans les 6 communes 
du département des Collines (Bénin) 
0,37 
CDC/2003/005-
002 // 55442 
 
The partnership between the EC/EU and Benin is seen as strong and has strengthened over time in 
terms of a political dialogue that mainly centres on the development issues facing Benin. The dialogue 
with the EU Member States represented in Benin and the Government is intense. This dialogue takes 
place within the framework of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, on the initiative of the Government 
or a partner, or finally in the framework of sectoral dialogues. 
The contribution of the European Union in the fight against poverty in Benin within the framework of 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy has been supported through the 9
th
 and 10
th
 EDF focused on 
strengthening governance, infrastructure development and acceleration of growth by budget support. 
Outside these areas of concentration, the EC supports civil society, the fight against child trafficking, 
the private sector and the environment. The 9
th
 EDF had more than 205 billion FCFA (313 million 
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EUR) of support that was fully committed. The 10
th
 EDF has an overall allocation of 219 billion FCFA 
(334 million EUR). The support focuses on the following areas: 
1. In the infrastructure sector is included the continued development work of the Exit Northwest 
Cotonou (40 million EUR), preparation of road works Béroubouay-Parakou (63 million EUR), 
continued cleanup of flooded neighbourhoods west of Cotonou (27 million EUR) and support 
to the Road Fund. 
2. In the area of governance, the 9
th
 EDF had accompanied the rehabilitation of 8 Courts of First 
Instance, the construction of two Courts of Appeal and two new Courts of First Instance. 
Besides these facilities, the Legal Support Project had 12 million EUR to support the 
modernization and computerization of criminal and civil information systems. This support has 
continued through the 10
th
 EDF favouring the development of a sectoral approach to 
empowering the sectors, and 25 million EUR have been provided for this purpose. 
3. In the area of decentralisation and local development, the EC/EU support is for the process of 
decentralisation through the PACTE Programme for an amount of 15 million EUR under the 
9
th
 EDF and 45 million EUR has been allocated under the 10
th
 EDF as mainly sector budget 
support. 
Note: a detailed list of EC/EU-funded interventions directly supporting decentralisation is provided in 
Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs  
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national 
stakeholders in partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international 
donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Ind 1.3.1:  
The various national stakeholders find that the EC/EU policy interventions on decentralisation and 
local governance have been pertinent and very clear but that the actual policy documents are less well 
known. To which degree that the policy statement or documents have been communicated widely is 
not evident, but the mere fact that the EC/EU has consistently been playing a lead role in the 
decentralisation and local governance field over the past 5 years, has also meant an increased 
visibility and also a shared vision for work with other key development partners (DPs).  
Ind 1.3.2:  
The development partners interviewed all find that the EC/EU policy framework has developed over 
the past 10 years and the EC/EU has become more active in decentralisation interventions. In Benin, 
the change from mainly area-based projects in the various regions supported by various donors to 
Programme support (PONADEC) and to sector budget support has all been accompanied by the 
EC/EU and the EUD staff has been instrumental in advocating for this change. The EC/EU strategy is 
therefore seen as clear and pertinent to the situation in Benin.  
Ind 1.3.3:  
The key staff dealing with decentralisation in Benin has been involved from the beginning in 
developing the EC/EU strategies on decentralisation and local governance and have been involved in 
training and regional meetings. For them there is clear guidance now for the decentralisation and local 
governance interventions and they work very much to increase harmonisation and alignment in the 
decentralisation area with all key stakeholders. The Government is very weak and therefore the DPs 
have in many ways taken the lead on the DLG agenda and not least the EC/EU through the EUD.   
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3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing 
with sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) 
or disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.1.1:  
The issues of decentralisation and local governance are actively discussed within the EUD and with 
the government partners. The on-going dialogue within the EUD and with external partners is intensive 
in terms of DLG issues. In the early process and under project implementation the procedures were 
often found to be both bureaucratic and excessive. Many of the implementing partners found that 
under project approaches the EC/EU procedures were very cumbersome and bureaucratic with many 
externally set and driven audits and reporting formats. However, over time a number of programmatic 
and sector budget support initiatives are found more flexible and useful for furthering the DLG issues. 
E.g. one of the components of the PACTE programme implemented with the help of a specific 
programme unit was delegated to GTZ (GIZ) as they were found to be technical sound in the capacity 
building area and the focus of the component was the capacity building of the deconcentrated services 
in the regions.  
Ind 2.1.2:  
During the mission, the Evaluation Team did not have specific meetings with the sector staff, nor did 
the sector staff attend the debriefing. However, the EUD has internal weekly management meetings 
where section heads discuss all relevant developments in the various key support areas and therefore 
a lively exchange of information is ensured through these meetings. Often sector staff invites the DLG 
focal points to various sector specific meetings of a wider relevance.  
Ind 2.1.3:  
Since mid-2000, a dedicated DLG expert has been working on DLG issues. Within the last 2 years this 
has become a unit as one more employee has joined the EUD and at least 1½ staff resources are 
being used for monitoring and coordinating DLG activities.   
Ind 2.1.4: No comments. 
3.2.1 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of 
decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.2.1:  
The Governance portfolio is important in EUD and increasing support to DLG issues over the 
evaluation period. The EUD has dedicated increasing staff resources to DLG over the period with 1 full 
time from 2006 onwards and now 1,5 person. The EUD DLG focal point has been lead donor for 
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several years over the evaluation period and appreciated by stakeholders. Some of the staff in the 
EUD has attended the training/workshops for DLG issues offered by the EC in 2007/8.  
Ind 2.2.2:  
The overall knowledge and capacity of the staff in terms of DLG issues is excellent and they have 
played a major role in the last 3-4 years in coordination and harmonisation of activities. Recent 
additional staff resources have bolstered the DLG section under the Governance umbrella.  
Ind 2.2.3:  
The training opportunities have been used in the past as well as wider participation in dialogues and 
regional workshops with headquarters.  
3.2.2 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) 
or systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, 
issues papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote 
the effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.3.1:  
The M&E of decentralisation and local governance is both present in the general budget support 
framework as well as in the sector. The annual sector review for DLG functions as the main M&E 
framework for monitoring progress within the national policy (PONADEC) and relates to issues of 
administrative, human resources and fiscal decentralisation at national, regional and local levels. 
Sectoral coordination is ensured within the Working Group. This Working Group is the natural forum 
for donor coordination and alignment of external support on national sectoral priorities. The dialogue 
culminates in the annual sectoral review of decentralisation and the joint review of the PRSP between 
the Government and donors (in June). In 2009 and 2010, the EUD is leading development partners in 
the overall sector and therefore assumes responsibility for the secretariat. The presentations at the 
annual review by the Ministry (MDGLAAT) are fairly comprehensive in terms of giving the latest overall 
information on capacity building issues at LG level as well as fiscal decentralisation indicators and 
implementation over the past year.   
Ind 2.3.2: N/A 
Ind 2.3.3:  
While it may not be possible to talk directly of a single “driver of change” in the EUD it is recognised by 
both the EUD itself and by DPs that the EC/EU has been very active in the dialogue with the GoB over 
the past 4-5 years and especially in terms of forming the PONADEC in 2009 and ensuring that more 
reliable investment transfer are secured for the municipalities under the FADeC.  
3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies? 
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational 
procedures related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds 
to LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant CSP sections on decentralisation and local governance 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.1.1:  
In the area of governance, the EUD participated actively in political dialogue in justice and local 
governance, being the lead donor in these two areas. The EC/EU is the largest provider of project 
preparation to the permanent voters list Computerization and participates actively in its management. 
The EC/EU support the PONADEC happens in active partnerships with several DPs who have 
supported the Government of Benin in the course preparing the PONADEC including EUD, BTC, 
KFW/GTZ, and Danida. This has enabled a more harmonised approach to supporting DLG activities 
from 2008/9 onwards and systematically supported by EC/EU and most recently through SBS. The 
President and official government policy mentions decentralisation as one of the key reform initiatives 
of the Government, but how active the support is throughout the government for this reform is not 
clear. The larger sector ministries seem slow to catch on to the reform focus of building capacities at 
local levels.   
Ind 3.1.2:  
The alignment is evolving and has been first and foremost pushed by donors present in the DLG area. 
However, a more systematic and encompassing sectoral transfer system from central to local 
government do not exist at this moment. The municipalities only disburse about 5% of the national 
budget and this is mostly linked to salaries and administrative costs and very little infrastructure 
development.  
Ind 3.1.3:  
The dialogue between GoB and the DPs is strong within the DLG field and has become even stronger 
over the evaluation period. While one might argue that the DLG agenda is mainly pushed and 
supported by the donors, and to a lesser degree government itself evidenced through very weak 
sectoral responses to DLG agenda at local level, the dialogue is strong and evolving. This is not least 
the case since 2009 and the PONADEC, which enables a more targeted and strategic discussion of 
the DLG issues and the joint annual review of decentralisation taking place between the donors and 
GoB.  
Ind 3.1.4:  
Reference to decentralisation and local governance is made throughout the CSP both for the 8
th
, 9
th
 
and 10
th
 EDF.  
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as "How should existing interventions best evolve?" are 
addressed in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.2.1:  
There is no doubt that the approaches to supporting DLG in Benin have evolved considerably over the 
past 10 years and has gone from the scattered project approach focusing only on limited districts/ 
municipalities to a more national and programme approach through the PONADEC. However, the 
donors still favour district-based programmes that only target a limited number of 
municipalities/communes per donor, and the support to e.g. capacity building is still scattered and not 
well coordinated. Attempts are being made under the PONADEC for MDGLAAT to design a more 
strategic approach to capacity building of LGAs. The overall importance of GBS and SBS has also 
grown considerably during the evaluation period. SBS is now in principle the modality for support to 
FADeC and should increase over the coming years in line with GoB funding priorities for local 
government investments. The GBS support framework has specific indicators for decentralisation that 
are aligned to the PONADEC and the FADeC.  
Ind 3.2.2:  
To some degree this has been addressed at the programming stage and a higher degree of 
interaction between DPs and government on approaches and interventions shows that this is the 
case.  
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3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support 
decentralisation and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme 
to be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as 
"When and how to use sector budget support?" or "what are the risks related to the") are 
addressed in project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid 
delivery methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.3.1:  
The EC/EU response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned with national 
policies, first to kick-start the capacity building of the municipalities and then in more programmatic 
and SBS forms. The partners are responding to the Governments' priorities / activities in the field of 
DLG. However, it is not clear to what degree other larger sector ministries also share this 
decentralisation reform process imperative, as overall decentralisation of functions and funds to carry 
out mandated functions at LG level is very limited in Benin.   
The choices of entry points and aid delivery methods have been appropriate to national contexts as 
discussed above. This can be seen foremost in the extent of emphasis on DLG issues a one of the 
prominent and specific indicators being monitored under the GBS. The role of decentralisation in 
sectors dialogue seems less prominent and very little evidence of the dialogue and the prominence of 
DLG issues in the sectors was found during the mission. Regarding the DLG agenda pushed by 
donors: it is not clear how much this policy is based on political reality and priorities or whether it is 
only a statement not actively pursued by Government.  
Ind 3.3.2:  
N/A 
Ind 3.3.3:  
This is discussed actively within the EUD and especially during the development of the CSPs. An 
active debate is on-going also with SBS support and how this can be best applied in the case of DLG 
support.  
Ind 3.3.4:  
N/A 
3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of 
the role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.4.1:  
It is clear from the assessed programmes and documentation that the EC/EU support is based on 
detailed analytical work relating to the decentralisation reform process and actors. This has led to a 
clear strategy and analysis of both the institutional and financial constraints of the sector.  
Ind 3.4.2:  
The DLG sector is subject to good collaboration between the EC/EU, France, Germany, Denmark and 
the Government, although all partners are actually involved. The preparation of the PONADEC was 
launched with the support of Belgium and in collaboration with MDGLAAT and of course the 
municipalities. The EC/EU was leader in 2007, Germany and France took over in 2008, the EC/EU 
again played the lead role in 2009. Under PACTE a full component targeting capacity building of the 
deconcentrated provincial level of administration was delegated and implemented by GTZ (later GIZ) 
with very good collaboration between the two institutions.  
  
Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Benin; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
11 
3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarities 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance 
issues among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor 
approaches, when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.1.1:  
Several levels of coordination are in place in Benin, at (1) of the European Union (Commission Heads 
of Mission and the 5 member states present in Benin), (2) heads of mission, bilateral and multilateral 
agencies (3) experts in thematic coordination groups. The activity of the working groups (WGs) for 
sectoral and thematic coordination has been uneven and the GoB leadership lacking in many WGs. 
E.g. in 2007, the EUD had the lead for Groups (1) Monitoring PRSP and Budget Support, (2) 
Decentralisation, (3) Justice (4) Transportation and (5) Aid Harmonisation and also active in Health, 
Water and Energy, and the private sector WGs. The dialogue with civil society was also intensified 
during this period 2007/8 and should continue through all phases of the implementation of the 10th 
EDF. These initiatives are in line with the wishes of the GoB, which is to strengthen the dialogue with 
stakeholders in society, through what is called "collaborative governance". 
Ind 4.1.2:  
N/A 
Ind 4.1.3:  
The EUD has played a lead role in the dialogue on DLG with the GoB over the past 3-4 years and this 
has been very much appreciated by all stakeholders. The coordination and general harmonisation of 
approaches has been seen and the Joint Annual Reviews have become institutionalised, which shows 
a degree of maturity, coordination and collaboration between the various stakeholders.  
Ind 4.1.4: N/A 
3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarities between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and 
other donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finances decentralisation programmes with Members States and major 
donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes 
and policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.2.1:  
Local development, decentralisation and devolution: the sector is subject to collaboration between the 
EC/EU, France, Germany and the Government, although other partners are also involved. The 
preparation of the PONADEC was launched with the support of the Delegation of Belgium and, in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Decentralisation, Local Governance, Administration and Spatial 
Planning (MDGLAAT). The development of PONADEC was also supported by the EUD. The EUD was 
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the lead donor in 2007, Germany and France took over in 2008, and the EUD then took over again in 
2009 as lead donor in the decentralisation working group. 
Ind 4.2.2:  
Donor Practices and efforts have been undertaken over the last 3-4 years to improve the coordination 
of partners and alignment with national procedures. Development partners seek to uphold the 
principles of the Paris Declaration on alignment and harmonization. The programming support of their 
projects is most often in connection with the preparation of budget proposals. But the predictability of 
aid is still insufficient. Development partners also aligned on national procedures for procurement, but 
still refer to their own procedures for accounting records and payments, audits and monitoring. 
Ind 4.2.3:  
N/A 
Ind 4.2.4:  
Yes participation is there in both national reviews and international conferences.  
3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors 
such as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment 
into decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1:  
There was no evidence of this having taken place to any larger degree. Of course the other sector 
programmes follow developments within the decentralisation sector but there is generally speaking a 
lot resistance to decentralisation in the larger sector ministries.  
Ind 4.3.2:  
This does not figure as a major concern in the documentation reviewed from the EUD.  
Ind 4.3.3:  
The EC/EU has been instrumental in establishing and implementing the DLG coordination 
mechanisms with major donors and GoB. The EC/EU-funded PACTE programme was implemented in 
coordination with other donors – delegated authority to GTZ for component 3. The EC/EU support to 
decentralisation processes is generally coherent with other (sector and GBS) activities, and has had a 
prominent place in the governance debate (see earlier discussion of the GBS indicators). The 
harmonisation of donor activities is now more clearly prominent under the PONADEC umbrella and 
very clearly present in the work of CONAFIL/FADeC as investment funding for municipalities is 
increasing being channelled through the FADeC formula-based grant mechanism. 
3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to implement 
decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.1.1:  
The National Policy of Decentralisation and Deconcentration (PONADEC – "Politique Nationale de 
Décentralisation et de Déconcentration") is the GoB’s strategy for enacting the development aim of 
involving local governments in administrating their own proper activities and contributing to increased 
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service delivery. The focus of the strategy/policy is on the implementation of policies of 
decentralisation, de-concentration and planning and how this is done at local government levels. 
PONADEC was finalised in 2009. This means that the focus of PONADEC is the creation of the 
institutional and organisational conditions for a sustainable and balanced local development based on 
grassroots development. There are three specific result areas namely:  
1. Implement a policy of planning and balanced development, incorporating the entire country to 
achieve sustainable and equitable development.  
2. Ensure the implementation of the principles of good governance in modernisation of local 
administration.  
3. Reduce the level of poverty by improving access to basic services and enhancing the economic 
potential of municipalities.  
PONADEC has an implementation horizon of over 10 years to be able to achieve grassroots 
democracy, good governance and sustainable local development through a decentralised unitary state 
which ensures the harmonious development, on the basis of the national solidarity, universal access 
to basic services, and the potential regional and interregional balance. 
Ind 5.1.2:  
There are all the key actors such as the Ministry of Local Government (MDGLAAT) the association of 
local government (ANCB) as well as inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms.  
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.2.1:  
In July 1996 the Government adopted various draft decentralisation laws. The Head of State later 
promulgated the following laws:  
 Law No. 97-028 on the organization of local administration of the Republic of Benin  
 Law No. 97-029 on the organization of Municipalities in the Republic of Benin  
 Law No. 98-005 on the organization of Municipal Special Status  
 Law No. 98-007 of Municipal Financial System in the Republic of Benin.  
 In 2000 the Head of State promulgated Law No. 98-006 on the communal / municipal electoral 
system in the Republic of Benin.  
In December 2002 and January 2003 the first municipal elections were held and in March 2003 the 
first municipal councils were installed. The second local election was held in March 2008. The brief 
overview of functions of the municipalities is included in section 2.1 above.  
Ind 5.2.2.  
During discussion with key stakeholders in Benin it was made clear that large parts of the existing 
sector legislation is not aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy and needs to be 
reviewed with this in mind. The EUD supports this work, as it is part of PONADEC to effectively 
implement the decentralisation policy and make more effective the deconcentrated levels of sector 
services. 
3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total 
public expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes 
and increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.3.1:  
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The mission could not get exact figures.   
Ind 5.3.2:  
Even the recent Public Expenditure Review (PER 2010) from the WB does not have a full overview of 
the fiscal position of LGs. As can be seen from the below table the evolution of revenues for LGs has 
over time changed from reliance on own revenues to in fact over the past 3-4 years to receive more 
revenue in terms of government grants and shared revenue sources. The total budget available to 
LGs has risen slightly over the past 5 years but this is also accompanied by a reduction in own source 
revenues. In real terms the budgets of LGs has doubled. This is a development supported by EC 
through the FADeC. 
Figure 1 Composition of LG Income and Revenues 
 
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that 
are discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in HRM: the extent to which LGs can hire and fire or 
otherwise manage personnel. 
 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local 
government’s degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.4.1:  
Benin has moved rapidly recently towards a more unified, harmonized approach and political 
commitment towards a strong decentralisation and deconcentration (and territorial management) 
policy and the creation of the corresponding Communal Development Support Fund (FADeC, 2008). 
The donor community and especially the EUD in Benin, equally has moved closer towards a sector 
wide, more unified, aligned and harmonised approach in their support to the national 2D-policy 
(creation of well functioning donor working group, increasing use of the modality of global and sectoral 
budget support, increasing channelling of their ODA through the FADeC Fund as single instrument for 
supporting Benin’s communes). A number of external development partners follow more or less also 
still their existing projects (project modality) due to previous contracts signed or because they have 
certain reservations still in regard to channelling their resources fully through the FADeC. However, 
even those more contribute, at least nominally, in parallel also to the FADeC. The FADeC, after a 
good start in 2008 and 2009, in 2010 suffered a setback in terms of Government’s level of funding. 
Also, many communes complain about the late arrival of funds and still weak efficiency of fund 
allocation, distribution and efficient fund management from the side of the central and departmental 
administration. Also, the communes themselves lack for a large part the resources and capacities to 
manage the new PONADEC priority action programme and FADeC adequately. 
Ind 5.4.2:  
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A local civil service has not been effectively created yet and the hire and fire of service delivery 
personnel often rests with the sector ministry concerned.  
Ind 5.4.3:  
In roles and functions are described in the legislation but in practice it is not yet down in the spirit of 
the law as sector ministries continue to work in a deconcentrated fashion also implementing activities.  
3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and 
reform implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & CSO) that capacities of key central government 
bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation have improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of M&E system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.1.1:  
Key central government bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation 
have improved capacities over the last 5 years. This is definitely the impression of key stakeholders in 
the DLG process and this is has been supported by EC programmes PRODECOM and PACTE over 
the past 10 years. Local governments capacities have also improved over the evaluation period but in 
limited fashion and in a very disjointed way as some of the larger municipalities have increased 
capacities and staff compliments but many rural municipalities have very weak and limited staff and 
own resources. The formation/implementation of PONADEC is an important element is this 
improvement. Numerous ministerial and inter-ministerial committees are being or have been put in 
place.  
Ind 6.1.2:  
See above 
Ind 6.1.3:  
The M&E is generally weak but the annual sector review of decentralisation does concentrate on 
presenting updated M&E figures on the most relevant capacity building and fiscal decentralisation 
issues.  
Ind 6.1.4:  
N/A 
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local councils 
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of 
information produced at local level 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.2.1:  
Decentralised structures are still weak. The focus is on deconcentrated levels for PFM training but also 
lowers levels. Local Government training is carried out through CEFAL (Centre de Formation pour 
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l’Administration Locale) and has been underway since 2008. Plan for implementation in all Prefecture 
(regions) underway with some sector ministry participation but the plan is behind schedule and is not 
actively supported by all government sectors. Local accountability of local governments still weak – 
seems that NGO and CSO involvement in this area is very weak as most are focused on service 
delivery and not advocacy. The recent 2007 PEFA has a rating scale from A (good) to D (low), and 
none of the 27 indicators is scored A, only 4 had a score B, with the remainder scoring C or D. This 
means that the general PFM is weak and very poor. The PRODECOM and PACTE have focused on 
capacity building issues for LGs. The emphasis on enhancing PFM capacity of national, regional and 
local level is a top priority of EC/EU support within the governance sectors. Fund utilisation and 
accounting of these under e.g. FADeC and other sector resources at LG level are very weak. 
Ind 6.2.2:  
Increased local development planning was an objective of PRODECOM. The priority under PACTE 
has been to further develop capacities at national and local level. Basically all municipalities have 
development plans today but since the relationship between plan and budget and the level of budget 
execution is still very low it is a sign of very serious capacity problems in terms of planning.  
Ind 6.2.3:  
Since only 2-3% of the national budget is utilised by LGs there isn’t much in terms of HRM to focus on. 
The largest part of the staff dealing with municipalities are still deconcentrated and under the control of 
sector ministries.  
Ind 6.2.4:  
N/A. 
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.3.1:  
The EC PACTE programme was working closely with the ANCB, which is still a very weak 
organisation that plays an increasingly more strategic role in the analysis of the decentralisation 
process, but which hasn’t been able to manifest itself properly till date. The overall objective of PACTE 
is to improve the social and economic conditions of the people in the context of democratic 
governance at local level. The specific objective is that the municipalities provide services to people, 
mobilize the means to ensure their viability and their mission to facilitate local development in an 
institutional environment adapted to the challenges of reform. The three results areas are:  
(R1) The municipalities strengthen their capacity to administer and promote local development through 
the ANCB authorized by them to provide them with local services and participate in their name in the 
dialogue on national policies.  
(R2) The municipalities are implementing their PDC in this context and provide the administrative, 
social, economic and cultural means to meet the challenges of development and inter-communality,  
(R3) The institutions responsible for steering the implementation of the reform of local administration 
ensure supervision of local authorities to improve their performance.  
The ANCB is basically a mirror image of the municipalities meaning that it exists on very limited own 
source funding and is forced to seek project funds for basic activities. This does not further a strong 
and independent minded organisation.  
Ind 6.3.2:  
The NGOs working with advocacy and information around decentralisation are very few and far 
between. Most NGOs in Benin are focused on service delivery issues in the sectors health, education 
and water and sanitation.  
Ind 6.3.3:  
N/A 
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3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.1.1:  
Local elections have improved over the past 10 years from the first local elections held in 2003 and all 
the local elections have been supported by the EC/EU. Two elections have been held in 2003 and 
2008, the first which allowed, in addition to the introduction of municipalities, the emergence of the 
National Association of Municipalities of Benin (ANCB), the second election saw the renewal of up to 
80% elected councillors. Recent support from the EC/EU has been through LEPI which is an attempt 
to make available computerised voter lists at local level.  
Ind 7.1.2:  
N/A 
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with 
citizens (notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.2.1:  
In general, local accountability of local governments still weak – seems that NGO and CSO 
involvement in this area is very weak as most are focused on service delivery and not advocacy. The 
Team could not verify this directly at LG level but it seems that issues of this nature have been 
addressed under the various donor-funded programmes and also the PRODECOM and PACTE but 
very little concrete evidence could be found.  
3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) 
provided to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.3.1:  
Increased transparency in fund allocation is evident in terms of the FADeC and local budgets. The 
difference in the FADeC is between the funds that are conditional and un-conditional.  For un-
conditional there is free choice of the sector, projects and / or activities to be funded. That is to say in 
effect that the funds are in addition to the municipalities own revenues to be subject to local planning. 
On the other hand, FADEC is sending funds made available to municipalities for sectoral activities and 
these activities may relate only to this sector. Often, resources are allocated for specific activities, but 
this is not binding. Indeed, there is a wide range of options - for example, for investments, we can go 
from a situation where the Ministry of Education has already identified the sites for the classroom 
situation or a ministry that provides resources for 'infrastructure sector' without consulting the LGs. 
FADeC is working on increasing the un-conditional part of the investment grant to municipalities. This 
interest is understandable because it would increase the investment budget for the municipalities own 
priorities and the donors would develop a mechanism to support the communes in the whole country 
(replacing the geographical support, but taking into account the equalization criteria) through the 
national system. Some progress has been made for the FADEC budget line for unconditional 
investment grants.  
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While donors have hesitated to start co-financing, the GoB took a decision to commit funds (although 
this was helped by the GBS support, especially including from the EC). Since 2008, municipalities 
have actually received investment resources to finance priority actions according to their CDPs. With 
the increase in transfers of investment also increases the amount invested (although transfers also 
seem to have replaced the use of own resources for local investment). The FADeC grant formula is 
based on a combination of a fixed amount (called "endowment structure"), variables representing 
spending needs, the variables being proxy (a proxy) for the ability to generate (other) revenues 
(collectively called equalization grants), and a premium to boost performance. 
Ind 7.3.2: N/A. 
3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) 
in local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.1.1:  
Actual figures on service delivery in the municipalities is hard to come by but as the below table 
demonstrates there is a very large gap between annual planned budgets at LG level and actual 
expenditures. This is normally an indication of poor capacity to transfer, manage and implementation 
funds for investment in service delivery improvements – an area that the EC/EU and other partners 
have concentrated on in larger sector programmes and also for investment purposes through the 
FADeC in the last 3-4 years. But with only 5% (PER 2010) of the national budget being spent through 
LGs the issue of decentralised service delivery is clearly more a centrally sector driven prerogative 
than a local development planning one.  
Table 3 Average % expenditure against budget 2004-2009  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
2004-2009 
Administration/Functions 
Investments 
Total Expenditure 
75 
41 
58 
64 
30 
47 
76 
48 
62 
125 
42 
83 
60 
88 
67 
67 
76 
70 
78 
54 
65 
Ind 8.1.2:  
Decentralisation in Benin started with elections for the 77 Municipal Councils in 2004. The 
municipalities were given a number of tasks mandated by law, amongst others the construction and 
maintenance of rural roads, primary schools and rural water supply. The municipalities were similarly 
assigned a number of revenues, amongst others taxe de voirie, sales tax etc., however their most 
important source of income from the outset was transfers from the central government. With only 
about 5% of the national budget being spent through the municipalities this remains extremely low 
also in comparison with other developing countries. Benin has in recent years taken further steps in 
promoting decentralisation. In 2007, a Decentralisation Ministry (MDGLAAT) was established, and in 
2008 elections for the second generation Municipal Councils were held. 2008 further saw the creation 
of FADeC (Fond d’Appui au Developpement Communale), a block grant (formula based) for the 
municipalities, and CONAFIL (Commission Nationale des Finances Locales), a policy advisory body, 
which provides oversight of the allocation of FADeC funds. Finally, in late 2009, a National 
Decentralisation Policy PONADEC was adopted as a guide for the decentralisation process in a 10-
year perspective. All of this has been supported actively by the EC/EU. The proposed formula-based 
grant for investment purposes is described above under Ind. 7.3.1. 
Ind 8.1.3:  
There are examples of public-private partnerships in delivery of services in Benin. Through 15 years of 
concerted effort initiated in Cotonou, the system of pre-collection of solid waste by NGOs working at 
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the household level has been well conceived and implemented. In the main urban areas, the NGO’s 
serve from 60-85% of establishments of their zones and receive payments regularly and adequately 
for their efforts. This high level of service is based on a high level of commercial establishment 
participation, offsetting the lower household level of participation. Cotonou has precise pre-collection 
zones and the pre-collectors work with official authorization. The authorization specifies performance 
criteria and appends a terms of reference and is given annually. The NGO’s then enter annual 
contracts with each household they serve. The fee for service in Cotonou is based on the city’s tariff 
structure, which takes affordability into consideration for each area and enables extra charges for 
additional volumes collected per source of generation. This is an area especially supported by the WB.  
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.2.1:  
The Evaluation Team while in Benin could not make a full analysis of the question of operation and 
maintenance budgets at local level. Normally municipalities have been using their own small revenue 
sources for O&M budgets, but these have fallen considerably over the past 5 years. Only the larger 
municipalities of Cotonou and other cities have some local revenue sources that allow for some 
meagre O&M budgets. The FADeC unconditional grants will have a degree of operation and 
maintenance built in to them.  
Ind 8.2.2:  
N/A 
3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for 
vulnerable groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 Ind 8.3.2. Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.3.1:  
The Communes funding is only marginally higher – most funds are expended through deconcentrated 
sectors and therefore in principle the central government. However, the GoB has received 
considerable Budget Support funding from the EC over the past 5-6 years. And following observations 
can be made in terms of the overall improvements in service delivery: 
 The total revenues of communes show an increase in transfers and a decrease in importance 
of own resources; 
 The budget for local investments has increased over the past few years but the actual 
expenditure of local budgets compared to planned ones is extremely low with an average of 
65% over the period 2004-2009 in municipalities.  
Ind 8.3.2:  
The recent 2010 PER by the WB states that even if the operating costs accounted for an average of 
nearly 70 percent of total public expenditure over the period 2004-2009 for LGs, their share dropped to 
61,6% in 2009. By contrast, after several years of decline, the evolution of public investment spending 
has experienced a reversal of trends from 2006. The share of investment expenditure in total public 
expenditure increased from 23,7% in 2006 to 38,4% in 2009. This increase is mainly due to increased 
capital expenditure domestically financed nearly 28,5% per year while that of foreign-financed 
expenditure was limited to 3%. In particular, it should be noted that capital expenditure domestically 
financed doubled between 2008 and 2009. This change in the economic composition of public 
spending in part reflects the will of the authorities in Benin (aided through GBS) to provide basic 
infrastructure to improve the competitiveness of the economy and support growth in the medium and 
long term. How this has translated into improved quality of service delivery at local levels is still too 
early to say. 
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4 Conclusions concerning the hypotheses and main challenges to 
be discussed in the synthesis phase 
Over the last 10 years, the EC/EU and other donors have pursued a gradual approach to 
working with the decentralisation process by supporting local development planning and 
increased investment at municipal level. The question is how committed the Government of 
Benin is to this process? 
Benin’s administrative system of local governance is characterised by a strong emphasis on central 
Government, with 12 deconcentrated departments throughout the country’s territory, vis-à-vis 77 
decentralised, but administratively still weakly developed "Communes" (municipalities). The 
departmental level functions more as a kind of central Government secretariat and less as a full- 
fledged intermediary administrative level between the Centre and the "Communes". A Government 
plan is underway to reform the departmental level of administration in the country (creation of 6 
Regions and up to 29 Departments closer to the "Communes"), including departmental inter-sectoral 
development plans (PDDI) to fill the gap between the 77 Communal Development Plans (PDC) at one 
hand and the overarching national development policies (Benin Alafia 2025, MDGs / PRSP). 
At the moment, most communal structures are still very weak, and suffer from funding well below their 
needs and mandates entrusted to them by the GoB. They also suffer still from major institutional 
weaknesses and in terms of their human resources and technical skill level. Their budget execution 
rate is still below capacity. Departmental advisory assistance services for municipalities are still not 
very well functioning. Line ministries have only deconcentrated their services towards municipalities by 
an average of 20% of their total operations. 
While Benin’s “2D” policy still has to go a long way to become fully operational, a good foundation has 
been laid by having developed a clear sectoral policy framework (PONADEC) with a clear priority 
Action Plan (around 25 million EUR for the period 2008-2013). And with the creation of FADeC, 
despite temporary funding and capacity gaps in its optimal execution, there are good prospects for 
reaching a better, more direct and efficient funding of municipalities in the near future (annual funding 
level of at least 10 billion FCFA). The fact that DPs in future have been invited to use this unified 
instrument as main funding modality is positive. In addition, DPs continue to increasingly use the 
budget support modality (general and sector budget support) – which is very well in line with the spirit 
of the Paris Declaration. The annual joint review and sector reviews in place offer the DPs the 
opportunity to enhance the necessary corresponding M&E framework to measure real impact of their 
support on the achievement of the MDGs. All of this has been supported by the EC/EU. The major 
question in the future will be how effectively the GoB to support the decentralisation reform efforts that 
will need the full support of larger sector ministries to be successful. 
 
Is sector budget support an effective instrument in dialoguing with the Government regarding 
the decentralisation reform process? 
The EC/EU has actively participated in the design and development of PONADEC (National Policy of 
Decentralisation), which today is the framework within which all programming and implemented 
interventions for decentralisation are taking place. A logical framework specifies the basic indicators to 
monitor progress towards the results within the DLG field. This has partly been based on the 
achievements of PRODECOM, and PACTE has capitalized and used the methodological tools 
developed by the government and donor support projects. The EC/EU has provided significant 
financial support to the FADeC. And these funds are already fully disbursed.  
The EC/EU through the PRODECOM and later PACTE has contributed greatly to strengthening the 
capacities of local communities in Benin. But overall the capacities of LGs are still very limited and 
weak and in need of further support.  
The EC/EU participated in the development of professional PDC (especially first generation) who 
engages in conduct of activities and projects at the commune level. And most importantly, the EC/EU 
has participated through the PACTE project capacity building of municipal actors. These different 
supports have certainly contributed to a better performance of service by the various municipalities but 
with mixed results. 
These developments point to a further deepening of decentralisation in Benin over the years to come, 
where municipalities are likely to become increasingly responsible for public service delivery in terms 
of primary education and health facilities and public transport as well as local economic development. 
The success of this undertaking, however, hinges on the ability of the Beninese authorities amongst 
others to maintain a coordinated approach and develop a system of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
that is in balance. In this regard CONAFIL, as an advisory body, is intended to and well placed to 
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undertake the policy research, which would be a prerequisite for sound decisions the development of 
such a system. 
So it looks like the mix of SBS over the last 3-4 years and the programme approach has worked well 
in terms of dialoguing with GoB surrounding the decentralisation reform process.  
The EC/EU contributes to strengthening the institutional framework for decentralisation in Benin. It has 
been one of the lead donors for years in the Working Group for DLG. The EC/EU actively participates 
and contributes to the annual sector review in the field of decentralisation, and financially supports the 
FADeC/CONAFIL. Through programmes like PRODECOM and PACTE, the EC/EU has been 
strengthening the institutional framework for the management of decentralisation in Benin over the 
past 10 years. 
The programmatic support and sector budget support to local authorities which was launched in 
January 2009 aim, firstly, to accompany the municipalities and their associations and, secondly, to 
support the strengthening of local government administrations. During sector reviews, debate and 
criticism are very objective, sincere and constructive. 
In Benin, there is a very active WG group on decentralisation and good governance, which meets 
regularly to harmonize their activities and ensure compliance with the national framework for 
decentralisation. This group is one of the most operational WGs in Benin. The EC support under 
PACTE was 15 million EUR and a SBS including budgetary support of 10 million EUR for the 
realization of the development plans of the municipalities in terms of investments. The support has 
focused on: (i) a project owner which MDGLAAT and Ministry of Development, Economy and Finance 
(MDEF), (ii) support to ANCB, (iii) and with a budgetary aid to support the financing of municipal 
budgets through the national budget. All of this is closely coordinated with other donors in the WG. 
 
What have the outcomes of the EC/EU support been in terms of improved service delivery from 
local councils? 
The local government spending in Benin in 2008 totalled 3.374 FCFA per capita, against 2.530 FCFA 
in 2007, an increase of 33%. This increase was attributable to an improved level of collection of own 
resources by the municipalities from 2007 to 2008 from 16,0 to 19,1 billion FCFA (19% increase) and 
the increase in transfers of the GoB, whose share of the total general budget expenditure of the state 
increased from 1,5% to 1,9% between 2007 and 2008. The trend continued in 2009 with a budget 
transfer for investment (FADEC) of 7.436 billion FCFA against 5.436 in 2008. This has been supported 
by the EC/EU both through GBS but also especially through SBS for decentralisation.  
If we look at 2008, own resources of municipalities for recurrent costs stood at an average of 53% of 
total resources. This share increases with the size of the town, between 20% and 56% for 
municipalities with over 90.000 inhabitants. The capital, Cotonou, stands out with an own revenue 
source for recurrent costs of about 80%. The share of investment expenditure in total expenditure in 
turn decreases with the size of the municipality by 49% to 24% to an average of 33%. This shows that 
the resource poor and rural municipalities have difficulty in meeting both recurrent and investment 
needs. This is the background for the work that the EC/EU spearheads with other DPs in terms of 
securing an equitable and more demand driven transfer system through FADeC. 
The central government transfers to municipalities have increased sharply since 2006 (up 14% in 
2007, up 42% in 2008 compared to 2007). In 2008 a total of 10,3 billion CFA francs has been paid to 
the municipalities, of which 53% allocated to investment and from the FADEC. So while the service 
delivery improvements can only be called tentative at most the EC/EU has been instrumental in 
securing increased funding for LGs for key functional needs and for local investments.  
 
  
  
Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Benin; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
22 
5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: The list of people interviewed 
 
Last name First Name Organisation Designations 
Date of 
interview 
PAZOU 
Victorin 
Azehoun  
MDLGAAT/DGDGL Director 10/05-2011 
GNONLONKOU Toussaint  MDGLAAT/DGAE Director 10/05-2011 
CHABI Sébastien  MDGLAAT/DCL Director 10/05-2011 
MEDEGAN Symphorien  MDGLAAT/DPP Director 11/05-2011 
DJACOTO Victorin  CONAFIL Secretary general 11/05-2011 
Robert Tossou  CONAFIL Assistant  11/05-2011 
NANAKO Cossoba  UNCDF Programme Officer 11/05-2011 
RENAUD Pierre-Yves  PACTE Coordinator 12/05-2011 
LAHLOU Taoufik  France Governance 12/05-2011 
BADOLO Loussir  KFW Economist 12/05-2011 
SCHMITT Gérald  GTZ 
Local Governance and 
Decentralisation Expert 
12/05-2011 
TRIPPOLINI Ivar  GTZ Governance Advisor 12/05-2011 
GALLEZ Alain  Belgique Local Governance Adviser 12/05-2011 
Edinger Kristian  
Royal Danish 
Embassy 
Head of Cooperation 13/05-2011 
DEGBE Sylvain  
Royal Danish 
Embassy 
Economist 13/05-2011 
BARBE Jean  EUD 
Adviser Social and Good 
Governance 
10-13/05-2011 
DECOUX Alain  EUD Adviser Decentralisation  10-13/05-2011 
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5.2 Annex 2: The list of documents consulted  
 EU Vol 1 + 2, Evaluation Stratégie Pays Benin, Février 2005,  
 EU - Stratégie de Coopération Pays, Benin (Addendum 2003-2007) 
 EU - Stratégie de Coopération Pays, Benin 2008-2013 
 MDGLAAT - PONADEC – Politique Nationale de Décentralisation et Deconcentration – 
Document de Cadre Politique, juin 2009 
 EU – PACTE – Programme d’appui aux collectivités territoriales, MDGLAAT 
 Projet d’aide-mémoire de la revue sectorielle décentralisation, deconcentration et 
aménagement du territoire, Cotonou, 12 mai 2011 
 EU – A Review of Territorial Development, examples from the field and Good Practice for 
Donor Support, Global Report Final, HTSPE, October 2010. 
 World Bank, Revue des Dépenses Publiques Renforcer la décentralisation pour améliorer la 
fourniture de services publics, (Public Expenditure Review), in collaboration with Dutch 
Embassy, Danish Embassy, Belgium Technical Cooperation, German International 
Cooperation October 2010 
 Décentralisation au Bénin, en Afrique et ailleurs dans le monde, ADJAHO, R, Première 
édition, Cotonou, 2002. 
 Coopération décentralisée et coopération multilatérale francophone, Agence de coopération 
culturelle et technique. 
 
Laws and regulations 
 Loi n°90-032 du 11décembre 1990, portant Constitution de la République du Bénin ; 
 Loi n°97-028 du 15 janvier 1999, portant organisation de l'Administration territoriale de la 
République du Bénin ; 
 Loi n°97-029 du 15 janvier 1999, portant organisation des communes en République du Bénin 
; 
 Décret n°2005-763 du 09 décembre portant approbation de la politique nationale de 
coopération décentralisée ; 
 Décret n°2005-764 du 09 décembre 2005 portant définition et modalité de la coopération 
décentralisée en République du Bénin ; 
 Décret n° 2007-448 du 02 octobre 2007 portant attributions, organisation et fonctionnement du 
MDGLAAT. 
 
Web links visited: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/benin/benin_en.htm   
 Ministère de la Décentralisation, de la gouvernance locale, de l’administration et de 
l’aménagement du territoire: http://www.decentralisation.bj/spip.php?rubrique207  
 GTZ: http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/afrika/577.htm  
 http://www.amenagement-afrique.com/  
 Website of the PDM (Municipal Development Programme): http://www.pdm-net.org/  
 UEMOA website: http://www.uemoa.int/index.htm  
 LARES NGO: http://inco-claims.gret.org/uk/theme/index.htm   
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Table 4 Detailed list of EC-funded interventions related to decentralisation in the Country 
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry point Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid 
modality 
Main contracting 
party 
Appui a la décentralisation et 
développement local 
1999 - 2009 0,37 0,37 
EDF/1999/014-
378 
Top-down N Grant - 
Programme d'appui au démarrage 
des communes - PRODECOM 
2003 - 2007 8,15 8,15 
EDF/2002/015-
861 
Bottom-up N 
Grant to the 
GoB 
Government of 
Benin 
Programme d'appui à la 
décentralisation (PACTE) 
2006 - 2008 13,7 7,8 
EDF/2007/019-
049 
Top-down N 
Mixed of 
Grant and 
Budget 
support 
Government of 
Benin 
Projet de développement local et 
d''accompagnement au processus 
de décentralisation dans les 6 
communes du département des 
Collines (Bénin) 
2003 - 2006 0,37 0,37 
CDC/2003/005-
002 // 55442 
Bottom up L Grant EU MS (France) 
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
5.4.1 Intervention 1 
Title: Programme d'appui au démarrage des communes – PRODECOM  
Budget:  8,15 million EUR 
Start date: 2003 
Objectives and expected results 
Strengthening of local governments' capacities, increased participation of civil society in local 
development and strengthening of the role of national institutions involved in the decentralisation 
process. 
The overall objective  
The overall objective is to improve the living conditions of the population through the development of 
democratic governance at local level. 
The specific objective  
The specific objective is the establishment of local governments ("communes") that can improve the 
standard of services delivered to the population (based on a participative approach) and the 
strengthening / support of the local governments ("communes"). 
Expected results: 
1.  Management capacities of 77 municipalities ("communes") are reinforced: 
 The municipalities carry out their various tasks for the administrative, financial and technical 
management, particularly in developing and managing budgets, development plans and 
project ownership, 
 The officials of the municipalities have the capabilities to perform their tasks and provide a 
minimum service to the people, 
 The municipalities mobilize growing local financial resources, 
 The municipalities engage collaboration within and between the municipalities. 
2.  The participation of civil society in the development process at local level is effective: 
 People understand the decentralisation reform and are involved in the life of their community; 
 Organizations of civil society and the private sector become partners of municipalities and 
local development partners; 
3.  The institutions in charge of decentralisation have enhanced their capacity to perform 
their respective tasks 
 The bodies in charge of decentralisation complete the strategic regulatory and technical 
framework and ensures its steering role of decentralisation; 
 The House of Local Governments performs its tasks of training and advisory support of 
municipalities; 
 The 12 "prefectures" ensure their support and advisory role within the municipalities; 
 A structured communication is taking place between the central institutions that are 
responsible for decentralisation and the municipalities. 
Activities: 
The activities of the programme have put in place an institutional support to the service of the 
municipalities: 
 A technical assistance to the 77 municipalities2 
                                                     
2
 in the form of mobile support teams to local municipalities intended to bring them in situ the information that they 
need, a basic training within the action, advices and answers to problems that they find in their start-up 
(organization, procedures, methods, system management, definition of the rules, implementation of minimum 
services, etc.) on the basis of their specific needs or those identified by the authority and by institutions 
responsible for guiding the reform. This same assistance will also be charged to facilitate links between 
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 A specific technical expertise (engineers, architects, planners, industry experts, social 
activists, etc.) at the request of the municipalities in response to their needs; 
 Actions of technical training for government staff and elected municipals. These actions will 
be defined with the House of Local Governments on the basis of needs identified by the 
EMAC3 and implemented notably with the support of the Municipal Development Programme 
(MDP) and the “Ecole Nationale d 'Administration” (ENA); 
 Communication activities. The priority actions will also support the municipalities in their 
own communication activities; 
 Specific studies: this component is to conduct studies firstly in order to support the "Mission 
of decentralisation" in its responsibilities for controlling the reform (establishing the modalities 
of transfer of jurisdiction, the terms of alignment of sectoral policies, reorganization of the 
decentralisation of services and redefining the roles of central government, etc.) and the 
House of Local Government to prepare its training modules; in addition, in order to prepare 
pedagogic information tool (development and dissemination of technical guides, systems 
management common procedures and modalities of the project owner , etc..); 
 Assessments and audits. 
5.4.2 Intervention 2 
Title: PACTE - Programme d'appui à la décentralisation 
Budget: 13,7 million EUR 
Start date: 2008 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objectives:  
 Improving conditions of social and economic life of people in a context of democratic 
governance at local level 
Specific objectives: 
 Initial support to accountability of actors 
 Provision of user services, mobilization of resources by the municipalities and new 
opportunities for citizen participation to ensure their viability and their mission to facilitate local 
development within an appropriate institutional environment  
 Establishment of a project management unit located with the National Association of 
Municipalities of Benin (ANMB), which will be responsible for:  
 Conducting of all the activities necessary to the achievement of result 1 
 Monitoring and evaluation of the system of municipal funding as a driver of 
achievement of the result 2 in the context of sector budget support to the 
decentralisation  / devolution 
 Support of services and supervision of local authorities 
Expected results:  
1. Strengthened municipalities' capacities and promotion of local development through ANCB 
which is mandated to bring their local services and participate in their name in the dialogue on 
national policies.  
2. The institutions in charge of piloting the implementation and supervision of local authorities 
improve the performance of their duties in the perspective of development administration. 
3. Accompanying the budget support, the national control system of funding provided to the 
municipalities is monitored and evaluated 
4. Strengthening of capacities to support the decentralisation of both local governments and 
national oversight bodies 
5. The DGAT provides a monitoring and evaluation system of the implementation. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
municipalities and their local (civil society and private sector), partners regional (decentralised services and other 
municipalities of the state) and national (state) partners and to bring back to the relevant central institutions (R, 
MCL, Ministries of Finance and Decentralisation and Prefectures) the data that are necessary to perform their 
respective functions 
3
 Equipes Mobiles d'Appui aux Communes 
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Activities: 
1. Compile and analyze the needs of ANMB and of the municipalities in relation to their strategic 
visions of their development, testing and implementation of their PDC, in relation to their 
institutional capacity (to audit), and develop plans for strengthening their capacities 
2. Develop a system of collection, analysis, access and dissemination of information on issues of 
common interests, experiences, tools, methodologies, available national expertise, regulation, 
etc.; 
3. Develop activities of capacity building and advisory support: training and coaching, expert 
point, study missions, development of methodological tools, etc.; 
4. Pooling of collective actions and inter-municipal support particularly through the harmonization 
and dissemination of methodological tools, the organization of common services, the 
promotion of initiatives of local authorities, etc.; 
5. Improve communication between the association and its members through meetings, 
dissemination of information materials, the promotion of relations of cooperation and 
coordination with departmental associations of municipalities that will also receive support, 
etc. 
6. Strengthen the communication compared to the communal reality against other national, 
regional and international actors 
7. Defend the interests of local governments with public authorities by promoting the participation 
if the ANCB in national areas of cooperation and by facilitating their participation in national 
policy dialogues. 
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
(Source: EUD Note on Decentralisation and Development in Benin) 
5.5.1 Economic and social and poverty analysis  
Benin is a low-income country, in terms of human development index, it ranks 161st in the ranking of 
182, according to the UNDP Human Development Report 2009.  
The majority of the workforce is employed by the primary sector (agriculture) and tertiary (commerce 
and industry). In 2009, the sector contributes 53% of GDP, the primary sector for 34% and 13% for 
secondary sector. The service sector remains heavily dependent on re-export to Nigeria, the operation 
of the autonomous port of Cotonou and telecommunications activities. The primary sector, in addition 
to food crops, is mainly based on cotton the main source of export.  
Annual growth in GDP rose from 2.9% in 2005 to 5.0% in 2008. This growth slowed in 2009 (3.1%) 
following the global crisis. These advances are likely to be hampered by population growth, estimated 
at over 3% per year. It is estimated, in this context, a growth of at least 7% would allow a significant 
and sustainable reduction of poverty.  
The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis has estimated that in 2007 one third of the 
population lived below the poverty line and is concentrated in rural areas. This finding highlights the 
need for a spatial approach of the European Community aid by supporting the national policy of 
decentralisation and devolution.  
5.5.2 National Policy Development  
Benin has a strategic framework for development and the fight against poverty, organized into three 
levels: [i] a national strategy for long-term "National Studies in Long Term Perspective, Alafia Benin 
2025" that "Benin is in 2025, a beacon, a country well governed, united and at peace, prosperous and 
competitive economy, cultural influence and social welfare "[ii]" Strategic Development of Benin from 
2006 to 2011 "which define medium-term basis for reviving the economy and the fundamentals for 
moving towards an Emerging Benin, [iii] a "Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction 2007-2009" 
(SCRP), which provides the framework Short-term fight against poverty.  
These documents provide the framework for the sectors in defining their policies.  
5.5.3 Sectoral context of decentralisation and deconcentration: Policies and Challenges  
Decentralisation has effectively been implemented in Benin since the municipal (commune) elections 
took place followed by the installation of Mayors in all municipalities in 2003. The expectations 
concerning this institutional reform are considerable and extend far beyond a simple administrative 
reorganisation of the various levels of government. Decentralisation aims to promote local democracy, 
strengthening and deepening. Participation of citizens in governance should promote grassroots 
development and its adaptation to local realities. Finally, decentralisation offers the opportunity to 
respond to the profound needs of the population in social justice and equity and reduce poverty by 
sharing the fruits of growth. 
While reform has been slow to establish effective and well-capacitated local governments, the focus 
from donor and government sides has instead been on the separation of powers, the proper operation 
of the public services, including elected bodies and the conduct of transparent electoral process, 
essential for the legitimacy of elected bodies. On the other hand a small, and until now rather weak 
civil society in Benin, has had the tendency to focus on democratic practices, information sharing, 
dialogue, debate and open goals, collective decision making, clarity in data reporting by delegates and 
officials, management transparency and the fight against corruption. The application by the 
municipality of this approach implies that the elected officials (mayor and council) are listening to civil 
society and different sectors of the population, they cultivate a dialogue with them, inform them 
outstanding issues and decisions and they clearly explain to people the decisions taken and their 
justification. 
The development of the decentralisation laws was made in conjunction with the restructuring of 
political parties. At first, these parties have played an adverse role in exacerbating fears of a 
withdrawal of the state, focusing their interest on a number of issues such as territorial division, with 
the emergence of competition between community leaders for the appointment of new chief towns 
departments. 
At the same time, financial and technical partners encouraged the implementation of decentralisation 
in estimating the urgent and indispensable. Several concerns related to good governance, local 
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democracy and the fight against corruption coincided with the objectives of decentralisation. They 
reasoned that there would be less risk of abuse if the funds were managed as close as beneficiaries. 
By the early 1990s, several NGOs and projects active in the field of development have introduced new 
forms of action in the spirit of the forthcoming reform. This includes participatory planning by the 
transfer of project management to lower levels, and future communication strategies and information 
on the process of decentralisation. The Constitution stipulates "the territorial self-governing through 
elected councils and under the conditions laid down by law" (Articles 98 and 150 to 153). This was 
accompanied by the establishment by the Minister in charge of decentralisation, an interdepartmental 
committee to develop the monitoring draft laws on decentralisation. 
The articles of the Constitution (1996) which create local governments and the decentralisation laws 
seek to clarify the relations of power, functions and responsibilities in the management of the city 
between the central state, its various components and decentralized municipal structures from 
decentralisation. Law 97-029 clearly defines the scope of local powers to enable them to properly 
secure their autonomy, their skills and compare them to the regulator and the central state (see 
Chapter 5). The town is the institutional framework for the exercise of grassroots democracy and the 
achievement of development activities. Benin has a sectoral policy, the subject of this support: the 
PONADEC.  
The 77 communes of Benin are the only level of decentralisation of the country. Based on the 
observation of a lack of articulation between decentralisation and deconcentration on the one hand 
and between land reform and government reform on the other hand, the Government of Benin has 
prepared a national policy of decentralisation and deconcentration (PONADEC) and was adopted 
October 19, 2009. This national policy is:  
 [i] a balanced planning and balanced, incorporating the entire country to achieve sustainable 
and equitable development,  
 [ii] a good territorial governance by an administration modernized and efficient and  
 [iii] the reduction Level of poverty by improving access to basic services and enhancing 
economic potential of Commons.  
The PONADEC was budgeted and has a financial tool to transfer to municipalities.  
The PONADEC for 2008-2013 has a financial tool (the Fund for Support to Development of Commons 
FADEC) and an Action Plan (PAP) decreased by shutters. The overall cost of implementing the 
PONADEC is estimated at EUR 24 million (CFA 16.4 billion). At that cost, plus the matching forecasts 
FADEC EUR 80 million (55.5 billion FCFA between 2008 and 2013) and amounts allocated FADEC 
amounting in 2010.  
5.5.4 Coordination of external support to the decentralisation / devolution in Benin  
Coordination between actors is facilitated by their alignment around the PONADEC under the 
leadership of the ministry in charge of decentralisation. The Government and the broad participation of 
key development partners present in Benin characterize the political dialogue between the central 
Government, local authorities and development partners in Benin. This dialogue allows for monitoring 
sectoral progress achieved. It revolves around the Technical Working Group on 
Decentralisation/Devolution/Regional Planning, which meets every two months and the Ministry in 
charge facilitates the process by conducting the annual joint review between the Government and the 
donors.  
The main donors involved in decentralisation in Benin are concentrated geographically in certain 
departments: Atacora / Donga for Germany; Mono / Couffo and Atacora / Donga for Belgium; Borgou 
and some municipalities in Alibori by UNCDF; Zou / Collines for Greater Cotonou by France (AFD). 
The Ouémé / Plateau and the municipalities of the Atlantic who are not part of Greater Cotonou are 
not specifically supported. Just as projects to support decentralisation of the 8
th
 and 9
th
 EDF, this 
project does not target specific region and thus may complement other donor-supported municipalities 
not covered.  
The EUD has since the 8
th
 EDF been active in the area of local development. The project support to 
local authorities of the 8th EDF (PRODECOM) had prepared the decentralisation process by 
supporting the programming municipal (communal development plans: PDC). Project 9 th EDF one 
hand, strengthened the capacity of municipalities to implement their PDC (project component) and 
partly supported (by untargeted sector budget support) the Government in its implementation process 
decentralisation / devolution. Besides the 9 th EDF PACTE programme, several donors currently 
support the decentralisation and deconcentration in Benin.  
  
Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Benin; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
30 
Belgium, through its Program to support the implementation of Communal Development Plans 
(PAPDC) in Atacora / Donga and Mono / Couffo subsidizes municipalities to help them realize the 
works and planned investments in their communal development plan. The PAPDC has a municipal 
development fund for the implementation of priority investments included in the municipal 
development plans (EUR 7.5 million), a fund for capacity building (EUR 1,5 million) and an initiative 
fund the project to support capacity building activities not covered by the municipalities (EUR 500 
000).  
Germany, through its Programme to Support Decentralisation and Local Development (DTCA) 
involves interventions at national and local levels in Atacora and Donga. The DTCA is organized 
around several axes (fiscal decentralisation, support for the operationalisation of the FADEC and 
CONAFIL, administrative decentralisation, support for ANCB with DED technical assistance, training 
support and resource management Human Rural Energy). Between 2010 and 2012, a EUR 4 million 
is foreseen for capacity building activities, combined EUR 16.7 million for the rural energy sector. KfW 
is currently considering whether to include sector budget support.  
Denmark continues to support decentralisation and plans to support municipal investments through a 
matching FADEC (3.2 million EUR are planned in that capacity for the period 2010-2012). Over the 
same period, an amount of 1.1 million EUR will be dedicated to strengthening human capacity in 
municipalities.  
France and the World Bank intervene in urban municipalities. Their actions are focused on investment 
and urban management.  
Many municipalities have twinning arrangements especially with French municipalities.  
UNCDF (Capital Development Fund United Nations) has reserved USD 2.6 million over the period 
2010-2012 in the form of financial support to the FADEC. Additional support of USD 1.5 million is 
allocated to strengthening the capacities of actors in the process of decentralisation and 
deconcentration.  
Switzerland between 2010 and 2012 provided $ 1.9 million EUR, of which will be implemented in the 
form of budget support through the FADEC. The complement consists of a support administered in 
draft form.  
Several levels of coordination are in place in Benin, in:  
 European Union (Ambassadors of five Member States present in Benin and Head of EU 
Delegation)  
 Heads of Mission of cooperation, bilateral and multilateral agencies, development partners 
and government representatives in the Technical Working Groups.  
 The activity of technical working groups is essential for donor coordination and alignment of 
external support to national sectoral priorities. This dialogue will materialize during sector 
reviews (which were usually held during the 1
st
 half) and the joint review of the SCRP between 
the Government and donors (in June). In the case of sectoral support in the subject, it is 
anticipated that coordination takes place at two levels:  
 with the 10th EDF Programme of support to the Public Finance Management,  
 with all donors grouped in the Technical Group or Decentralisation in Groups covering 
technical skills communal.  
After exercising diagnosis PEFA 2007, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has developed an action 
plan for improving management of public finances. In March 2009, the Government adopted the plan 
covering the period 2009-2013. It will cost about 52 million EUR (of which half is funded by the 
General Budget of the State).  
The European Commission has provided with additional support from the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Belgium (through transfer agreements 3) Operational Support in 2010 that Reform Management Unit 
which members were recruited will manage this process. This program aims to strengthen public 
financial management throughout the chain of public expenditure.  
Germany has prepared during the 1
st
 quarter of 2010 a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
technical and financial partners of the FADEC on the harmonization of financing and technical 
assistance measures. Besides Germany, Belgium, Denmark and UNCDF consider signing this 
agreement, which provides both a list of criteria for financing of the FADEC and secondly a framework 
for harmonization of technical assistance activities related to the FADEC. The European Commission 
does not support targeted FADEC and therefore cannot accede to this Protocol. However, this project 
will be part of harmonization of technical assistance to the FADEC, and open for support also by non-
signatories.  
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5.5.5 Human Resource Management  
Benin has already an institutional framework for advisory assistance to municipalities. It also prepares 
the revision of the Statute of the Public Service (to include employees of local authorities) and the 
creation of a permanent tool for unifying and strengthening the capacities of local authorities (Centre 
for Training Administration Local Cefalà).  
Based on the recommendation of the Supreme Court to bring the statutes of the state officials (central 
level) and municipal officials, a joint committee (Government and staff representatives) has finalized 
amendments to the Statute and intended to convey the project to the Government for transmission to 
the Supreme Court and then to the National Assembly.  
In December 2008, the Government has adopted the principle of creation of the Training Centre for 
Local Government (Cefalà). The Cefali will be responsible for the training of B and C of the local 
authorities and local politicians.  
Monitoring and evaluation  
The PONADEC itself was equipped with a control system. Benin has since 2008 a system of 
indicators to measure sector performance.  
The PONADEC provides a Steering Committee, chaired by the Ministry in charge of decentralisation 
and composed of the Ministry in charge of administrative reform, the Ministry of Development, Ministry 
of Labour and Public Service, the Ministry in charge of relations with institutions and the National 
Association of Municipalities of Benin (ANCB). The CONAFIL is a joint state / local government 
commission responsible for managing and monitoring specific FADEC.  
Since 2008, Benin has a sectoral information system that gives rise each year, at the sectoral review 
of decentralisation, a measure of performance based on indicators whose targets (at least for a subset 
of indicators) are validated in the matrix of indicators for joint budget support to the implementation of 
the PRSP.  
5.5.6 Macroeconomic Management  
Following the government's commitments to ensure better fiscal discipline, the macroeconomic 
framework remains oriented towards stability.  
The latest agreement between Benin and the IMF under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) expired August 4, 2009. The year 2009 has witnessed an alarming deterioration of the 
macroeconomic framework characterized by an increase in off-budget spending, deferrals massive 
budget and an increase in failure to control the wage bill. Declining fiscal resources and the global 
financial crisis has cut funding requirements of the Government.  
Following the government's commitment to redress the budget situation, which led to overruns in 
2009, and progress in implementing necessary structural reforms, 14 June 2010, the IMF granted to 
Benin from its Facility Extended credit. IMF calls on national authorities to continue to execute their 
program of structural reforms and prudent macroeconomic policies (which implies in particular to 
contain the growth of payroll). The IMF program also includes important elements in improving the 
management of public finances.  
Budgetary support from development partners, sectoral and global, the V-Flex CE, offer the 
opportunity, if the Government keeps its commitments to bridge the financing gap of State Budget, 
estimated by the IMF in 2010 to 50 billion FCFA (about 76 million EUR).  
5.5.7 Financial Administration  
Although subject to many challenges, management of public finances has a framework for improving 
shared and supported by the donor community  
Benin is confronted with a number of challenges for public finance management, the principal 
residents of the low rate of implementation of the General Budget of the State.  
Following the PEFA assessment conducted in 2007, an action plan for improving the system of public 
financial management was developed and its implementation begins to start. As part of its project to 
support the 10th EDF for the reform of public finances, the European Commission supports the 
implementation of this comprehensive reform, together with Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
participates in policy dialogue and to monitoring the implementation of this plan through joint reviews 
of General Budget Support (GBS). The eligibility criterion relating to the management of public 
finances is the same for this budget support (SBS) for GBS. This program will cover both in its 
dimension in the budgetary support component of the project, specifically its local dimensions through 
the sector review and policy dialogue.  
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In terms of local public finance, the control system of transfers to municipalities is now in place. The 
Finance Act 2010 has provided a local development tax that will be renovated an essential tool for 
strengthening the financial autonomy and accountability between administration and municipal 
administration. Significantly, the willingness of the central government has resulted in an increase of 
about 20% between 2006 and 2009 local government spending per capita (from 2900 to 4700 FCFA). 
The first reason for this development lies in the development of transfers to municipalities, transfers 
controlled by the FADEC. In 2010, allocations for the FADEC unallocated amount to 15 million and 
EUR 8 million EUR for the FADEC sectoral allocations.  
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5.6 Annex 6: Key Aspects of 10th EDF  
The partnership between the EU and Benin is dynamic and has strengthened over time and it revolves 
around a political dialogue and development activities.  
5.6.1 Political dialogue 
The dialogue between EUD and EU Member States represented in Benin and the Government is 
intense. This dialogue takes place within the framework of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, on the 
initiative of the Government or a partner, or finally in the framework of sectoral dialogues.  
In 2009, EPA4 negotiations have continued. It was noted significant progress in the field of fishery 
products with a mission of the Veterinary Office European Commission has proposed to allow exports 
of Benin (mainly shrimp), while by monitoring the Action Plan developed by the Competent Authority 
(Directorate of Fisheries) and approved by the Veterinary Office.  
Finally, the Commission, such as community development partners are engaged in a fruitful dialogue 
sectoral policy embodied by the meeting of technical groups, keeping the sector reviews and a general 
review of the status of the SCRP contribution to the development of the new SCRP.  
5.6.2 Cooperation measures  
The contribution of the European Union in the fight against poverty in Benin within the framework of 
the SCRP5 through the 9th and 10th EDF focuses on strengthening governance, infrastructure 
development and acceleration of growth by budget support. Outside these areas of concentration, the 
EC/EU supports civil society, the fight against child trafficking, the private sector and the environment.  
The 9th EDF has more than 205 billion CFA francs (313 million EUR) has to date been fully 
committed.  
The 10th EDF with 219 billion CFA francs (334 million EUR) is running.  
The shares outstanding following are underway:  
 In the infrastructure sector include the continued development work of the Exit Northwest 
Cotonou (26 billion CFA francs - 40 million EUR), preparation of road works Béroubouay-
Parakou (41 billion CFA francs - 63 million EUR), continued cleanup of flooded 
neighbourhoods west of Cotonou (18 billion CFA francs - 27 million EUR) and support the 
Road Fund.  
 In the area of governance, the 9
th
 EDF has accompanied the rehabilitation of 8 Courts of First 
Instance, the construction of two Courts of Appeal and two new Courts of First Instance. 
Besides these facilities, the Support Project Integrated Programme for Strengthening legal 
and judicial systems with 8 billion CFA francs (12 million EUR) has supported the 
modernization and computerization of criminal and civil chains. This support will continue 
through the 10th EDF favouring the development of a sectoral approach to empowering the 
sector, 16 billion CFA francs (25 million EUR) have been provided for this purpose.  
 In the area of decentralisation and local development, the European Commission together 
with Benin in its process of decentralisation through the PACT Program for an amount of 10 
billion CFA francs (15 million EUR) on the 9
th
 EDF support focused 30 billion CFA francs (45 
million EUR) under the 10th EDF.  
The Commission supports the preparation of LEPI for $ 4.6 billion FCFA (7 EUR million) through a 
common basket supplied by the Government and a number of development partners.  
The EC/EU continues to support the Government of Benin in the implementation of the SCRP through 
the budget support coupled with a strengthening of public financial management. In 2009, an amount 
of 36 billion CFA francs (55 million EUR) was paid to Benin under budget support. 
 
                                                     
4
 Economic Partnership Agreement. 
5
 Stratégie de Croissance pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons and to provide recommendations to help 
for opportune and timely support to decentralisation processes; it shall cover aid delivery over the 
period 2000-2009 taking into account the different entry points used by the EC/EU to delivery its 
support to decentralisation processes. This evaluation is partly based on a number of country missions 
to be carried out during the field phase.1 
The field visit to Honduras had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. By no means, this note should be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered at the single country level, as they are 
formulated to be answered on the global level using the whole information collected from the desk 
study and the different field phase country studies. 
The reasons for selecting Honduras as one of the field studies were: 
 A large EC/EU support programme with a budget of 34 mEUR, 
 Top down entry point for decentralisation reform, 
 Sector budget support for decentralisation, 
 A country with frequent policy changes to decentralisation during the programme period and a 
coup d’état in June 2009, 
 Geographical specificities (Central America). 
The field visit was carried out from 5 to 13 June 2011. The evaluation team was composed of Philip 
Bottern (team leader) and Marco A. Aguero (national consultant). 
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research foci 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Honduras has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
1. How has the sector budget support (SBS) to decentralisation worked with the aim to support 
the national decentralisation programme PRODDEL? Does the SBS modality give the EU the 
necessary flexibility to encourage the inclusion and adjustment towards specific EC/EU 
priorities?  
2. Has the choice of EC/EU support to decentralisation been coherent with other EC/EU sector 
support programmes in Honduras?  
3. What have the results of the EC/EU support been in terms of improved service delivery from 
local governments and capacity of key government institutions? 
4. Has the SBS to decentralisation been effective in a set up with changes in the Government of 
Honduras (GoH) support to decentralisation?  
Based on the above, the following working hypotheses have been made for the field visit to Honduras:  
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
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1.2.2 Working hypotheses  
The following working hypotheses have been developed in the desk phase, which will be attempted to 
be validated, nuanced or rejected during the field phase:  
With the choice of a SBS modality, the EC/EU has limited influence on how the funding is spent by the 
national government once the funds are released from the EC/EU. On the other hand the SBS gives 
the recipient country increased flexibility to adjust to needs and actual priorities. This has resulted in 
the formulation of two hypotheses: 
1. The SBS modality will result in EC/EU having little influence on how the funds are spent in the 
national budget, 
2. Budget support is an efficient way to give flexible support and adjust to changing national 
policies. 
During a decentralisation process, government programmes supported by development partner must 
be adequately coordinated with the development in decentralisation – in particular delegation of 
functions to municipalities and the fiscal decentralisation process.  
A third hypothesis to be tested in the field is:  
3. The EC/EU has established adequate procedures to coordinate programmes with support to 
specific sectors with its support to decentralisation.   
1.2.3 Data collection methods used 
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
development partners, as well as the overall decentralisation process in Honduras.    
During the field phase, the team, in addition to continued document review, also interviewed key staff 
in ministries and development partners with relevant and extensive knowledge of decentralisation in 
Honduras including NGOs and individual researchers.  
Some interviews were carried out as focus group meetings, but the preferred approach was individual 
in-depth interviews focused on the relevant EQs and the working hypotheses. A list of people met can 
be found in Annex 1. The information deemed of critical importance was subjected to a process of 
triangulation to ensure validity and internal consistency.  
Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field phase, prioritisation was necessary 
and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ reviews/ monitoring missions that had 
already been undertaken. The team relied extensively on the related reports and the LC’s knowledge 
about decentralisation in Honduras attempting to extract more general findings, trends and recurring 
themes that are of relevance to a broader audience. The dialogue also centred around distilling 
broader lessons and themes, rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. To 
reiterate, this country note is thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of the 
overall portfolio of the EC/EU. Rather it is an attempt to learn from the Honduras experience and to 
encourage wider reflections on how best to structure and focus EC/EU assistance to decentralisation 
processes. 
As a new government started in Honduras in 2010, it has been a special challenge to meet people in 
ministries with particular knowledge of the PROADES and the implementation of other programmes 
with the EC/EU2 or other development partners.  
Statistics: Getting reliable updated statistics in Honduras is difficult as time series are not updated 
regularly and surveys are not carried out as planned. Furthermore some functionaries in the ministries 
and public institutions visited were reluctant to provide information and data from before 2010, when 
the present government started.  
 
                                                     
2
 During all interviews with public sector staff or politicians their answers were quickly directed towards the new 
strategy of the government (from 2010) and likely achievements within decentralisation in the future. Likewise 
some requests for data during the evaluation period resulted in provision of data from 2010 and 2011.  
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2 Short description of the country context and EC/EU support to 
decentralisation 
2.1 Short description of the decentralisation process in the country  
Summary of the concept of decentralisation in Honduras 
The concept of decentralisation adopted by Honduras is the transfer of competences from central to 
regional or local levels. The transfer is made under the principles of subsidiarity and graduality, within 
a legal framework, which facilitates the process. Six major themes exist in the decentralisation process 
in Honduras: a) strengthening the institutional and policy framework (modernization of the state), b) 
decentralisation of public services, c) fiscal decentralisation, d) municipal strengthening e) the land 
management and f) transparency and citizen participation.  
Modernisation of the State and the Law of Municipalities (Ley de Municipios) 
The decentralisation process in Honduras commenced within the process of modernisation of the 
State in the 1990's with a series of reforms, accompanied by the adoption of the Law of Municipalities 
(Ley de Municipios, 1991) and the Modernisation of the State Act, which establishment the 
Presidential Commission for State Modernization. It brought reforms within administrative, legislative 
and judicial elements as well as reforms that strengthened the electoral organisation. The Programme 
for De-bureaucratisation was also created, and the status of the Comptroller General of the Republic 
changed to the Court of Accounts (Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, TSC). In this process the national 
program for municipal decentralisation was also born, later called the National Programme for 
Decentralisation and Local Development (PRODDEL) for the purpose of promoting the development 
of municipalities’ independence and autonomy from the central government. 
Decentralisation in Honduras during the last decade 
The decentralisation process in Honduras over the past decade can be divided into three stages: a) 
Momentum of the decentralisation process and strengthening the institutional framework (2001-2005), 
b) Stagnation of the decentralisation process (2006-2009) c) Reactivation of the decentralisation 
process (from 2010). 
Decentralisation of public services in Honduras do not respond to a policy or strategy of the GoH, but 
rather to pilot initiatives supported by development partners in several parts of the country. Some of 
these initiatives have achieved very good results, such as water and health, and it is unlikely that 
these models would be reversed. Other experiences show uneven development progress from region 
to region and subsequent setbacks such as the area of environmental management. 
According to the amendment to the Law of Municipalities (2009) and in the framework of the national 
Pact for Decentralisation, between the Government and the Association of Municipalities of Honduras 
(AMHON) it is agreed to increase budget revenue transfer to municipalities from 5% 2009, 8% 2011 
and finally to 11% by 2013 to assure the development in the fiscal part of the decentralisation process. 
Municipal Strengthening in the context of decentralisation and local development 
The good coordination between the government and its cooperation partners resulted in the design 
and approval of the National Training and Technical Assistance for the Municipalities. The aim of the 
policy is to provide more efficient services from the central government to local governments or local 
organisations.  
The Law of the Municipal Administrative Career (Ley de la Carrera Administrativa Municipal) has been 
adopted recently (2010), supported by the development partners and AMHON. The law is expected to 
generate sustainable actions at the municipal level, ensuring that the normal high staff turnover during 
the transitional period after elections (every fourth year) will be avoided. Another intention with the law 
is that management of the human resources in the municipalities will be to professionalised.  
Inter-institutional Coordination in Decentralisation Process 
The monitoring of the national program for decentralisation and local development (PRODDEL), and 
the coordination of the various actors, who interact with the national and local level, has gradually 
strengthened the Executive Commission for State Decentralisation (CEDE) and recently the 
Decentralisation Forum (FTD) with participations of GoH, AMHON, civil society and development 
partners. However, the country's political problems and the lack of a plan to enhance the roles of 
CEDE, TFD and the Technical Unit of Decentralisation in SEIP, which are not institutionalized 
sufficiently in the government structure with limited management capacity, are elements that hinder 
the sustainability of the efforts and achievements in the process, creating a gap in the continuity and 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Honduras; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
4 
systematization of results, and promoting dispersal or atomization of the management of information 
for the decentralisation process. 
2.2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions  
The evaluation team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in Honduras through a 
number of interventions. The table below summarises the major EC/EU-funded interventions 
considered in the analysis. 
Table 1 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision Nr. 
Comment 
Programa de apoyo a la 
descentralización en Honduras 
(PROADES) 
33,65 ALA/2004/016-807 
The financial agreement was 
signed in February 2005. Only 
18,4 mEUR has been released 
up to November 2010. An 
addendum has been signed in 
2011 up to 2013 for the 
remaining funds.   
Projects financed from programme for 
non state actors and local authorities 
(NSA-LA)  
  
The EUD in Honduras has not 
been able to provide details on 
the projects. Apparently 6 
projects exist with LGs as 
implementers.  
Reducción de la pobreza y desarrollo 
sostenible con equidad en 2 municipios 
del Occidente de Honduras 
0,26 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2009/021-
105 
 
Note: A more detailed list is provided in Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs  
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national 
stakeholders in partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international 
donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 1.3.1 
Officials from the Ministry of Interior and Population (Secretaria de Interior y Population, SEIP) were 
not aware of any EC/EU policy on decentralisation e.g. during the negotiation in 2010 about a 
continuation of the Support to Decentralisation Programme (Programa de Apoyo a la 
Descentralizacion - PROADES).  
A few persons from SEIP also recalled that during the formulation of PROADES in 2004 no specific 
policies of the EC/EU for decentralisation was discussed rather the PROADES was formulated to 
support the national decentralisation programme (PRODDEL) in a Sector Budget Support (SBS) 
Modality.    
Ind 1.3.2 
The development partners met were not aware of a specific EC/EU policy for decentralisation. Some 
(BID, WB) see however the EC/EU taking an active role in decentralisation in the present situation 
with the formulation of the new Government of Honduras policy but also in e.g. 2003 and 2004 during 
the formulation of the national programme for decentralisation PRODDEL.  
Ind 1.3.2 
According to the Delegation of the EU (EUD) in Honduras the reference document on decentralisation 
from 2007 has been consulted during the recent considerations (2009 and 2010) to prolong the 
PROADES up to the end of 2013. The staff see however the document as very general without 
specific guidelines for interventions in decentralisation and in particular in a SBS modality.  
The EUD needs guidance for a particular challenge i.e. to define indicators for decentralisation as 
conditions for releases of tranches for the PROADES during a prolongation. The EC/EU framework for 
decentralisation has not been supportive for the formulation of indicators.  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Honduras; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
6 
 
3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing 
with sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) 
or disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.1.1 
Some flexibility exists in EC/EU procedures with possibility for quick responses to national need and 
also to select the relevant partner but for selection of support modality the HQ prefers the SBS 
modality.  
This preference for SBS resulted in less flexibility in 2004 when the EUD supported by a consultancy 
formulated the Decentralisation Support Programme (PROADES) to support the national 
decentralisation programme (PRODDEL). The EUD and the consultants suggested (in coherence with 
the national partner government) a modified SBS modality linked up to certain sub-sectors within in 
decentralisation, but this was changed by the EC/EU Headquarters to a normal budget support 
modality for decentralisation.  
In 2010 when an opportunity to prolong PROADES was seen by the EUD and an addendum to the 
financial agreement from 2005 was signed with the GoH again a sector budget support (SBS) modality 
to decentralisation was chosen.  
Ind 2.1.2 
No formal procedures exist within the EUD for coordination of sector programmes with 
decentralisation. It is done informally between the staff members at occasional meetings or staff 
meetings.   
Ind 2.1.3 
In the EUD, one person is responsible for decentralisation. This is his primary responsibility and 
approximately 10-20% of the working time is dedicated to this. No working group exists for 
decentralisation in the EUD.  
Ind 2.1.4 
No incentives or des-incentives exist for risk taking with in decentralisation. There seem however to be 
a certain incentive for modalities with quick disbursements, which often is the SBS or GBS modalities.  
3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of 
decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.2.1 
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One person in the delegation works with decentralisation and limited time (10%-20%) is dedicated to 
this. Staff in the EUD expresses that it is difficult to get adequate support from the EC/EU HQ. The 
EUD has recently communicated with the EU HQ on decentralisation approaches via personal 
contacts about the prolongation of PROADES – but the HQ has not been able to guide the EUD on 
new and better indicators for the development in decentralisation in Honduras3.  
Ind 2.2.2 
The responsible person has achieved knowledge about decentralisation during the 4-5 years he has 
been in charge of decentralisation in the EUD. Other development partners expressed the risk of the 
EUD losing the capacity for decentralisation, when the person in charge with decentralisation leaves 
the EUD.   
Ind 2.2.3 
An event was arranged in Brussels in June 2009 for EUD staff with responsibilities for 
decentralisation. The EUD in Honduras could however not participate at the event due to the Coup in 
Honduras during the same month and the necessity to redefine activities. 
3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) 
or systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, 
issues papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote 
the effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.3.1  
The EC/EU and GoH agreed on 5 indicators for the fixed tranches for PROADES and 9 indicators to 
calculate the release of the flexible tranches. The indicators are presented below (se details on the 
calculations of the 9 indicators for the flexible tranches in annex 8): 
Table 2 Indicators for PROADES 
Indicator 
number 
Indicators for fixed trances (14 mEUR) Indicators for flexible tranches (18mEUR) 
1 Positive Evaluation by the EU of the macro-
economic, tax and budgetary environment in 
Honduras 
GOH expenditures on salaries relative to 
GNP 
2 Establishment of indicators and base line for 
monitoring the improvement in PFM 
The development partners view on the 
execution of the national PRSP    
3 Positive appreciation by the “Foro Tripartito de 
Descentralizacion” of the implementation of 
PRODDEL  
Share of municipalities with a development 
plans with focus on territorial organization 
4 The Foro Tripartito de Descentralizacion 
(Decentralisation Forum) is functioning permanently 
in order to establish a dialogue between GoH, civil 
society and development partners 
Share of municipalities with a social audit 
carried out 
5 Establishment of a base line with the budget lines 
corresponding to the principal activities of PRODDEL 
with a 3 years projection considering two scenarios, 
with and without PRODDEL. The differences 
between the two would demonstrate a value added  
Positive view of CE for advances in public 
financial management 
6  Timely presentation of PRODDEL annual 
                                                     
3
 After the consultant’s field visit in June 2011 negotiation has continued between the EUD and the GoH on new 
and better indicators for the SBS with some support from the HQ. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Honduras; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
8 
work plan 
7  The increase in local governments’ revenue 
collection 
8  Share of municipalities audited by TSC 
9  GoH presentation of M&E for development 
in decentralization 
Source: EUD  
As can be seen the indicators do not focus on the results (outputs or outcomes) of decentralisation. 
For the fixed tranches they deal with macro-economic and tax performance, the functioning of the 
Decentralisation Forum and about setting up a rather advanced system for measuring PROADES’ 
value added. The indicators for the flexible tranche are too many, not focused on decentralisation and 
oriented toward processes e.g. existence of municipal development plans and social municipal audits 
and subjective views on PRODDEL’s annual work plans and the execution of the national PRSP4.  
For the fixed tranches the first and second were released, while the third and fourth were cancelled 
due to the macro-economic situation (indicator 1), while the variable tranches were released partly: 
Table 3 Releases from PROADES 
Tranches Budget 
mEUR 
Real mEUR 
Fixed tranche 1 4,0 4,0 
Fixed tranche 2 4,0 4,0 
Fixed tranche 3 3,0 0 
Variable tranche 1 7,0 4,55 
Variable tranche 2 7,0 3,85 
Variable tranche 3 4,0 0 
Total 32,0 16,4 
Source: SGJ and EU (2010); Evaluacion Global de PROADES. 
Monitoring and evaluation is also done by the ROM reporting - according to the EUD the ROM system 
is not able to cover programmes implemented in a SBS modality and from 2010, the ROM system will 
not be applied for SBS and GBS.      
Ind 2.3.2: No joint learning system or thematic group about decentralisation are established at the 
internal level of the EUD or with other EUD delegations e.g. in Nicaragua.   
Ind 2.3.3: The staff member in charge of decentralisation is active in the EUD to inform colleges about 
decentralisation and the present discussion about defining relevant indicators for decentralisation in 
the negotiation with the SEIP for the continuation of PROADES. He has however no formal mandate 
to be a “driver of change” for decentralisation.  
3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies? 
                                                     
4
Indicators for the SBS with more focus on results could be the municipalities’ share of the total public 
expenditures and the size of the national transfers to municipalities.  
The GoH has promised a gradual increase in the transfers to municipalities to 11% of the central government’s 
own revenues in 2014, which could be incorporated in new indicators.   
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3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational 
procedures related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds 
to LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant CSP sections on decentralisation and local governance 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.1.1  
An analysis was made on decentralisation and its status during the preparation of PROADES in 2004 
– following the analysis it was decided to support the national decentralisation programme 
(PRODDEL), which is designed to support the National Poverty Eradication Plan (Estrategia de 
Reduction de la Pobreza, ERP). The analysis presented some serious risks with a SBS modality and 
therefore it was suggested to apply a modified SBS modality linked up to certain sub-sectors within 
decentralisation (aporte presupestario redigido), but this was changed by the EC/EU Headquarters to 
a normal SBS. 
The prolongation of PROADES was handled as an administrative procedure as “a moment of 
opportunity” to support the new GoH’s Vision 2038 and the Strategic Plan for Decentralisation 2010 to 
2014.  
The EC/EU is however aware of the risk of using a SBS modality again as the evaluation of 
PROADES shows that of the 16,4 mEUR released to the GoH, only 4.45 mEUR were allocated for 
decentralisation i.e. the rest was used for other GoH expenditures.   
Therefore the EC/EU is keen to develop some better indicators to assure, that these are more oriented 
to establishing the overall framework for decentralisation than those applied for PROADES from 2005. 
The preparation of the addendum for the three extra years has been done locally by the EUD without 
involvement of consultants6.  
Ind 3.1.2 
The SBS model with transfer to the Ministry of Finance (Secretaria de Finanzas) and from there to 
SEIP is the national transfer system. This is also applied for other EU sector programmes. According 
to the national system the SEIP then allocates funds to LGs following the national transfer system with 
specific allocations to municipalities.  
There is however no mechanism to ensure that funds are allocated to municipalities following the 
formula for transfers. It follows from interviews with BID and SEIP that specific municipalities are often 
selected by the SEIP, when new funds are available and projects are even implemented at municipal 
level by SEIP instead of letting more municipalities participate i.e. by using the official transfer formula.  
Ind 3.1.3 
In 2010-2011 a good dialogue with the government exists on decentralisation and in particular on the 
indicators for decentralisation for the prolongation of PROADES. The dialogue was of lower quality 
from 2006 to 2009, when the government did not prioritise decentralisation. In the first half of 2000 the 
dialogue was much better including during the formulation of PROADES in 2003-2004, when the GoH 
had a positive attitude to decentralisation. 
Ind 3.1.4  
Decentralisation was not a priority of the GoH during the formulation of the CSP 2008 to 2013 and as 
a consequence support to decentralisation was not included in the CSP. Decentralisation was part of 
the CSP 2002-2007 as the government in 2001 was more favourable to decentralisation.   
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
                                                     
5
 According to former staff in the SEIP  mEUR 1.1 was provided to an NGO established by a former director in 
SEIP without any activities implemented.      
6
 See also note 3.  
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 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as "How should existing interventions best evolve?" are 
addressed in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.2.1: The entry point in 2005 was a top down approach with a budget support to decentralisation. 
This modality was not appropriate to the national context as the GoH according to the EUD and other 
stakeholders met did not understand the modality.  
“Me estaba llamando desde la secretaria sobre si pueden comprar algunos vehiculos”  (EUD 
staff member) 
The EC/EU proposed in 2004 a more gradual approach to SBS by starting with a modified SBS with 
some budget lines, but this was not approved by EC/EU HQ.  
Ind 3.2.2: The present addendum to the financial agreement from 2010 has the main objective to 
support the national plan (Vision 2038), which has decentralisation as a strategy. There has not been 
a real formulation phase with an analysis of the set-up for decentralisation – but likely there is an 
inconsistency within the GoH policy, where the planning ministry (SEGEPLAN) is developing a 
regional strategy while SEIP focuses on the further decentralisation to 298 municipalities.  
In 2004 during the formulation of PROADES an in depth analysis was carried out.   
3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support 
decentralisation and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme 
to be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as 
"When and how to use sector budget support?" or "what are the risks related to the") are 
addressed in project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid 
delivery methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.3.1: The entry point in 2005 was a top down approach with a budget support to decentralisation. 
Some projects are financed from the NSA-LA programme with a bottom-up entry point. EC/EU started 
out with an SBS modality to support decentralisation in Honduras in 2005 and this approach has 
continued since.  
Ind 3.3.2: The SBS is an inflexible modality for the EUD and efficiency has likely been lost in the 
Honduranian context with changing government policy to decentralisation compared to a modality 
(project) with more EC/EU control of the allocations of the funds provided.   
This is shown by the final evaluation of the PROADES7 (EU, GoH) as only mEUR 4.4 of the mEUR 
16.4 released to SEFIN (Ministry of Finance) has been transferred to SEIP (decentralisation), so 
clearly the programme has not functioned as expected to support decentralisation and GoH has not 
fulfilled its obligations for a SBS modality. The EC/EU has not followed the funds8 after these were 
released to SEFIN as it is also stated in the evaluation:  
“Es Claro que el apopo presupuestario es aquel que convirtiendose en fondos nacionales, pasa a ser 
de libre disponibilidad del Gobierno, y que la UE no verifica el destino de fondos.” (SGJ and EU, 
Evaluacion Global de PROADES p. 37).  
And as the GoH’s policy to decentralisation changed from 2006 it is clear that decentralisation was not 
a priority, which is also seen by the allocation of funds from PROADES.  
Furthermore the technical assistance (AT) from PROADES, which started in 2007 and continued to 
September 2009 in spite of the Coup d’état in June 2009 as the funds could not be stopped as some 
ongoing activities i.e. various consultancies should be financed. The AT was of limited use starting in 
2007 when the government had little interest in decentralisation and staff in SEIP had hardly any 
knowledge of the ATs’ results and documents produced e.g. for devolution of sectors.  
                                                     
7
 Secretaria de Gobernación y Justicia and EU (November 2010), Evaluacion Global del PROADES. 
8
 This is also the normal procedure for the EC/EU for sector and general budget support (no traceability), so the 
evaluation of the PROADES seems to be a special case, where the funds actually have been traced.   
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3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of 
the role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.4.1 
The EUD staff did not recall any specific analysis on the role of different actors in the decentralisation 
processes.   
Ind 3.4.2 
The EC/EU has approved five to six projects9 with municipalities as project implementers from the 
programme for non state actors and local authorities (NSA-LA). Other partner major is the Inter-
American Development Bank (BID), which also supported the national decentralisation programme 
(PRODDEL) and development partners in the sub-group for decentralisation (Mesa de la 
Descentralizacion).  
                                                     
9
 A detailed list of the projects could not be provided by the EUD during the field phase. 
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3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarity 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance 
issues among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor 
approaches, when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.1.1  
The development partners established a decentralisation group (mesa de la descentralizacion) in 
1998 after the Mitch natural disaster, with all the development partners in Decentralisation (EU, WB, 
GTZ, Jica, etc.). The group meets once a month to coordinate actions and share information. The 
chair is changed every six months. Government institutions and CSOs are invited at particular events 
to discuss certain issues. The actors share information, views and analyses in the meetings, but the 
actual programme implementation on the ground is not coordinated well according to the several 
persons met during the mission. 
"La coordinación? - está funcionando en las mesa, si, pero en el terrano, no" (former 
government official) 
Ind 4.1.2 
No records exist of the EUD taking a particular role to resolve inconsistencies in decentralisation. 
Ind 4.1.3 
The EU participates as a normal member in the decentralisation group, but some development 
partners (i.e. BID, WB) see the EUD taking an active role in decentralisation in the present situation, 
where the Government of Honduras has just formulated policies on decentralisation but also in 2004 
during the formulation of the national programme for decentralisation PRODDEL.    
Ind 4.1.4 
The EC/EU follows it own approach with the government with some flexibility, it has not adjusted to 
others donors’ approaches to decentralisation e.g. within mutual programmes.  
3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarity between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and 
other donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finances decentralisation programmes with Members States and major 
donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes 
and policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.2.1: The EUD informs the other donors at the decentralisation group meetings about its 
interventions in decentralisation, but the real dialogue is with the government on the actions in the 
programmes. 
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Ind 4.2.2: There is no evidence of clear agreements between development partners on a division of 
tasks. The practical arrangement is that EUD and BID work at the central level with the key ministries 
in decentralisation (the Ministry of the Interior and Population (SEIP) and the Ministry of Finance 
(SEFIN), while other donors are more involved at the municipal level. 
Ind 4.2.3: There is no joint financing of programmes, i.e. PROADES is only financed by the EC/EU.  
Ind 4.2.4: The EUD is active at events in the SEIP and with other actors in the decentralisation 
process at the national level according to the EUD and other development partners (WB and BID).   
3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors 
such as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment 
into decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1 
Stakeholders met from the government and development partners (decentralisation, education and 
health) do not find inconsistency in the EC/EU actions between sectors and decentralisation. For 
environment, the programme PROCORREDOR’s actions are coordinated with the participating 
municipalities in the Caribbean, while for education and health the EUD does not make a particular 
effort to assure coherence with decentralisation. In general it is expected that the GoH coordinates 
different activities in sectors with decentralisation. 
Ind 4.3.2 
Gender mainstreaming and environment are included in the national programme for decentralisation 
(PRODDEL) and with the support to decentralisation in a SBS modality, the EUD does not have 
means to assure that the cross cutting priorities are followed. However in environment evidence exist 
on the decentralisation of certain functions e.g. through the PROCORREDOR.     
Ind 4.3.3 
A general budget support (GBS) modality is established with the government to support the National 
Development Plan. The GBS contains only indicators for education and health. 
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3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to 
implement decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Introduction: The EC/EU supported the national decentralisation programme (PRODDEL) with a SBS 
of 32 mEUR by PROADES, which was signed in early 2005 while the GoH was supportive to 
decentralisation. The GoH policy to decentralisation shifted, so PROADES was implemented during a 
time when the GoH did not support decentralisation and the final evaluation between EC/EU and GoH 
shows that only 4,4 mEUR has been allocated for decentralisation. In addition to this the PROADES 
also allocated 2,0 mEUR directly to technical assistance to SEIP (at that time SGJ) in 2007 to 2009 – 
provided by a private company. During the AT the GoH had little interest in decentralisation, so 
although a number of documents and analysis were produced (in particular on devolution of functions 
to municipalities), they were of little use and the present staff in the SEIP has hardly any knowledge of 
the AT.  
National stakeholders and development partners agree that the results of the PROADES has been 
few and that the results in decentralisation in Honduras has been limited in the last 10 year - most 
achievements were actually reached in the 1990s. It should also be noted that with a SBS the precise 
EC/EU contribution to the few specific achievements in decentralisation since 2001 cannot be defined 
and it is also clear that the support has been limited compared to the budget allocated from the 
EC/EU. 
Ind 5.1.1: The GoH has no formal Policy for Decentralisation, although policies have been prepared 
during the last 10 years. The present GoH took office in 2010 with a new national strategy “Vision 
2038” approved by all political parties in the Parliament, which has decentralisation as one of its pillars 
formulated in more details in (Plan Estrategico: 2010-2014: Decentralisation para el Desarrollo Local 
en el Marco de la Vision de Pais 2038, SEIP 2010). 
Before the GoH from 2002 to 2005 had decentralisation as part of the national development strategy 
as presented in the Poverty Eradication Strategy Plan (ERP), 2003, while the government from 2006 
did not have decentralisation as a priority, although this changed a little with the “Minimum Plan for 
Decentralisation” (Agenda Minima de Descentralización) introduced in 2008 with some particular 
actions for decentralisation (education, health). The EC/EU has supported the development of a policy 
for decentralisation with its support to the national decentralisation programme PRODDEL through 
PROADES.  
Ind 5.1.2: The Ministry of the Interior and Population (SEIP) - formerly (to 2010) the Ministry of the 
Governance and Justice, is responsible for coordinating the relation between the government and the 
298 municipal governments including the authority over the GoH budgetary transfer to municipalities. 
For the overall decentralisation coordination, in 1994, the Executive Commission for State 
Decentralization (CEDE), was established. The CEDE has however not had the ability to meet 
frequently over the past ten years due to the changing GoH policy to decentralization, low priority of 
the GoH and the high turnover of staff and politicians within the central government, which reduce the 
sustainability of the strategies and undermines the credibility and the management capacities. Instead 
the AMHON (the association of municipalities in Honduras) has taken the role of coordination of 
relations between central government and municipalities including initiatives for new important 
legislation e.g. the recent approved law for municipal administrative carrier.   
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.2.1 
A national framework exists for decentralisation. Some of the most important laws are listed below: 
1. Law of Municipalities (Ley de Municipios, LdM 1991), with some important amendments in 
2009. 
2. Planning Law (Territorial Order, 2003), 
3. Water and Sanitation (2003), which recognizes municipalities and water boards as provider of 
services and requires the central government to transfer the 33 operating systems and 
aqueducts to the municipalities. 
4. Law on forestry (2006).  
5. The law of the Municipal Administrative Career (2010), (with effect from August 2011), which 
aims to prevent political patronage and improve the efficiency of municipal management 
through the recruitment and retention of qualified human resource, promoting the preservation 
of institutional memory of municipal governments and sustainability of the process regardless 
of the change of governments. 
According to the stakeholders the law framework is supportive to the decentralisation process, but the 
practise to approve law as amendments to existing law create difficulties in understanding the full 
importance of a law. E.g. the LdM (1990) exist parallel with a Law on an amendment of the LdM.  
The PROADES intended to support the development of a new LdM, but this did not materialise.  
Ind 5.2.2: According to the interviewed stakeholders some problems exist with overlaps between 
functions of municipalities in the LdM and sector laws. These are however often solved with a de facto 
division of tasks e.g. when municipalities take over responsibilities form the central ministries. The 
EC/EU has not supported the development of sector laws within the decentralised framework.   
3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments’ fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total 
public expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes 
and increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.3.1: Little information exists about the quality of staff recruited at local level, where the hiring of 
staff is sometimes done for political reasons and therefore staff is often of low quality. The EC/EU has 
not supported the establishment of more staff in municipalities and their management. 
Municipalities’ operational expenditures have increased with 51% in constant prices from 2002 to 
2009, so it is likely that more funds are spent on salaries.  
Table 4 Municipalities expenditures on salaries (constant prices, index 2002=100) 
Year Total Expenditures 
2002 100 
2003 110 
2004 107 
2005 76 
2006 117 
2007 197 
2008 114 
2009 151 
Source: Own calculations - see details in annex 7. 
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Ind 5.3.2: The government has failed to comply with the transfer of the central government’s own 
revenues to the 298 municipalities for years. The percentage of the transfer is established in article 91 
of the Law of Municipalities, passed in 1990, which was 5% of the central government’s own 
revenues. But it was not until 2005 that the GoH met the 5%. At the end of 2010, the percentage is 
7%, but the Central Government only schedule 6,5% in the national budget, a situation that has 
mobilized local authorities to monitor compliance with the agreed value (7%), the idea is to increase 
the percentage to 8% in 2011, 9% in 2012, 10% 2013 and 11% in the year 2014 onwards. Serious 
confusion exists on all these figures and how they should be calculated. 
The EC/EU has not supported the development of a transfer system to municipalities or systems for 
more revenue generation.   
Table 5 Municipalities’ total revenues, own revenues and transfers (constant prices, index 
2002=100) 
Year Total revenues  Local revenues  Transfers  
2002 100 100 100 
2003 110 116 105 
2004 117 116 116 
2005 106 113 147 
2006 159 142 219 
2007 168 146 232 
2008 129 99 195 
2009 166 137 253 
Source: Own calculations - see details in annex 7 
As can be seen all revenues for municipalities have increased with 66% in constant prices giving the 
municipalities a substantial increase in resources. It can also be seen that transfers from the central 
government has been the main reason with a real increase of 153% from 2002 to 2009.  
With the exception of 2008, municipalities’ collection of local revenues has also increased but the 
actual collection is still only about Le 500 (27.4 EUR) per inhabitant per year.  
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that 
are discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in HRM: the extent to which LGs can hire and fire or 
otherwise manage personnel. 
 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local 
government’s degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.4.1: The LdM gives municipalities clear autonomy to raise revenues (property tax, local taxes, 
service fees etc.) and for their planning and budgeting.  
The EC/EU has not supported generation of local revenues. 
Ind 5.4.2: According to the LdM, LGs can hire, fire and manage their own staff. Most stakeholders 
agree that staff management is of low quality in particular in municipalities of category C and D10. 
HRM/D in local governments may be improved by the approval of the Law of the Municipal 
Administrative Career (2010), which takes effect from August 2011. The law aims to prevent political 
patronage and improve the efficiency of municipal management through the recruitment and retention 
of qualified human resource, promoting the preservation of institutional memory of municipal 
governments and sustainability of the process regardless of the change of governments. 
The EC/EU has not supported HRM/D at municipal level. 
                                                     
10
 The GoH has categorised municipalities according to their capacity from D (very low) to A (high). Of the 298 
municipalities only 55 are category A or B i 2009 (see also indicator 6.1.3).  
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Ind 5.4.3: The LdM was amended in 2009, which clarified the LGs general right and autonomy for all 
their affairs.  
The role of different levels of government is defined in the legislation, but some inconsistencies exist.  
For water and sanitation inconsistencies has been solved with a law from 2006: Ley Marco de Agua 
Potable y Saneamiento, while laws for other sectors are old and unclear.   
An example is education where the Education Law is from 1966 and many amendments have been 
approved by the parliament, without preparing a new general comprehensive law. As late as in 2010 
the Law on Improvement in Education and Public Participation (Ley de Fortalecimiento a la Education 
Publica y la Participacion Comunitaria) in Education with establishment of Municipal Education 
Comities (Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo Educative, COMDE). This is understood as a 
“municipalisation of education” but the municipal council will only have one (1) of 15 members in the 
COMDE, so it is more a de-concentration.    
Further ministries make specific agreements (convenios) with councils, so municipalities have taken 
up responsibilities within education, health, environment and water and sanitation. This implies more 
decentralisation but does also make the system less clear. Below in the table is shown the number of 
municipalities, where municipalities have taken up functions within the sectors – normally with a 
signed agreement with a ministry and often a development partner for providing additional finance. 
Table 6 Municipalities, which have taken functions in sectors from central ministries 
Sector Number of municipalities 
Education 34 
Water and sanitation 63 
Primary Health Service  62 
Environmental licenses 5 
Source: Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, SEIP, development partners.  
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3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and 
reform implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & CSO) that capacities of key central government 
bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation have improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of M&E system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.1.1 The Technical Decentralisation Unit (la Unidad Tecnica de Descentralizacion) in the Ministry 
of the Interior and Population (SEIP) is the responsible unit for decentralisation and the coordination of 
the reform process. It has produced the Decentralisation Plan 2010-2014 (Decentralisation para el 
Desarrollo Local, DDL 2010-14) as part of the national development strategy “Marco de la Vision de 
pais 2038”.  In 2010, when the new government entered, most senior staff was changed in the SEIP, 
so the institution has presently not the capacity to lead a reform process or formulate policies 
effectively. It is e.g. seen presently by the inconsistency within the government policy, where the 
planning ministry (SEGEPLAN) is developing a regional strategy while SIEP focuses on the further 
decentralisation to 298 municipalities.  
The EC/EU with the programme PROADES supported the SEIP (formerly SGJ)11 within a SBS 
modality and direct technical assistance 2007 to 2009, but with limited interest from the receiving 
government as decentralisation was not a high priority. During that period the establishment of a Tri-
Party Forum with the government, development partners and civil society for decentralisation was 
supported and also in general building up the capacity of the SGJ, but both support activities had little 
results – in particular as the staff was changed when the new GoH started in 2010 and the SGJ did 
only receive 4,4 mEUR of the 32 mEUR for the PROADES SBS. The PROADES’ technical assistance 
(AT) produced several analyses on decentralisation and papers on how to devolve sectors, but the 
documents were not applied for implementation for decentralisation of sectors as the government did 
not prioritise this. According to the present staff in SEIP the results of the AT were limited and 
documents are not used.    
Ind 6.1.2 Civil society organizations, AMHON and local governments do not find that the SEIP has 
capacity for policy formulation because of the large staff turnover and the inconsistent support to 
decentralisation from the GoH during the last ten years.  
Ind 6.1.3 At central level a monitoring and evaluation system for the decentralisation process does not 
exist.  
The GoH applies a system for categorisation of the capacities of municipalities but unfortunately 
criteria shifted in 2006, so the changes in the categories do not give a correct indication of the 
development. The table below shows that more municipalities are categorised as category C and D in 
2009 and only 55 as A or B compared to 75 in 2006 and 86 in 2002 in category A or B.  
                                                     
11
Up to late 2010 the SEIP was called: Ministry of Governance and Justice (Secretaria de Gobernacion y Justicia, 
SGJ) 
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Table 7 Municipalities according to category in 2002, 2006 and 2009. 
Year 2002 2006 2009 
A 24 25 23 
B 62 50 32 
C 123 156 107 
D 89 67 136 
Source: SEIP.  
Ind 6.1.4 The National Committee for Decentralisation (la Comisión Ejecutiva para la 
Descentralización del Estado, CEDE) was established in 1994. It has however not taken up to role to 
coordinate the decentralization process because of the GoH’s changing policy to decentralisation and 
a low priority of the GoH to reinforce the CEDE. Instead the ongoing dialogue between the central 
government and the Association of Municipalities of Honduras (AMHON) has helped in the last 
decade to channel the demands of municipal authorities to the executive and legislative branches and 
coordinate initiatives from the government and municipal side. The parties signed a “pact” in 2006, 
which functions as an agreement for the continuation of the decentralisation process – although it has 
not been respected fully by the GoH.  
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local councils 
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of 
information produced at local level 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.2.1 There is little evidence of improvement of municipal financial management. The Court of 
Accounts (Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, TSC) has in recent years only been able to audit 44 
municipalities each year (15%) although their ambition is to carry out an audit in each municipality 
every second year. There is no systematic follow up of the recommendations generated by the audit. 
TSC, SEIP and also AMHON agree on the problems with financial management and arrange together 
numerous capacity development activities but apparently without a good assessment of the needs 
according to some participants met by the mission. The EC/EU has not supported financial 
management in municipalities. 
Ind 6.2.2  
During 2002 to 2005 the GoH promoted intensively the development of strategic municipal 
development plans (PEDM), which often became a list of projects (investments) instead of a strategic 
development plan for a municipality. In the beginning PEDM was often supported by development 
partners, but the instrument was losing its credibility because it was perceived more as an 
administrative requirement instead of a management tool.  
The EC/EU has not supported development planning directly, but their may be some projects funded 
by the NSA-LA programme. 
Ind 6.2.3.  
No strong evidence exists about improvement in municipal human resource management 
development (HRM/D). During the evaluation period a lot of focus has been on the law on municipal 
administrative carrier, which was approved in 2010. The reason for this is the high rotation of staff in 
municipalities in particular after elections, which has impeded improvement in HRM/D in municipalities. 
The EC/EU has not supported HRM/D in municipalities, but the PROADES may have supported the 
development of the law by its SBS to SEIP. 
Ind 6.2.4.  
No monitoring and evaluation system exists to generate information for use at central or local levels on 
decentralisation. As part of the technical assistance the PROADES facilitated to SEIP (at that time 
SGJ) a conceptual design for a system was proposed, which apparently is still under discussion in 
SEIP. 
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3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.3.1: A strong national association for municipalities exists, AMHON, which has been 
strengthened as project implementer for the development partners. It was established in the mid 
1960’ties and was revitalised in the early 1990’ties, with the new Law of Municipalities. It has played a 
role to represent municipalities vis-à-vis the central government and it is well acknowledged. It has 
recently played an important role for the increased transfer to municipalities and the new law on the 
administrative municipal carrier. 
The PROADES has supported AMHON by supporting the establishment of the tri-party forum (El Foro 
Tripartido, EFT), which was set up in 2005 with participation of the GoH, AMHON, civil society and 
development partners. The EFT is a forum for dialogue on decentralization.  
Municipal corporations (mancommunidades) have also been established as a solution to issues, which 
go beyond the borders of the individual municipality. This initiative has been strongly promoted by the 
development partners. Presently 53 corporations exist.  
Ind 6.3.2: No progress is evident with NGOs involvement in local service delivery and good 
governance. The work of NGOs is mostly responding to individual efforts or needs of local 
governments but without any link to a national strategy on the decentralised governance or service 
delivery. 
Ind 6.3.3 Some limited research exists on the issue of local governments. The AMHON has played a 
role to generating technical documents and systematizing experiences with support from development 
partners.  
The EUD is currently preparing a publication on decentralisation in Honduras to be published in 2011.  
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3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.1.1 
During the evaluation period the procedures for the local elections have not been changed, and 
national and local elections were executed the same days in late 2001, 2005 and 2009. Observations 
agree that these three elections have been held in fair conditions and without any fraud.    
The same has according to many stakeholders had the effect that the election is mainly seen as a 
national election, although national and local politicians are elected separately. The AMHON in 
particular argues therefore that the local elections should be separated from the national elections to 
give the local level more importance.  
There are significant advances in terms of political decentralization, allowing independent candidates 
for presidential elections, municipal and national congress to run. 
Ind 7.1.2 
The planning system is a bottom up type with communities expressing their needs to the local councils 
and the development of a municipal development plan. Municipalities should also arrange open 
meetings (cabildos abiertos) with the public at least twice a year. 
Some people met expressed that likely only half of the municipalities execute their planning with public 
participation. Planning is also disturbed by other agencies having parallel system to that of the local 
government with direct intervention at the community level e.g. the Social Investment Fund (Fondo 
Hondureño de Inversión Social, FHIS). 
A survey financed by USAID12 shows that the citizens in general participate less than before in local 
issues e.g. 18,5% of the population participated in 2006 in a municipal council meeting and only 8,8% 
participated in a council meeting in 2010. Similarly only 6,5% asked for assistance in the municipality 
compared to 12,3% in 2004 and the participation in community organisations has also declined from 
24,8% in 2004 to 12,8% in 2010. 
Table 8 Citizens’ Participation in Local Government Activities 
 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Participation in 
municipal council 
meeting (session 
municipal o cabildo 
abierto),  
15,1% 18,5% 10,3% 8,8% 
Request for assistance 
from the municipality 
12,3% 13,5% 7,8% 6,5% 
Participation in 
community 
organisations 
24,8% 18,7% 11,9% 12,8% 
Source: USAID (2010) Cultura Politica de la Democracia en Honduras, 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/atoz/tagged.php?id=research 
                                                     
12
 USAID (2010), Cultura Politica de la Democracia en Honduras. About 1,500 Hondurans participated in the 
survey. 
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3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with 
citizens (notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.2.1 
The system for communication and use of feed back mechanism with the citizens is mainly organised 
though the bottom-up planning system and the semi annually meetings, where the municipal budget 
and its execution are presented respectively.  
The EC/EU has not supported systems for citizens’ dialogue with the municipality through PROADES, 
but likely the EC/EU has financed some projects through the NSA-LA programmes.  
3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) 
provided to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.3.1 
The general transfers to municipalities has since 2000 followed a formula, which has been changed 
frequently since 2004 to cater more for poverty and the municipalities’ effort to collect more revenues.  
Table 9 Formula for transfers to municipalities 2000 to 2011 
 2000-2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2010 and 
2011 
Equal share 40% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Population 60% 43% 38% 35% 32% 30% 20% 
Poverty  7% 8% 9% 10% 10% 30% 
Fiscal effort   4% 6% 8% 10%  
Source: SEIP, Tribunal Superior, AMHON (2011), VI Seminarion Taller Gestion Municipal 
The frequent changes in the formula make it difficult for the municipalities to plan effectively as their 
allocations are changed every year. Furthermore the allocation of 50% of the transfers as “equal 
share” is against good practises as this implies that all municipalities get the same amount - i.e. 
Tegucigalpa and small municipalities with 5000 inhabitants get the same amount.  
Further to this funding are also provided to municipalities from specific projects managed by 
development partners and from the Social Investment Fund, (FHIS). So in synthesis although formula 
exist for the transfer from the GoH, it is not clear how other sources are distributed,  
E.g. 15 meeting rooms have been financed from directly by SEIP by PROADES funding, but the 
selection of the municipalities for this is not transparent likely done by the Minister.    
The EC/EU has not supported the development of transfer systems. 
 
Ind 7.3.2: Information on transfers to municipalities are not presented systematically to citizens e.g. in 
the papers or on municipalities notice board. The information is rather presented at public meetings 
(cabildos abiertos) twice a year, where the municipality presents its budget and its execution 
respectively. 
Stakeholders met informed that for the larger municipalities in category A and B, the public meetings 
are held, while for the municipalities with less capacity (category C and D)  it is less likely that the 
meetings are held. 
Transfers can also be found on the homepage of SEIP (www.seip.gob.hn). 
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3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) 
in local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU has not supported the building up or transfer of more resources at municipal level via 
PROADES. 
Ind 8.1.1 
Municipal expenses for operations have increased with 51% from 2002 to 2009 in constant prices 
indicating, that more funds are available for service delivery. Expenses for service delivery cannot be 
separated.  
Table 10 Municipal Expenditures 2002 to 2009, constant prices index 2002=100 
Year 
All expenses 
(egresos totales) 
Operacional costs 
(gastos de 
funcionamiento) 
2002 100 100 
2003 114 110 
2004 124 107 
2005 75 76 
2006 96 117 
2007 211 197 
2008 137 114 
2009 167 151 
Source: Ministry of the Interior and Population (SEIP) - see detailed calculations in annex 7. 
Ind 8.1.2: The changes in the formula for transfers (see indicator 7.3.1) with more weight on poverty 
levels in the municipalities had made the allocation slightly more targeted towards needs related to 
poverty.  
Ind 8.1.3: Experiences with public private partnerships do not exist.  
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.2.1 
Funding for maintenance and operation cannot be seen separately in the municipal budgets. Table 10 
above shows that municipal expenditures have increased with 67% from 2002 to 2009, and some of 
this might have been allocated for maintenance.  
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Ind 8.2.2 
The delegation de facto of functions within education, health and water and sanitation (see table 6) 
have according to people met from in particular ministries had the effect that communities and 
municipalities are more active in the maintenance and operation of local infrastructure.   
3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for 
vulnerable groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 Ind 8.3.2. Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.3.1 The mission did not find evidence for better access to service for vulnerable groups. Most 
likely few changes have taken place as is also supported by the information below in table 11 and 12.  
Ind 8.3.2 No firm data exist on whether local service delivery has improved – and the question cannot 
be answered – but it seems like services have not improved substantially during the evaluation period 
as presented below.   
A survey financed by USAID13 shows that 28.5% of the citizens in Honduras are satisfied with the 
services they receive from the municipalities. Compared to 2004 and 2006 the figure has decreased, 
but it is higher than in 2008.  
Table 11 Citizens’ attitude to local services in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010  
 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Citizens who think 
municipal services are 
good or very god 
36,3% 32,1% 22,1% 28,5% 
Source: USAID (2010), Cultura Politica en la Democracia de Honduras 
(http://www.vanderbilt.edu/atoz/tagged.php?id=research) 
Asked directly about specific services in 2010 most people find that the quality of the service has not 
changed. For instance, 44,1% of the citizens think that the service for water and sanitation is the 
same. 
Table 12 Attitude to selected local services in 2010 
 2004 2006 2008 2010 
 Improved The same Worse 
Service don’t 
exist 
Solid waste 
management 
15,4% 30,6% 6,5% 47,5% 
Market 7,9% 29,3% 11,8% 51,1% 
Water and 
Sanitation 
18,9% 44,1% 12,4% 24,6% 
Source: USAID (2010), Cultura Politica en la Democracia de Honduras 
(http://www.vanderbilt.edu/atoz/tagged.php?id=research) 
                                                     
13
USAID (2010), Cultura Politica en la Democracia de Honduras – also presented at 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/atoz/tagged.php?id=research. About 1.500 Hondurans participated in the survey.  
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4 Conclusion concerning the hypotheses to be tested and main 
challenges to be discussed in the synthesis phase 
The first hypothesis formulated during the desk phase states that:  
1. The SBS modality will result in EC/EU having little influence on how the funds from PROADES 
are spent in the national budget. 
According to the Final Evaluation of the PROADES only 4,4 mEUR out of 12,55 mEUR released up to 
2010 were spent for decentralisation as budget transfers to the Ministry for Governance and Justice 
(from 2010: Ministry for Interior and Population, SEIP). Further the EUD and SEIP agree that:    
“Es claro que el apoyo presupuestario es aquel que convirtiendose en foncos nacionales, pasa a ser 
de libre disponibilidad del Gobierno y que la EU no verifica el destino de los fondos, sino que mide los 
resultados obtenidos...” (Evaluacion Global de Proades, Noviembre 2010 p. 37). 
(“It is clear that the budget support once the funds are changed to national funds, become of free 
disposal of the government and that the EU does not verify how the funds are used only the results 
achieved”).    
So the first hypothesis is clearly confirmed and it follows that most of the funds were not spent for 
decentralisation. Furthermore the indicators selected for PROADES do not measure the results of 
decentralisation as presented in indicator 2.3.1. 
The second hypothesis states: 
2. Budget support is an efficient way to give flexible support and adjust to changing national 
policies. 
According to the EUD the flexibility is the idea with the SBS. And the PROADES certainly gave the 
GoH flexibility to adjust to the actual GoH priorities even when decentralisation was not a priority for 
the GoH. However, it is also clear that if decentralisation is a priority for the EC/EU, the SBS is not the 
appropriate modality as the receiving government spent most of the funds on other priorities than 
decentralisation.     
The third hypothesis stated that: 
3. The EUD has established adequate procedures to coordinate programmes with support to 
specific sectors with its support to decentralisation.  
The third hypothesis is most likely rejected as the EC/EU does not have clear procedures to 
coordinate sector programmes with its support to decentralisation. On the other hand the mission did 
not find overlaps between sector programmes and support to decentralisation. It could be because the 
GoH coordinate, so overlaps are avoided.  
Below follows a synthesis of the main findings from the mission following the eight evaluation 
questions. 
EQ 1. Clarity of EC/EU policy/ strategies on decentralisation.  
The staff at the EUD and government official and other development partners have little knowledge 
about the specific EC/EU policies on decentralisation. The EUD could not find guidance on 
development of indicators for decentralisation for a SBS modality in the EU support document for 
decentralisation i.e. the reference document for decentralisation from 2007.  
EQ2. The institutional capacity for decentralisation in the EUD 
The EUD experience on decentralisation is related to one staff member who applies about 10% to 
20% of the working time on decentralisation. After dealing with decentralisation for 4-5 years the 
capacity of the responsible person is high, but the institutional capacity will most likely be lost once the 
person is not located in the EUD in Honduras any more.    
EQ3. EC support to decentralisation processes’ responsiveness to national contexts and 
aligned with national regulations and policies  
The PROADES is aligned to the national decentralisation support programme and national 
procedures. The weakness with the SBS is the inability to adjust when national policies on 
decentralisation are changed.  
EQ4. Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence 
The EC/EU seems to be an active player in decentralisation among the development partners in 
Honduras and its support to decentralisation is coordinated with that of other donors. The EC/EU does 
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not implement programmes in decentralisation with other development partners, and the EC/EU's 
main partner is BID (i.e. both supported the national decentralisation programme, PRODDEL).    
EQ5. Programme results on transfer of functions to local councils   
With the SBS modality it cannot be said exactly what the EC/EU has supported in decentralisation. It 
is however clear that of the budget for the SBS from PROADES only 4,4 mEUR of 32 mEUR reached 
the SEIP and 2 mEUR for technical assistance through a private company. The global evaluation and 
the persons met during the mission all agree that the results are very limited and that most results for 
decentralisation in Honduras were reached during the 1990s. It is however clear that the municipalities 
have increased their total revenues with 66% in constant prices from 2002 to 2009 mainly because of 
an increase of government transfer with 153% in constant prices.  
EQ6. Programme result for capacity of stakeholders  
PROADES has worked directly with the ministry responsible for decentralisation (SGJ, SEIP), but the 
capacity has not increased in the ministry due to numerous changes in staff. In general the GoH’s 
capacity for decentralisation reform has not increased either. For the municipalities, it seems like the 
progress in capacity is limited as well – a promising new law is the Law on Municipal Administrative 
Carrier, which might create more stability in staff and improve HRM/D in the 298 municipalities. The 
national association of municipalities (AMHON) has increased its capacity and is now the main actor in 
decentralisation in Honduras with may separate initiatives.   
EQ7. Programme results on local governance  
The PROADES has not supported local governance directly. In general, it seems as if few results 
have been reached since 2000 and less participation takes place in local decision making.   
EQ8. Programme result on service delivery 
The municipalities’ operational costs have increased from 2002 to 2009 with 51% in constant prices, 
which may have resulted in the provision of better services. An investigation into the citizens’ attitude 
to public services indicates that the citizens in general not have changed their attitude to municipal 
services during the evaluation period.   
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5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: The list of people interviewed 
Last name 
First 
name(s) 
Organisation 
Position Date of the 
interview 
Bounchard David EUD Task Manager 6, 9, 13/6/11 
Hick Willy EUD Task manager 13/6/11 
Versteeg Peter EUD Head of Delegation  13/6/11 
Fache Andre EUD Task manager 16/6/11 
Caraccioli Arnoldo Technical Decentralisation 
Unit Ministry of the Interior 
and Population 
Director 6/6/11 
Ordoñez Victor Technical Decentralisation 
Unit Ministry of the Interior 
and Population 
Assistant Director 6/6/11 
Madrid Africo Secretary of State – Ministry 
of the Interior and 
Population 
Secretary 6/6/11 
Nuñez Wilson Municipal Strengthening / 
Ministry of the Interior and 
Population 
Director 6/6/11 
Castro Glora Public Credit / Ministry of 
Finance 
Subdirector 7/6/11 
Ferrera Juan National Convergence 
Forum (FONAC) 
Director 7/6/11 
Mineros Guillermo Municipality Auditing 
Direction / Supreme 
Accountability Tribune 
Director 7/6/11 
Avila Roberto Municipality Auditing 
Direction / Supreme 
Accountability Tribune 
Technical Assistant 7/6/11 
Alvarado Jonabelly Municipality Auditing 
Direction / Supreme 
Accountability Tribune 
Technical Assistant 7/6/11 
Lopez Cesar Municipality Auditing 
Direction / Supreme 
Accountability Tribune 
Technical Assistant 7/6/11 
Hernandez Christian Municipality Auditing 
Direction / Supreme 
Accountability Tribune 
Supervision 
Auditing 
7/6/11 
Reyes Samuel Vice-presidency of 
Honduras 
Vice-president 7/6/11 
Pinel Sandra Health Service Network Unit 
/ Health Ministry 
Director 7/6/11 
Sosa Eugenio Decentralization Investigator Investigator 7/6/11 
Castillo Danilo Executive Chief / 
Association of Honduran 
Municipalities (AMHON) 
Executive Director 8/6/11 
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Duron Lourdes Decentralisation Unite / 
Association of Honduran 
Municipalities (AMHON) 
Chief 8/6/11 
Miranda Freddy DANIDA International 
Technical Assistant 
8/6/11 
Munguia Miguel Reduction Poverty Strategy Director 8/6/11 
Ordonez Magdalena Reduction Poverty Strategy Monitoring Director 8/6/11 
Vargas Cesar Decentralisation Consultant 
/ Municipal Revenue 
Consultant (ATI 
PROADES) 
8/6/11 
Palermo Marcelo Decentralisation Consultant 
/ Social Society Participation 
Consultant (ATI 
PROADES) 
8/6/11 
Cruz Carlos Comayagua Municipality Vice Mayor 9/6/11 
Alcerro Antonio Comayagua Municipality First Council 9/6/11 
Cerritos Marcio Comayagua Municipality Fourth Council 9/6/11 
Velazquez Manuel Comayagua Municipality Treasurer 9/6/11 
Gomez Freddy Comayagua Municipality Auditing Chief 9/6/11 
Machado Ivan Comayagua Municipality Accountant 9/6/11 
Menjivar Eduard Comayagua Municipality DANIDA Project 
Coordinator 
6/9/11 
Velàsquez Max World Bank Water and 
Sanitation 
Programme 
10/6/11 
Betancourt Orlando Education Ministry Planning and 
Evaluation Unit 
Director 
10/6/11 
Sànchez Maria IDB Social Protection 
Specialist 
10/6/11 
Perez Rincon IDB Municipality 
Specialist 
10/6/11 
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5.2 Annex 2: The list of documents consulted  
EU (2009); Mid term Review CSP Honduras 2007-2013 
EU (2010); PROADES Project Summary 
EU and GoH (17 Dec. 2004); Convenio de Financiacion (Financial Agreement)  
EC, (2007); PROADES Monitoring reports 2007  
EC, (2009); PROADES Monitoring reports  
EC, (2010); PROADES Informe Final 2010. 
Secretaria de Justicia (2010); Plan Estrategico 2010-2014. Decentralisation para el Desarrollo Local 
en el Marco de Vision 2038. SGJ 2010. 
www.amhon.hn 
www.SEFIN.gob.hn 
Particip, ADE, DRN (2010); Evaluation of EC’s Cooperation with Honduras, Country level Evaluation  
USAID (2010); Programe de Apoya a la Descentralizacion en Honduras, Delegation de la Union 
Europea en Honduras and El Foro Tripartito de Decentralisation Honduras, 2010 
Secretaria de Gobernacion y Justicia and EU (November 2010); Evaluacion Global del PROADES 
La Gazeta (May 2010); Ley de Fortalicimiento a la Educacion Publica y la Participacion Comunitaria 
AMHON (November 2008); La Experiencia del Pacto Nacional por la Decentralisacion y el Desarrollo 
Local 
AMHON (December 2008); Mancomunidades de Honduras 
AMHON (2010); Agenda Municipal de Honduras 2010-2014 
Tribunal Superior (2011); Seminario Taller Gestion Municipal 2011-06-11  
USAID (October 2010); Cultura Politica en la Democracia en Honduras, 2010 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ 
Secretaria de Finanzas (2011); Informe de la Liquidacion de Ingresos y Egresos l Presupuesto 
Nacional de la Republica Ejercicio Fiscal 2010   
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Table 13 Detailed list of EC-funded interventions related to decentralisation 
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry point Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid 
modality 
Main contracting 
party 
Programa de apoyo a la 
descentralización en Honduras 
(PROADES) 
2004 - 2007 33,65 18,4 ALA/2004/016-807 Tow down N SBS to GoH 
Government of  
Honduras 
Indirect interventions         
Reducción de la pobreza y 
desarrollo sostenible con equidad 
en 2 municipios del Occidente de 
Honduras 
2009 0,.258 0,068 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2009/021-
105 
   NGO 
Projects financed from the 
programme for non state actors 
and local authorities   
       
Associations, 
CSOs, LGs   
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
5.4.1 Intervention 1 
Title: Programa de apoyo a la descentralización en Honduras (PROADES) 
Budget: 33.651.500 
Start date: 2004 
Objectives and expected results: 
Contribution to poverty reduction and the establishment of a modern and efficient public 
administration. The PROADES falls within the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS) and the National Programme for Decentralization and Local Development (PRODDEL), 
both programs are designed with a long-term perspective. 
Activities 
Key dates for the execution of PROADES 2003 to 2011.  
Calendario resumen  
principales acontecimientos y apoyos de la UE 
Fecha 
Lanzamiento del PRODDEL  Marzo 2003 
Misión de formulación PROADES Abril 2004 
Firma convenio financiación entre el Gobierno de Honduras y la C.E. Febrero 2005 
Pago del primer TF Agosto 2005 
Nueva administración Gobierno Presidente Manuel Zelaya Enero 2006 
Pago del 2ndo TF Septiembre 2006 
Pago del 1er TV Febrero 2007 
Decisión no pago del 3er TF Diciembre 2007 
Inicio de actividades de la ATI Febrero 2008 
Misión de evaluación de medio termino 2005-2008 Abril-Mayo 2008 
Inicio de la fase de Asistencia Técnica Mayo 2008 
Decisión pago 2ndo TV (pero sin condiciones para efectuar el pago)    Febrero 2009  
Decisión no pago 4to TF y 3er TV Febrero 2009 
Interrupción del Orden Constitucional  Jun 2009-Ene 2010 
Nueva administración Gobierno Presidente Porfirio Lobo Sosa Enero 2010 
Ley de Visión de País y Plan de Nación  Enero 2010 
Final de las actividades de la ATI Mayo 2010 
Plan Estratégico de Descentralización del Estado Julio 2010 
Creación SEIP Octubre 2010 
Pago 2ndo TV (en fase de aprobación) Noviembre 2010 
Negociación sobre un posible addendum de extensión del convenio  Sept-Nov 2010 
Source: SGJ, EU (2010); Evaluacion global del PROADES 
 
5.4.2 Intervention 2 
Title: PROCORREDOR  
Budget: 25.000 mEUR 
Execution: 2006-2012 
General Objective 
To help improve the quality of life of people through maintenance and restoration of ecological 
and economic functions of the Caribbean Corridor of Honduras as an integral part of the 
Mesoamerican Biologic Corridor. 
Specific Objectives 
Improving conditions for environmental management at institutional and local levels, around the 
sustainable management of protected areas and interconnecting areas as well of the  Honduran 
Caribbean Biological Corridor, contributing to its conservation and recovery. 
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Main Strategies 
1. Regional system of protected areas in the Caribbean Corridor strengthened through 
efficient management and participatory areas. 
2. The watershed areas are sustainably managed, with full participation of municipalities 
and local residents, generating ecological, economic and social benefits. 
3. Municipalities have land based on land use planning, land cadastre, regularized and 
legalized. 
4. Governmental and non-governmental environment sector with strengthened capacities at 
central and local levels to improve environmental management. 
 
PROCORREDOR and the Decentralisation Process 
The Project is in its intermediate stage, and works across the board in all axes to improve the 
management capacity of local governments in the Caribbean part of Honduras (in tax matters, 
management, planning, transparency, modernization) and other community agencies such as 
water boards and environmental committees in preparing these bodies to articulate a process of 
regionalization, an initiative recently implemented in the country 
Although the project has no direct impact on the national framework or policy relating to the issue 
of decentralization, locally, is working to prepare local actors to assume these responsibilities and 
benefits with greater capacity and participation, some examples are the preparing of the 
environmental decentralization strategy, and the environmental services payments. 
 
www.procorredor.org
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
5.5.1 Summary of the Concept of Decentralisation of the State.  
The increase in poverty and extreme poverty forces the governments to seek innovative or non 
traditional alternatives to combat this, addressed from a national perspective with implications at local 
and / or regional levels. Thus decentralisation has become the instrument for gradually achieving this 
goal. In short, the concept of decentralisation, adopted by the GoH is the transfer of competences 
from central to regional or local levels, to recipients who are prepared to exercise those powers. The 
changes are made under the principles of subsidiarity and graduality, within a legal framework that 
facilitates the process. There are six major themes in the decentralisation process: a) strengthening 
the institutional and policy framework (modernization of the state), b) decentralisation of public 
services, c) fiscal decentralisation, d) municipal strengthening e) land management and f) 
transparency and citizen participation.  
The decentralisation process in Honduras commenced within the process of modernisation of the 
State in the 90's with a series of reforms, accompanied by the adoption of the Law of Municipalities 
(Ley de Municipios) and the Modernisation of the State Act, the first evidence of an intention to 
decentralize the state.  
Modernisation of the State.  
In 1992 the approval of the Modernisation of the State Act established the Presidential Commission for 
State Modernization (CPME). The initiative includes the consideration of the fact that the process of 
modernising of the State must be a sustained effort and a strategic imperative for the national and the 
international development. It brought reforms with administrative, legislative and judicial elements as 
well as the momentum of reforms that strengthened the electoral organisation. The State Programme 
for De-bureaucratisation was also created, and the status of the Controller General of the Republic 
changed, becoming the Court of Accounts (TSC). In this process the national programme for 
municipal decentralisation was also born, later called the National Programme for Decentralisation and 
Local Development (PRODDEL) for the purpose of promoting the development of municipalities’ 
independence and autonomy from the central government. 
5.5.2 Chronology of the process of Decentralisation  
The decentralisation process in Honduras has been determined by several internal and external 
factors, with development partners being one of them. The process has changed frequently since 
1990 depending on the current level of priority of the  Government as the main element, and also the 
leadership of the representatives of different sectors involved in the issue (especially the Ministry of 
Governance and Justice, now the Ministry of Interior and Population). After 2000 the decentralisation 
process in Honduras can be divided into three stages: a) Momentum of the decentralisation process 
and strengthening the institutional framework, b) Stagnation of the decentralisation process c) 
Reactivation of the decentralisation process. Below follows a description of the development since 
1990. 
1990-2000  
Although the legal framework has existed since the approval of the Law of Municipalities (1991) and 
the Modernisation Act (1992), the Central Government did not follow a genuine decentralisation policy. 
It promoted more an administrative de-concentration of some of the sensitive services for the 
population, such as education or health to the Departmental District with Regional Health and 
Education Bureaus. In this period the Government was unable to comply with the article 91 of the Law 
of Municipalities addressing the transfer of 5% of the government budget from current revenues. 
These events clearly show that the issue of decentralisation had not yet matured. 
In 1994 the Executive Commission for State Decentralisation (CEDE) was established by an executive 
order. The CEDE would appoint the executive secretary to the Technical Unit of Decentralisation, the 
technical body responsible for coordinating the decentralisation and promoting technical and political 
process. The National Program for Decentralisation and Local Development was created as a part of 
CEDE, this was however not adopted as a decentralisation strategy by the government. 
The Decentralisation Process with Momentum 2000-2005  
In 2002 the Decentralisation and Local Development (PRODDEL) was re-established as a 
government programme that addresses decentralisation, with some considerations for sector 
perspective, trying to establish an institutional environment for decentralisation.  
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From that date, agencies such as the World Bank, BID and the GIZ, were important sources of funding 
to boost PRODDEL and reactivate CEDE. It is with this support that the inter-sectoral consultation 
process started, to determine the specific services to decentralise within each sector, in particular 
education, health, water, roads and fire fighting. The Ministry of Governance and Justice was also 
strengthened, thereby generating a strategy to support the efforts of municipalities, re-starting the 
process of training and municipal development, specifically in the areas of administration and 
accountability. The process depended more on the will of the heads of each sector (ministers and 
deputy ministers in some cases) than on the government policy on decentralisation. 
It is in this period, that the Donor Committee for Decentralisation also systematically begun the 
discussions and coordination on decentralisation, focusing efforts on issues aiming at strengthening 
local capacities. Supported by AMHON and the development partners a number of corporations (man-
communidades) were established as an alternative to regional government projects and to unite small 
municipalities for economics of scale. 53 municipal corporations exist in 2010.  
During 2002 to 2005 major efforts were undertaken to decentralise public services to improve their 
quality, for which the government held a series of bilateral consultations with the sectors. However, the 
development process depended more on the goodwill of the ministers of certain sectors, such as 
health with decentralized management models of preventive health, or the mayors' own initiatives 
such as the delegation of environmental licensing. For the water sector, the Law on Water and 
Sanitation, adopted in 2006 gave an important impetus to the decentralisation of the main water 
supply even under operation of the National Potable Water and Sanitation (SANAA), widening the 
participation of municipalities and community organisations in providing and monitoring the service.  
During this period, the Executive Committee for Decentralisation of the State (CEDE) was reunited a 
few times to address these actions politically, and to demand the delegation of certain actions to the 
municipal level from other sectors and institutions such as Infrastructure (Honduran Social Investment 
Fund), Road (Road Fund), Education (Ministry of Education), Environment (Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment). However, it was not possible to define and institutionalize these actions 
due to lack of political will in these sectors. 
An important event during this period (2003) was that, 14 years after the adoption of the Law of 
Municipalities (1990), the transfer of 5% of the budget for current revenues from the central 
government to municipalities was for the first time completed. 
The distribution should be based on the following scale: 
1. 1% for children and adolescents 
2. 1% for the Court of Accounts (TSC) 
3. 2% for women's programs 
4. 13% for health and education. 
5. 68% for infrastructure 
6. 15% for operating expenses 
However, 243 (of 298) municipalities exist with little financial autonomy (municipalities category C and 
D), highly dependent on the transfers from the central government, and with only a limited generation 
of own revenues.  
In 2005, another event was the signing of the Programme to Support Decentralisation in Honduras 
(PROADES). It operated under the PRODDEL to complement other efforts by the government, 
particularly the Ministry of the Governance and Justice in order to promote the decentralisation 
process in municipalities C and D, as there were other funding such as the Municipal Building 
Programme and Local Development (BID 1478) in a final stage of implementation, and aimed at 
strengthening the capabilities of other type of municipalities, mainly category B. The establishment of 
the Decentralisation Forum (TDF) was a part of the conditionality of the EU Cooperation, comprising of 
representatives of the central and local government, civil society and donors. The forum has been 
established to become a genuine forum for discussion and debate on the country's decentralisation 
strategy, but it has so far more been a forum for approving release of tranches from the PROADES.  
Stagnation and coup for the Decentralisation Process 2006-2009 
The period of 2006 to 2009 can be described as a "stagnation" in the process of decentralisation. The 
PROADES did not generate the expected results, some models of decentralisation of public services 
such as environmental licensing delegation experienced a setback due to the unclear legal framework, 
the experiences of Honduran Community Education Program (PROHECO) began to lose credibility 
and were politicised, and the CEDE and the Decentralisation Forum (FTD) forums were not operative. 
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Nonetheless, there were sectors such as health or water and sanitation, which willingly and convinced 
by the improvement of development indicators further consolidated decentralised management 
models. The civil society on the issue during this period became even more invisible, with no signs of 
wanting to coordinate closely with central or local governments. 
With a lack of a clear government policy on decentralisation, the Association of Municipalities of 
Honduras (AMHON) started the momentum with the signing of the  "Pact for Decentralisation", with 
the government seeking a political commitment to streamline the process of decentralisation, and 
marking important milestones, such as: a) increased central government transfers to municipalities, b) 
commitment to establish a National Decentralisation Policy, c) reforms to the Law of Municipalities, 
and d) approval of a Municipal Administrative Career Law. Thus during this period the AMHON 
covered the gap, which  the government left with its limited interest for decentralisation. However, as 
the government did not have a strategy of decentralisation, it was more some particular political and 
legal issues promoted by AMHON and some development partner, which created the conditions for a 
further decentralisation process. 
In the area of decentralisation, the government made some minor efforts and began restructuring the 
institutions (SGJ) and sought to develop strategies to advance in the process. The so-called 
Decentralisation Minimum Agenda was created in 2009, a strategy that seeks to position 
decentralisation as a priority in the government's agenda, looking for resources in the Ministry of 
Finance as part of that process. The instrument was further developed in response to the Ministry of 
Finance, as there was doubt about the use of funds and institutional capacity of the Ministry of 
Governance and Justice in its implementation. The Minimum Agenda was never implemented. It is 
noteworthy that during this period from 2006 to 2009, the institutional decentralisation process was 
severely weakened due to the high turnover of staff at all levels, ministers, deputy ministers, directors 
and technicians, who in a period of 4 years rotated 5 times. 
The Year 2009 
In 2009 the AMHON promoted a series of legal reforms such as reforms to the law of municipalities’ 
articles 12 and 13, which clearly state the principles of autonomy and clarify municipal authority in 
matters of natural resources protection and public services, when appropriate to the municipality.  
The conclusion of the Municipal Administrative Carrier Law was also reach in this period. The law aims 
at achieving some strategic elements for the implementation and development of career development 
within the municipal sector, especially in regard to selection processes for human resources, 
performance appraisal of personnel, training, implementation of career management, and a pilot 
project design for creation of a database with municipal and other local administrative careers.  
In mid-2009, Honduras plunged into political confrontations generated as a result a "coup" or 
"constitutional succession" aggravating the "stagnation" in decentralisation, as well as other cross-
cutting or sectoral issues of national interest. The implications of this political situation were quite 
significant since the first international reaction was to freeze programmes or projects funded until 
clarity was reached on the country's political situation. This break created a space of time out of about 
a year, until gradually, after the elections and the new government installed in January 2010, the 
strategies were re-initiated with a new approach – "regionalization". 
Reactivation of the Decentralisation Process 2009-2011 
2009-2010 
The new government established a frank and direct dialogue with municipal mayors, thus establishing 
as part of its first actions, called "Government of National Reconciliation” a gradual increase in the 
transfers of the national budget for current revenues to the municipalities, from 5% to 11% by 2013. 
Presently, the actual transfer is 6.5%, according to the general budget of Honduras. The AMHON and 
the mayors demand 7% at the end of 2010, which was agreed upon by the GoH. 
The Law on Municipal Administrative Carrier was also adopted in 2010 and is expected to come into 
force in August of 2011.  With its implementation the expectation is a reduction in political patronage, 
more professionalism and technical sustainability, and in particular avoiding large staff turnovers after 
each election.  
Another of the first actions of the present government (2010 - 2014) was the promotion of The Country 
Vision Law 2010-2038 (published in 2010) and the National Plan 2010-2014. The objective 4 – "A 
transparent, modern, accountable, efficient and competitive state by 2038 include "to achieve 
decentralisation of 40% of the public investments to the municipal level". It also establishes the new 
planning system, subdividing the country into 6 regions and 13 sub-regions, identified and mapped 
according to the most important river basins and sub basins of the Honduran territory. In the medium 
term, it is expected to support budgeting by regions and a bottom-up planning system from the 
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communities and municipalities based on regional planning and aligned with GoH policies at the 
national level. This effort has created regional development councils, composed of local and 
departmental authorities, civil society and cooperation. This scheme is still in process of organisation.  
2010-2011 
In early 2010 and according to the provisions of the GoH, the Ministry of Governance and Justice, now 
the Ministry of Interior and Population was made responsible for overseeing the country's 
decentralisation process. In this function, the Ministry is discussing with the development partners, 
AMHON and other central government institutions various initiatives that are expected to be the long-
term foundations for a genuine process of decentralisation. Such is the case for renewed consultation 
process of the National Decentralisation Policy, efforts initiated since 2008, and the continuation of 
PROADES, including the reactivation of the Decentralisation Form (FTD), and other support 
programmes of the development partners. No political efforts to reactivate the Executive Commission 
for State Decentralisation (CEDE) have been observed. 
5.5.3 Government Structure Today 
The country is currently basically governed on two levels. The intermediate level is represented by the 
departmental governments, which lack legitimacy because they are not democratically elected, they 
are appointed by the President. Since the new constitution of 1982 and the Law of Municipalities 
(1990) they have no real interference with the administration or municipal level. 
Honduran Territorial Division 
INTERMEDIATE GOVERNMENT 
Territorial 
Organisation 
Executive 
Departments 
Authority:  Departmental Governors. 
Designation: Appointed by the executive branch. 
Function: National Executive Representative of the Department. 
 
Level of 
Government 
Executive Legislative 
Municipalities* 
Authority: Mayor. 
Term: 4 years. 
Designation: Elected by popular vote. 
Requirements: Honduran, born in the town 
or have lived for more than 5 consecutive 
years in the same, being over 18 and literate. 
Emoluments: Not designed. 
Authority: Municipal council 
Term: 4 years 
Designation: Elected by the people. 
Requirements: Honduran, born in the 
town or have lived for more than 5 
consecutive years in the same, being over 
18 years and literate. 
Emoluments: Depending on the economic 
capacity of the municipality, members 
receive diet for attending sessions or a 
salary commissions for your work. Entitled 
to per diem and travel expenses. 
*Municipalities are further divided into cities, villages and hamlets, and cities in colonies and 
neighbourhoods. 
 
5.5.4 Progress in Decentralisation of sectors. 
Decentralisation of sector public services in Honduras does not respond to a policy or strategy of the 
GoH, but rather to pilot initiatives supported by development partners in several areas of the country. 
Some of these initiatives have achieved very good results, such as water and health, and it is unlikely 
that these models would be reversed. Other experiences show uneven development progress and 
subsequent setbacks such as the area of Environmental management. Below is presented 
experiences within different sectors: 
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Services Progress and Constraints Head of Sector 
International 
Cooperation  
Health  
Delivery Basic Package Health and implementing 
Management Models Decentralized Health Services 
through Municipalities or corporations, involving 
communities.  Today there are 63 municipalities 
implementing these services. 
Health Secretary 
AMHON, 
Municipalities, 
Associations, Civil 
Society 
BID, BM 
Education 
Implementation of Community Self-Management 
Programs, such as the Community Education Program 
(PROHECO) and the Program of Local Education 
Development Associations (ADEL), models of 
educational management with the active participation of 
parents organized. Similarly, the recently passed 
Education Act, seeks to delegate to municipalities the 
authority to supervise classes, maintenance work, school 
vouchers, among others. Today, according to the Ministry 
of Education, 36 municipalities have assumed the 
implementation of the education service. 
Ministry of Education, 
National Congress 
BM, BID 
Water service 
and 
Sanitation 
The de-facto decentralization of the consolidation of 
water boards 5 000 approximately and the gradual 
transfer of SANAA water systems (National) to the 
municipalities that operate this service, some under 
different models such as the concession arrangement, 
leasing, special units of the Municipalities and Municipal 
Enterprises. The Law on Water and Sanitation is not yet 
fully implemented. SANAA has transferred more than 15 
pipelines from central to municipal water systems and 16 
pending the transfer, the limiting factor is the payment of 
labor liabilities. 
National Council on 
Water Supply and 
Sanitation (CONASA), 
National Water and 
Sewerage Service 
(SANAA) Regulator 
Water and Sanitation 
UE, BM 
(PROMOSA), 
BID, PNUD, 
Coop Suiza 
Environmental 
management 
Delegation of the environmental licensing processes 
central to the municipal level. There have been 7 
experiences with this model; however the legal 
framework is still unclear, forcing many of these to give 
up this model.  Due to this legal issues, today there are 
only 5 municipalities implementing the licensing. 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and 
Environment 
(SERNA), 
Municipalities 
DANIDA, UE 
Infrastructure 
Implementation of Decentralization Project Cycle 
Operations, enhancing the concept of "Projects 
Implemented by the Communities.  It is a decentralisation 
model for infrastructure services and it responds more to 
demands of a local government but is not a 
decentralisation model or policy, and sometimes 
depending on the political factor or the good negotiation 
skill of a local council. The Social Investment Fund (FHIS) 
transfers the capital so the municipality can administer it 
directly for infrastructure. On the other hand FHIS has the 
attribution to respond to a demand implementing the 
infrastructure directly in a decentralized manner. 
Honduran Social 
Investment Fund 
(FHIS) 
BID, BM, KFW 
Tourism and 
Security 
Strengthening Municipal Tourist Commission for Tourism 
and Safety in preventive security approach, the 
involvement of citizens in public safety tables 
Honduran Institute of 
Tourism and Ministry 
of Security 
AECI 
As a priority, the decentralisation of important public services such as water service, health, education, 
safety, environmental management and infrastructure has been devolved with specific actions in each 
sector, including efforts to harmonise regulations, new legal frames and management and 
coordination of the institutionalism. However, sometimes the efforts are too dispersed, giving the 
impression that the actions are not a priority or that sufficient political will does not exist.  
In parallel, new laws have created a direct impact on decentralisation and local development to 
improve or simplify the management of some resources; such is the case of the Education Incentive 
Law (2011), Property Law, Water and Sanitation Law, the Forestry Law, among others, which give 
greater involvement of communities and municipalities in the provision of services.  
The decentralisation of municipal finance has also been one of the most important strategies in the 
context of decentralisation. The main task has been to articulate the various municipal financial 
management systems, and support the installation and operation in most municipalities. The main 
systems are the Financial Revenue Management System (SAFT) and the Municipal Management 
System, which the government intends to link with the System of Central Government Finances 
(SIAFI). Development partners, including the EU have been and will remain crucial in this process.  
According to the amendments to the Law of Municipalities (2009) and in the framework of the Pact for 
decentralisation, the Government and the Association of Municipalities of Honduras (AMHON) have 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Honduras; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
38 
agreed to increase the transfer from the budgeted central government revenues to municipalities from 
current 5% 2009, to 8% in 2011 and finally to 11% by 2013. 
5.5.5 Municipal Strengthening in the context of decentralisation and local development. 
The good coordination between the government and cooperation partners resulted in the design and 
approval of the National Training and Technical Assistance for the Municipalities, which is coordinated 
by the National Committee for Municipal Training and Technical Assistance (CONCAM). The aim of 
the policy is to provide more efficient services from the Government at a central level to local 
governments. One of the most important objectives is to maintain the effort in the implementation of 
actions to strengthen the municipalities, mainly led by the Ministry of Governance and Justice (now 
Ministry of Interior and Population) and the Association of Municipalities of Honduras (AMHON). 
As part of the reform to the Municipalities’ Law in 2009, municipal corporations are mentioned, 
although these in fact have been consolidated in the last decade throughout the territory, to address 
social, economic and environmental challenges. Currently 53 corporations exist, most operating with 
the support of Inter-municipal technical units.  
The Law of the Municipal Administrative Career has been adopted recently, strongly supported by the 
development partners. It is expected to ensure that during the transitional period after the municipal 
elections, the high staff turnover will be avoided  and staff management will be professionalised. The 
law was adopted in 2010 and is expected to come into force in August of 2011.  
5.5.6 Land Management (regionalization) 
Under the Land Act and the new national plan (Vision 2038), there is a new approach to land 
management, which is built on the division of national territory into 6 regions. This approach is 
expected by the GoH to boost regional economic development in a sustainable manner and allowing a 
redistribution of central government budget resources based on these regions.  
5.5.7 Interinstitutional Coordination in the Decentralisation Process 
The monitoring of the national programme for decentralisation and local development (PRODDEL), 
and the coordination of the various actors, who interact with the national and local level, has gradually 
strengthened the Executive Commission for State Decentralisation (CEDE) and recently the 
Decentralisation Forum (FTD). These two bodies coordinated by the Technical Unit of Decentralisation 
(UTD) in SEIP bring together the political and technical sector of the government, civil society and the 
development partners, who periodically review the progress of the decentralisation process. However, 
the country's political problems, the lack of a plan to enhance the roles of CEDE, TFD and the 
Technical Unit of Decentralisation, are elements that hinder the sustainability of the efforts and 
achievements in the process, creating a gap in the continuity and systematization of results, and 
promoting dispersal or atomisation of the management of information.  
5.5.8 Role of external cooperation and the Association of Municipalities of Honduras 
(AMHON) in the process of Decentralisation and Local Development  
The development partners and AMHON have been crucial in keeping the decentralisation an the 
government agenda. It would hardly have been possible to move forward, with all the political 
setbacks in the process in the last decade without the support of AMHON.   
AMHON, created in 1961, is an association chaired by its elected president and comprising 243 
mayors. The Executive Director of the AMHON is the technical arm and manager, who is a 
professional administrator. AMHON’s funding comes from 1% of the transfers from the government, 
which is automatically subtracted from the allocations to each municipality and placed in the accounts 
of the association. To address the main challenges of municipal development, AMHON contains a 
number of technical units within its structure to promote the strengthening of municipal management, 
decentralisation, local development and policy advocacy.14 
The BID and the EU have in the last decade been the main contributors to the decentralisation 
process, through loan and grant funding, respectively. The actions of the Municipal Development 
Programme (BID loan) and the PROADES have been complementary.  
                                                     
14
 AMHON Structure: Gerencia de Comunicaciones, Gerencia de Administración Financiera, Planificación, Asesoría Legal, 
Gerencia de Incidencia Política y Gerencia de Descentralización y Desarrollo Local. 
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5.5.9 Challenges, Constraints and Gaps by 2011 
There is not enough clarity in the administrative and technical government authorities on the use of 
budget support funds. Most of the beneficiaries, be it central government and local government 
officials perceive that under this mechanism, the use of funds does not meet the decentralisation 
purposes. 
Another challenge is to improve the institutional framework for decentralisation, clarifying roles and 
strengthening management and policy makers who are responsible for coordination of the 
decentralisation process, and to establish indicators that will gradually measure progress, constraints 
and lessons learned of the decentralisation process in Honduras. 
A more permanent character to the Technical Unit for Decentralisation in SEIP should be provided, 
strong enough to: 
 coordinate the CEDE and FTD  
 be able to maintain and make an impact on the central and local governments, civil society 
and development partners and maintaining a broad cross-sectoral dialogue 
 revisit the lessons learned from the decentralisation process in recent years e.g. using the 
successful models for the sectors such as health and water, 
 promote orderly decentralisation of public services always ensuring legal, economic and 
technical coordination 
 Ensuring a real governmental political will reflected in transfers to municipalities 
 build the  strategies according to the local requirements and priorities and 
 ensuring transparency at all levels  
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5.6 Annex 6: PROADES Indicators  
Calculation of PROADES release of flexible tranche in 2007 
The annex explains how the flexible tranche for PROADES was calculated in 2007 based on the 
development in 2006.   
Valoración de Indicadores de Tramo Variable 2007 (resultados año 2006) 
Indicador 1 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
Gastos en sueldos y salarios del 
Gobierno central en porcentaje del 
PIB  
9.6% 9.7% 
(Parcialmente 
cumplido) 
10% 0.35 
La información reportada por el Banco Central de Honduras con respecto al ejercicio presupuestario 
2006 arroja un monto de Lps. 17,025.6 millones en el rubro de Sueldos y Salarios lo que representa 
el 9.7% del PIB, confirmando lo programado originalmente por el FMI.  
El monto más significativo corresponde al rubro de maestros que representa el 4% del PIB. El rubro 
de maestros es también aquel que refleja el mayor incremento durante el año 2006 representando 
Lps. 747.6 millones. 
Aún cuando para el año 2006 el resultado alcanzado en este indicador (9.7% del PIB) se acerca 
mucho a la meta esperada del 9,6% del PIB, resulta claro que para el año 2007, por decisiones 
tomadas en el año 2006 (acuerdos salariales alcanzados en los sectores de Educación y de Salud), 
se alejará de forma significativa de la meta esperada. En el 2007, un informe de ASDI destaca que 
"Dos de cada tres lempiras de los fondos de condonación estimados para el 2006 se destinaban a 
asuntos relacionados con las promesas de la campaña del Presidente Zelaya, tal como el salario 
para aumentar la fuerza policial, salarios a maestros, médicos y otros rubros relacionados (Informe 
país Honduras 2006, pag. 50). 
La Delegación propone considerar esta meta como parcialmente cumplida.   
 
Indicador 2 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
Presentación del Plan de Actividades 
Anual para el próximo año de 
PRODDEL, así como el informe de 
ejecución presupuestaria de las 
líneas del presupuesto vinculadas a 
PRODDEL del año anterior  
S/N Parcialmente 
Cumplido 
10% 0.35 
El POA 2007 y el informe de ejecución física y financiera 2006 del PRODDEL fueron presentados en 
septiembre del 2007. El POA fue discutido durante el quinto FTD (28 de septiembre de 2007). Los 
documentos fueron presentados muy tarde en el año 2007, y el impacto de un Plan de Actividad 
Anual redactado en Septiembre del mismo año es muy relativo. La Delegación propone considerar 
esta meta como parcialmente cumplida. 
 
Indicador 3 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
Apreciación positiva por la Comision 
Europea (basado en opiniones de la, 
Sociedad Civil y otros donantes) de la 
ejecución de la ERP por parte del 
GdH 
S/N Parcialmente 
cumplido 
10% 0.35 
- En su "Informe sobre Revisión de la Medición de la Pobreza en Honduras" de marzo 2008, el Banco 
Mundial destaca de mayo 2005 a mayo 2007 una "disminución significativa tanto en la pobreza 
general (del 65.3% de los hogares al 60.2%) como en la pobreza extrema (del 47.1% al 35.9% de los 
hogares)". Al mirar  más de cerca, se nota que la reducción de la pobreza extrema se acelera entre 
mayo 2006 y mayo 2007 (pag. 3). 
- En el informe del Fondo Monetario Internacional de junio 2007 "Joint Staff Advisory Note on the 
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Indicador 3 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
Fourth Annual Progress Report of the Poverty Reduction Strategy", queda claro que si los resultados 
de la ERP fueron modestos entre 2001 y 2006, la mejoría (caída de las cifras de pobreza) se debe 
principalmente al año 2006 (nota 2 pag. 1).  
- Ahora, los informes de los donantes son menos positivos cuando se trata de evaluar la ejecución por 
parte del Gobierno de Honduras de la ERP durante el 2006. El mismo informe del FMI reconoce que 
el cambio de personal (debido al cambio de Gobierno al principio de 2006) ha afectado de una 
manera u otra la implementación de la ERP durante el año 2006 (pag. 3). El documento de ASDI 
"Que pasó con la ERP?" de Abril 2007, abunda en el mismo sentido señalando que se creó bastante 
"confusión acerca de la gerencia de la ERP" con la nominación del Ministro de Cultura como Jefe del 
Gabinete Social y sobre el papel del Comisionado de la ERP (conclusiones pag. 49). Más grave 
todavía, el mismo informe destaca en sus conclusiones (pag. 50) que "se esperaba que el 2006 fuera 
un año de implementación acelerada y notoria de la ERP, dado que Honduras alcanzó el punto de 
culminación de las negociaciones HIPC apenas un año antes. La realidad fue otra, ya que el grado de 
implementación de las políticas de reducción de pobreza fue bajo". 
- En conclusión, si existe un consenso de los donantes sobre los relativamente buenos resultados de 
reducción de la pobreza para el año 2006, también están de acuerdo para presentar sus dudas en 
cuanto al impacto de la ERP ejecutada en 2006 por el nuevo Gobierno. 
Frente a esta aparente contradicción, la Delegación propone que se considere esta meta como 
parcialmente cumplida. 
 
Indicador 4 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
Crecimiento promedio anual de los 
ingresos tributarios de las 
municipalidades C y D 
15% 26.33% 
(Cumplido) 
10% 0.7 
Según la información remitida por el GdH, el crecimiento promedio anual de los ingresos tributarios de 
las municipalidades C y D entre 2005 y 2006 es de 26,33%, cifra confirmada por la ATI del 
PROADES. Esta buena cifra se debe en gran parte al hecho que el crecimiento el año anterior había 
sido  apenas de 2,7% (posiblemente por razón electoral), constituyendo una base muy baja para 
2005. Pero de todos modos, la meta 2006 de 15% está superada y la Delegación propone considerar 
esta meta como totalmente cumplida.  
 
Indicador 5 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
El % de municipios C y D que integran 
el enfoque de ordenamiento territorial 
en su PEDM (Plan Estratégico de 
Desarrollo Municipal)  
10% 15% 
(Cumplido) 
10% 0.7 
La inclusión de enfoques de OT en los PEDM y su análisis para poder determinar la calidad de esos 
criterios y su incidencia en el momento de construcción de los PEDM, sería complejo y largo de 
determinar y supondría la realización de una consultoría en si misma que, ex post, pudiera reconstruir 
los procesos de formulación de los PEDM y verificar en que medida estos fueron “teñidos” por 
criterios de OT. Hasta el momento, el cumplimiento o no de las metas establecidas en este indicador 
ha sido interpretada bajo un criterio formal: la existencia de PEDM y de Planes de OT en municipios C 
y D. Es también el método utilizado este año. En este sentido, pudimos evidenciar la existencia al 
final del año 2006 de Planes de Ordenamiento Territorial y PEDM en 35 municipios C y D, 
representando el 15% de los 223 municipios C y D. La Delegación considera esta meta como 
totalmente cumplida. 
 
 
Indicador 6 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
El % de municipio C y D auditados 
bien directamente por el TSC o bien 
20% 20.5% 
(Cumplido) 
10% 0.7 
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por una firma de auditoría privada 
contratada por el TSC  
Si entendemos este indicador de manera cumulativa, la meta es que entre los años 2005 y 2006 se 
haya auditado el 20% de los municipios C y D, o sea 42 municipios. Después de una revisión de 
todas las auditorias realizadas por el TSC a los municipios, podemos afirmar que 55 municipios C y D 
fueron auditados durante los años 2005 y 2006, y que 44 auditorías habían sido presentadas 
oficialmente a las autoridades municipales al 31/12/2006 (11 auditorías realizadas en 2006 fueron 
presentadas en enero o febrero del 2007). De todos modos, con 44 auditorías debidamente 
presentadas al 31/12/2006, la meta está totalmente cumplida. 
 
Indicador 7 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
El % de municipios C y D que cuenta 
con una auditoría social de su 
ejecución presupuestaria 
40% 0% 
(No 
Cumplido) 
10% 0 
Todas las auditorías sociales presentadas como evidencias fueron realizadas en Agosto/septiembre 
del 2007. No se pueden recibir. La Delegación considera esta meta como no cumplida. 
 
Indicador 8 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
Presentación de informes semestrales 
de Monitoreo y Seguimiento que 
permita medir de manera pertinente, 
simple y verificable los avances del 
proceso de descentralización 
2 informes 
por año 
0 
(No 
cumplido) 
10% 0 
La evidencia presentada para este indicador es el “Informe de Ejecución. Plan Operativo y 
Presupuesto PRODDEL 2006” presentado en septiembre de 2007. Nos parece difícil considerarlo 
como un documento de monitoreo y seguimiento del proceso de descentralización. Para poder 
llamarlo así, debería identificar y analizar algunas debilidades y fortalezas estratégicas del proceso de 
descentralización, así como algunos factores que influyeron en ellas y procurar/proponer medidas de 
corrección y de prevención para un trabajo aun más eficiente y eficaz en el futuro. En vez de esto, el 
informe de PRODDEL 2006, como todos los otros informes del PRODDEL hasta ahora, es muy 
descriptivo y consiste en la comparación, en términos cuantitativos, de lo ejecutado contra lo 
planificado (medición de la ejecución de insumos). La Delegación considera esta meta como no 
cumplida.  
 
Indicador 9 Meta Ejecución Peso € 
Apreciación positiva de la CE sobre el 
avance en la mejora de la gestión de 
las finanzas públicas, en base a 
informes de SEFIN y el TSC 
(cumplimiento de los planes de acción 
derivado del CFAA, CPAR y TCR) 
S/N Parcialmente 
cumplido 
20% 0.7 
El proceso de elaboración de la "Matriz de Indicadores de la Mejoras en el Desempeño de las 
Finanzas Publicas", instrumento de seguimiento y valoración de las mejoras de las finanzas publicas, 
ha sufrido un retraso substancial y su versión final ha sido acordada en el curso del 2006. 
De acuerdo con la información proporcionada por la Secretaria de Finanzas y por el Tribunal Superior 
de Cuentas, durante este año se avanzó en la mejora de la gestión de las finanzas públicas. Los 
avances se registran principalmente en el Sistema de Compras y Contrataciones (ONCAE) y en la 
interconexión institucional, funcionamiento y utilización del Sistema de Administración Financiera 
Integrada (SIAFI). El Gobierno informa que en el 2006 se cumplieron las metas de los indicadores de 
esta matriz.  
Por lo tanto, la Delegación propone considerar esta meta como parcialmente cumplida. 
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  Ejecución  € 
TOTAL  55%  3.85 
 
Nota 1: La Categorización Municipal para Requerimientos de Fortalecimiento Institucional, la cual fue 
elaborada por la SGJ desde 1999, no ha sufrido modificaciones hasta el último año. Según esta 
categorización, son 156 municipios C y 67 municipios D, para un total C y D de 223 municipios, base 
para los cálculos de esta tabla.  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Honduras; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
44 
5.7 Annex 7. Municipal Revenues and Expenditures 2002-2009 
Actual, 2009 prices and index (2002=100). 
Municipal Revenues 2002 to 2009, Le 
Year 
Total (Ingresos 
Recaudados) 
Local revenues 
(ingresos corrientes) 
Transfers 
(transferencias)  
2002 2.978.237.178 1.517.263.838 476.826.999 
2003 3.529.103.035 1.893.206.737 537.241.544 
2004 4.054.618.162 2.050.291.979 644.402.972 
2005 4.010.145.651 2.165.197.158 889.905.438 
2006 6.316.129.058 2.875.005.759 1.395.294.633 
2007 7.139.446.940 3.165.120.454 1.581.314.748 
2008 6.128.277.055 2.404.512.500 1.484.399.515 
2009 8.585.370.950 3.610.450.428 2.090.360.727 
Municipal Revenues 2002 to 2009, Le, 2009 prices 
Year 
Total (Ingresos 
Recaudados) 
Local revenues 
(ingresos corrientes) 
Transfers (transferencias)  
2002 5.156.508.278 2.626.984.714 825.576.413 
2003 5.689.248.421 3.052.028.612 866.084.264 
2004 6.035.868.342 3.052.147.442 959.284.289 
2005 5.486.592.953 2.962.375.062 1.217.549.019 
2006 8.177.221.622 3.722.146.751 1.806.428.168 
2007 8.647.508.638 3.833.687.216 1.915.335.047 
2008 6.659.573.821 2.612.973.981 1.613.090.933 
2009 8.585.370.950 3.610.450.428 2.090.360.727 
Municipal Revenues 2002 to 2009, constant prices, index 2002=100 
Year 
Total (Ingresos 
Recaudados) 
Local revenues (ingresos 
corrientes) 
Transfers (transferencias)  
2002 100 100 100 
2003 110 116 105 
2004 117 116 116 
2005 106 113 147 
2006 159 142 219 
2007 168 146 232 
2008 129 99 195 
2009 166 137 253 
Source SEIP and www.econstats.com (inflation index) 
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Municipal Expenditures 2002 to 2009, Le 
Year All expenses (Total egresos) 
Operacional costs 
(gastos de 
funcionamiento) 
Priceindex 
(www.econstats.com) 
2002 2.915.276.043 1.406.791.142 121,48 
2003 3.575.750.472 1.666.851.961 130,47 
2004 4.200.338.500 1.743.461.987 141,29 
2005 2.768.586.093 1.360.899.214 153,73 
2006 3.748.518.657 2.210.557.299 162,46 
2007 8.791.784.286 3.952.133.116 173,65 
2008 6.368.094.158 2.551.221.948 193,55 
2009 8.445.957.702 3.673.082.315 210,33 
 
Municipal Expenditures 2002 to 2009, Le, 2009 price level 
Year All expenses (Total egresos) 
Operacional costs 
(gastos de 
funcionamiento) 
2002 5.047.497.614 2.435.712.718 
2003 5.764.448.507 2.687.123.269 
2004 6.252.793.523 2.595.387.923 
2005 3.787.918.513 1.861.952.329 
2006 4.853.046.468 2.861.913.804 
2007 10.648.868.349 4.786.940.158 
2008 6.920.182.094 2.772.402.544 
2009 8.445.957.702 3.673.082.315 
 
Municipal Expenditures 2002 to 2009, 2009 price, index 2002=100 
Year All expenses (Total egresos) 
Operacional costs 
(gastos de 
funcionamiento) 
2002 100 100 
2003 114 110 
2004 124 107 
2005 75 76 
2006 96 117 
2007 211 197 
2008 137 114 
2009 167 151 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons and to provide recommendations to help 
for opportune and timely support to decentralisation processes; it shall cover aid delivery over the 
period 2000-2009 taking into account the different entry points used by the European Commission 
(EC)/ European Union (EU) to delivery its support to decentralisation processes. This evaluation is 
partly based on a number of country missions to be carried out during the field phase.1 
The field visit to Lebanon had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. By no means, this note should be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered at the single country level, as they are 
formulated to be answered on the global level using the whole information collected from the desk 
study and the different field phase country studies. 
The reasons for selecting Lebanon as one of the field studies were: 
 Within European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) it is one of the countries that have attached 
relative high level of importance to support to decentralisation/ local governance – it ranks 
among the top 3 in terms of budget allocation (together with Syria and Jordan), 
 It represents an interesting case of “bottom up support” to decentralisation common in country 
contexts with lack of Government direction for local government and decentralisation reforms, 
 It also represents a case of support to decentralisation/ local governance in a (post-) conflict 
situation/ fragile state. 
The field visit was undertaken between 23/05 and 31/05/2011. The evaluation team was composed of 
Dr. Karam Karam (national consultant) and Dr. Per Tidemand (team leader). 
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research foci 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Lebanon has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
 Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support to decentralisation – has the general EC/EU 
framework for support to decentralisation facilitated programming of relevant interventions? 
 Evolution of the EC/EU approach and responsiveness to the special context - the relative 
importance of in-depth analytical sector analysis; 
 Documentation of possible results of local development interventions on the overall 
decentralisation process  
1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
The case study is based on 11 days of work (7 days of field work, 4 days of travel, documentary 
review and report writing), which obviously limits the extent to which detailed assessments can be 
provided. However, the data collection was eased by the significant existing relevant literature and 
keen interest of all stakeholders met during the field work in the country.  
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
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development partners, as well as the overall decentralisation process in the country. Much additional 
documentation was collected during the fieldwork. 
In addition to studying the documentation, the team interviewed key informants with relevant 
knowledge on the chosen interventions, as well as informants offering broader insights into the 
evolution of the decentralisation context in the country (see table below for summary of institutions met 
and annex 1 for details of persons met). 
Table 1 Overview of interviews carried out 
Delegation of the European Union (EUD) Focus group discussion with 6 Mayors 
World Bank Field visits to Union of Municipalities Joumeh Aakar 
United Cities and Local Governments Municipality of Jbeil-Byblos 
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities Economic and Social Fund for Development (ESFD) 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/ Art 
Gold 
Italian Development Cooperation 
Ministry of Administrative Reform  Agence Francaise de Développement 
Advisor to Prime Minister Non Government Organisation (NGO) and research 
institutes 
Ministry of Finance (MOF)  
The team undertook a field visit to the Union of Municipalities Joumeh Aakar and the Municipality of 
Jbeil-Byblos. A focus group meeting was held with a group of mayors as well as a separate group 
interview with the core team working on local development issues within the EUD, but otherwise the 
preferred interview methodology was individual in-depth interviews focused on the relevant EQs and 
the working hypotheses. The information deemed of critical importance was subjected to a process of 
triangulation to ensure validity and internal consistency. 
Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field phase, prioritisation was necessary 
and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ reviews/ monitoring missions that had 
already been undertaken. Rather the team relied extensively on the related reports and attempted to 
extract more general findings, trends and recurring themes that are of relevance to a broader 
audience. The dialogue with informants also centred around distilling broader lessons and themes, 
rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. To reiterate, this country note is 
thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of the overall decentralisation 
portfolio of the EC/EU. Rather it is an attempt to learn from the Lebanon experience and to encourage 
wider reflections on how best to structure and focus EC/EU assistance to decentralisation processes. 
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2 Short description of the country context and EC support to 
decentralisation 
2.1 Decentralisation and Local Governments in Lebanon 
2.1.1 Overall Structure of Government2  
Lebanon is a unitary state with four tiers of administration: Central, Mohafaza, Qada, and municipality. 
The first three are tiers of central government, whereas the municipalities are local governments with 
locally elected councils. The total population is approximately 4,4 million – spread across almost a 
thousand municipalities – suggesting a relative fragmented system of administration compounded by 
significant variation in size of municipalities (see further below). 
The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) exercises its authority over the management, budget 
and finances of all municipalities through each of the Qaemakam, the Mohafez, and the Minister of 
Interior and Municipalities. The Qaemakam and Mohafez provide their approval (set at certain financial 
thresholds) of budgets, contracts, authorization of works, disposal of municipal property, approval of 
donations, and dispute resolution. The MoIM exercises oversight at a higher level including 
organizational issues such as the formation of unions or the creation of municipal units; specifications 
regarding supplies, works, and services; compensations for municipal president and vice-president; 
and disciplinary sanctions. In addition, the MoIM exercises its authority over the budget and finances 
of 50 municipalities, which are subject to the oversight of the Controller General. 
The Mohafaza does not enjoy any legal personality or independent authority. It is an administrative 
subdivision formed by the central government and headed by a grade one civil servant appointed by 
the Council of Ministers (CoM) upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior. The duties of the 
governor of the Mohafaza, or the Mohafez, are primarily administrative and involve local 
implementation of policies established by the central government and the coordination among central 
government offices and officials within the Mohafaza. The Mohafez represents all the ministries except 
for the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defense. 
The functions of the Mohafez, according to articles 4 to 26 of Decree 116/1959, include the following: 
implementing laws and regulations; putting into practice political directives from the central 
government and informing the government of the general political situation in the Mohafaza; 
 administering all matters in relation to (personnel status, and inspecting and controlling all 
central, 
 government bureaus and civil servants in the Mohafaza; guaranteeing public security, 
personal freedom, and private property; and coordinating events, when required, in 
collaboration with internal, 
 security forces placed under his command. 
In total, Lebanon„s Mohafazat, with the exception of Beirut, are subdivided into 26 Qadas. Like the 
Mohafaza, the Qada is a geographical subdivision and enjoys neither legal personality nor financial 
autonomy. Of the 25 Qadas, five are administered directing directly by the Mohafez because they are 
capitals of their respective Mohafazat. The remaining Qadas are administered by a District Governor 
Qaemakam, usually a grade two civil servant, appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the 
recommendation of the Minister of Interior. The Qaemakam performs in his Qada similar functions to 
those performed by the Mohafez, except that he does not represent the various ministries of the 
central government. The duties of the Qaemakam, according to articles 27 to 46 of Decree 116/1959, 
include the following: supervising the general situation in the Qada and informing the government of 
the developments through the Mohafez; administering the regional offices of various ministries in the 
Qada as well as controlling and supervising employees; implementing rules and regulations and 
preserving public security and order; and supervising the agricultural sector, granting hunting and 
building licenses, imposing health measures, and appointing certain low-level employees. 
                                                     
2
 For additional details see Annex 5. This section 2.1 is largely ad-verbatim extract from the key report: Republic 
Of Lebanon, Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, First Municipal Infrastructure Project, Municipal Finance 
Studies Program, Final Strategic Framework, Submitted by: International City/County Management Association 
(ICMA) With its subcontractors: Consultation and Research Institute (CRI) TCG International (TCGI) February 8, 
2011. 
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2.1.2 The Municipal Sector 
According to articles 2 to 5 of Decree-Law 118/1977, a municipality is established by a ministerial 
decision that sets the name of the municipality, its location, and its geographical boundaries. 
Not all municipalities in Lebanon are subject to the same administrative or financial laws or 
procedures. It is essentially the council of ministers to decide which municipalities to be subject to 
which type of oversight. Thus, only 41 municipalities are subject to the General Accounting Law of 
1963 and the remaining 904 are subject to Decree 5595/1982 which governs the accounting and 
financial matters of local governments. On the other hand, only 46 municipalities are subject to the 
Court of Audit, which has financial control over the larger municipalities though both pre- and post-
audits. In addition, 50 municipalities are assigned chief controllers from the MoIM, who exercise 
control over municipal budgets, contracts, revenues, and financial operations and transactions. Finally, 
only 10 municipalities are subject to the Civil Service Board, which oversees all municipal decisions 
regarding employees, administrative organization, and salary scale. 
Municipal authorities consist of two major bodies: A decision making body represented by the 
Municipal Council (MC), and an executive authority embodied in the Municipal Council President 
(MCP). The Municipal Council is elected for a period of 6 years. The Municipal Council elects the 
Municipal Council President. In 1998, municipal elections were held for the first time since 1964. Since 
then, elections have been held periodically. The most recent municipal elections were held during the 
month of May 2010. 
The 1977 Decree-Law entrusts municipalities with a broad range of tasks. It stipulates that any work 
having a public character or utility within the area of the municipality falls under the jurisdiction of the 
MC. According to article 49, the MC is in charge, among others, of the following: 
 Formulate and adopt the municipality„s annual budget; 
 Determine the tax rate and fee to be collected as allowed by law;7 
 Manage the municipal funds; 
 Plan, improve, and expand the streets, establish gardens and public places, and execute 
designs related to municipality, etc.; and 
 Establish shops, parks, racing places, playground, toilets, museums, hospitals, dispensaries, 
shelters, libraries, etc. 
Furthermore, based on article 50 of the above Decree-Law, the MC is entitled to establish or manage 
directly or indirectly, among others, of the following: 
 Public schools, nurseries, and technical schools; 
 Public hospitals, sanatoriums, dispensaries, and other health establishments and institutions; 
 Museums, public libraries, theatres, cinemas, amusement centres, clubs, playgrounds and 
other public and sports shops as well as social, cultural and artistic institutions; and 
 Local means of public transportation. 
According to Decree 2339/2009, there are 945 municipalities in 2009 compared to 713 municipalities 
in 1998.  The number of municipal council members is determined by the size of the population. For 
instance, municipalities whose registered population is less than 2,000 have 9 members and those 
between 2,001 and 4,000 have 12 members, etc. Only the municipalities of Beirut and Tripoli have 24 
council members. 
It is worth pointing out that one of the major constraints that impedes governmental planning, 
especially on the regional and local levels, is the absence of any reliable data on the actual resident 
population„ of Lebanese cities and towns. The reason is that Lebanese citizens are registered in the 
civil status registries of their towns of origin which more often than not, are different from their places 
of residence. As a result, municipal planning and budgeting, and even municipal shares of their fiscal 
transfers from central government (the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF) – see further below) are 
related to the size of the registered population and not the number of actual residents. In addition to 
hampering local management, this situation distorts the democratic process with most people living in 
communities they do not vote in and municipal councils that are not in effect accountable to their 
actual constituencies. 
There is high level of imbalance in the distribution of the population in Lebanon across local 
governments. Just 16% of the population is registered in half of the municipalities and the largest 10% 
of municipalities contain 42% of the population. 
2.1.3 Municipal Finance  
The expenditures of Lebanese municipalities have increased significantly in real terms from 128.012 
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million Lebanese Lira (LL) (86 million Unites States Dollars (USD)) in 1999 to LL 253.344 million (213 
million USD) in 2008, an annual average increase of 10,6%.The rise in municipal expenditures is 
higher than central government expenditures (excluding debt) as the share of municipal spending to 
central government spending increased from 3,6% in 1999 to 5,6% in 2008. 
Despite these increases, the spending of local governments in Lebanon compared to those in other 
countries remains low.  
Municipal revenues have also witnessed significant increase. More specifically, total local revenues 
rose in real terms from 247,969 million LL (165 million USD) in 1999 to 457,067 million LL (305 million 
USD) in 2008, annual average rise of 7,06%. As a share of central government revenue, local 
revenues remained relatively stable between 1999 and 2008. This could be attributed to the fact that 
central government revenues also increased during this period at an equivalent rate. It is worth 
pointing out that the increase in municipal revenues would have been higher were it not for several 
central government policies that effectively reduced either the tax base or the rate of certain municipal 
fees. 
In accordance with Article 86 of the Municipal Act, municipal revenues include: 
 Fees collected directly from taxpayers (Appendix 3.C); 
 Fees collected by the central government, independent entities, or public institutions on behalf 
of municipalities and distributed directly to each municipality; 
 Fees collected by the Central authority on behalf of municipalities and deposited in the IMF to 
be later distributed to municipalities. 
As for the composition of local revenues, direct revenue as a share of total revenue remains relatively 
low. It is estimated that in 2005, direct revenues, which include 36 fees and taxes collected directly by 
the municipalities, made up 43% of total revenues and 36,5% in 2008. As for the IMF transfers, it 
constituted another 43% in 2005 and 48% in 2008. The distribution of the IMF to local governments is 
not very transparent and subject to recent analysis and future reform (to be supported by EUD).  
2.1.4 The Municipal Unions 
Municipal unions which enjoy moral legal personality and financial autonomy have been established 
among interested municipalities to consolidate their capacities. A union is created by a decree from 
the Council of Ministers, upon the suggestion of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities either 
through an initiative from the Minister of Interior and Municipalities or upon the request of the 
municipalities. 
Based on Articles 118 and 119 of Decree-Law 118/1977, unions consist of two bodies: a decision 
making authority represented by the Presidents of the municipalities which are members of the union 
and an executive authority headed by the President of the Council of the Union. The Council of the 
Union is in charge, among others, of the following (article 126):  
 Public projects of common interest from which all or some of the member municipalities shall 
benefit, etc.; 
 Planning, expropriation and specifications and everything required to execute projects; 
 Coordinating between member municipalities and decide on conflicts arising between them; 
and 
 Ratify the budget of the Union. 
Based on article 130, the President of the Union is in charge, among others, of the following: 
 Convening the council and setting its agenda; 
 Making budget forecasts, the statement of activity and the annual report; 
 Supervising the finances of the Union and controlling its revenues; and 
 Authorizing fees and ordering the payment of the budget. 
According to articles 133 and 134 of Decree-Law 118, the revenues of the union are derived from the 
following sources: 10% of the revenue of each municipal member based on the prior year actual 
revenue; an additional percentage from the budget of the municipalities which benefit from a common 
project in an amount to be determined by the union and approved by the Minister of Interior and 
Municipalities; grants and loans; a share from the independent municipal transfers for the unions; 
central government contributions to the unions„ budget; personal grants and bequests. 
There are currently 42 unions in Lebanon distributed across the five Mohafazat. A total of 600 
municipalities belong to a union, which is 65% of all local governments. On average, a union has 14,6 
members with the smallest union is Fiha'a in the North which has 3 members and the largest is Tyre 
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with 54 members. 
2.2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions  
The evaluation team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in this specific country 
through a number of interventions. The table below summarises the major EC/EU-funded 
interventions considered in the analysis. 
Table 2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
EU 
contribution 
Comment 
Economic and 
Social Fund (ESFD)  
18 mEUR 
Approach: The fight against poverty.  
Responsible Agency: Team ESFD  
Description: Although this is a financing decision for 1999, this project of 
25 million Euro (EUR) actually started in 2003 (only part of which is 
allocated to local development, the remainder being allocated 
component to "job creation" support access to credit).  
20 clusters were selected following a study on the pockets of poverty in 
Lebanon. A community diagnosis was conducted in clusters for a 
definition of priorities through a participatory approach. ESFD then 
signed grant agreements with these clusters for local development 
activities. In 2007, an additional 1 million EUR has been allocated to 
ESFD for community development activities in the South (regions 
affected by the conflict of 2006) - still ongoing.  
LOGO I and II 
(Local 
Governance)  
 
13 mEUR  
Approach: Capacity building of local authorities.  
Responsible Agency: OMSAR (Office of the Minister for Administrative 
Reform)  
Description: The project has undergone various stages (commitment of 4 
million EUR in 2005, followed by an additional 9 million EUR in 2007). 
The project aims at strengthening the capacity of 15 groups of 
municipalities throughout the Lebanese territory. The project supported 
the preparation of local development plans, the rehabilitation of local 
development offices, staffed by agents of local development (ADL), and 
is now financing the implementation of some priority projects within each 
grouping (grant contracts signed by municipalities so that manage the 
implementation independently, with support in the form of training on 
procurement processes and oversight by technical assistance).  
Local 
Development in 
Northern Lebanon  
18 mEUR 
Approach: Regional development. 
Responsible Agency: Planning Division Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR)  
Description: The Financing Agreement was signed in 2009 for a total of 
18 million EUR. The activities are of two types: community development 
projects on a smaller scale (grants to groups of municipalities), 
infrastructure projects (construction contracts signed by the CDR). The 
areas of intervention will be concentrated around agriculture and rural 
development. Preference will be given to income-generating projects, 
rehabilitation of existing farm roads, construction of hill lakes. The 
Ministry of Agriculture is very involved and provide space to 
accommodate the project management team (CDR agents and experts 
recruited by the project) in the North. The project will also finance the 
development of a regional plan for North cazas).  
In addition the EC/EU (not through the EUD) supports a regional project for municipal development: 
Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue (CIUDAD)3. 
The EC/EU has also supported projects indirectly related to these issues – e.g. support for 
development of National Physical Master Plan (developed 2005, approved by council of Ministers in 
2009)4 for the Lebanese Territory. 
According to the EUD, EC/EU support in Lebanon is not directly supporting the decentralisation 
process but includes support to capacity building of municipal stakeholders and support for local 
services and small infrastructures. Finally it should be noted that the EC/EU recently has designed a 
                                                     
3
 http://www.ciudad-programme.eu/grant_country.php?lang=1&country_id=8   
4
 http://www.cdr.gov.lb/study/SDATL/sdatle.htm   
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new project: Support to Municipal Finance in Lebanon, CRIS Number: 022-758 (20 million EUR) that 
will have more explicit objectives of municipal fiscal reforms (“to improve the municipal finance 
framework and to enhance the capacities of municipal sector management”). The two main 
components will be “municipal finance reforms” and "Performance-based project financing" whereby 
unions of municipalities will be provided with development funds on a competitive basis. The main 
government partner for the project will be MOIM. 
In addition, a call for proposals for Thematic programme "Local authorities" has been issued - the 
evaluation of concept notes is on going so no project is contracted yet. 
A detailed list of relevant EC/EU-funded interventions is provided in Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs  
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national 
stakeholders in partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international 
donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
National stakeholders and other development partners recognised the clear position of the EC/EU in 
terms of its focus on local authorities when supporting local development interventions. This is also 
well communicated by the EUD in e.g. its recent newsletter (issue 3, 2010) where “strengthening the 
role of local authorities” was the major theme. However, it is well recognised by all stakeholders that 
the Government of Lebanon doesn't have a clear vision or strategy for decentralisation reforms – the 
EC/EU approach has therefore hitherto been guided by a general recognition of the potential role of 
local authorities in development and inclusion of municipalities as local partners rather than specific 
decentralisation strategy. The EC/EU itself realises the limitations of earlier approaches and has 
therefore embarked on the formulation of a programme for municipal finance reform as a future more 
strategic approach. (Ind1.3.1 and 1.3.2). 
Staff in the EUD are not familiar with all policy documents related to decentralisation support but 
generally found the EC/EU policy framework useful in guiding its interventions in Lebanon. Staff had 
attended workshops, made use of the 2007 Reference document and communicated informally and 
relatively frequently with colleagues in Brussels and elsewhere on experiences with support to local 
governance and decentralisation (Ind 1.3.3.) 
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3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing 
with sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) 
or disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The overall institutional EC/EU environment is broadly considered by the EUD as suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation. It has enabled the EUD to design and implement a number of 
responses in support of “local development” that ultimately may lead to “decentralising” through a 
bottom up approach. However, the EUD realises the relative lack of strategic direction in the past 
interventions and e.g. the relative ad-hoc approach to selection of partners. (Ind2.1.1) 
Staff within the EUD has had a fairly active dialogue on decentralisation related issues – this has also 
been facilitate by the fact that staff has been organised in a section “Infrastructure and Local 
Development” where “decentralisation” is defined beyond a “governance issue”. (Ind2.1.2) 
Staff felt that “institutional incentives” primarily guide staff towards issues related to “aid 
harmonisation”, “effective programme implementation”, and “EU visibility” in their work and that this 
also guides their work in support of decentralising/local governance. (Ind2.1.4) 
3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of 
decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Support to decentralisation is managed by the section “Infrastructure and Local Development” with 
one head of section and two programme officers and is in this manner relatively well staffed. (Ind2.2.1) 
Staff has sought on their own initiative to orient themselves in understanding of the “local governance 
sector”. Some staff members have made use of the “decentralisation training course” and found it 
“useful” although not of immediate operational use. (Ind2.2.2 and 2.2.3) 
3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) 
or systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, 
issues papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote 
the effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Main emphasis on results oriented monitoring (ROM) and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems 
for ongoing EC/EU support to local development has been on the achievements of planned 
outputs/disbursement strictly related to the specific projects rather than wider monitoring / assessment 
of decentralisation/sector development. Many basic issues in the sector have during most of the 
evaluation period been poorly analysed in the sector generally: e.g. overall staffing capacities and the 
local government fiscal framework (the latter is recently well studied by MOIM 2011 op.cit). More 
specifically, the EUD were criticized by some external observers familiar with the projects for being 
overly concerned with “implementation and disbursements according to time schedules rather than the 
substance of the work” (Ind 2.3.1) 
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3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies? 
Overall key findings 
 The Government of Lebanon has not had a clear policy on local government reforms or 
decentralisation,  
 Nevertheless, the choice of entry points and aid delivery methods have until recently mainly 
concerned with capacities for local (infrastructure) development rather than decentralisation,  
 The change in choice of key partners (ESDF, OMSAR, CDR and now MOI) not guided by 
overall EU institutional assessments/strategies but in part by more political assessments of 
“who could do the job”/ pragmatic fund allocations (OMSAR). 
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational 
procedures related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds 
to LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant country strategy paper (CSP) sections on decentralisation 
and local governance 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU is currently planning a new project in support of municipal finance reform – the formulation 
of the project was based on stocktaking of the past ten years experiences in support for local 
development and is summarised below:  
Box 1 EC/EU new project in support of municipal finance reform 
The EC/EU has been active in the last 10 years in the local governance sector and targeted unions or 
clusters of municipalities, giving them an active role in the management of their own grants. Major 
actions in the sector include, among others: 
 The Local Governance Project (LOGO), supports 12 Unions of Municipalities (UoMs) throughout 
Lebanon in the field of local development planning, capacity building and funds the implementation 
of priority local development projects. 
 The Local Development Programme in North Lebanon adopts a regional approach and focuses on 
poverty alleviation in the most vulnerable region of Lebanon. The programme will help local actors 
to diversify their economy and will initiate a land use planning approach at regional level. 
 The Economic and Social Fund for Development, has been supporting clusters of municipalities to 
address unemployment and poverty through grants for the implementation of projects (income 
generating activities, social infrastructure). 
The Project complements and builds on the lessons learned from these projects in that it continues to 
support UoMs (given the small average size of municipalities and the need to realise economies of 
scale) but it moves towards a more competitive approach, promoting performance-based municipal 
grants to UoMs and recognises that capacity building activities on project management should 
continue as most of UoMs are not yet fully able to formulate, design and implement local development 
projects. 
Another lesson is that the lack of involvement of central government stakeholders prevented the past 
projects from addressing the structural problem of chronic, insufficient funding of the municipalities. 
Thus great importance will be given to (i) MoIM‟s ownership of the Project to ensure long term 
sustainability ; (ii) municipal finance reform to strengthen the relation between the central and local 
levels, by reforming the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), enhancing local revenues and ensuring 
performance-based fiscal transfers from central government and donors to municipalities. (From: 
Action Fiche for Lebanon/ European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI)/Support to Municipal 
Finance Reforms) 
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Earlier project intervention only included scant sector analysis (Ind3.1.1.). Fund allocations to 
municipalities didn't make use of fiscal transfer systems such as the IMF – but more “project specific” 
arrangements as in LOGO and ESFD (Ind3.1.2). 
Partner dialogue (Ind3.1.3) has been challenging because of the general Government crisis and lack 
of clear government guidance on direction of decentralisation reforms. The initial focus on EC/EU 
interventions was also mainly focused on “local development” where partner institutions were 
identified on a rather ad-hoc basis (see further section 3.3.4 below) and thus without clear mandate for 
policy dialogue on local government reform issues.  
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as "How should existing interventions best evolve?" are 
addressed in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
As evident from the EUD self-assessment (above box and section 3.3.4 below): most of EC/EU 
support has applied a “bottom up approach” – working mainly with “local development” as main 
objective and limited attention to how this can be linked to wider state reforms/decentralisation. The 
EC/EU is now planning for a different kind of entry point – where municipal fiscal reform is at the core 
of the project design although experiences from earlier phases of local development support (such as 
the emphasis on Unions of Municipalities) are maintained. This transition of support was not foreseen 
in earlier local development programmes. 
The overall objective of the Project is to contribute to a balanced socioeconomic development 
through modernised municipal administration and effective central support to local governments.  
The Specific objective is to improve the municipal finance framework and to enhance the capacities 
of municipal sector management. 
The achievement of these objectives is critical for the long term decentralisation strategy that the 
MoIM is going to initiate5. The Project can facilitate the initiation of such a decentralisation process 
through the support to the creation of a Municipal Development Fund (MDF), strengthening of the 
municipal finance framework and provision of performance-based municipal development (Action 
Fiche for Lebanon/ENPI/Support to Municipal Finance Reforms) 
3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support 
decentralisation and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme 
to be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as 
"When and how to use sector budget support?" or "what are the risks related to the") are 
addressed in project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid 
delivery methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The basic aid delivery methods have not changed substantively over the evaluation period – aid has 
been in the form of “projects” with no serious consideration of Sector Budget Support (SBS). The 
political and institutional situation has throughout the period been too uncertain and the “sector” 
obviously too undeveloped for SBS to be considered. 
                                                     
5
 The successful of decentralisation reforms depend on local governments‟ financial, administrative and technical 
capacity to deliver basic public services and to engage in activities that promote growth and socio-economic 
development. Equally important is the central government‟s capacity to provide stable, transparent and 
predictable financial support to local governments and to monitor and evaluate their implementation performance 
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3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of 
the role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU has supported local development in Lebanon through a variety of national institutional 
entry points. The challenge for the EC/EU has been that the “sector” was ill defined by both national 
government and donors: “local development” was by the EUD clearly associated with “local 
authorities”, but these were in turn very weak and there was no clear designation of government 
institution to oversee their development. In hindsight, the EUD provided the following reflections on 
past interventions6: 
"These projects have been carried by different institutions, having no real mandate to support 
municipalities, and were not intended to accompany a national vision, which affects the sustainability 
of results. There has been no approach to reconciliation between central and local levels. These 
activities are unfortunately not addressing the structural problems of the municipalities (financial 
resources, degree of autonomy)”.  
The implementing organisations ESFD, CDR and OMSAR had no particular mandate to work with 
“local government reform”. ESFD and CRD were established to work with “local development”. 
OMSAR core mandate was to work on overall public sector reforms, yet ´because of having to take 
responsibility for unspent EU funds it had to take responsibilities for e.g. local solid waste 
management. 
At the local level, OMSAR worked with projects for clusters of local governments (similar to but not 
identical with the unions), whereas ESFD mainly worked with projects implemented by the individual 
municipalities. 
It is only in the proposed future municipal finance reform project that MoIM is given a lead status for 
implementation of local development activities. Under the new programme, focus for local level project 
implementation will be at “union” level. 
 
                                                     
6
 Overview based on the memo from the EUD: "Projets UE en cours dans le secteur du développement local".  
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3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarity 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
Overall key findings: 
 The EUD has contributed to establishing and implementing a coordination mechanisms with 
Member States and major donors (“working group on local development” – however with 
limited progress to date and not meeting for a year (probably not realistic to expect MOI 
leadership) – yet no joint analytical work (except some development partner (DP) mapping), 
no joint reviews etc 
 Complimentarily with other EU countries has been achieved (in particular excellent with Italy – 
not France) – division of labour with UNDP rather unclear – scope for 
collaboration/coordination with World Bank (WB) through new municipal finance project seems 
high,  
 EUD support to decentralisation/local development processes is generally coherent with other 
relevant EUD activities, but role of local governments (LGs) is also limited outside traditional 
municipal services, - the various projects supporting local development incl e.g. CIUDAD and 
Thematic programme on non-state actors and local authorities are complimentary but not 
strategically linked or well coordinated 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance 
issues among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor 
approaches, when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind4.1.3 
The EUD has played a major active role in establishing a "Working Group on Local Development". The 
group initially met in April 2008 at the Embassy of France whereby EU Members States approved to 
establish a lead donor structure in three key sectors: Water, Local Development and Environment. 
Consequently, Germany agreed to assume the overall coordination of the Water Sector, while Italy 
agreed to provide overall coordination in relation to Local Development and Environment. As a first 
step, the Embassy of Italy organised a conference on governance and local development intended to 
clarify and harmonize diversified views on and approaches. Recognizing that Non‐EU Members States 
countries and international organisations are dynamically involved in the local development process, 
the EU Working Group was broadened to encompass a wider representation of donors and 
multilateral organisations.  
"To avoid previous interventions fragmentation and lack of sufficient coordination between 
Government, donors, agencies and numerous non-governmental organisations, the Working Group 
(WG) on Local Development has drafted "Common Donors Guidelines on Local Development". 
Moreover, as the MoIM is recognised as the key institutional partner in this area, the project should 
support the MoIM to manage and chair the WG in order to ensure ownership and overall coordination. 
The Ministry has developed in 2009 a Local Development Master Plan with the purpose of listing and 
coordinating local development activities in Lebanon." (Extract from Action Fiche 2010: Support to 
Municipal reform) 
However, MoIM has expressed uncertainty about whether it has the resources (time and staff) to lead 
such a process (interview) and all stakeholders interviewed expressed frustration about the continued 
lack of common approaches among donors. 
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There are few if any co-financed projects supporting local development and local governance. 
However, the new municipal finance reform project was subject to a joint identification/formulation 
process with the Italian Government. The Italian Government will grant additional funds to the 
component 2 of the program through a parallel funding to the Government of Lebanon.  Related to this 
process the World Bank financed a major analytical work on municipal finance that feeds directly into 
the new EUD project. (Ind4.1.1)  
An alternative approach to co-financing of projects – that was internally rejected by EUD – was to 
support the UNDP Governance and Local development (GOLD) project. The rejection was partly 
based on assessment of the overall soundness of the UNDP project and partly on principle concerns 
about financing UNDP. (Ind4.1.4) 
3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarity between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and 
other donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finances decentralisation programmes with Members States and major 
donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes 
and policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EUD consult with other EU member states in programming – the French complained about lack of 
dialogue but Italians were very satisfied (interviews) – the EUD has undertaken joint analytical work 
with Italy (Ind4.2.1). 
There is not yet a very explicit division of tasks among DPs in relation to support to the 
“decentralisation agenda”. The reason is primarily that there is no consensus on any government led 
strategy. Different ministries within the government pursue different approached to local development 
(Ind4.2.2). 
There are few if any co-financed projects supporting local development and local governance. 
However, the new municipal finance reform project was subject to a joint identification/formulation 
process with the Italian Government. The Italian Government will grant additional funds to the 
component 2 of the program through a parallel funding to the Government of Lebanon. (Ind4.2.3) 
EUD staff has participated in the recent workshops on future direction of local government reforms – 
but not co-financed arrangements (Ind4.2.4). 
3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors 
such as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment 
into decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in general budget support (GBS) performance 
assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1.  
Local governments in Lebanon are not significantly involved in sectors such as health and education – 
but mainly “municipal infrastructure”. The EUD has organised its own work in a manner that integrates 
“decentralisation and local infrastructure” – the EC/EU support is mainly supporting local infrastructure 
development but with a view of including local authorities in the work for sustainability and governance 
reasons.  
Ind 4.3.2.  
Gender issues are mainly addressed by including stakeholder consultations with women in 
identification of the various the local development projects. However, there is no evidence of projects 
seeking to support a more permanent gender balanced participation in local governance structures. 
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Environment is more clearly and prominently mainstreamed in the projects: this is reflected in the 
prevalence of specific environmental sub-projects financed in particular in the recent LOGO (see 
annex 3). 
Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments: Not relevant as no GBS.  
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3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
Introduction 
Prior to discussion of the extent to which EC/EU support in Lebanon has impacted on overall 
decentralisation processes it should be made clear that such objectives never featured prominently in 
interventions to date. The latest CSP describes the overall modest level of objectives regarding 
broader local government reforms:  
The EC/EU has developed successful experience of addressing municipalities (support for 
participative planning of local development and financing infrastructure projects), many of which are 
located in areas affected by the conflict. Cooperation between municipalities has shown that their 
elected representatives and their communities can work together even beyond political and 
confessional boundaries. Continued EC/EU support to local communities in the field of participatory 
planning methodology has the potential to lay the basis for a more balanced regional development and 
possibly, in the medium term, provide the Government with a further incentive towards enhanced 
decentralisation. In the short term, it will enable the local communities to finance infrastructure 
reconstruction and municipal regeneration projects. (CSP 2007-13) 
Key findings: 
 National decentralisation policies and strategies have not been developed – however various 
consultations have taken place – not directly supported by EC/EU, 
 Local government legislation (Municipal Act) has largely remained unchanged since 1977 – 
only minor amendments of regulations, 
 Local Governments Fiscal resources have not increased significantly (or relatively), 
 Local Governments Autonomy has not increased although significant own revenue generation, 
 EC/EU has in general not sought to influence the above. 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to 
implement decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Discussions of decentralisation reforms in Lebanon are still in preliminary stages.  
The President of the Republic of Lebanon, his Excellency General Michel Sleiman has in broad terms 
expressed support for decentralisation reforms that “gives municipal councils financial autonomy, 
strengthens democracy, revitalises regions and local participation...”7 
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU has not yet engaged in assistance with the aim of reforming legislation (or sector 
legislation) supporting decentralisation. 
                                                     
7
 Speech of the President, opening ceremony October 17
th
, 2009 – Decentralisation in the near east, International 
seminar, Tripoli, Lebanon, 17-19 2009.  
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3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total 
public expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes 
and increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind5.3.1 Human Resources in local governments are very poorly developed – many of the smaller 
municipalities have hardly any staff at all and even larger municipalities like Beirut (see below) face 
significant constraints. EC/EU as well as other DPs have not supported reforms of personnel in local 
governments in Lebanon. 
Box 2 Overview of Human Resources in Local Governments 
The administrative staff of municipalities is in dire need of in-depth reform on various levels including 
the development of a new organizational structure and a modern salary scale, new job descriptions 
and requirements. There is also a need for a specialized unit in charge of organizing public 
competitions and training municipal employees in order to gradually build the competence and 
information technology (IT) skills of municipal staff. 
Moreover, there is a need to review the distribution of the authorities related to human resource 
decisions between the central and municipal governments in order to address the most prominent 
obstacles that prevent municipalities from exercising most of their authorities. These obstacles include: 
 The depletion of municipal financial resources due to a deterioration in assessments and 
collections; 
 A large number of unfilled vacancies, especially in large municipalities. For example, the 
municipality of Beirut suffers from a very large number of unfilled positions reaching up to 70% or 
even 100% in some departments such as Engineering, Rated Institutions, and even the Finance 
Department. Beirut currently counts only about 140 filled positions out of the 1.292 positions 
identified in its organizational structure); and 
 The deterioration of the human resources in a number of municipalities, as well as an increase in 
the average age of their employees. For example, the average age of employees at the 
Municipality of Beirut is approximately 57. 
Despite having a negative impact on the conditions of municipal manpower, the large number of 
vacancies and high average age may also represent an opportunity for implementing serious reforms 
in terms of increasing staff qualifications without having to let go current municipal employees. Once 
detailed job descriptions and hiring requirements are developed, municipalities may begin filling their 
vacant positions with young employees who are better able to handle recent technologies. 
In many municipalities, especially the newer ones which tend to lack financial resources, the members 
of the municipal council, including the Municipal President and his/her deputy, perform the tasks of 
assessment, collections, cashiering, accounting, in addition to many other administrative and technical 
functions. Despite this, Chapter 6 of the Municipal Act, namely Articles 103 and 110 which concern 
disciplinary measures against members of the municipal council have not been applied. These articles 
are essential especially for municipalities, which are not subject to the oversight of the Court of Audit 
and in light of the cancellation of the Civil Inspection Board„s oversight authority over the municipal 
council members. Moreover, Article 111 requires the written approval of the Governor before the 
Municipal President, his/her deputy or municipal council members may be prosecuted for an offense 
related to their duties. The end result is that, except for municipalities, which are subject to the 
authority of the Court of Audit, municipal council members are not effectively held accountable by the 
Lebanese legal system. 
Source: MOIM 2011, Strategic framework, page 57 
Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level  
The EC/EU has not supported reform of overall system of municipal finance (until the new programme 
starting in 2011).  
The share of total public expenditures managed by the municipalities has increased significantly in 
relative terms over the last decade (from 3,6% to 5,6%) but is still – in global comparisons – at a very 
low level.  
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Table 3 Trends in municipal finance in Lebanon 1999-2008 
 1999 2008 Real average 
annual 
increase 
Central government expenditures excl. 
debt 
3,563,036 
($2,383) 
4,507,228 
$3,786 
5.3% 
Municipal expenditures 128,012 
($86 million) 
253,344* 
($213 million) 
10.6% 
Municipal spending as share of central 
government expenditure 
3.59% 5.63%  
Central government revenues 4,448,393 
($2,966 million) 
7,773,800 
($5,183 million) 
6,4% 
Municipal revenues 247,969 
($165 million) 
457,067 
($305 million) 
7,0% 
Municipal revenues as a share of central 
government revenues 
5.57% 5.88%  
Source: Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 
*This includes the sum of the expenditures incurred by the municipalities plus a 40% share of the IMF 
for 255 municipalities deducted in return for providing cleaning services 
 
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that 
are discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in human resource management (HRM): the extent to which 
LGs can hire and fire or otherwise manage personnel. 
 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local 
government’s degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
There have been no major changes in the relative autonomy of the municipalities over the evaluation 
period – and EC/EU support has had no objectives in that regard.  
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3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
Summary key findings: 
 Key central government bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and 
implementation have not substantively improved (United Nations (UN) Habitat/ Italy in process 
of supporting MOI). 
 Local governments' capacities have NOT significantly improved – the basics (staff, structures, 
etc) not in place that would allow traditional capacity building (CB) to have impact. 
 Hardly any of the 12 regional development offices (LOGO) are still operative. 
 Planning capacities are not developed in sustainable manner. 
 Many separate and uncoordinated DP funded capacity building activities (planning and 
training). 
 Hardly any general monitoring of LG capacity building. 
 Limited development of relevant non state actors (such as LG associations or LG research 
centres) have emerged in Lebanon (except maybe United Cities and Local Governments 
(UCLG)) – and not supported by EC/EU. 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and 
reform implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & civil society organisation (CSO)) that capacities of 
key central government bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation 
have improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of M&E system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
In general it should be observed that none of the past EC/EU projects had explicit objectives within 
this area: “capacity building of central stakeholders for decentralisation policy formulation and 
oversight”. It is only with the newly formulated municipal finance reform project that this becomes an 
objective of support. 
The overall assessment from people met was that the MoIM hardly undertakes a policy and oversight 
role – however within the last year this has to some extent changed – partly because of dynamic 
Minister (who later resigned in May 2011) and partly because of some donor financed support 
activities (UN, Italy and World Bank -see below). 
It is the MoIM that is overall in charge of decentralisation policy support and oversight. To date it can 
be noted that these functions are only given scant attention by the Ministry that overall is mainly 
concerned with “Internal Affairs”: security and general central government administration rather than 
the role of municipalities. The responsible directorate (1 directorate dealing with municipalities out of a 
total 18 directorates in the ministry) of the Ministry only have 30 staff members (compared to 350 
intended positions) – and out of these 23 are contractual workers8. 
One year ago the MOIM conducted an institutional assessment preparing a new organisational chart 
(with assistance from UNDP) for an organisation supposedly to deal with regulations, capacity building 
etc. Ministry currently doesn‟t have the capacity – Italy is working with them (and Habitat) to develop 
curriculum for both staff and politicians at municipalities.  
Initial focus on larger municipalities and newly elected members. With support from the UNDP 43 
TOTs were trained from MOI.  
                                                     
8
 Interview Rabih El-Chaar, Adviser to the Minister 25
th
 May 2011, Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. The 
following paragraphs are also based on the same interview. 
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The Ministry has done some policy work – e.g. been working on electoral laws – proportional law, 
women‟s quota, redeveloped ballot – this is currently is discussed by cabinet and parliament 
The MOIM has with the NGO “Common Space” been working on strategy for decentralisation 
workshop/ dissemination to debate law on decentralisation – this based in part on “book with 100 
questions on decentralisation” (supported by Italy) - some 8 months from now the MOIM expect overall 
proposal based on consultations and studies. The Ministry has also recently – through funds from the 
World bank – completed a major study on LG finance by World Bank – all reports from these 
assignments are on ministry website http://www.moim.gov.lb/ . 
Box 3 Resignation of the Minister Baroud 
On May 26, 2011, Baroud announced that he would no longer continue his ministerial duties. Baroud‟s 
resignation came after the developing events that occurred on Thursday between Minister of 
Telecommunications in Lebanon Charbel Nahas and the Internal Security Forces unit that banned him 
from entering one of his ministry‟s buildings. Baroud asked the personnel to leave the building, but his 
request remained unfulfilled. 
His resignation speech included the following memorable statement: “Since I no longer want to be a 
false witness or a caretaker minister with the duty to sign the ministry’s mail, which something an 
acting minister can do and since I don’t want to violate the constitution despite any political stance, I 
decided to free myself from my duties.” 
Sources – see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziad_Baroud  
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local councils 
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of 
information produced at local level 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU had not attempted to improve financial management or HRM in local governments in 
Lebanon (Ind6.2.1 and 6.2.3). It should be noted that EC/EU support has primarily been targeting the 
smaller municipalities with almost no professional finance staff.  
The EC/EU has through its support sought to build capacities for local planning in various ways. 
However, the support has been limited to interventions leading up to implementation of the intended 
local EC/EU supported infrastructures/project – rather than broader and general development of 
planning capacities within the local government structures. One of the key components of the support 
under LOGO project was the establishment of the 12 regional development offices – these were 
intended to form the basis for the LG clusters planning for project interventions as well as a long term 
planning capacity. However, virtually none of these offices are operative today. Some stakeholders 
argued that the project set-up and methods of contracting out responsibility for “capacity development” 
delivered poorly – see box below.  
Box 4 Results of the capacity development component 
The EC/EU had ideas about the development office functions that were not clearly supported by law or 
coherent…the project built offices, established one local planner, tourist maps (atlas cartographique
9
) 
office equipment, communication strategy (TV spot, news paper article) and establishment of links with 
European cities 
Assistance for the Rehabilitation of the Lebanese Administration (ARAL) prepared LOGO I, this 
included support to 12 clusters of municipalities, 12 development offices and support to one project 
per cluster. LOGO II supports the implementation of the projects – there was significant time lack 
between the different phases (from planning to implementation) and communities and municipalities 
didn't clearly see the linkages.  
Implementation on the ground was in practice not corresponding the overall philosophy of the project. 
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 ARAL: Preparation de project d‟action municipale dans un cadre planifie de development local 
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The development office concept indicated “partnerships with communities and municipalities”, 
however when project started realised that MCs were not involved in design. Their assumed 
contributions and responsibilities were not sufficiently anchored in realistic assessment of the MCs 
capacities. In execution stage no effective involvement of “platforms” – contractual issues always took 
priority over concepts. These problems are not clearly stated in M&E reports but my own reflections. 
These types of reflections were not encouraged as the EU stuck to bureaucratic reporting 
requirements. (Interview Adviser, Ministry of Administrative Reform, LOGO) 
In contrast, the ESFD evaluation suggest that the ESFD was (more) successful in establishing 
participatory planning – most likely because the ambition was more modest: to use the existing 
municipalities for planning and delivery of projects – rather than seek to establish “clusters” of local 
governments for planning more “strategic” projects as under LOGO (see below). 
Community Development interventions built a sophisticated and sustainable participative methodology 
able to achieve notable results in term of needs analysis, problems definition and planning. The ESFD 
strategy for community development has been based on working through municipal councils rather 
than the common pattern of through NGOs. This was a new strategy for the Lebanon. As 
Municipalities have legitimacy with the population. The process of local development planning and 
preparation of the Community Development sub-projects was based on an intensive process of 
mobilization, preparation and formulation involving both local municipal councils and beneficiary 
communities. A participatory approach to needs assessment was applied by ESFD involving the 
beneﬁciaries in the preparation of projects, and which they perceived as of beneﬁt to them. The ﬁeld 
visit and consultations conﬁrmed that the process was followed although it took considerably longer 
than planned by ESFD. (ESFD Evaluation page 18) 
Local governments – in particular the smaller municipalities and their unions have virtual no M&E 
systems in place. (Ind6.2.4) 
One of the few successful “local government capacity building interventions” in recent years in 
Lebanon has been the gradual establishment of municipal unions – that also have been encouraged 
by EC/EU support.   
Although there are 945 municipalities in Lebanon, the majority of them have few fiscal resources to 
provide services. Consequently, the formation of municipal unions has increased from 13 in 2000 to 
42 in 2010. Unions now have a total of 600 municipalities as members10.  
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU has not directly supported capacity building of local government associations or research 
institutions working with local governance issues. However, the EC/EU has actively engaged in 
dialogue/conferences with such institutions.  
Ind6.3.1 
There is no formal local government association established in Lebanon – the local office of the United 
Cities and Local Governments acts in way as an official local government association it legally isn‟t 
constituted as a governance body representing all local governments in the country11. The formal 
governance body hasn‟t been established because stakeholders fear it being split into political 
factions12. The organisation is liaising with several larger European municipalities for twinning 
arrangements with local governments in Lebanon. The organisation has also played a lead role in 
establishing a major conference (October 2009 in Tripoli) on local government policy reforms attended 
by the President. Subsequently it has worked on “100 questions on decentralisation” and a 
consultative proves nationwide on future direction of reforms.  
 
                                                     
10
 MOI 2011a, note the number of municipalities we adopt in this report is based on the IMF Distribution Decree 
2339 of 2009. 
11
 See http://www.euromedalex.org/node/3385  
12
 Interview M. Béchir ODEIMI, Resident representative and Director of UCLG.  
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3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
Key findings: 
 Legal and institutional framework for citizen engagement in local affairs NOT improved (e.g. 
no reforms of MC elections, procedures for holding MCs accountable etc), 
 Increased local participation in local development planning but only for project specific 
interventions – no sustainable reform or changes in normal LG planning (not well 
documented), 
 Local accountability of local governments still weak (not well documented though), 
 Transparency in fund allocation is still major problem (IMF etc), 
 Limited attention to above issues in EUD support – although the future municipal finance 
project may contribute to the above. 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind7.1.1. 
Elections for local governments had for a long time been abolished (1963-1998) because of political 
situation and civil war. They were re-introduced in 1998 and elections have been held 2004 and 2010.  
Elections are open for party members and independents. Voter turnout is higher in LG elections than 
national elections. Citizens are not electing their council according to residence: As resident in Beirut – 
I am paying taxes here etc – but when electing I do so for my “original” village. Residents who are not 
voters claim to be discriminated against, as they don't get the same service as others.  
Tacit agreement that LG mayors are from certain traditional dominant denominations even though 
they may no longer effectively be in majority. (Interview Randa Antoun – Professor of Public 
Administration) 
Ind7.1.2 
Public participation in local governments is not well studied. EC/EU support has been limited to 
support to improved local government planning discussed earlier. 
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with 
citizens (notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Not supported by EC/EU. 
Feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens are generally poorly developed – 
but clearly related to the relative limited role of local governments in service delivery.  
3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation)  
 provided to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The main transfers from central government to local governments in Lebanon are through the IMF – 
this system has recently been thoroughly analysed (MOIM 2011 op city) and key conclusions are that 
the current system is non- transparent and with problematic allocation criteria (although with elements 
of formula based allocations).  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Lebanon; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
24 
The revenues of the taxes and fees that constitute the IMF are not publicly available. The lack of 
transparency of the data, confounded with the withdrawals and deductions taking place without the 
consultation of municipalities (see next section), have created an environment of mistrust between 
central and local governments; 
As previously mentioned, the distribution criteria are set in a Decree rather than a Law. This has given 
the government the right to change the allocation of the revenues as it sees fit. Consequently, this has 
made the distribution to municipalities unpredictable with an adverse impact on the ability of 
municipalities to effectively plan; - The government has regularly altered the criteria for distribution 
which effectively changed the municipalities' share of the IMF. Between 1993 and 2007, the 
government has adopted 4 different versions for distributing the IMF revenues. This further introduces 
uncertainty and instability to the municipalities' budgeting and planning processes; (MOIM 2011 op.cit) 
The EC/EU support has to data not sought to reform this arrangement, but it is a key priority in the 
newly formulated municipal finance project.  
3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
Key findings: 
 No evidence of increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision (reform of IMF or similar) – except project specific financing 
 No evidence of improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services (no data / 
but problems noted in e.g. ESFD evaluation)  
 Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services? No overall data – but 
some project specific investments, 
 However EUD support has established significant number of local development projects – 
wider impact and sustainability not well documented (MC projects under ESFD / “cluster 
projects under LOGO) 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) 
in local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
EC/EU has not sought to reform these areas. 
As earlier discussed, fiscal resources have generally increased, but funds for “service delivery” have 
mainly come from donor funds. EC/EU has with its projects channelled additional funds to the local 
governments. 
No additional targeting of resources (Ind8.1.2) 
The EC/EU has in various ways sought to improve public – private partnerships; partly in the 
establishment of waste management services and partly by development of the “eco-plans” in the 
clusters of municipalities supported under LOGO. It is too early to determine if establishment of such 
partnerships will be successful. (Ind8.1.3) 
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc.) 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
EC/EU support for local development has focused on establishment of additional “projects” – the only 
available external evaluation (of ESFD) poses serious questions about the sustainability of projects 
(see below).  
The support of ESFD has been mainly concentrated during the planning and the tendering phase, with 
minimal support after these projects were handed to the local communities. We noticed that the 
projects operated as close as possible to their agreed-upon action plan until the hand-over phase 
when they were still accountable by legally binding agreements to ESFD (who had provided an initial 
seed budget for operations) but they went idle soon after external accountability stopped. 
Source: Impact Evaluation of ESFD
13
 page 8. 
3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for 
vulnerable groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 Ind 8.3.2. Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU has supported establishment of local development projects in municipalities and unions of 
an estimated value of 52 million EUR (see Annex 3). This is a significant investment in the concerned 
communities. The investments include wide range of support (see annex 3 for details): 
 Eco-tourist plans and related paths, 
 Rural parks, 
 Municipal centres, 
 Rods, 
 Solid waste, 
 Rural health, education, 
 Improved farming. 
There are no meaningful statistics available to determine overall trends in access of services delivered 
by municipalities or the quality of these.  
The projects under LOGO are still under implementation. 
The ESFD project has recently been evaluation but the evaluation was rather tentative (see box 
below).  
The level of access to public services and provision of basic utilities increased as consequence of 
ESFD interventions, but more than half of the projects are still not completed. From the visits on the 
ﬁeld and the information collected it appears that in the communities where the projects have been 
completed, there is an increase of services provided to the populations or the beneﬁciaries are using 
the new facilities. The fact remains that most of the interventions still have to be completed and after a 
long while since the ﬁrst contact with the beneﬁciary community. Another issue not well assessed is 
how many poor people access the services: this demands that more accurate analysis of ex-post 
developments should be done. (page 21) 
                                                     
13
 Impact Evaluation of the Community Development Component of the Economic and Social Fund for 
Development (ESFD), Ziad Moussa, Evaluation Specialist - March 17th 2010 
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4 Conclusions concerning the hypotheses to be tested and main 
challenges to be discussed in the synthesis phase 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Lebanon has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
Table 4 Research focus 
Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support to decentralisation – has the general EC 
framework for support to decentralisation facilitated programming of relevant 
interventions? 
1-2 
Evolution of EC/EU approach and response to the special context – the relative 
importance of in-depth analytical sector analysis 
3 (and 4) 
Documentation of possible results of local development interventions on the overall 
decentralisation process  
5-8 
4.1 Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support the decentralisation  
EC/EU approach for support to decentralisation in Lebanon has been pragmatic with main emphasis 
on “local development” with some emphasis on the role of local authorities. The EC/EU policies, 
programming guides and reference documents are not all known in the EUD – but are broadly 
considered as relevant and useful. 
EC/EU decisions on staffing levels in support of local development reflect relative high priority given to 
the issue. The staff has made some use of “decentralisation” training opportunities and found them 
generally useful although not immediately operation.  
The Lebanon case study, therefore confirms some of the initial desk based hypotheses, such as: 
 EC/EU policy framework for support to decentralisation gives significant discretion to EUDs for 
interpretation on whether or how to support decentralisation processes in partner countries;  
 EC/EU capacities for support to decentralisation are foremost of a “local” character and differ 
substantially from one EUD to the other;  
 Decisions on allocation of staff resources to work on decentralisation issues in EUDs are 
critical for effective support to decentralisation; 
However, the Lebanon case study also questions the validity of other desk-based hypotheses. In 
particular it is interesting that a relative large portfolio as the EUD support for local development has 
developed with minimal “sector analysis” – rather, the project portfolio has evolved on a learning by 
doing basis further discussed below.  
In Lebanon, staff has benefitted from informal dialogue with staff members in other countries. It is 
possible that more structured head quarter (HQ)-inputs and guidance or substantive sector analysis 
could have led to more strategic interventions at an earlier stage.  
4.2 Evolution of EC/EU approach and response to the special context 
The EC/EU has supported local development in Lebanon through a variety of national institutional 
entry points. The challenge for the EC/EU has been that the “sector” was ill defined by both national 
government and donors: “local development” was clearly associated with “local authorities” by the 
EC/EU, but these were in turn very weak and there was no clear designation of government institution 
to oversee their development. The initial (from 1999) support was mainly through the ESFD where 
community project interventions at municipal level formed a minor component of the overall 
programme. The LOGO I and II (from 2005) shifted emphasis to unions/clusters of municipalities and 
attempted to facilitate more strategic planning process. The Local development project in Northern 
Lebanon in a similar manner supported projects mainly for clusters of smaller municipalities and 
regional planning. 
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In hindsight the EUD provided the following reflections on past interventions14: 
"These projects have been carried by different institutions, having no real mandate to support 
municipalities, and were not intended to accompany a national vision, which affects the sustainability 
of results. There has been no approach to reconciliation between central and local levels. These 
activities are unfortunately not addressing the structural problems of the municipalities (financial 
resources, degree of autonomy)”.  
The implementing organisations ESFD, CDR and OMSAR had mo particular mandate to work with 
“local government reform”.  
It is only in the future municipal finance reform project that MoIM is given a lead status for 
implementation of local development activities. Under the new programme, focus for local level project 
implementation will be at “union” level and a component will be dedicated for structural municipal 
finance reforms.  
The direction of the new programme seems very sound as it will combine immediate local 
interventions with reforms for wider systemic reforms and link local government level interventions with 
the appropriate ministry.  
This evolution over ten years could most likely have occurred faster if more thorough sector analyses 
had taken place as part of country strategy and programme planning.  
4.3 Intended and un-intended results of EC/EU support on overall 
decentralisation reforms 
Prior to discussion of the extent to which EC/EU support in Lebanon has impacted on overall 
decentralisation processes it should be made clear that such objectives never featured prominently in 
interventions to date. The latest CSP describes the overall modest level of objectives regarding 
broader local government reforms:  
“Continued EC support to local communities in the field of participatory planning methodology 
has the potential to lay the basis for a more balanced regional development and possibly, in 
the medium term, provide the Government with a further incentive towards enhanced 
decentralisation. In the short term, it will enable the local communities to finance infrastructure 
reconstruction and municipal regeneration projects” (CSP 2007-13) 
In summary, the analysis indicates that the support has enabled local communities to finance various 
local development projects at a quite substantive level.  
However, the wider results in terms of capacity building of local authorities have been very limited and 
to some extent unsustainable. The capacity development of local authorities has primarily been in 
support of “local planning”, but the basic prerequisites for building such capacity – e.g. clarity of the 
basic legal mandate, appropriate structures (avoidance of the current fragmented local structures) and 
recruitment of basic skilled planning staff have simply not been in place. The support from EC/EU has 
provided some incentives for strengthened collaboration of municipalities through unions as a sound 
approach, however EC/EU efforts for establishing local planning offices within these structures has 
failed – most likely because the offices were too narrowly defined in relation to EC/EU support rather 
than well analysed approach for sustainable development of unions capacities for planning. 
In addition it is also still uncertain if the investments in local projects will prove to be sustainable – the 
evaluation of the ESFD posed serious questions and ongoing projects under LOGO II are too early to 
assess. However, there is no clear monitoring system in place to access viability and operation of 
projects. It is concern that the responsibilities for operation and maintenance are vaguely defined and 
without well resourced local institutions in place.  
Overall, the EC/EU support has nevertheless helped to demonstrate the development potentials of 
local authorities and general government commitment to wider decentralisation reforms have in recent 
years been more clearly articulated. However, the reform commitment is still only vaguely articulated 
and overall political situation of Lebanon quite unstable and unforeseeable. The recently developed 
new municipal finance reform project by the EC/EU presents therefore a wise response that will 
combine a pragmatic continued support to unions of municipalities with stringer linkages to overall 
systematic local government (finance) reforms.  
                                                     
14
 Overview based on the memo from the EUD: "Projets UE en cours dans le secteur du développement local".  
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5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: The list of people interviewed 
Name of the person to 
be interviewed 
Government / Organizations / institutions 
Date of the 
interview 
Cécile Abadi European Commission (EUD) 24/05 
Sateh Arnaout World Bank, EU Funded Programme on Municipal Finance 24/05 
Rabih El-Chaar Ministry of Interior and Municipalities - Advisor to the Minister 25/05 
Khalil Al-Hajal 
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities - General Directorate of 
Municipalities 
25/05 
Ahmad Rajab 
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities - General Directorate of 
Municipalities 
25/05 
Alain Bifani Ministry of Finance - General Director  25/05 
Randa Antoun Professor of Public Administration – Expert on decentralisation 25/05 
Sami Atallah 
Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies LCPS - Senior Expert of 
municipal financial resources  
25/05 
Francesco Bicciato  UNDP/Art Gold 26/05 
Mayors Local Government 26/05 
Khalil Gebara 
Advisor to the Prime Minister Saad El-Hariri – Senior Expert on 
Governance issues  
27/05 
Dima Sader ESFD - CDR Community Development 27/05 
Haitham Omar 
Economic and Social Fund for Development ESFD at the Council 
for Development and Reconstruction CDR - Director  
27/05 
Kamal Hamdan Consultation and Research Institute – Director 27/05 
Adnan Melky 
Lebanese Association for Democratic Election LADE – UNDP 
Global Environment Facility Small Grants Programme 
27/05 
Sajieh Aatieh 
(Field visit) 
Union of Municipalities of Joumeh Aakar / President of Rahbeh 
Municipality 
28/05 
Sami Menkara 
Al-Manar University of Tripoli – President (Former Minister and 
former Mayor of Tripoli and expert on decentralisation) 
28/05 
Najwa Bassil 
(Field visit) 
Municipality of Jbeil-Byblos and Senior expert LOGO 1 
28/05 
Clément Nadim Zakhia MADA association for local development 28/05 
Hind Al-Khatib Ministry of Administrative Reforms - LOGO 30/05 
Denis Cassat Agence Française de Développement - Director 30/05 
Mustapha Adib 
Advisor to the Prime Minister Najib Miqati - Director Centre 
d‟Etudes Stratégiques pour le Moyen Orient CESMO 
30/05 
Sawsan Mehdi. 
 
Italian cooperation, in charge of local development projects and 
of the secretariat of the donors' working group on local 
development 
30/05 
Roula Qabbani  Ministry of Administrative Reforms - LOGO 30/05 
Simon Bashawaty Ministry of Administrative Reforms - LOGO 30/05 
Sami Feghali 
CDR Planning Division, Director of EC Support to Local 
Development in the North 
30/05 
Ismaïl Makki CDR Environment and Agriculture 30/05 
Ibrahim Chahrour CDR Planning and Programming department 30/05 
Bechir Odeimi United Cities and Local Governments UCGL - Director 30/05 
Beshir Osmat 
Development Management International - Senior Expert LOGO 1 
and Project Manager LOGO 2 
30/05 
Marie-Elena Kassardjian UNDP/Art Gold 30/05 
Jawad Adra Information International Research Consultants - Director 30/05 
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5.2 Annex 2: The list of documents consulted  
EC Country Strategy Papers 
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011a: (Republic Of Lebanon) First Municipal Infrastructure 
Project, Municipal Finance Studies Program (MFSP), Final Strategic Framework, submitted by: ICMA 
February 2011 (available at the Ministry website)  
Documentation on ESFD Support 
Final evaluation of the Economic and Social Fund for Development project (ESFD) Lebanon, April 
2010.  
Impact Evaluation of the Community Development Component of the Economic and Social Fund for 
Development (ESFD) – Interim report Ziad Moussa, Evaluation Specialist March 17th 2010 
Documentation on LOGO projects: 
- Final report of the "Conseiller en Développement Local (CDL) auprès de l'Unité d'Appui au Projet - 
Appui à l'amélioration de la gouvernance locale) - Paul Casalonga - (August 2009 for final report) 
- Intermediary and final reports on the Technical assistance and support to Municipalities in the Fields 
of Local Development a various municipal groups, prepared by ICON Institute - October 2009 
- Activity Report of OMSAR regarding the implementation of LOGO I 
- Reports on "Cooperation Décentralisée auprès des Collectivites Locales Libanaises", prepared by 
Bechir Odeimi, BTVL. 
Décentralisation et coopération décentralisée au Liban: état des lieux. A chapter on the state-of-art on 
decentralisation that I wrote in 2009 for the bureau of CGLU/BTVL. 
How well is Lebanon fiscally decentralized? The author of this article was the team leader of the 
research group who prepared document N°1. 
Lebanon Local Governance in Complex Environments: Project Assessment.  
Localiban web site (http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?rubrique503),  
Council for Developmnet and Reconstruction: http://www.cdr.gov.lb/  
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Municipalities: http://www.moim.gov.lb/   
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Projet Nom du contrat Caza Municipalités Montant  
Logo 2 Plus Haut …..Autrement Chouf 
Aamatour, Ain Qani, Bater, Baadarane, Boutmeh, 
Haret Jandal, Jebaa, Khreibi, Maaser El Chouf, 
Moukhtara, Mrusti, Niha 
677.232,00 
  Ressusciter Jezzine / Tourisme de Villegiature Jezzine 
Jezzine, Aaray, Wadi Jezzine, Sabbah, Al-Harf, 
Al-Midan, Bteddine El-Leksh, Mashmoushe, 
Bkassine, Benwate, Aazour, Roum, Al-Houmsieh, 
Qaitouleh, Haitoura, Qattine, Hideb 
972.110,00 
  Centre de Vulgarisation Agricole Bint Jbeil 
Aytaroun, Ain Ebel, Aynata, Ayta Ech Chaab, 
Kounin, El Tyreh, Baraachit, Beit Yahoun, Maroun 
er rass, Bint Jbeil, Qouzah, Chakra, Hanine, 
Rmeish, Debel, Yaroun 
1.071.497,00 
  Circuit Touristique Zgharta 
Zgharta-Ehden, Haret El Fouwar, Ouchach, 
Mejdlaya, Ardeh, Rachiine, Kfaredlakous, Karah 
Bech, Kfarhata, Laal, Kfaryachite-Bisebeel, 
Kfarzayna, Bchenine-Daraya, Kfarfou, Raskifa, 
Karem Saddeh, Ljbaa, Sereel, Kfarzaghab-
elmerh, Arjess, Bnachii, Mazraet El Touffah, 
Basloukit Arbet Kazhaya 
464.521,00 
  Tourism & Archeology and Rehabilitation of Water Sources Nabatieh 
Arabsalim, Houmine el Faouqa, Jarjouh, Jbaa & 
Ain Bousoir, Ain Qana, Kfarfila, Sarba, Houmine 
el Tahta 
810.856,00 
  La vie à l'Ancienne Kesrwan 
Kleyaat, Kfardebian, Faytroun, Mayrouba, Hrajel, 
Faraya, Ajaltoun, Ballouneh, Batha, Jeita, 
Rayfoun, Daroun, Aachkout, Bekaatet Achkout, 
Shaileh, Ain El Rihani, Aintoura, Ghosta, 
Raachine 
6.246.969,00 
  Circuit Touristique du Patrimoine Culturel et Naturel Baabda 
Qirtadah, Ras El Metn, Dier El Harf, Jourat 
Arsoun, Arsoun, El Zandokah, El Arbanieh, El 
Dleybeh, Salima, Btakhnay, El Ksaibe, El 
Knaysse, Jwar El Hawz, Tarchish, Kfarselwane, 
Hasbaya, Bzibdine. 
502.676,00 
  Les Circuits du Patrimoine et des Retrouvailles  Chouf Baakline, Ain Bal, Gharifeh, Mazraat ech Chouf, 678.866,00 
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Kahlounieh, Aatrine, Jdeidet ech Chouf, 
Semkaniyé et Ain ou Zein 
  Circuit de Tourisme Rural et Patrimonial Bekaa Ouest 
Aana, Ammiq, Dakweh, Ghazze, Haouch El 
Harimeh, Kamed El Laouz, Khiyara, Manara, 
Mansoura, Marj, Sawiri, Sultan Yaacoub, Rawda, 
Tall Zenoub 
751.491,00 
  Parcours Vert Bleu Aakkar 
Akkar el Attika, Beit Mellat, El Ouyoun, El Dawra, 
Mmneh, Tachea, Ilat, Ain Yacoub, Dahr el 
Laysineh, Rahbeh, Bazbina, Tekrit, Jibrael, El 
Borj, Aayat, Bayno 
483.219,00 
  Unite Frigorifique Oleicole Hermel 
Hermel, Elkasr, Kwekh, Shawaghir, Jouar el 
Hachich 
650.415,00 
  
The Construction of a rural park, a local development office and 
rehabilitation of water sources in the Clusterof Aley 
Aley 
Souk El Gharb, Bmakine, Qamatieh, Ain El 
Saideh, Ain El Remaneh, Aley, Ain Jdideh, 
Bkhechtay, Rejmeh, Bhamdoun Mhatta, 
Bhamdoun Balda, Btaloun, Sawfar, Majd El 
Baana, Charoon, Badghan, Mansourieh, Btater, 
Chaney, Meshref 
462.240,00 
ESFD 2 
Support to the Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in the 
Community of Adchit 
Nabatieh Aadchit 38.000,00 
  
Support to reconstruction and improvement of living conditions in 
the cluster of Adchit and Touline  
Marjeyoun Aadchit, Touline 112.290,00 
  
Support to the Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in the 
cluster of Al Boustan  
Tyr Al Boustan 206.000,00 
  
Support to reconstruction and improvement of living conditions in 
the community of Al Fardees 
Hasbaya Al Fardis 100.000,00 
  
Support to reconstruction and improvement of living conditions in 
the community of Rashaya al Foukhar  
Hasbaya Rashaya Al Foukhar 106.000,00 
  
Support to the Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in the 
community of Al Jubbeyn 
Tyr Jibbain 48.000,00 
  
Support to the Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in the 
Cluster of Ayta Al Shaab and Rmeich 
Bint Jbeil Ayta Ech Chaab, Rmaych 80.000,00 
  
Support to the Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in the 
village of Aytaroun 
Bint Jbeil Aytaroun 107.810,00 
  
Support to the Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in the 
village of Hanine 
Bint Jbeil Hanin 5.600,00 
  
Support to reconstruction and improvement of living conditions in 
the community of Kfarhamam  
Hasbaya Kfar Hamam 196.300,00 
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Recovery 2006 
The construction of a water reservoir & the drilling of two new 
boreholes in Nabatieh 
Nabatieh Kafra, Nabatieh 686.968,00 
  
The construction of Water Network System South Lebanon, Bent 
Jbeil and Nabatieh District  
Bint Jbeil 
Aytaroun, Kafra, Maroun El Rass, Bint Jbeil, Beit 
Yahoun, Aita El Chaab 
703.437,00 
  
The Construction of Public Buildings in six Municipalities, South 
Lebanon 
Bint Jbeil, 
Nabatieh 
Qsaibe, Nabatieh el Faoqa, Roumin, Zefta, Haris  992.955,00 
  
The Construction of sewage network systems and wastewater 
treatment plants in South Lebanon 
Nabatieh Yohmor, Kfarsir, Zawtar 6.807.135,00 
Recovery 2007 Construction of an Irrigation Pipeline  Marjeyoun Al Khiam  269.398,00 
  Drainage Network in Nabatieh Tahta Nabatieh Nabatieh El Tahta 799.825,00 
  Rehabilitation of an Existing Water Pond  Bint Jbeil Bint Jbeil 286.415,00 
  The Construction of Municipal Building  Bint Jbeil Chakra 385.851,00 
  The Construction of Roads  
Hasbaya, 
Nabatieh, 
Marjeyoun 
Chebaa, Kfarchouba, Hiberieh, Rachaya El 
Foukhar, Kfar Hamam, Yohmor, Taybeh 
1.208.355,00 
  
The Construction of a Solid Waste Treatment Plant in the Caza of 
Nabatieh 
Nabatieh Kfour 899.000,00 
Projets 
régionaux 
CIUDAD 
Réseau de Villes EuroMed sur la bonne gouvernance locale Beyrouth Ghobayré 200.000,00 
  
Promotion de la participation des femmes et des jeunes dans les 
processus de développement local 
Hermel Union des municipalités de Hermel 300.000,00 
  
Immunité aux conflits armés des Villes classées au Patrimoine 
mondial 
Mont Liban Byblos 200.000,00 
  Gestion des eaux urbaines Mont Liban Fédération des Municipalités du Chouf Souayjani 300.000,00 
  Gestion optimisée des Déchets dans la Méditerranée Tripoli Tripoli 300.000,00 
  Développement économique durable et bonne gouvernance 
Nabatieh, 
Chouf, 
Zgharta, 
Hermel 
Fédération des Municipalités de Bint Jbeil, 
Fédération des Municipalités de Haut Chouf, 
Union des Municipalités de Zgharta, Fédération 
des municipalités de Hermel 
400.000,00 
Nord Liban 
Développement communautaire du programme d'appui au 
développement local dans le Nord Liban 
Aakkar 
Fneideq, Hrar, Mishmish - Beit Ayyoub, Mqaybleh 
(Wadi Khaled), Machta, Machta Hammoud, 
Machta Hassan, Chadra, Akkar al Atiqua, Hweich 
2.500.000,00 
    Danniyeh Kfar Bbnine, Sfinet, Beit Faqs, Taran 250.000,00 
    Hermel Qasr-Fissane, Jouar al Hachich, Kwekh 250.000,00 
Ligne Appel à propositions Local autorités en cours Tout le Liban Municipalités ou Unions de municipalités 250.000,00 
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budgétaire 
Local 
Autorithies / 
non-state actors 
  Appel à propositions Local autorités années 2011-2012 Tout le Liban Municipalités ou Unions de municipalités 700.000,00 
ENPI 
Projet Municipal Finances - Appel à propositions pour les Unions 
de municipalités 
Tout le Liban Unions de municipalités 13.000.000,00 
ESFD 1 
Rural Bridge; Heatlh care center for women and child; municipal 
center for education/culture/development of agriculture 
Aakkar Michmich 300.000,00 
  
Solid Waste Management Facility; Municipal Center for 
Education/Culture/Development for Agriculture; Day Care center 
Bint Jbeil Aytaroun 300.000,00 
  
Health Care Centre; Cultural Centre, Agricutlure Centre; Municipal 
Sports Facility 
Bint Jbeil Rashaf, Srobbine, El Tyreh 300.000,00 
  
Social & Cultural Centre; Equipment and machinery for 
infrastructure works; Rain water collection pond and drainage 
canals project 
Bint Jbeil Aynata 300.000,00 
  Public Sanitation Network; Irrigation Network Aakkar Deir Dalloum, Mar Touma, Majdala 300.000,00 
  Irrigation and potable network; Public Sanitation Network Aakkar Kreibet el Jourd, Chan 300.000,00 
  
Maintenance in Municipal Infrastructure: Rehabilitation of an 
existing communal centre; Mobilisation of irrigation water 
Nabatieh Aadchit 300.000,00 
  Agricutlure centre with processing units of traditional crops Tyr Al Boustan, Jibbain, Marwahin 300.000,00 
  
Municipal Machinery park for maintenance ork and community 
services; health care centre; improved mobilisation of irrigation 
water 
Marjeyoun Aadchit Al Qsair, Toulin 300.000,00 
  
Intensification of irrigation in the plains of Es Saddaneh; 
Implementation of a small sewege network 
Hasbaya El Mery, El Majidiyeh, Helta 250.000,00 
  
Dairy and fruit processing facility; Vocational Training Centre; 
Physiotherapy Centre 
Baalbeck Aarsal 400.000,00 
  
Rehabilitation of the Fatah canal; Collection and safe disposal of 
solid waste: Strengthening local NGO network active in VT and 
educational activities. 
Beirut Sabra, Chatila 400.000,00 
  
Improvement of farming practices; Rehabilitation of the public 
beach and implementation of the eco-park near El Bared River; 
Rehabilitation of the physical appearance of the business area on 
the Mhamara international road; VT and education centre 
Aakkar Mhamara 300.000,00 
  Olive oil Mill Aakkar Akroum 300.000,00 
  Waste water treatment plant and sanitation network Baalbeck El Khodor 300.000,00 
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Revival of the agriculture sector: Social development centre; 
commnal health care centre: Youth sports facility 
Aakkar Dinbou 300.000,00 
  Centre for dairy processing; Centre for artisan works Aakkar Al Kwashra 300.000,00 
  
Support to Mina small and informal producers Mina Community 
Market; Refurbishment of old facades of shops; Set up of the Mina 
Tourism Point; Set up of a fish nursery 
Tripoli Mina 400.000,00 
  Agricultural extension centre (olive oil processing unit) Saida Loubieh, Qonaytra (village), Kzez (Village) 250.000,00 
  Improvement of irrigation water supply Aakkar Qashlaq, Al Ghzaileh (villages) 120.000,00 
      
Sous-total projets terminés depuis moins de deux 
ans 
6.020.000,00 
      Sous-total projets régionaux (en cours) 1.700.000,00 
      Sous-total projets en préparation 16.950.000,00 
      Sous-total projets en cours d'exécution 27.811.431,00 
      
Total (projets finis, en cours et en préparation) 52.481.431 € 
 
Légende 
Projets en cours d'exécution 
Projets en préparation (2011 et 2012) 
Projets terminés depuis moins de deux ans 
Projets régionaux (en cours) 
 
"Intervention coverage": 
 8 Mohafazah sur les 8 du pays, 
 19 Cazas sur les 25 cazas du pays, 
 241 Municipalités sur 945 municipalités du pays. 
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
5.4.1 Intervention 1 
Title: Support for the Implementation of Reforms (LOGO I) 
Budget: 10 mEUR 
Start date: 2005 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: 
 The project has the overall objective of allowing the Government to respond to the citizens' 
expectations and contribute to the economic development and social stability of Lebanon, by 
launching and implementing a credible short to medium-term national reform agenda. 
Specific objective: 
 The specific objective is to provide national authorities a support in the implementation of short 
and medium-term reforms of public policies, included in a Government Action Plan. 
Expected results: 
Result A: 
 Definition of reform priorities and improvement of the Government capacity to implement 
them; 
 Increased capacity of the Government to coordinate at the national level; 
Result B: 
 Implemented reform actions in a number of core domains. 
 Effective monitoring and follow up, including donors and interministerial coordination of the 
implemented reform priorities. 
Activities: 
Linked to Result A) 
 Support the creation, monitoring and regular follow up (of a core Inter Ministerial Working in 
charge of defining reform priorities and ensuring donor coordination; 
 Assisting the said working group in defining reform priorities and implementing them through 
feasible projects ready for immediate execution. 
Linked to Result B) 
 Support the Government and all other involved stakeholders in implementing the priority 
initiatives selected, including through technical assistance (TA), training, exchange of 
experiences and best practices, provision of equipment, etc; 
 Support the monitoring of the implementation of the reform plan and evaluate their impact 
through regular reviews, independent expertise, missions, etc. 
 
5.4.2 Intervention 2 
Title: Support to Economic Recovery I: local development, reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure (LOGO II) 
Budget: 18 mEUR 
Start date: 2007 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: 
The overall objective of the project is to meet the needs of economic recovery and reconstruction of 
Lebanon. 
Specific objective: 
 Component I: Implementation of local development projects: Providing support to restore the 
living conditions of physically and/or economically by the conflict affected local people by 
contributing to restart economic activities-  
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 Component II: Provision of infrastructure support: Providing support to restore the living 
conditions of severely by the conflict affected local people by contributing to the rehabilitation 
and expansion of basic infrastructure.  
Expected results: 
Component I) 
 Development of resources in local areas 
 Launch of new economic activities, job creation and rising incomes 
 Reducing migration to the cities and reducing emigration 
Component II) 
 Improved public services rendered to the local population 
 General improvement of living conditions of the local population 
 Support to revitalize the economic and social life of the municipalities 
Activities: 
Component I) 
 The effective implementation involves: rehabilitation of administrative buildings, rehabilitation 
of production facilities, infrastructure rehabilitation of water supply and water irrigation, civil 
works for the development of agricultural land or rural roads; provision of seedlings and 
reforestation, rehabilitation of buildings or sites of architectural, historical, cultural or 
environmental value, office and/or production equipment supply and / or training and 
consultancy services and technical control; publication of information materials and production 
of communication campaigns and support for operating costs. 
Component II) 
 The effective implementation of these projects involves: construction or rehabilitation of public 
buildings (agricultural centres, souks, municipal buildings), rehabilitation of infrastructure 
(bridges and roads) rehabilitation or extension of water supply infrastructure, drinking and 
wastewater treatment and solid waste, provision of equipment, consultancy and technical 
control, publication of information materials and production of communication campaigns. 
5.4.3 Intervention 3 
Title: Support to the economic recovery and reconstruction of Lebanon  
Budget: 18 mEUR 
Start date: 2007 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: 
The overall objective is to contribute to rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of the Lebanese 
economy in the areas affected by conflict. 
Specific objective: 
 Component I: Finance public service infrastructure and development which fall under the 
general scope of a revival of the economic and social life of municipalities affected by the war. 
 Component II:  
 (i) Support recovery or the creation of economic activities of small and  medium-sized 
enterprises affected by the conflict through the provision of non-financial services and 
easier access to bank loans and 
 (ii) Rehabilitate infrastructures of municipal clusters partners of the ESFD affected by 
the conflict. 
Expected results: 
Component I:  
 R1: The economic life of municipalities affected by the conflict is supported in its recovery, 
through rehabilitation of infrastructure and utilities. 
 R2: The conditions and living standards of people affected by the conflict are improved. 
Component II:  
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 R1: The ability to analyse finance and trade of small and medium-sized enterprises affected 
by the conflict are enhanced, allowing them to restore, maintain or strengthen their activities 
and maintain / create jobs. 
 R2: Small and medium-sized enterprises have easier access to available credit on favourable 
terms. 
 R3: Public infrastructure priorities of partner municipalities, affected by the conflict, are 
rehabilitated. 
Activities: 
Component I:  
Construction or rehabilitation of public buildings, rehabilitation of infrastructure, rehabilitation or 
expansion of infrastructure for supplying drinking water and wastewater treatment and solid waste 
equipment supply, consulting and technical control, publication of information materials and production 
of communication campaigns. 
Component II:  
 R1: Identification of entrepreneurs whose economically viable businesses, have been directly 
or indirectly affected by the conflict or in search of new economic opportunities. 
 Improving the capacity of financial expertise and commercial contractors: (i) training (ii) 
preparation of loan applications submitted to banks, (iii ) monitoring the management of loans. 
 R2: Strengthening the system of financial support to SMEs, implemented by the ESFD. 
 R3: Assistance to damaged clusters to identify priority projects for rehabilitation and 
development.  
 Implementation of identified projects (rehabilitation and development of public infrastructure, 
provision of equipment and services). 
 
5.4.4 Intervention 4 
Title: Support for local development in Northern Lebanon / North Lebanon 
Budget: 18 mEUR 
Start date: 2009 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: 
 Contribute to national unity through a rebalancing of the regions and improving the living 
conditions of the Lebanese population by exploiting the potential of regions suffering from a 
lack of development. 
 Contribute to a national planning policy. 
 Contribute to the improvement of environmental protection. 
 Contribute to the creation of jobs. 
Specific objective: 
The specific objective is to support, by using a participatory approach, local communities in Northern 
Lebanon in the sustainable management of agricultural and natural resources. 
Expected results: 
 R1: Administration, local governments, the private sector and civil society are mobilized 
around strategies for sustainable development planning 
 R2: The agricultural sector is diversified, productivity and profitability have improved. The use 
of Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) is systematized and jobs in the agricultural sector are 
maintained and, if possible, increased. 
 R3: Mountain ecosystems are protected. 
Activities: 
R1 
 Promoting the emergence or the establishment of space for dialogue and decisions that will 
bring together elected officials and community representatives for a local development 
program. 
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 Support of the community in the formulation of inclusive local development plans. 
 Strengthening the capacity of leaders and elected officials in their dialogue with the central 
authorities and industry. 
 Development of a project database (Geographic Information System - GIS). 
 Support and strengthening of sectoral structures and support to CDR in their mandate to 
provide public services to the most vulnerable communities. 
R2 
 Identification of investment projects in accordance with local development plans. 
 Implementation of public investment in environmentally friendly infrastructure at the 
municipalities or municipal union. 
 Promotion of measures to support equitable distribution of water, both for an improvement of 
its quality and for its rational use in agriculture. 
 Extension of GAPs, by including the expertise of agricultural extension centres that participate 
in the region. 
 Support for the creation or specialisation/ professionalization of profitable sectors by involving 
the private sector and the Chamber of Agriculture. 
 Support for the development of graze lands and support for better access of local products to 
markets. 
 Development of peripheral jobs in the agricultural sector. 
R3 
 Protection of forests against fire and streamlining its development based on the national 
strategy, developed with support from the EC. 
 Support and promotion of alternative energy at the household or community level. 
 Improvement of the living conditions (beautification of villages) and public awareness in 
environmental protection. 
 
5.4.5 Intervention 5 
Title: SUPPORT TO REFORMS AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE (Priority 1. Support to ENP 
Initiatives) 
Budget: 4.000.000 EUR 
Start date: 2007/ 2005 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: 
 enable the Lebanese central and local institutions to better meet the expectations expressed 
by citizens  
 contribute to the countries´ economic development and social stability. 
Specific objective: 
 increase the impact of the action of local authorities on a balanced regional development by: 
 the development of inter-municipal relations  
 the use of technical planning  
 effective implementation of local development strategies  
 association of civil society in municipal management 
Expected results: 
 The elected local and municipal staff using tools and methods that enable them to monitor 
effectively, within their prerogatives. 
 The implementation of local development  
 The planning reflects a shared vision and is supported by the local population  
 The 12 clusters of municipalities implement their development strategies.  
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 A number of municipalities Lebanese use methods and tools for participatory planning of local 
development. 
Activities: 
 Attend the 12 clusters in maintaining the structures of inter municipal consultation (elected 
committees of the local area)  
 Support the establishment of technical structures for the promotion of development strategies 
and monitoring of projects identified in the framework of territorial planning 
 Conduction of the training for the elected municipal staff of the 12 clusters 
 Linking the elected of the 12 clusters with the experience of local European authorities 
in matters of management development and participation of civil society in local 
governance. 
 Assistance to the 12 clusters 
 Training activities and outreach 
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
5.5.1 Background  
Remark: This article has been developed by Dr. Karam Karam (national consultant on this 
assignment) and is largely based on previous studies, mainly: Karam Karam, 2009, Décentralisation et 
coopération décentralisée au Liban: état des lieux. Etude réalisée sur demande du bureau de Office of 
Cities and Local United Governments (CGLU)/ Bureau Technique des Villes Libanaises (BTVL). Cette 
étude s’inscrit dans le cadre d’un partenariat avec la Diputacion de Barcelone pour le projet SAWA - 
plateforme pour le renforcement institutionnel et la gouvernance locale en Méditerranée – phase pilote 
au Maroc et au Liban) (http://www.bt-villes.net/Rapport_sur_la_decentralisation_au_Liban.pdf). 
Questions on administrative decentralisation and local development have never been absent from the 
agenda of various governments and different political actors since the independence in 1943, 
particularly in times of crisis and wars. The modernized reforms proposed and initiated by President 
Fouad Chehab (1958-1964) after the insurrections of 1958, included among its main objectives the 
integration of peripheral and marginalized areas through a process of decentralisation, redistribution of 
wealth and urban planning projects. Under the slogan of the “harmonious development” public 
authorities have initiated, during President Chehab mandate, plans and strategies for new institutions 
in order to administer and “develop” the Lebanese society. Another prompt momentum, the Taif 
agreement of 1989, which puts an end to the civil war (1975-1990), proposed transformations of 
administrative decentralisation structures in order to achieve a “balanced development” between 
different regions in Lebanon. 
The essential features of the debate on decentralisation and local development often refer to a 
dichotomy, sometimes Manichean, between unity / division; central / peripheral; central / local 
government; national representation / local representation, etc. These representations are rooted in 
the political history of Lebanon. Traditionally, parliamentarians and political leaders (the traditional 
zai’m) have opposed the strengthening of the capacities of municipalities. In the framework of the 
“process of municipalisation”
15
 and rehabilitation of municipal councils that took place after the war 
and during the 1990s; these leaders obstructed the conduct of municipal elections because it threats 
their traditional political role as service providers and local patrons. These local leaders have 
managed, through their personal clientelist networks and personalized ways of managing local affairs, 
to impede reforms and divert or channel funding and resources allocated for regional development for 
their own benefits. It is only in 1998 that the municipal elections were held. These elections were the 
first after the end of the civil-war, and the first after 36 years of interruption (in fact the last municipal 
elections were held in 1963). Since the back to normal local elections cycle, three municipal elections 
took place (1998, 2004, 2010). With the renewal of the municipal council, candidates with different 
profiles and backgrounds (youth, women, diverse social categories, professionals such engineer, 
architect, lawyer, businessman or doctor…) have been elected. Since, these emerging local elites are 
cohabitated with the traditional leaders, and have been introducing a different style of governance 
reshaping the role of the municipality as main actor in the local development process. 
5.5.2 The administrative decentralisation in post-war Lebanon  
The Taif agreement states under the section “other reforms” paragraph (A) “Administrative 
Decentralisation” that the “expanded administrative decentralisation shall be adopted at the level of 
the smaller administrative units [district and smaller units] through the election of a council, headed by 
the district governor , in every district, to ensure local participation”. It also stipulates that: “a 
comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and 
socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and unions of 
municipalities shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources”. 
The Taif agreement, however, does not provide any further details regarding the reforms of 
decentralisation; it merely states brief suggestions while leaving the tasks for the proposal drafting of 
detailed projects to the executive and legislative powers 
                                                     
15 Lebanon has experienced different modalities of local governance and governments since the mid-nineteenth century. The 
first municipalities were created under the specific political and administrative regime named al-Mutasarrifiya. This regime 
gave, in 1860, the Mount Lebanon the status of autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire. The first created 
municipality was created in 1864 in Deir El-Qamar in the Chouf region, followed by the municipality of Beirut in 1867, and 
the municipality of Tripoli, North Lebanon, in 1877, etc. See: Favier, Agnès, 2005, « Histoires de familles patronages et 
clientèles dans l‟espace politique local au Liban », Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord 2003, Paris, CNRS éditions. 
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Lebanon is a unitary State with four tiers of administration: Central, Muhafaza, Qada, and municipality. 
There are six administrative regions or Muhafaza: Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, Bekaa, 
South Lebanon, and Nabatiyeh. Two additional Muhafaza, Baalbek Al-Hermel, in the Bekaa, and 
Aakkar, in the North, had been created in 2003. The implementation decree of these newly created 
administrative divisions have not been issued as to date thus they are not administratively operational, 
and still fall under the administrative division mentioned above. Each Muhafaza with the exception of 
Beirut, in turn, is divided into Qadas. In total, there are 25 Qadas which are distributed as the 
following: : 6 in Mount Lebanon, 7 in North Lebanon, 4 in Nabatiyeh, 5 in the Bekaa, and 3 in South 
Lebanon. Muhafaza and Qadas represent the levels of deconcentration in Lebanon, whereas 
municipalities are the only decentralized autonomous body as defined by Law. 
The general orientation provided in the Taif text shows clearly, from the outset, a desire to strengthen 
the deconcentration of power of the central government, through the muhafez (prefect, regional 
governor), head of the muhafaza
16
, and qaïmmaqam (sub-prefect district governor) at the head of the 
qada
17
 and other administrative services of the centralized State to the detriment of decentralisation. 
“The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all State 
administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as 
to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally”
18
. The “administrative 
decentralisation”, stated by the agreement, is in fact limited to the expansion of administrative 
deconcentration. The division of districts has not seen the light yet. 
Indeed, in the line of the Taif agreement, the draft laws and proposals submitted in the last two 
decades
19
, have never been adopted or implemented, showing no real willingness to move toward an 
effective administrative decentralisation. Instead of considering decentralisation through the transfer of 
powers to elected local authorities, these projects rather delegate power of the central government to 
the deconcentrated authorities. 
Several reviews and comments have been directed against these projects, which we summarize as 
follows: 
 Among these proposals some of the projects do not separate between decentralisation and 
deconcentration. In fact, they do not distinguish the two concepts. They perceive the 
                                                     
16
 The Muhafaza does not enjoy any legal personality or independent authority. It is an administrative subdivision 
formed by the central government and headed by a grade one civil servant appointed by the Council of Ministers 
upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities. The duties of the governor of the 
Muhafaza, or the Muhafez, are primarily administrative and involve local implementation of policies established by 
the central government and the coordination among central government offices and officials within the Muhafaza. 
The Muhafez represents all the ministries except for the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defense. The function 
of the Muhafez, according to articles 4 to 26 of Decree 116/1959, include the following: implementing laws and 
regulations; putting into practice political directives from the central government and informing the government of 
the general political situation in the Muhafaza; administering all matters in relation to (personnel status, and 
inspecting and controlling all central government bureaus and civil servants in the Muhafaza; guaranteeing public 
security, personal freedom, and private property; and coordinating events, when required, in collaboration with 
internal security forces placed under his command. 
17
 In total, Lebanon„s Muhafaza, with the exception of Beirut, are subdivided into 25 Qadas. Like the Muhafaza, 
the Qada is a geographical subdivision and enjoys neither legal personality nor financial autonomy. Of the 25 
Qadas, five are administered directing directly by the Muhafez because they are capitals of their respective 
Muhafazat. The remaining Qadas are administered by a District Governor Qaïmmaqam, usually a grade two civil 
servant, appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior and 
Municipalities. The Qaïmmaqam performs in his Qada similar functions to those performed by the Muhafez, 
except that he does not represent the various ministries of the central government. The duties of the 
Qaïmmaqam, according to articles 27 to 46 of Decree 116/1959, include the following: supervising the general 
situation in the Qada and informing the government of the developments through the Muhafez; administering the 
regional offices of various ministries in the Qada as well as controlling and supervising employees; implementing 
rules and regulations and preserving public security and order; and supervising the agricultural sector, granting 
hunting and building licenses, imposing health measures, and appointing certain low-level employees. 
18 Taef Agreement, section “other reforms”, article A, point 2 
19
 For instance, the draft law for the “modification of the law for the administrative organization” submitted in 1995 
by the MP Auguste Bakhos. The draft law the “administrative organization and the administrative decentralisation” 
submitted in 1997 to the Parliamentary Commission of the Administrative and Justice”; the draft law 
“administrative decentralisation, administrative, municipal and mukhtar‟s, and the reorganization of the Ministry of 
Interior and Municipalities, accepted by the council of ministers on July 31
st
 1999 and submitted to the Parliament 
in August 1999 and in 2004 the Parliamentary Committee on Administration and Justice had prepared a draft law 
on "administrative organization and administrative decentralisation”. In 2009, with the support of the President of 
the Republic, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities has launched a study to develop a new project on 
decentralisation. 
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empowerment of the prerogatives and powers of deconcentrated bodies to the detriment of 
the decentralized authorities; 
 Other projects considered the separation of the decentralized power from deconcentrated one. 
However they failed to provide a mechanism of cooperation between the two of them. 
 Some other projects call for the establishment of the “qada councils”, comprising at the same 
time both elected and appointed members
20
, under the presidency and the authority of the 
deconcentrated representative of the central government and the representative of the 
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM). Decisions of these councils are subject to a prior 
approval by the central authority prior their enforcement
21
. 
 These projects converge in the fact that they base the administrative division on a single 
decentralized scale between central and local level
22
.  
Based on the above, experts who have worked on the reform of decentralisation and the creation of 
local councils (council or qada) in Lebanon (see bibliography), converge on the following proposals: 
 Local councils should enjoy legal personality and administrative and financial autonomy, as 
well as deliberative and executive power; 
 The prerogatives of local councils should be separated from those of municipal councils and 
unions of municipalities; 
 Human, administrative and financial resources, of the local councils, should be consistently 
and permanently guaranteed; the administrative control must be limited to certain processes; 
 Elections shall be the sole principle of appointment of all members of the local councils; 
 The cooperation between local councils, regional and central authorities must be precisely 
defined. 
In all means, the current situation of decentralisation still far from what reforms suggest; In fact the 
municipalities continue to be governed according to the 1977 law. 
5.5.3 Municipal Council and Decentralisation 
Until the implementation of new decentralisation reforms, the municipality remains the only 
decentralized institution in Lebanon recognized by the law and in charge of local development and 
able to provide decentralized cooperation
23
. The current Municipal law in Lebanon was adopted in 
1977 (Legislative Decree No. 118 dated 30/06/1977)
24
. It defines the municipality as “a local 
administration enjoying legal status and financial and administrative independence which exercises 
powers and responsibilities over the area it is granted by law” (article 1). This legal and administrative 
framework within which operates the municipal institution, though liberal, is now overshadowed by the 
reality on the ground and the needs for development. 
Within the existing administrative system in Lebanon, a critical review of the municipality, its legal 
prerogatives, its financial and human resources and its mode of operation, allows us to better 
understand the place and role of this institution in the local development and decentralisation 
processes.  
                                                     
20 For instance, article 38 of the draft law on “administrative organization and the administrative decentralisation” 
proposed in 1997 to the Parliamentary Commission of the Administration and Justice “suggests the election of 2/3 
of the members of the council of the Muhafaza through secret and vote, and the nomination of the one third by a 
decree following the proposition of the Minister of Interior”. Sleiman, Issam, 1999, “Analyse des projets de 
decentralisation administrative”, CERMOC, document N°4, p.6 
21 “While looking at the prerogatives that will be granted to the council by virtue of article 41 of the draft law, we 
can tell that it will be a deliberative body rather than a center of decision and execution”, Sleiman, op-cit. p.6. 
22
 “At the local level, the central power is exercised to the towns and villages through the mukhtars and councils of 
mukhtar. These councils are not decentralized legal personalities but rather the third level of the central 
administrative organization. It is true that the mukhtar and his council are elected, what differentiates from the 
qaïmmaqam and muhafiz. But the prerogatives of the mukhtar are purely administrative, such as granting 
licenses and birth certificates as well as facilitating the tasks of government employees. Although he t is elected, 
however he is subject to the hierarchical power of the qaïmmaqam and appears as the representative of the 
central authorities," Antoun, Randa, 1999, «La décentralisation et la situation municipale au Liban», CERMOC, 
Document N°4, p. 7-10.1999, p.7-8. 
23
 For a critical review of the main reforms on decentralisation proposed by the municipal law in Lebanon, and for 
an analysis of the activities of the municipalities see: Al-'amal fi Lubnan al-Baladi: dirassa maydaniyya taqiim wa 
lil-tajriba (The municipal work in Lebanon: field study and evaluation of the experiment), collective, Beirut, 
Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2002. 
24
 For all references to the municipal law, Legislative Decree No. 118 dated 30/06/1977, see: Annex. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Lebanon; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
43 
5.5.4 Legal Personality  
The 1977 Law granted the municipality the moral and legal personality, which allows for it “a legal 
status, and an administrative and financial autonomy”. On the local level, it enjoys important 
prerogatives in different areas. 
According to the law of 1977, the prerogatives of the municipal council are extended to all public 
services and “any public activity or public utility within the limits of its territory” (art. 47). Sections 49 
and 50 (Law 1977) list the prerogatives of the municipal council in a non-exhaustive way (see below). 
Basically, in theory, the municipality exercises locally all the powers and functions of the central 
government except those related to defense and national security and foreign policy. 
Under this status, the number of municipalities and unions of municipalities continue to increase since 
the local elections of 1998. The number of the municipalities on 1998 was 646 municipalities (as 
defined by the decree n°23, issued by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities in 16/4/1998). The 
number of municipalities kept on increasing to reach in 2010, 964 municipalities, as defined by the 
Minister of Interior and Municipalities in 22/4/2010
25
. The number of voters was 3.326.572 (the voting 
age is 21 years old) in 2010 municipal elections
26
. There are now 42 unions of municipalities that are 
divided between the 6 Muhafaza and the 25 Qada-s (see table n°1). 
The union of municipalities has the same status as the municipalities, according to the article 114 of 
the Municipal Law of 1977; it enjoys legal status and financial and administrative autonomy. A union 
can be composed of an unlimited number of municipalities, in order to undertake projects with 
common interest and implemented on a larger geographic scale than the territory of one municipality. 
These projects exceed most of the time the financial capacity of a one single municipality. The union 
consists of a decision-making body, called the Union Council, composed of mayors of municipalities 
that are members of the union, and the executive power is assumed by the president of the union. The 
union has the same prerogatives as a municipality. It is subject to the same prior control and suffers 
the same difficulties faced by municipalities. 
In reality, the municipal authority is constantly challenged by the central government in terms of its 
activities and in its prerogatives, namely the decision-making on both executive and financial levels,. 
Municipalities remain dominated by the central authorities. On one hand, the  the laws tightened the 
municipalities and made them barely financially independent and on the other hand, governmental 
agencies was created and took over some of the municipal provisions related to the urban 
management and local development such as the CDR
27
 and the Council of the South. 
5.5.5 Municipal authority and prerogatives under the control of the central government 
The law has placed the decision-making prerogatives in the hands of the municipal council, stating in 
article 47 that “any activity which is public or related to a public utility, within its territory, is the 
responsibility of the council”. Thus, article 49 of the law states, but not limited to, the broad powers of 
the council in areas and issues such as the municipal budget, determining the rate of municipal taxes, 
the specifications of contracts and conditions of public works, planning and improving roads, creating 
gardens in public places, transport coordination, supervision of educational activities and operation of 
public and private schools, the relief to the poorest and disabilities, support to clubs and associations, 
etc. 
The municipal council may also, by virtue of article 50, “create or manage within the municipal area 
directly or by delegation, and participate in, or assist in the execution of the following: 
                                                     
25
 See: http://www.moim.gov.lb/UI/news/news368.html. 
26
 The number of municipal council members is determined by law in proportion to the population registered on 
the civil status registers of the municipality, and not based on the number of effective residents. Hence, and 
according to the article 45 of Law no.665, dated December 30, 1997: “The Municipal Council shall comprise 
members determined as follows: 9 members for the municipality whose registered residents are less than 2000 
people (in 2010 elections: 413 municipalities); 12 members for the municipality whose registered residents are 
between 2001 and 4000 people (in 2010 elections: 257 municipalities); 15 members for the municipality whose 
registered residents are between 4001 and 12000 people (in 2010 elections: 237 municipalities); 18 members for 
the municipality whose registered residents are between 12001 and 24000 people (in 2010 elections: 39 
municipalities); 21 members for the municipality whose registered residents exceed 24000 people (in 2010 
elections: 16 municipalities); 24 members for the municipalities of Beirut and Tripoli”. For more details about 
municipalities, voters, and municipal financial incomes, see, “Al-intikhabat al-baladiyya wa al-ikhtiyariyya 2010” 
(Municipal and Mukhtar elections 2010), Information International, Assafir, 2010 (www.information-
international.com). 
27 The CDR is the main actor for conducting projects of national reconstruction on the entire Lebanese territory. It 
was created in 1977 and is in charge of the coordination between different donors. It is directly affiliated to the 
council of ministers without the ability to take autonomous decisions.  
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Public schools, nurseries and technical schools; social residences, toilets, public wash houses and 
swimming pools; public hospitals, sanitariums, primary health care center, and other health 
establishments and institutions; museums, public libraries, theaters, cinemas, amusements centers, 
clubs, playgrounds and other public and sports shops as well as social, cultural and artistic 
institutions;” etc. 
Based on article 51 of the law, the consent of municipal council is required to address the following 
issues: 
Changing the name of the village; changing the boundaries of the village; organizing traffic and public 
transportation; carrying out projects for improving and delimitating highways in addition to general 
master designs in the municipal area; creating and transferring or closing public schools, 
governmental hospitals and dispensaries; measures related to public emergency; creating charitable 
institutions and offices; applications of exploitation permit for classified shops, restaurants, swimming 
pools, coffee shops, amusement centers and hotels. 
The municipal council finally has a right of control over the executive power and ensures the proper 
functioning of the municipal council. Under article 67 of the law, the executive “belongs to the 
president of the municipal council”. 
The prerogatives of the president of the municipal council (the mayor) are determined by the law 
provisions, but not limited to the main following areas: 
Executing the decisions of the municipal council; making municipal budget forecasts; managing and 
supervising municipality departments; managing the funds and real estates of the municipality and 
thereafter carrying out all the required works in order to preserve its rights; managing revenues of the 
municipality and overseeing accounts; ordering the payment of the municipal budget, settling and 
controlling the charges and giving notices of payment; concluding contracts of rent and barter, 
accepting donations and ordered goods, purchases, and transactions after having authorized such 
works according to the provisions of the law; acting the same regarding the purchases, agreements, 
transactions, undertakings as well as supervising and receiving the works that are carried out on 
behalf of the municipality; representing the municipality before the Courts; authorizing fees by virtue of 
a statement or an invoice; taking measures to tackle  alcoholism, epidemic or infectious diseases, and 
animal diseases; demolishing insecure buildings and repairing them on the expenses of their owners, 
according to the provisions of the law on construction; receiving donations and funds ordered to the 
municipality, if they are likely to be damaged or lost and keeping them until a decision is taken with 
respect thereto; taking measures to restrain begging; taking the appropriate measures regarding 
misbehaving people who may threaten ethics or people„s safety and goods; among others. 
In order to preserve the territory and interests of the state, the legislator has placed the municipal 
councils under the direct supervision of the central government. Thus, in exercising its authority, the 
council is subject to several protections and a series of control that determines his relations with the 
central government and the public administration. 
There are several levels and types of control over the duties of the municipal Council: administrative, 
financial (from the Ministry of Finance, the Court of Auditors, the Auditor of Accounts, the Comptroller 
General of Finance), Civil Service Board, the General Inspectorate, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry 
of Environment, Ministry of Justice, other autonomous ministries and administrations, etc..The focus 
below is specifically on the administrative control. 
Administrative control is the prerogative of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, the muhafez and 
the qaïmmaqam. It is almost unlimited. It covers most of the decisions of the council to rule on its 
legality, and its public interest. 
The control of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities on the decisions of the municipal council is 
fixed by the article 62 of the Municipal Law. It focuses on the following municipal decisions: decisions 
by virtue of which a public system is established, loans, naming of the streets, creation of municipal 
units, the creation of unions of municipalities, allowances of the President and Vice-President of the 
municipality, the transformation of public goods in municipal property, etc.. 
The Control of the Muhafez, according to article 61 of the Municipal law, is identified by a series of 
municipal decisions including: the authorization of transactions over 80 million Lebanese pounds (U.S. 
$ 53,333)
28
, permission to work and acquisition of equipment of over 50 million Lebanese pounds 
(U.S. $ 33,333), buying or selling properties in more than 100 million Lebanese pounds (U.S. $ 
66,666), leases whose annual value is more than 40 million Lebanese pounds (U.S. $ 26,666), etc. 
The control of the qaïmmaqam, according to article 60 of the municipal law, on municipal decisions is 
identified by the following: transfers and appropriations in the municipal budget, setting the level of 
                                                     
28 1 USD is equal to 1500 Lebanese Pounds  
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municipal taxes, lease with an annual value that not exceeds 20 million in Lebanese pounds (U.S. $ 
13,333), permission to work and acquisition of equipment for a value ranging from 20 to 50 million 
Lebanese pounds (U.S. $ 13,333 to U.S. $ 33 333) the acceptance or refusal of donations, etc. 
Article 59 of the municipal Law of 1977, specifies only few municipal decisions that are free of control  
and immediately enforceable. Thus, article 63 of the law allows the council to consider a decision as 
binding and valid if the power of administrative control concerned does not give its opinion within a 
month from the testimony of the decision. And under Article 64 of the Act, the municipality always has 
the right to have recourse to the tribunal if it refuses to approve certain decisions imposed by the 
supervisory authority. But despite these possibilities, in practice, councils are still awaiting the 
approval of the authority of administrative control prior to the execution of a decision to maintain good 
relations with the central power which they remain largely dependent. 
Indeed, several decrees promulgated by the Council of Ministers are in conflict with the municipal law. 
It requires a kind of discretionary and arbitrary control over the municipal councils which is based on 
any legal rule. For example, we might mention as example the ban on Councilors to travel and attend 
conferences abroad without prior authorization from the Council of Ministers. Thus, "the practices of 
central powers against councils and unions of municipalities have turned into a direct or indirect 
involvement in the acts, decisions and management of municipal affairs, and sometimes taking a 
decision instead of municipalities. These practices were justified in scattered texts developed and 
compiled over the years by central governments and are in contradiction with the law and the 
prerogatives of municipal councils”.
29
 
5.5.6 The lack of the financial resources 
In Lebanon, municipalities generally have limited  resources for revenues and are subject to binding 
rules of financial management. A survey conducted in 2009 showed that two-thirds of municipalities 
(about 645 municipalities) have insufficient resources to meet their needs. Their budget does not 
exceed U.S. $ 65,000 per year
30
. Thus majority of the resources comes from government transfers
31
. 
The Law of 1977 identifies the financial resources of municipalities according to several categories 
(art. 86): 
 Fees collected directly from taxpayers; under law 60 of 1988, municipalities have the right to 
collect 16 different types of taxes; 
 Fees collected by the central government, independent entities, or public institutions on behalf 
of municipalities and distributed directly to each municipality; under the Law 60 of 1988, the 
taxes collected by public administrations and institutions on the real estate gains (3%), 
subscriptions and telephone communications (10%) on electricity consumption (10%) and 
water consumption. Private institutions collect taxes on insurance policies (except life 
insurance) and the use of mobile phones
32
 (Atallah, 1999, p. 12); 
 Fees collected by the Central authority on behalf of municipalities and deposited in the IMF to 
be later distributed to municipalities. Central government collects 13 kind of taxes and 
surcharges and deposits them in the IMF; 
 Financial aid and loans; 
 Revenues from municipal properties, including the total revenues of public domains related to 
the municipality; 
 Fines, and donations, and wills. 
The charges filed with the IMF is redistributed under Decree 1917 of 1979 to the municipalities (75%) 
and unions of municipalities (25%), deduction is made on expenses for salaries and cost of Ministries 
of Finance and Interior and Municipalities services. The redistribution of these funds is proportional to 
the number of people enrolled in the registry of the municipality and to the taxes collected by each 
municipality during the previous two fiscal years. "The goal is to encourage municipalities to collect 
taxes themselves, because the more they collect taxes the more their share is increased” (Antoun, 
1999, p. 8). 
                                                     
29 Ghassan Moukheiber, 1999, “The municipalities and the central government” 
http://ghassanmoukheiber.net/showarticles.aspx?aid=32&mlang=A&lang=F  
30
 Non-published survey conducted by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities in 2009. 
31
 See : Dewailly, Bruno et alii., 2003, «Pouvoirs locaux et décentralisation en période de (re) construction étatique. Les cas 
du Liban et de la Palestine : étude comparée », dans Lebris Émile (dir.), Les Municipalités dans le champ politique local. 
Effets de l'importation des réformes de décentralisation dans la gestion de villes d'Afrique et du Proche Orient, Paris, 
programme PRUD, GEMDEV, ISTED. 
32
 See : Atallah, Sami, 1999, « Les finances municipales au Liban », Beyrouth, CERMOC, Document N°4, p. 12-16. 
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Thus, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities has made two disbursements of IMF funds to 
municipalities and unions of municipalities between 2008 and 2009: in December 2008, for the year 
2006, municipalities received $ 290 billion Lebanese pounds (193,333,333 U.S. $ million). In April 
2009, for the year 2007, they received 280 billion Lebanese pounds (186,666,666 million USD)
33
. 
Indeed, the taxes levied by the State and public institutions on behalf of municipalities are over 80% of 
all financial resources of most municipalities. This measure indicates the fragility of the theoretical 
"financial independence" of municipalities and their dependence on central power. For Sami Atallah 
(1999) municipal revenues are challenged by three types of problems: administrative and institutional 
and legal: 
 For taxes levied directly by the municipalities, the law does not allow municipalities to create 
new taxes or fix the tax base, the method of valuation fees is slow, not modernized, and 
accounting is not computerized for a considerable number of municipalities. In addition , most 
of them suffer  from the lack of enough tax collector (Atallah, 1999, p. 13); 
 For taxes levied by the state, by autonomous boards and public institutions on behalf of 
municipalities and paid directly to each of them: in practice, municipalities do not control these 
taxes, do not master the process nor managing the money collected, and "have no way to 
force these institutions and services to transfer the money owed to them (Atallah, 1999, 13). 
 For taxes levied by the State on behalf of all municipalities and are filed in the IMF: the 
redistribution of this money was for a long time suspended and the funds were used largely in 
the service of public debt. Since 1997, the allocation of these funds to municipalities has taken 
a non-transparent, unpredictable and subject to the voluntarism of the central government. 
Indeed, 75% of IMF funds are invested by the government in major development projects 
entrusted to the CDR, the Council of Great City Projects in Beirut and other development 
institutions, and not to municipalities. Part of the funds of the IMF is also used to fund salaries 
and services of the ministries of Finance and Interior and Municipalities. 
Sami Atallah (1999) proposes in his study several needed practices and reforms to strengthen, 
improve and make effective the financial autonomy of municipal institutions. This proposition is 
twofold. At the municipal level, councils should update and modernize their database (i.e: number of 
residents); map the buildings and common services existing real estate constructions, review the tax 
laws, computerize the bills, improve tax collection, etc. At the laws and decrees level, they should 
ensure a wider decentralisation and an effective financial autonomy, namely through: the inclusion of 
the recipe due to municipalities in the State budget; the representation of municipalities in all 
institutions and administrations in charge of the management of municipal funds and ensuring a 
regular transfer of funds to the municipalities every three months; the cancellation of prior control on 
the municipalities, etc. 
5.5.7 Human Resources of the Municipalities 
The control of the central authorities and the lack of financial resources are added to deficit of the 
municipalities in their human resources. Once more, the prerogatives of municipal councils are 
challenged by a series of main decisions. For several decades, municipalities have suffered from the 
non-renewal of their elected members, since no election was held between1963 and 1998, and their 
servants, because the government has banned them from recruiting new staff. Although the situation 
has gradually started to change after the 1998 municipal elections, the legacy of past decades is still 
visible. This is reflected more specifically in the lack of experience in municipal management on the 
part of elected representatives and aging municipal servants as well as their deficiency in terms of 
training and expertise. 
Indeed, article 80 of the Municipal law stipulated the municipalities that are capitals of Muhafaza to be 
under  the control of the Civil Service Board, by considering the possibility at anytime to extend this 
control measure to other municipalities (through a decree by the Council of Ministers upon the 
proposal of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities). In fact, the control of the Civil Service Board 
covers all the matters related to municipal servants or officials: monitoring officials, their appointments, 
transfers, dismissals and referrals, the end of service, discipline, etc. It also controls the competition 
and training for new staff. It deprives municipalities of their autonomy and their ability to respond 
quickly and avoid the lengthy and bureaucratic procedures, lack of staff, managers, technicians or 
employees. 
                                                     
33
 For an exhaustive study on the municipal finance, see: ICMA, CRI, TCGI, 2011, Municipal Finance Studies 
Program, Final Roadmap for Modernizing Municipal Finance in Lebanon (Final Report of Studies 1, 2 & 3), MoIM, 
Beirut (http://www.moim.gov.lb/UI/moim/PDF/FinalRoadmapforModernizingMunicipalFinance.pdf). 
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As for the public servants, recent studies
34
 show the need for real autonomy for municipal councils 
and independence in managing their human resources at all levels (recruitment, appointment, 
contract, promotion, etc.). This autonomy would be ensured through the cancellation of article 80 of 
the Municipal Law and the ministerial decrees the obliged municipalities in managing their human 
resources to the control of the Civil Service Board. 
That been said, the means, resources and personal skills are not given to all elected municipal 
members and officials. The ability to gather all factors favorable to assure the role of the decentralized 
local government depends on several criteria. It refers primarily to the knowledge of local actors and 
stakeholders, especially elected officials, their own situations, their resources and skills, both personal 
and institutional. A survey SOFRES-CERMOC-1999 (Favier, 2001, Appendix 3), conducted through a 
questionnaire sent to all presidents of municipalities (out of 711 municipalities surveyed in 1999, 600 
responded), and a sample of municipal council members (on a sample of 336 council members, 311 
responded), helped to define the profiles of presidents of municipalities, vice-presidents, and the 
municipal council members:  
 The average age of presidents is 51.8 years and 46 years for councilors;  
 7.2% of the presidents were single and 91.7% were married, 10.9% of the municipal council 
members are single and 87.1% are married;  
 70.2% of the presidents and 76.5% of the vice-presidents live in their locality;  
 As for the education: for the presidents of municipalities: 0.5% are illiterate, 7% with a basic 
level, 14.8% with a complementary level, 22.8% a secondary level, 6.3% a technical level , 
28.3% university level – (BA), 12% a university level – (Masters) and 8.2% doctoral level. For 
the municipal council members: 3.5% have a basic level, 5.1% complementary level, 11.3% a 
secondary level, 5.1% a technical level, 41.8% university level – (BA), 18% a university level – 
(Masters), and 14.8% doctoral level. 
 For the degree of specialization (technical and academic) for the presidents and for the 
council members Law (lawyer) came first, followed by architecture / engineering, medicine, 
administration, business and economic affairs, political science, etc. 
 The main occupation or work: Businessman, 41% of the presidents and 33.1% of council 
members; Self-employed, 26.5 of the presidents and 43.7% of council members; Executive, 
Manager or Officer, 5% of the presidents and 7.4% of council members; Officer of the private 
sector, 7.7% of the presidents and 8.7% of council members; 
 The order of importance of municipal work in relation to areas of activities: creation and 
infrastructure improvement 94.6%, environment 66.8%, creating and improving educational 
and social services 52.7%, urban planning 36 , 7%, organization of statistical information on 
the town 37%, cultural activities27.7%, carrying out activities aimed at engaging civil society 
27%, economic development 16.7%; 
 The degree of importance of the obstacles faced by the municipal council in carrying out his 
plans: lack of financial resources, lack of administrative resources, routine and administrative 
paralysis, relationship with the central power (authority), intervention of politicians, political 
parties or religious leaders on the work and activities carried by the municipal council, the lack 
of interest of public opinion, differences and divisions within the localities, political differences 
within the municipal council, familial differences within the municipal council; 
Surveys and qualitative studies
35
 have highlighted the importance of the personal skills of local elected 
representatives, particularly the presidents, mayors, in the management of municipal and local affairs. 
These investigations have also revealed the role of civil society organizations in the local management 
of the municipalities. Indeed, the law granted the municipality council and the mayor the prerogatives 
to encourage and strengthen the participation of individuals and organizations in all fields and sectors. 
Article 50 of the law gives the municipal council the authority and capacities to manage, directly or 
indirectly, its territory, all types of public projects, or to entrust management to a third party. Thus, the 
law allows the municipality to create ad hoc committees specializing in different areas and issues, 
composed of municipal council members and individuals from outside the council, civil society actors, 
                                                     
34 We rely precisely on the data of two surveys conducted with mayors and members of municipals councils in 
1998 for the mandate of 1998-2004. The first was conducted by SOFRES-CERMOC in 1999, and published in 
Favier, Agnès (Eds.), 2001, Municipalités et Pouvoirs locaux au Liban, Beyrouth, Les Cahiers du CERMOC, n° 
24; the second, Al-'amal fi Lubnan al-Baladi: dirassa maydaniyya taqiim wa lil-tajriba (The municipal work in 
Lebanon: field study and evaluation of the experiment), collective, 2002, Beirut, Lebanese Center for Policy 
Studies, Chapters I and II. 
35 Favier, Agnès (Eds.), 2001; LCPS, collective, 2002, op. cit. 
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experts, etc;. This paves the way for wide opportunities to cooperation and partnership between the 
municipality and institutions and actors outside the council, at the local, national and international 
levels. 
Table 5 Key figures on Muhafaza, Qada, Municipalities, Unions of Municipalities, Inhabitants 
Muhafaza Number of Caza-s 
(Qada') 
Number of 
Municipalities per 
Caza 
Number of Unions 
of Municipalities  
(Ittihad baladiyyat) 
per Caza and 
Names of Unions 
Number of 
Municipalities per 
Unions of 
Municipalities 
Number of 
Inhabitants per 
Unions of 
Municipalities 
Bierut - 1 - -  
Beqaa 3 
-Zahle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Beqaa-Ouest 
 
 
 
-Rachayya 
84 
-29 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-29 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
-26 Municipalities 
5 
-3 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Qada‟ Zahle 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Beqaa al-Awsat 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Sharq Zahle 
 
-2 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Sahel al-Sahel 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Buhaiyra 
 
- 
 
 
-7 Municipalities 
 
-4 Municipalities 
 
-6 Municipalities 
 
 
-11 Municipalities 
16 Municipalities 
 
-32 376 
InInhabitants 
 
-22 450 
Inhabitants 
 
-14 714 
Inhabitants 
 
-47 903 
Inhabitants 
-72 574 
Inhabitants 
Baalbek Al-
Hermel 
(Muhafaza formally 
established in 2003. 
The implementation 
decree of these 
newly created 
administrative 
division have not 
been issued as to 
date thus it is not 
administratively 
operational, and still 
fall under the 
administrative 
division of the 
Bekaa muhafaza ) 
2 
-Baalbek 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Al-Hermel 
63 
-58 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5 Municipalities 
5 
-4 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Baalbek 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Gharbi Baalbek 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Sharqi Baalbek 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Challal 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Hermel 
 
 
-6 Municipalities 
 
-11 Municipalities 
-6 Municipalities 
 
-3 Municipalities 
 
 
-4 Municipalities 
 
 
-74 600 
Inhabitants 
 
-66 576 
Inhabitants 
-23 143 
Inhabitants 
 
-12 808 
Inhabitants 
 
 
-52 217 
Inhabitants 
North Lebanon 
(Lubnan al-
chamali) 
6 
 
-Tarablouss 
(Tripoli) 
 
 
-Al-Minieh-
Denniyeh 
136 
 
-3 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-33 Municipalities 
 
7 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Fayha‟ 
 
-2 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
 
 
 
-3 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-5 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-326091 
Inhabitants 
 
 
-48026 
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-Zoghorta 
 
 
 
-Becharreh 
 
 
-Batroun 
 
 
 
-Koura 
 
 
-31 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-11 Municipalities 
 
 
-24 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-34  Municipalities 
al-Minieh 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Denniyeh  
 
-1 Union 
- Ittihad baladiyyat 
Qada‟ Zoghorta 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Qada‟ Bacharreh 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Batroun 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Koura 
-20 Municipalities 
 
-24 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-11 Municipalities 
 
 
-22 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-24 Municipalities 
Inhabitants 
-75 346 
Inhabitants 
 
-67853 
Inhabitants 
 
 
-55 208 
Inhabitants 
 
 
-47 903 
Inhabitants 
 
 
-61 733 
Inhabitants 
Aakkar 
(Muhafaza formally 
established in 2003. 
The implementation 
decree of these 
newly created 
administrative 
division have not 
been issued as to 
date thus it is not 
administratively 
operational, and still 
fall under the 
administrative 
division of the 
muhafaza of North 
Lebanon) 
1 
-Aakkar 
100 
-100 Municipalities 
4 
-4 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
mintaqat al-Joumeh 
Aakkar  
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Jurd al-Qati‟ 
- Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Shift 
- Ittihad baladiyyat 
Wassat wa Sahel al-
Qati‟ 
 
 
-16 municipalité 
 
-9 Municipalities 
 
-13 Municipalities 
 
-7 Municipalities 
 
 
-64 129 
Inhabitants 
 
-43 199 
Inhabitants 
 
-38 654 
Inhabitants 
 
-34 338 
Inhabitants 
Mount-Lebanon 
(Jabal Lubnan) 
6 
-Baabda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Matn 
 
 
 
 
-Chouf 
 
 
 
307 
-45 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-50 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
-73 Municipalities 
 
 
 
11 
-3 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Matn al-„Aala 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Dahiyya al-
Janubiyya 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Sahel al-Matn 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Sahel al-Matn al-
Chamali al-Sahili 
wa al-Awsat 
 
-4 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Iqlim al-Kharub al-
 
 
-24 Municipalities 
 
-3 Municipalities 
 
-3 Municipalities 
 
 
-33 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
-6 Municipalities 
 
-16 Municipalities 
 
 
-55 266 
Inhabitants 
 
-68 780 
Inhabitants 
 
-26 493 
Inhabitants 
 
 
-172 520 
Inhabitants 
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-Aaley 
 
 
 
-Kisrouan 
 
 
 
-Jbeil-Byblos 
 
 
 
 
 
-55 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-48 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-36 Municipalities 
Janubi 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Iqlim al-Kharub al-
Chamali 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Suwaijani 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Chouf al-„Aala 
 
-1 Union 
- Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Jurd al-„Aala 
Bhmdoun 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Kisrouan al-Ftouh 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Qada‟ Jubail 
 
-9 Municipalities 
 
-12 Municipalities 
 
 
-8 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-48 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-14 Municipalities 
-15 342 
Inhabitants 
 
-84 392 
Inhabitants 
 
-30 658 
Inhabitants 
 
-27 215 
Inhabitants 
 
 
-23 626 
Inhabitants 
 
 
 
-112 073 
Inhabitants 
 
 
 
-53 998 
Inhabitants 
Liban Sud 
(Lubnan Al-
Janoubi) 
3 
-Saïda 
 
 
 
 
-Tyr (Sour) 
 
 
 
-Jezzine 
138 
-45 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
-58 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-35 Municipalities 
5 
-2 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Saïda al-Zahrani 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Sahel al-Zahrani 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Qada‟ Sour 
 
-2 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Mintaqat Jezzine 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Jabal al-Rayhan 
 
 
-16 Municipalities 
 
-16 Municipalities 
 
 
-52 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-26 Municipalities 
 
-6 Municipalities 
 
 
-127 484 
Inhabitants 
 
-66 493 
Inhabitants 
 
 
-239 256 
Inhabitants 
 
 
 
-43 996 
Inhabitants 
 
-17 095 
Inhabitants 
Nabatiyeh 4 
-Nabatiyeh 
 
 
 
 
-Majaayou 
116 
-39 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
-26 Municipalities 
5 
-2 Unions 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-Shaqif 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Iqlim al-Tufah 
 
-1 Union 
 
 
-29 Municipalities 
 
-9 Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
-166 073 
Inhabitants 
 
-29 713 
Inhabitants 
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-Hasbayya 
 
 
 
-Bint-Jbeil 
 
 
 
-15 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-36 Municipalities 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Jabal Aamel 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
al-„arqoub 
 
-1 Union 
-Ittihad baladiyyat 
Qda‟ Bint-Jbeil 
-11 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-6 Municipalities 
 
 
 
-10 Municipalities 
 
-59 449 
Inhabitants 
 
 
 
-29 493 
Inhabitants 
 
 
 
-88 619 
Inhabitants 
8 muhafaza 25 caza-s 945 Municipalities 42 Unions de 
Municipalities 
585 Municipalities 
affiliées à une 
Union de 
Municipalities 
2 819 875 
Inhabitants 
dans les 
Unions de 
Municipalities 
Source: table composed from different figures available at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities in May 2009.  
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5.6 Annex 6: Overview of Central Partners for EU support in Lebanon 
The EU has supported local development through various interventions with four main partners that all 
have a varying degree of legal mandate for local development and local government support: 
1. ESFD 
2. CDR 
3. OMSAR 
4. MOI 
Basic information is provided below on each of these four key government institutions 
1. ESFD36  
The ESFD mission is to alleviate poverty and mitigate the social impact of the economic transition in 
Lebanon on marginalized and disadvantaged groups. 
Foundation & History 
The ESFD is the fruit of the Euro-Med partnership. It was created in November 2000 with the 
signature of a financing agreement between the European Commission and the Lebanese 
Government and started its activities in June 2002. 
From a Project to an Institution 
To date, the ESFD is an autonomous department directly attached to the CDR. It is to become a 
permanent public institution for poverty alleviation in Lebanon. 
Funding 
The ESFD is a project of Euros 31 Million, of which 25 Million were granted by the European 
Commission and 6 Million by the Lebanese Government. In 2007, an additional fund of Euros 6 Million 
was mobilized from the European Commission. Since the launching of its mainstream activities in 
2002, the ESFD has committed and disbursed 97% of the initial grant of Euros 31 Million. 
In order to achieve our mission, we focus our activities and efforts on two areas: 
- Job Creation: aimed at creating job opportunities through the provision of small and micro-credit to 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) through commercial banks; 
- Community Development: aimed at improving access, distribution and quality of social services to 
deprived communities. 
Our Team 
The ESFD has a lean management structure and a highly qualified professional team of 15 staff who 
are managing a portfolio of Euros 31 million funds. 
The ESFD is headed by Mr. Haitham Omar as Managing Director. The Job Creation Component is 
headed by Mrs. Racha Chahine-Merhebi, the Community Development Component is headed by 
Miss. Dima Sader. 
 
2. CDR37 
 
Towards the end of the year 1976 and, after almost two years of painful and destructive events 
particularly on the infrastructure level as well as the public institutions and ministries, which were at the 
time suffering from an acute shortage in human resources and equipment and, following the 
restoration of security through the presence of the Joint Arab Forces, the government found it 
necessary to create a new public body which would be able to carry out the enormous task of the 
reconstruction of Lebanon. 
On the other hand, some friendly countries wishing to help Lebanon in its reconstruction efforts were 
in need of a reliable side to depend on when negotiating and to create channels through which this aid 
will go through especially that the Ministry of Planning ceased to exist. 
Thus, the Council for Development and Reconstruction was established through Decree No. 5 dated 
31st January 1977 . The responsibilities of the CDR were specified to three main tasks: complying a 
plan and a time schedule for the resumption of reconstruction and of development, guaranteeing the 
funding of projects presented, supervising their execution and utilization by contributing to the process 
                                                     
36
 extracted from the ESFD website  
37
 See http://www.cdr.gov.lb/eng/home.asp  
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of rehabilitation of public institutions, thus enabling it to assume responsibility for the execution of a 
number of projects under the supervision of the Council of Ministers. 
Contrary to other authorities, the CDR was an autonomous institution endowed with extended 
jurisdiction and is directly accountable to the Council of Ministers through the Prime Minister, thus 
evading the administrative routine matters which had ceased to be followed in order to accelerate the 
reconstruction process and to allow adequate time for the reconstruction and building of public 
institutions that were devastated during the events 
 
 
OMSAR38 
OMSAR is a government organization that seeks to develop the institutional and technical capacities 
of the Lebanese ministries, central bodies, public agencies and municipalities. OMSAR is in charge of: 
assessing their reform and development needs; devising and updating administrative reform and e-
Government strategies; identifying, implementing and evaluating development projects that translate 
the strategies into action; conducting organizational and legal studies; streamlining work procedures; 
and training civil servants. OMSAR is keen to remain responsive to the demands of the Lebanese 
administrations and to modernize them by building effective partnerships with them as well as with 
international donors, non-government organizations and the civil society. 
 
The decades of civil war have thwarted the development of an efficient administration with modern 
facilities and skillfully executed functions. This has hampered economic recovery and stability. 
Consequently, OMSAR in Lebanon had to play a crucial role by acting as an agent of change. Building 
the Government‟s physical and administrative infrastructures will have a profound effect in improving 
the productivity of the Ministries and Public Agencies - and ultimately benefit citizens. The first 
rehabilitation program that targeted the civil service after the war was the national Administrative 
Rehabilitation Program (NARP) that identified the needs of the public sector entities for physical 
reconstruction, technical assistance and human resources. Loans and grants poured into OMSAR to 
meet the set recovery and development targets. 
 
 The ultimate goals are: 
* Ensuring efficient delivery of public services to all citizens; 
* Utilizing and growing the human capital of the nation; 
* Enhancing ethics, integrity and sense of belonging; 
* Keeping abreast of the latest technological developments and managerial good practices. 
 
MOIM  
MOIM in Lebanon is responsible for governorate, caza, municipalities, federation of municipalities and 
village matters, in addition to political parties and organizations. 
The ministry was created in the first post-independence government in 1943. In 2000, it was named 
the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. During the evaluation mission in May 2011 the minister (the 
independent Ziad Baroud) resigned. 
The Ministry is in practice primarily concerned with security and central government administrative 
issues and is yet to establish its capacity to deal with municipalities in a substantive manner.  
                                                     
38
 Extracted from the website: http://www.omsar.gov.lb  
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5.7 Annex 7: Overview of CIUDAD Projects in Lebanon  
 
EUMED Cities – EuroMed Cities Network on Good Local Governance  
Location of Activities: Lebanon, Morocco,  
Theme: Economic Development and Social Inclusion 
Theme: Good Governance and Urban Development Policy 
Sector: Good Governance 
Lead Partner: Barcelona City Council (Spain) 
The cities of Fes, Tangier and Ghobayré are currently experiencing rapid population growth, immigration 
and a concentration of vulnerable populations. This challenges local authorities to develop strategies to 
enhance sustainable human and economic development for the benefit of all citizens, particularly those in 
vulnerable communities.  
 
Save World Heritage List (WHL) Cities War Free World Heritage Listed Cities  
Location of Activities: Georgia, Lebanon,  
Theme: Good Governance and Urban Development Policy 
Sector: Cultural Heritage 
Lead Partner: Council of the United Municipalities of Jbail-Byblos (Lebanon) 
Both Byblos (Lebanon) and Mtskheta (Georgia) are WHL cities which have recently been threatened by 
the ravages of war. Despite the fact that WHL sites have a significant impact on the image of countries 
and local economies, few measures are put in place to safeguard them. In part this is due to a lack of 
awareness of civil and military concerned authorities (and even less concern is shown by attacking 
forces) of the provisions of 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols. An even more significant 
impacting factor is the lack of structures, guidelines, and capacity to develop appropriate policies, and 
prepare and implement risk management plans.  
 
Partnership for urban renewal towards regional economic development 
Location of Activities: Jordan, Lebanon,  
Theme: Economic Development and Social Inclusion 
Sector: Economic Development and Employment 
Sector: Good Governance 
Lead Partner: Province of Turin (Italy) 
The operational capacity of local authorities as well as the physical conditions within small local 
communities, both in Lebanon and Jordan, needs to be enhanced. They lack both funding and  skills. But 
these can be addressed by helping them build networks that bring together the administration, the private 
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sector, and civil society in a collaboration that benefits everyone.  
 
GODEM - Optimised Management of Waste in the Mediterranean 
Location of Activities: Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia,  
Theme: Environmental Sustainability 
Sector: Solid Waste Management 
Lead Partner: Capital Region of Brussels / ACR+ 
Not only does the average person in the EU produce twice as much waste as their southern neighbours, 
but in the south almost twice as much of the waste produced is organic. In general, however, on both 
sides of the Mediterranean, the quantity and changing composition of waste is making it urgent to find 
sustainable methods of waste disposal. Of particular concern in the South is the fact that waste is mainly 
thrown away in an uncontrolled manner, with only 5% being recycled.  
 
WADI - Urban Water Management 
Location of Activities: Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory,  
Theme: Environmental Sustainability 
Sector: Water and Wastewater 
Lead Partner: Municipality of Pisa (Italy);  
Improved and more efficient water and waste water management is a major challenge facing local 
governments in the Eastern Mediterranean, where natural water resources are scarce and threatened by 
over-exploitation. Although there are piped sewerage systems in parts of larger cities, there is usually no 
waste water treatment and, in most urban areas, particularly smaller ones, households still rely on 
cesspits or septic tanks. This results in continuous contamination of groundwater resources.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons and to provide recommendations to help 
for opportune and timely support to decentralisation processes; it shall cover aid delivery over the 
period 2000-2009 taking into account the different entry points used by the EC/EU to delivery its 
support to decentralisation processes. This evaluation is partly based on a number of country missions 
to be carried out during the field phase.1 
The field visit to Mali had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
assess Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. By no means, this note should be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered at the single country level, as they are 
formulated to be answered on the global level using the whole information collected from the desk 
study and the different field phase country studies. 
The reasons for selecting Mali as one of the field studies were: 
 The importance of the country portfolio in terms of EC/EU support to decentralisation (the 
EC/EU disbursed around 120mEUR for direct support to decentralisation over the period 
2000-2009); 
 The EC/EU support to decentralisation was given since 2006 as sector budget support 
(60mEUR SBS complemented by 8mEUR supporting funds, capacity building measures, TA 
etc). Mali was the first country worldwide for which the EC/EU used a sector budget support 
modality as main funding modality to support decentralisation. 
 The EC/EU supported the decentralisation via a top-down approach (via sector budget 
support), completed by a bottom-up approach in selected regions (via the project ADERE 
Nord).  
The field visit was undertaken between 10/05 and 19/05. The evaluation team was composed of 
Emmanuel Pousse (team leader), Ibrahima Sylla (national senior consultant) and Sarah Seus (junior 
evaluation consultant).  
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research focus 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Mali has 
specifically looked into the following:  
Research focus Mainly related to EQ 
What lessons can be drawn of the EC/EU decision to support the decentralisation 
process via budget support after 10 years of continuous support?  
3 
The EC/EU is the lead donor and driving force in the decentralisation sector in Mali. 
Which lessons can be drawn from this role played by the EC?  
4 
The EC/EU (sector budget) support to decentralisation is directly linked to the state 
reform (it supports both, decentralisation and the state reform). What lessons can be 
drawn of this articulation of both reforms? What are the critical factors for a 
successful interaction in terms of 1) effective transfer of resources and capacity at 
both deconcentrated and decentralised levels, 2) local capacity building and 3) the 
improvement of service delivery at local level? 
5-8 
What have the outcomes of the EC/EU support been in terms of improved service 
delivery by LG and capacity of key government institutions? Are there improvements 
over time? 
8 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
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1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
development partners and the overall decentralisation process in the country. Documents consulted 
included relevant sectoral strategic plans such as the "Document cadre de politique nationale de 
decentralisation" (2005-2014), the PNACT I "Programme national d’appui aux collectivités territoriales 
- Phase I" (2002-2005) and PNACT II (2006-2010), the reform programme of the Malian state 
“Programme de développement institutional" (PDI), and its following operational programmes covering 
the periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2009. The main strategic documents of EC-Mali cooperation have 
also been consulted, including: “Strategie de coopération et programme indicatif national” (2003-2007) 
and "Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national” (2008-2013). Furthermore various 
evaluations and analysis of decentralisation in Mali have been consulted such as: "Decentralisation in 
Mali: Putting Policy into Practice, SNV/CEDELO 2004" or "Evaluation des Operations D’Aide 
Budgétaire au Mali de 2003-2009 – Rapport de Synthèse, Vol 1+3, 1ère Version, Février 2011".  
During the field visit, the evaluation team collected further documentation, especially: 
 Recent progress reports produced by the government and international donors, audits 
and evaluations reports, 
 Up-to-date data and statistics on the evolution in the transfer of financial resources as well 
as on service delivery. 
A full list of documents reviewed is presented in Annex 2. 
In addition to studying the documentation available, the team also interviewed a number of key 
informants with relevant knowledge on the chosen interventions, as well as informants offering 
broader insights into the evolution of the decentralisation context in the country. It is evident that for 
the extensive 9 years evaluation period, it is difficult to find persons able to give a comprehensive 
overview of the whole period. Nevertheless, the team managed to interview a broad range of persons 
with a good overview over the evaluation period at various levels such as:  
 ministries (incl. sectoral ministries),  
 ANICT ("Agence Nationale d’Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales"),  
 local governments,  
 representatives of local authorities, and  
 civil society organisations.  
The person in charge of decentralisation at the EUD (in office since 2005) has also been able to 
provide a broad overview and valuable insights into the sector. 
The information deemed of critical importance was subjected to a process of triangulation to ensure 
validity and internal consistency. Given the resource available for the mission (especially time-wise), 
prioritisation was necessary and the field team had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ reviews/ 
monitoring missions that had already been undertaken. Rather the team relied extensively on the 
related reports and intended to extract general findings, trends and recurring themes of particular 
relevance. The dialogue with informants also centred around distilling broader lessons and themes, 
rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. Taking into account the 
consultants‟ knowledge of the local situation due to prior work, it was chosen not to carry out visits at 
local level but to rely on the information gathered in prior studies.  
To reiterate, this country note is thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of 
the overall decentralisation portfolio of the EUD. Rather, it is an attempt to learn from the Mali 
experience and to encourage wider reflections on how best to structure and focus EU assistance to 
decentralisation processes. 
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2 Short description of the country context and EC/EU support to 
decentralisation 
2.1 Short description of the decentralisation process in the country  
It is just after the revolution of March 1991 that Mali started a process of state reform involving a more 
democratic management, including a decentralisation of the state. The decision to make 
decentralisation the new mode of administration of the country is based "on a broad societal 
consensus and a shared political vision; it is even seen as a strategic priority for the construction of 
the "future" of the Malian nation."2 
In 1992, the principle of decentralisation was enshrined in the Constitution of the 3rd Republic (Art 97-
8). This marked the beginning of a state reform whose implementation continues until today. This 
reform is based on two main axes: a) the deepening of democracy and b) the reduction of poverty 
through local economic development and increase in the supply of public services to people. 
Phase 1: Design of the process of decentralisation 
Key elements of the institutional and territorial dispositions, such as the establishment of Local 
Governments (LG) and their democratically elected bodies, started to emerge in 19933.  
In the field of legal planning: An arsenal of legislative texts and regulations have been developed and 
adopted, making a total of around twenty laws and decrees, substantially influencing the political, 
administrative and institutional set. 
In the field of administrative planning: The country‟s territorial organisation was significantly reviewed. 
In particular, the definition and geographic delimitation of different territorial entities have been carried 
out in a participatory process: the institutional reform has been broadly discussed with the civil society 
including the political class through the "reference group" (at national level) and the "study and 
mobilisation groups". At regional and local level, the process defined 761 "Local Governments" divided 
into three categories: the "Commune" (703 entities), the "Cercle" (49 entities) and the "Region" (8 
entities), as well as the District of Bamako (considered as a region).  
The first local elections of 1999 equipped the 761 local governments with legislative and executive 
bodies that still ensure to this day their functioning. 
In the field of institutional planning: in 2000, the reform process lead to the creation of the "Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Local Governments" (MATCL) and the attached "National Institution for 
Local Governments" ("Direction Nationale des Collectivités Territoriales" - DNCT). The MATCL is the 
supervisory authority of local governments and the DNCT has a key role in the design and 
implementation of the decentralisation process: it does not only watch over the application and 
development of the regulatory framework applicable to the Local Governments but is also responsible 
for strengthening the decentralisation process, by 1) supporting the LGs so that they can carry out 
better their functions and 2) enhancing the cooperation between the LGs and between the LG and 
other institutions. In addition, a "National Agency for Local Governments‟ Investment Programmes" 
("Agence Nationale d’Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales" - ANICT) was created (and 
attached to the MATCL). The High Council of Authorities (HCC), set up in April 2001, ensures the 
representation of authorities at national level.4.  
In the field of political planning: The management of the new LGs is ensured by elected bodies 
(elected for a five-year term through either direct universal voting, in the case of the "Communes" or 
indirect voting in the case of the "Cercles" and the "Regions"). 
Phase 2: Implementation of the decentralisation process 
The decentralisation reform entered in a new phase in the 2000s. The challenge then was to run the 
new arrangements and institutions in order to implement the effective transfer of functions and 
resources. But it is only in 2005, with the adoption of the "2005-2014 Framework Document of the 
National Decentralisation Policy" (DCPND), that Mali adopted a strategy for decentralisation for the 
following 10 years. This document describes a comprehensive strategic approach for the 
implementation of the decentralisation reform. The DCPND is declined in two main areas: 1/ the 
                                                     
2  See: Catek Gouvernance Développement / Direction nationale des collectivités territoriales (2011), Etude sur le 
bilan et les perspectives de la décentralisation au Mali (p. 6-7). 
3
 See also: Ministère de l‟administration territoriale et des Collectivités Locales/DNCT (2005): Document cadre de 
politique nationale de décentralisation (p. 7-9). 
4 
The roles of the different institutions and their functioning as well as the main stakeholders involved in the 
decentralisation process are described in more detail in annex 5. 
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PNACT5 - National Plans for the Support to Local Governments (2002-2006 PNACT I; 2006-2010 
PNACT II; and 2010-2014 PNACT III) focusing on "decentralisation" and 2/ the 2003-2013 PID 
(Institutional Development Plan), focusing on the "deconcentration" of state services. These 
operational plans translate the willingness to ensure adequate articulation and coherence between 
decentralisation and deconcentration reforms6. 
In order support the decentralisation process, in particular at territorial level, two instruments of 
financial and technical support were created and made available to local governments in order to 
support them particularly in the area of project management: 
1. a financial fund managed by ANICT (FICT7) allowed specific investments by "Communes", 
2. "Centres for local advice" (CCC Ŕ "centres de conseil communaux") were created at "Cercle" 
level in order to provide the "Communes" with adequate technical support.  
Conceived as a temporary structure, their mandate ended in 2007. The CCC are now partly replaced 
by new support structures, for example technical centres for decentralised services or for newly 
created "inter-communality" structures, or the new "training centre of local governments" (CFCT) 
founded in 2008.  
The institutional linkage of the Malian State Reform is presented in the figure below.  
Figure 1 Institutional linkage of the Malian State Reform  
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Source : Ministère de l’administration territoriales et des Collectivités Locales/ Secrétariat Général (2009): 
Programme National d’appui aux collectivités territoriales 2010-2014, p 8. 
Phase 3: Consolidating Decentralisation and accelerating Deconcentration 
"Radical in its design of local autonomy, immediate in its generalisation ("decentralising the whole 
country and at the same time"), but progressive in its effective implementation" 8.  
One can find today a weakening of the decentralisation process, even though the effective transfer of 
financial and human resources at sectoral level is still little advanced. Having fully achieved the initial 
primary objective of the reform, namely democratic participation at various territorial levels, the second 
                                                     
5
 Programme National d‟Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales. 
6
 See also EC 2011: Evaluation des opérations d‟aide budgétaire au Mali 2003-2009. Rapport de synthèse, 
version provisoire, p. 63.  
7
 Fonds d’Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales. 
8 
EC 2011: Evaluation des opérations d‟aide budgétaire au Mali 2003-2009. Rapport de synthèse, version 
provisoire, p. 62 
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objective - the transfer of functions and resources and thus the improvement of the delivery of basic 
services - appears far from being completed. 
Nearly 20 years after the launching of a major reform project, "decentralisation is now an institutional 
reality, the process is irreversible and the gains for stakeholders, including local governments are 
indisputable"9.  
However, if on a legislative and institutional level the framework of decentralisation is existing, major 
constraints hinder the effectiveness and efficiency of the functioning of a state with several territorial 
levels. The challenge in the next years will be the acceleration of the effective transfer of financial and 
human resources and the improvement of the knowledge and competences of the decentralised 
players, for both LG services and deconcentrated state services. Today, decentralisation is heavily 
driven and funded by the development partners. In order to ensure the viability and autonomy of the 
LG in financial terms, it will be essential to find ways to increase their own tax revenue in the coming 
years. 
The EU support to the decentralisation process in Mali 
Mali was the first country in the world for which the EC/EU has used the specific sector budget support 
(SBS) modality to directly support decentralisation and state reform ("sector budget support 
programme for administrative reform and decentralisation Ŕ PARAD"). The SBS programme aims at 
strengthening the national institutional framework of governance in a context of fight against poverty 
through an improvement in the administrative capacity to conceive, manage and coordinate the 
policies and actions in favour of establishing effective decentralisation. The budget support 
programme includes a component of institutional support and is completed by a specific project to 
support the three northern regions in the decentralisation process, the ADERE programme. (see 
annexes 5.4.2 for details) 
The EC/EU support through SBS continues with the program PARADER (2010-2014). The aim of this 
new SBS is to continue supporting the decentralisation process and the state reform by adding a 
Regional Economic Development component which should enable local governments to carry out 
infrastructure investments and to develop the local economy. 
2.2 List of the major EC-funded interventions  
The table below summarises the major EC-funded interventions in support to decentralisation covered 
by field phase analysis. 
Table 1 List of the major EC-funded interventions during the evaluation period 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr. 
Comment 
Appui au démarrage des communes 
au Mali 
40,25 FED/1999/014-626 
Project modality, financed the local competence centres 
that supported the newly created local authorities in 
assuming their responsibilities.  
ADERE-Nord 5,87 FED/2005/017-650 
Project targeting the three Northern regions. It consists 
in funds for regional investments as well as capacity 
building to LG. 
Programme d'appui à la réforme 
administrative et à la décentralisation 
(PARAD) 
71,82 FED/2006/017-914 
Sector Budget Support modality including capacity 
building measures. 
                                                     
9 
Catek Gouvernance Développement /Direction nationale des collectivités territoriales (2011), Etude sur le bilan 
et les perspectives de la décentralisation au Mali, p. 69. 
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs 
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national 
stakeholders in partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international 
donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU orientations on decentralisation appear to be clear for both national authorities and other 
partners. In the case of Mali, the leading role played by the EC/EU in decentralisation, with clear 
choices from the start, gave good visibility to its action. (Ind 1.3.1; Ind 1.3.2.) 
The strategic framework is considered satisfactory and useful (e.g. reference document on "supporting 
decentralisation and local governance in Third Countries"). However, the "recent evolutions decided at 
HQ level regarding the continuous assessment of the three general eligibility conditions for budget 
support prove to be inconsistent with the existing guidelines and with the contents of the signed 
financing agreements. It would thus be useful to indicate the new position of the HQ and amend the 
current financing agreements in order to avoid different understandings which would induce delays in 
the implementation of sector policies." (Programme Officer at EUD). It is thus apparently still 
necessary to continue discussing and refining the EC/EU approach on sector budget support and 
practical issues related to the implementation of the strategy to support decentralisation. (Ind 1.3.3.) 
3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing 
with sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) 
or disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.1.1.: EC/EU procedures have allowed to adjust aid modalities and to be flexible. The project and 
budget support approaches could have been combined. 
Ind 2.1.2.: There is a dialogue between the teams at the EUD, but, with respect to decentralisation, the 
dialogue is more linked with the team working on "economy" issues. Operating methods actually 
differs at the EUD unit in charge of infrastructures in terms of the respect of the code of local 
governments (esp. for the management of services or "maitrise d’ouvrage" by the regions). 
Ind 2.1.3.: Only one person is in charge of decentralisation (covering the monitoring of the policy of 
decentralisation and the state reform, the management of related projects, the coordination with 
donors and the dialogue in this sector). Tasks are carried out in a context of heavy workload and 
thanks to a strong personal commitment. 
Ind 2.1.4.: The field visit did not generate any information on this Indicator. 
3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of 
decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.2.1.: Only one person is in charge of decentralisation (covering the monitoring of the policy of 
decentralisation and the state reform, the management of related projects, the coordination with 
donors and the dialogue in this sector). Tasks are carried out in a context of heavy workload and 
thanks to a strong personal commitment. 
Ind 2.2.2.: The person in charge has the necessary skills and has developed a real expertise/ know-
how through the implementation of various programmes and the leadership role among Development 
Partners (DPs). 
Ind 2.2.3.: EUD Mali staff has participated in two workshops out of three organized by the EC/EU 
headquarters (HQ) on decentralisation. These workshops are considered very useful in terms of 
exchanges of experiences between programme managers from different EUDs. 
3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) 
or systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, 
issues papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote 
the effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.3.1. Annually (or sometimes bi-annually), EC/EU HQ organise a monitoring mission to Mali. A 2-
page summary note is produced and is used as a framework of discussion between the EUD and HQ 
for the management of the programmes.  
Ind 2.3.2. The transfer of knowledge related to other sectors supported by the EC/EU in Mali is difficult 
as the exchange within EUD staff is not institutionalised. Exchanges are thus rather ad-hoc and 
conflict of objectives or potential for synergic action are only discovered by chance. To illustrate this 
situation, the WATSAN programme (PACTEA) does not respect the principles of decentralisation as it 
goes against the idea of a management ("maîtrise d’ouvrage") by the LGs themselves. After some 
parallel developments, some links could be established with ARIANE, a support programme to CSO 
on the strengthening of the capacity of users' associations. Interviews with EUD staff has revealed that 
the lack of communication between the EUD staff can be explained by time constraints and the 
absence of institutional exchange platform such as regular meeting and presentation of the work 
carried out in the different sectors. 
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Ind 2.3.3. No relevant information was collected regarding this indicator. 
3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies?  
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational 
procedures related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds 
to LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant CSP sections on decentralisation and local governance 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.1.1: The EUD perfectly integrated the policy orientations of the Malian government in the late 
1990s. These orientations were defined in the national conference held after the fall of the General 
Moussa Traore‟s regime, a conference which laid the bases of a new society. The decentralisation 
was meant to be at the heart of the reform. That is why the principle of decentralisation was actually 
placed in the forefront in the Constitution adopted in 1992. The new regime considered it as a central 
topic and made special efforts to create the conditions for the establishment of local governments. 
This work culminated in 1999 with the first local elections. These elections established the deliberative 
and executive bodies of 761 local governments which covered the entire national territory (703 
Municipalities / "Communes", 49 Circles / "Cercles", 8 Regions / "Régions" and the District of 
Bamako). A corpus of texts was developed for this purpose and the development of LG was integrated 
in the various policy and strategy documents defined during this period. 
The EUD has clearly considered its support as an accompanying measure to the 
decentralisation process and thus has made the choice of a long-term support.  
Moreover, unlike in other countries, this change corresponds to a very strong political choice of the 
Malian authorities involving major institutional evolutions.  
The strategy documents of the EC/EU (the framework documents of the EC-Mali partnership, the 
Country Strategy Papers 2003-2007 and 2008-2013) clearly reflect the analysis of the EUD of 
government policy directions and the choice to contribute to their implementation. The Malian 
government‟s orientations are also found in both the documents outlining the strategy of poverty 
reduction and the more general guidelines drafted in particular between 1995 and 2005. That said, a 
shift (at the level of the central government) occurred later, decentralisation disappearing from the 
political agenda. 
The EC/EU Country Strategy Papers from 1997, 2003 and 2007 highlight the strategic choices of the 
government in the matter justifying that decentralisation becomes a focal sector of the EU-Mali 
cooperation. References are made to the 2002 national poverty reduction strategy which focused on: 
 "institutional development and improvement of governance (incl. participation) as a starting 
point to the decentralisation reforms which should be followed at different levels, 
 human development and access to basic social services,  
 development of infrastructures and support to productive sectors with in the first instance the 
emphasis on a development plan and a balanced regional policy of appropriate infrastructure." 
This 2002 PRSP10 is very clear in terms of decentralisation: 
"All the considered policies fit into the context of the effective implementation of 
decentralisation, which organizes the division of functions between the state and the LG. The 
institutional development programme will also provide the framework for strengthening the 
administrative decentralisation in conjunction with the decentralisation process. The reforms 
envisaged in the field of audit of public resources aiming at developing good governance will 
consolidate the activities currently engaged in the fight against corruption." (Ind 3.1.4.) 
                                                     
10
 Gouvernement du Mali (2002). Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté 
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Given the continuous and strong political will in Mali since the early 1990s, the choice of the EUD to 
make decentralisation a concentration sector was consistent with the expectations of the partner 
country. The size of the EC/EU support actually steadily rose over the years: from the 7th EDF (7 
mEUR) to the 8th EDF (39 mEUR) and the 9th EDF (72 mEUR on decentralisation and the state 
reform, which represents 25% of the total commitments).  
The list below presents again the main EC-funded interventions supporting decentralisation: 
 Support to the mission of decentralisation within the framework of preparations for the 
implementation of legislative and institutional framework and the first local elections. 
 Support to launch the "Communes" from 2000 to 2005 for an amount of 40 mEUR. 
 PARAD, support programme for administrative reform and decentralisation, 2005 - 2012 for an 
amount of 72 mEUR. 
 ADERE North programme of support for the development of the northern regions, from 2005 
to 2011 for an amount of 5 mEUR. 
 PARADER, support programme to the administrative reform, decentralisation and regional 
economic development from 2011 onwards for an amount of 75 mEUR. 
See also next JC on the continuity of the EC/EU support.  
Ind 3.1.2.: From the start of the support programme to the local governments, the choice of the EUD 
was to use national mechanisms of transfer of funds: 
 the funding planned for the local governments went through the National Agency ANICT 
("Agence Nationale d’Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales"), a perennial national 
mechanism for collecting all funding for local governments‟ investments (Investment Fund of 
Local governments - FICT11); the ANICT has seen its mission widened in 2007 and is now 
also in charge of the attribution of the funds to local governments for technical support and 
operating expenses; 
 the funding intended for the technical support was directed towards the national system of 
support to local governments the "council centres" (CCC Ŕ "centres de conseil communaux") 
and a national coordination unit (CCN Ŕ cellule nationale de coordination). 
It is also important to point out the fact that the mechanism of investments funding corresponded to a 
direct support to LG's budget with a special system of drawing rights. These rights were initially multi-
annual (3 years) but became annual due to a lack of visibility of the ANICT about the volume of 
funding available. 
Ind 3.1.3.: The 2006 EUD annual activity report illustrates well the approach of the EUD within this 
accompaniment characterised by a permanent dialogue with the Malian government: 
"The decentralisation process was launched in 1992 and has become effective since the local 
elections in 1999 and the implementation of local governments. 
It is an essential element of the state reform. 2006 has seen the deepening of the 
decentralisation process and the adaptation of the administration to the system of local 
governments (684 "communes rurales", 19 "communes urbaines", 49 "cercles", 8 "regions" 
and the District de Bamako). The Malian government has shown a real determination in 
the implementation of its strategic framework related to decentralisation. This framework 
draws the guidelines of the decentralisation process for the next decade and details the 
activities for the coming years. The existence of this framework has been a key factor in the 
choice of the European Commission to move to a new modality of accompaniment of the 
Malian authorities: Sector Budget Support. " 
The various documents of the EUD highlight the central role played by decentralisation in the state 
reform process and the role of LG (the "Communes") in the delivery of basic social services. The 
analysis of the EUD has matched the one of the Malian authorities: initially focused essentially on LG 
("Communes"), the support has taken into account the state reform and then regional development 
aspects. This is clearly the result of an ongoing dialogue between the EUD and national authorities. 
The above extract from the 2006 report is not trivial. This year corresponds to the end of the rise of 
decentralisation as a priority of the Malian authorities. The framework document of the national 
decentralisation policy ("Document Cadre de la Politique Nationale de Decentralisation" - DCPND 
2005-2014) is certainly a clearly defined strategic document (making the linkages between 
decentralisation and state reform in particular on deconcentration, transfers, etc.) but it has not been 
backed by a strong political support of Malian authorities until now. 
                                                     
11
 Fonds d’Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales. 
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Yet, the EUD developed its programmes under the 9
th
 EDF and decided to use sector budget support 
as a main modality of support based on the fact that a clear policy framework for decentralisation and 
a real political will prevail until the 2000s. Unfortunately, the political agendas reversed in the late 
2000s and this lead to a paradoxical situation with decentralisation being backed by 
development partners rather than by the Malian authorities in 2010. 
Nevertheless, this decline of political will do not put into question the foundations of decentralisation in 
Mali which is strongly rooted in the political landscape. Local Governments operate and deliver 
services despite the incomplete transfer of functions and resources. 
Several elements illustrate the decline in interest of the national government for decentralisation. 
Decentralisation does no longer appear in the programme document of the current President of the 
Republic for the last elections. Moreover, the level of transfer of resources to local authorities 
stagnates or even declines. In addition, the transfer of powers have never really been implemented 
despite that LG have assumed the new powers and functions from the start of the process. Central 
governments have in their vast majority tried to slow or block these transfers. It was necessary to wait 
ten years before the Prime Minister gave instruction to activate these transfers (in 2008), on a new 
political impetus stemming from weak results of sectoral policies. Overall, from 2007 onwards, the 
dialogue between the EC/EU and national authorities has been less fruitful and more "confrontational" 
dealing with commitments which have not been realised. 
Ind 3.1.4.: see details in Ind 3.1.1.  
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as "How should existing interventions best evolve?" are 
addressed in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.2.1: The sequencing of EC/EU interventions is interesting. It shows how the EC/EU has rapidly 
expanded its intervention to take into account the institutional environment of decentralisation and 
then the related economic issues (regional economic dimension). The sequences of interventions 
have been: 
 7
th
 FED: support for the preparation of decentralisation and the design of tools; 
 8
th
 FED: support for the start-up of the "Communes",  
 9
th
 FED: support for the state reform and continued support for decentralisation, and 
integration of a focus on the northern regions: 
 10
th
 FED: continued support for state reform and decentralisation, and integration of the 
regional economic dimension. 
During the 7
th
 FED, the EC/EU has supported the national authorities to create the necessary 
conditions for the implementation of decentralisation: preparation of the legal and institutional 
framework, support for the establishment of the consultative framework for the administrative division, 
preparation of technical and financial tools to support the local governments to organize elections. 
Here the point of entry was a direct support to the national body responsible for preparing the 
implementation of the decentralisation process: the "Mission de Décentralisation et de Réformes 
Institutionnelles" (MDRI). 
During the 8
th
 EDF, the EC/EU has provided the resources to finance the start up of the "Communes". 
This involved (i) the financing of the investment of the "Communes" through the "Agence Nationale 
d’Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales" (ANICT) and (ii) the financial support of a mechanism 
to provide technical support to local governments12. This contribution proved to be decisive as it 
allowed LGs to establish themselves and invest in several areas including basic social services. The 
entry point was the financial support to the "Communes" through: 1/ the funding of the national system 
which channelled funds to LG, and 2/ still the support to the national structures in charge of piloting the 
decentralisation process and providing technical support. 
During the 9
th
 EDF, the EC/EU has sought to address one of major obstacles to the progress of 
decentralisation which was the non-implementation of the planned state reform. The institutional 
development program (PDI) established in the state reform was giving no result. The contribution of 
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the EC/EU aimed at supporting the authorities more consistently and to establish a "stronger link 
between decentralisation and deconcentration". This is the essence of the PARAD programme. The 
entry points are a financial support to the national system financing the LG and a contribution to 
support the state reform process at national level.  
In parallel, the EC/EU has chosen to provide support to the development of the Northern regions. The 
"regions" are a key step in territorial planning and the territorialisation of public policies. Choosing to 
work also directly with that level, the EC/EU strengthened their role and allowed them to acquire tools 
for consultative planning process for public investments with on the one hand the lower level LG, 
"Cercles" and "Communes", and, on the other hand, the local state services. The entry point was a 
support at regional level.  
With the 10
th
 EDF, the EC/EU pursues the same interventions with still as guiding thread the 
combination of support to state reform and decentralisation as well as the support to regions but also 
the integration of economic development dimensions. It is noteworthy that the support to the regions 
(through ADERE and PARADER) has been made in the form of specific commitments and not of 
budget support. 
What comes out as the strengths of the EC/EU action is: 
 The continuity of its intervention and the combined support to decentralisation and 
state reform. 
 Coupled intervention: at national level, on the actors responsible for the implementation of 
the decentralisation process and the related institutional framework, and, at local level, on the 
financial support to municipalities. 
3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support 
decentralisation and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme 
to be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as 
"When and how to use sector budget support?" or "what are the risks related to the") are 
addressed in project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid 
delivery methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.3.1: The EC/EU support has evolved from a "project / programme" support to a sector budget 
support. In 2006, Mali was the first country where the EC/EU launched a sector budget support to 
decentralisation. The sector budget support has always been combined with direct support in the form 
of programmes or specific commitments. 
The first support consisted of commitments essentially in favour of the MDRI to prepare the legal and 
institutional framework and other actions prior to the elections. In 2000 the programme supporting the 
start up of the "communes" was also in the form of a project including several components one of 
which actually corresponded to an indirect budget support to municipalities (contribution to the FICT - 
Investment Fund of Local Governments13 managed by the ANICT). In 2005, in line with the logic of 
accompanying the decentralisation policy that had been implemented for several years by national 
authorities and due to the existence of a clear policy in this area and encouraging results in the first 
years of the process, the EC/EU decided to move towards sector budget support (SBS). The pre-
requirements in terms of policy documents and sector programmes existed with: the 2006-2015 
framework document of national decentralisation policy ("Document Cadre de la Politique Nationale de 
Decentralisation" Ŕ DCPND), the national programme of support to the "Communes" (PNACT II 2006-
2010) and the Institutional Development Programme (PDI 2003-2013). Furthermore, there was a mid-
term expenditure framework - MTEF ("Cadre des Dépenses à Moyen Terme" Ŕ CDMT) for 
decentralisation and the state reform. Nevertheless, these MTEF were considered to be weak. 
59 mEUR of the 72 mEUR PARAD programme were used for SBS (75% to decentralisation and 25% 
for the state reform) and 13 mEUR were set aside for specific activities related to institutional support. 
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It is noteworthy that the PARAD corresponds to 8,6% of the budget support received by Mali for that 
period (2006-2009) and almost 22% of the volume of SBS. 
The weight of PARAD in financing the decentralisation and state reform is crucial because it 
represents 30% of contributions for decentralisation (contribution of state and development partners) 
and 48% of contributions for the state reform.  
The ADERE programme was implemented as a "project". 
The new PARADER programme continues within the same logic as for the PARAD combining sector 
budget support and project support for institutional aspects. 44 mEUR were allocated to SBS and 31 
mEUR were allocated in the form of "project”, of which 7 mEUR for structuring investments for regional 
development (support to decentralisation - DER component), 12 mEUR for the support of regional 
assemblies (DER), 5mEUR for institutional support for the state reform and 3 mEUR for the support to 
decentralisation (DNCT, ENA / CFCT). 
A significant part of the SBS within PARAD and PARADER was directed towards the ANICT. 
Ind 3.3.3.: Analysis of the EU support to decentralisation through SBS 
The analysis of the use of SBS within the framework of PARAD offers many lessons due to the pilot 
nature of support in the "sector" of decentralisation. The SBS has been delivered in the form of fixed 
and variable tranches. The ratio between fixed tranches and variable tranches vary over time: the 
fixed payment is 100% in year 1, 60% in year 2, 50% in year 3, 40% in year 4.  
The goal of SBS is to ensure some predictability in the delivery of aid and to progressively enter a 
results oriented logic based on indicators. The success of a SBS is generally due to three factors:  
 the quality of sectoral dialogue between stakeholders (national authorities, representatives of 
LG and partners);  
 the relevance and quality of the indicators chosen to underpin this sectoral dialogue and to 
trigger the payments of the different tranches;  
 the support in terms of capacity building to accompany national actors directing the process. 
Based on these elements, the evaluation team has tried to draw some lessons from this SBS 
experience by analyzing the following aspects: 
 The structure of consultation and dialogue14; 
 The selection of indicators for SBS;  
 The effects of the SBS; 
 The combination with the project approach. 
The structure of consultation and dialogue.  
The implementation of budget support is accompanied by the identification of the bodies that are 
responsible for implementation and monitoring of the relevant policies and those who will be 
considered for political dialogue and consultation between the government and pooling partners. 
Here, the system related to the state reform, the decentralisation process and the monitoring of 
relevant programmes shows a superposition of six bodies having in theory different functions and 
different nature. In reality, there are often overlaps with monitoring responsibilities. 
This leads to a fragmentation of responsibilities especially as the body most highly placed in terms of 
monitoring and supervision, the Monitoring Committee of the State Reform (CSRE), which was 
supposed to decide on potential trade-offs and to suggest reorientations, is practically not functional. 
The evaluation team observes that: 
 The CSRE was set up within the framework of the dialogue between the government and its 
partners with the goal of having a national authority at the highest level that would ensure this 
coordination of reforms. The CSRE is under the supervision of the Prime Minister. The 
implementation of this committee was one of the specific target indicators of SBS. In fact, it 
took time to meet the target (2006 to 2009). Given the fact that this situation could create the 
suspension of disbursement, partners had to meet several times with the national authorities 
and engaged in extensive discussions. 
 The institutions responsible for the implementation reform (CDI Ŕ "Commissariat au 
Développement Institutionnel") and the National Directorate of Local Governments (DNCT 
"Direction Nationale des Collectivités Territoriales") have weaknesses in terms of "institutional 
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positioning" which limits the scope of their actions. The Commission for institutional 
development (CDI) does not really play a guiding role due to an ambiguous institutional 
positioning. It is in fact placed on a level with the Ministry responsible for the state reform, 
although it could be attached to the Prime Minister in order to be heard in other departments 
because of the cross-cutting of involved issues.  
 The DNCT remains rather marginalized within his department, the MATCL without any real 
autonomy of action neither representation in the regions. It has few qualified human resources 
and low capacity to influence the choice of policy directions. It is expected to be transformed 
into a General Directorate, which would give him more scope for making decisions. 
 A general weakness of all the committees established concerns the fact that the meetings are 
not prepared, the members come without having taken note of the questions to be addressed 
or bringing the point of view or proposals of their structures. 
 The panel of decentralisation appears as a place for exchange between partners and the 
authorities, but it is the CDI and DNCT who participate at the governmental level and it 
appeared that their weight was limited. The recurrent questions asked by partners on points 
that are not resolved in the process of decentralisation (transfer of powers and resources to 
LG, reform of local taxation, monitoring of decentralisation, technical support to LG ...) 
illustrates the limitations of this panel. 
 Within the established monitoring system, an "annual review" allows to analyze the situation of 
the indicators jointly between nationals and partners. This review appears to be an interesting 
place for debate on the progress and constraints but it always stays at a level of "technicians". 
In summary, one can ask whether there is a real political dialogue. In view of the observations made, 
we can say that the answer is no for the period after 2006. We are in the typical case of the absence 
of real support of the reforms by the government, the conditionalities are fulfilled under pressure of the 
partners, but without any real initiatives from the government. You can also question the relevance of 
the multiple bodies set up in the absence of political support. If the institutions in place and in charge 
of the relevant areas assumed their responsibilities, these ad hoc and parallel bodies (CSRE, Panel of 
decentralisation, annual review) would not be necessary. 
This lack of supporting the reform is rooted largely in the unwillingness of central administrations to 
change their policies and move towards decentralisation with the necessary transfers. Since there is 
no political will to induce changes in these central administrations, and neither a requirement in this 
area at the level of the National Assembly, the process has bogged down. Sectoral dialogue related to 
the SBS can only suffer from that. 
The selection of indicators for SBS. 
For the PARAD, 12 indicators were selected (see Annex 7: Other annexes). Nine indicators concerned 
decentralisation and three the state reform. Some indicators are decomposed into sub-indicators, 
leading, once disaggregated, to the total number of 21 indicators. 
Indicator selection has proven to be difficult. It combines some of the indicators related to the MDGs 
and of other objectives of the PDI and of the national policy document on decentralisation (DCPND - 
"Document cadre de politique nationale de decentralisation" 2005-2014). These areas are well 
targeted: 
 Public access to basic services covered by the LG; 
 Decentralisation Policy; 
 Interdependence of decentralisation-deconcentration; 
 State reform. 
The indicators themselves seem to be justified even though some can be discussed. In particular one 
must notice the difficulties in fulfilling them. The reasons of these difficulties have laid in the 
formulation phase of the indicators which reveals a lack of accuracy in the definition of the calculation 
procedure and the obstacles to gather the right data for the indicators in the implementation phase. 
This difficulty is explained In order to calculate the fulfilment of the indicators, the specific supporting 
documents have first to be generated which then causes delays in the original deadlines. Furthermore, 
there is a lack of accurate definition of certain indicators (e.g. one indicator is the existence of water 
points, which then does not take into account the operational water points15) or questioning about 
construction of the indicators (e.g. for the deconcentration of the budget: "is the progress in the 
transfer of the resources consistent with the needs of deconcentrated services?"), the fact that the 
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databases non-functioning (SIGMA, OISE and DGMP) are not any more in use or not updated. In 
some cases, the reliability of data is questioned by certain observers (as indicators of the number of 
sessions and the PV of the municipal executive). 
The target set for the indicators can be considered as little demanding. Indeed, the expected 
improvements appear very realistic, even low regarding the example of the indicator on the resources 
of local governments per inhabitant to increase from CFAF 850 in 2004 to 1032 FCFA in 2009 if we 
refer to the low level of recovery. The calculation of those indicators, verified during an annual joint 
review, raises every time lively discussions between the parties. 
But the basic problem, which appeared with hindsight, concerns the reality that covers those 
indicators. It does not seem that these indicators are revealing true dynamics of change in the field as 
noted by recent evaluation of budget support (see box below). 
Box 1 Evaluation of budget support operations in Mali 
"As for the indicators themselves, with hindsight of four years operating SBS, and despite their 
average rate of satisfactory achievement (in the range of 10/12, the figures for 2009 are still to be 
verified), it appears that this attack is not always revealing an improvement in the situation described 
by the indicator. Without challenging their relevance point by point, we can address them the critic of 
having been designed without sufficient consideration of their specific modalities of implementation16. 
While stimulating aimed performances they remain punctual and do not necessarily have a positive 
impact on their context. Their appreciation does not sufficiently take into account the current 
dynamics, as it was stressed during the meeting of the Focus Group MoEF17. " 
The difficulty in producing the indicators was a source of delay in the disbursements of variable 
tranches, which had a negative impact on the results. The mechanism measured: the release of 
tranches for the year N is done in the N-year analysis of the indicators for the year N-1. Now this 
problem is solved in N years analyzing the indicators of the year N-1 for disbursement in year N +1. 
This problem of intelligence of indicators is linking to a deficit of more general information. Who talks 
about monitoring a sector, talks about an "information system" to produce reliable data about the 
situation in the sector. This system is particularly important in the context of budget support based, as 
we have seen, on indicators that determine the start for payment of tranches. In Mali, this system fails. 
The EC/EU has funded the implementation of a database (OISE), unfortunately it is practically no 
longer functional since its attachment to deconcentrated territorial administration. Only few elements of 
the base are fulfilled... to inform about two or three indicators for SBS rather than producing 
information for controlling the sector. 
The combination with the project approach 
The share of funds PARAD as "project" is relatively high: 13 mEUR. This choice is explained by the 
desire to provide ongoing support to institutions responsible for decentralisation and state reform, the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MATD) and the Commissioner of 
Institutional Development (CDI). Their weakness is known, the option was to focus on their capacity 
building, mainly with technical assistance. To this is added the financing of external control in the 
achievements of the ANICT. 
After some starting difficulties, related to the control program and the adequacy of technical 
assistance, adjustments were made and institutional support could proceed as planned. Technical 
assistance to DNCT (punctual supports) and CDI (permanent and ad hoc AT) was assessed. It helped 
to support these structures in the production of tools and texts. 
This contribution was all the more necessary that the state has not increased as expected in human 
resources as the two key structures. This situation calls also on the willingness of the state to provide 
the means to drive its reform. 
The results of budget support 
Document analysis of budget support in Mali recalls the various achievements of budget support: 
 LG work (they are in their third term). The sustainability of LG as an institution is progressing. 
They hold regular meetings of their governing body. The development of a local development 
plan, one of the obligations made by the Code to LG, is made. They produce their budgets 
and administrative accounts on time. 
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 LG make investments and produce services; this is in large part due to the financial support of 
the EC/EU to ANICT via BS since 2006 (more than 14 000 projects under funding ANICT, half 
from EDF funds). Achievements (investments in various equipments, services etc.) performed 
by local authorities are numerous and have changed the landscape of LG. 
 The effective development of the local civil service reinforces the capacity of LG, including (i) 
the creation in 2007 of the Training Centre for Local Authorities (CFCT), (ii) more than 2.500 
local civil servants in 2007-2008 in 2008-2009 and the recruitment of 721 new officers. 
 Strengthening the role of the region thanks to the effective function of coherence of 
development strategies and planning. 
 The development of inter-community continues, despite the difficulties it is one of the tracks 
for the sustainability of the device for technical support. 
These undeniable achievements should not obscure the fragility of LG, primarily due to their limited 
financial resources, the incomplete transfer of powers and lack of monitoring and control services from 
of the state. 
Ind 3.3.2. Information related to this indicator will partly be found in the above point (Ind 3.3.3.) related 
to the analysis of the SBS. One can emphasize the issue of the support to regions within the ADERE 
and the PARADER. It has already been indicated that the support addressed to the regions is carried 
out in the form of specific commitments. It seems regrettable that the investment support to the 
regions did not use the ANICT channel even though the EUD tried to make that all funds (from the 
state and the partners) would pass through this channel. It is also regrettable that the regions are not 
fully responsible for the choice of allocation, management and implementation of these funds as 
provided by law and that some funding has already been directed to road infrastructure. 
Ind 3.3.4: Ŕ The EUD draws a mixed picture of the SBS: positive in terms of disbursement and 
direct support to the communes, more limited in the removal of obstacles to the reform 
process of the state and decentralisation. Delays in the transfer of functions and powers as well as 
political and financial support by the partners and not by the state itself raise many questions about 
the need for continued support in the form of SBS. 
Indeed, in a context where it now has a low political support, many observers wonder about the 
maintenance of a sector budget support to decentralisation. The question is worth asking, but the 
answer is not easy. Should the SBS be really questioned? The evaluation team tries to offer some 
elements of answer below. 
On the one hand there are tangible results: local governments operate, produce services and the 
democratic process is taken place. After ten years, which is a relatively short time period given the 
context of Mali, decentralisation is now strongly rooted in the institutional landscape and does not 
seem reversible. The EC/EU has contributed greatly to this success; the current SBS has certainly 
been instrumental in maintaining the decentralisation in the agenda of state reform and funding the 
"communes". 
On the other hand, the weak political support undermines one of the conditions of the SBS. It is clear 
that without the contribution of partners and the EDF in particular, the "Communes" would not have 
reached this point. 
The introduction of the SBS has also obliged a new kind of dialogue between the EC/EU and national 
authorities. Despite the weakness of the dialogue, despite the imperfections of the current system, the 
mechanism of SBS requires a focus on results. It seems best to continue to improve the approach as 
well as pressure on the national government to respect their commitment rather to go back. 
Three elements support the idea of continuing the SBS to decentralisation: 
 The policy environment can change and the political support to the decentralisation process 
can evolve positively. It makes more sense to position itself over time (as does the EC/EU 
now) regardless of political vicissitudes, rather than to change its mode of action based on 
them. 
 Decentralisation is a cross-cutting dimension of the state reform. To provide continuous 
support facilitates the fact that it is taken into account in the various sectors. And the 
improvement of basic services delivery which helps achieving the MDGs requires the 
capacity development of local governments. 
 The SBS can provide a minimum level of predictability of the resources available to 
implement a national policy; moreover, if adequately designed as a tool for dialogue, the SBS 
can be a useful tool to induce changes where necessary. 
The experience of the EUD and national authorities should help to better frame the coming budget 
support, the "conditionalities" and the choice of indicators. A key to success will certainly be to better 
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ensuring the link between the different supports (budget and non budget support), to accelerate the 
transfer of functions and powers at sectoral level and to take into account the cross-cutting dimension 
of decentralisation. The increase in resources at local level, including the level of the national budget 
allocated to local governments, should be one of the main points in upcoming discussions about the 
future SBS. 
3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of 
the role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.4.1: The multi-actor approach is well illustrated in programming and strategic documents of the 
EUD. However, it should be noted that in the infrastructure sector, the place of LG is less well 
considered. 
Ind 3.4.2: The EC/EU operates at three levels: municipal, regional and central levels. The first two 
levels involve LG, the central level concerns the institutions in charge of the state reform and 
decentralisation. The guiding documents of the EC/EU take fully into account the role of central 
institutions (DNCT, CDI) and the need to strengthen them. 
Yet, the approach does not really consider LG elected officials at the national level nor does it take 
into account the National Assembly. Attempts to work with the association of elected officials had not 
given convincing results. Associations of elected officials have taken little initiative to boost the 
decentralisation process and to actively engage in lobbying. 
Regarding the civil society, it has not been significantly involved. It is more at a lower level that links 
can be established between civil society and other actors of the decentralisation process, in particular 
in the planning of public investments and the co-management of facilities financed by LG. 
3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarity 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance 
issues among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor 
approaches, when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.1.1: Development partners (DPs) involved in decentralisation have created an TF 
"decentralisation and institutional development." The working group can trade on the implementation 
of the decentralisation process and a degree of harmonisation of interventions. 
Ind 4.1.2: The EUD has been instrumental in encouraging other partners to meet national mechanisms 
in place (ANICT device and technical support). The EUD has not hesitated to play its political weight to 
influence the choice of the World Bank. The latter has been forced to take account of these devices, 
but did so only marginally. The World Bank has always remained outside the system of 
decentralisation focusing on a community approach. 
Ind 4.1.3: Since the start of decentralisation, EUD is the leader among DPs. This role was reflected in 
two ways: (i) being the "voice" of donors involved in discussions with the authorities and (ii) ensuring 
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an overall consistency to finance the technical support facility and financial. Indeed, the majority of 
donors have targeted their interventions including geographically. The EC/EU has agreed that its 
funds are not targeted and can thus meet the needs in areas not supported. With this choice the 
equalization system could be effective. 
There is an ad hoc structure for coordination among donors and government called the "Panel de la 
decentralisation". This coordination platform is lead by the EUD. The majority of partners recognize 
the leading role played by the EC/EU, although some believe that the EC/EU tries to always first 
consider its own point of view. 
Ind 4.1.4: The EC/EU is a lead donor and driving force of decentralisation. There is a consensus 
among donors on the approach developed by the EC/EU. In the future decentralisation support 
(programme PARADER) the EC/EU plans to use a new cooperation modus with EU Member states 
(“convention de delegation) which allows delegating a part of the programme implementation to EU 
Member States. In this case it will be Germany (GIZ) and Belgium (CTB-BTC). Interviews with EU 
Member State representatives revealed that the EC/EU procedures are demanding and rather 
inflexible and that this is the reason for a negotiation phase taking more than one year. The agreement 
should be finalised in the current of 2011. 
3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarity between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and 
other donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finances decentralisation programmes with Members States and major 
donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes 
and policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.2.1. The dialogue was ongoing with the other DPs supporting decentralisation (see above). The 
main partners were CTB, UNCDF, GTZ, SNV and AFD (now with limited support). These partners all 
finance the PNACT (national support programme to local authorities), like the EU. The EUD has 
consulted these stakeholders during the programming process. 
Ind 4.2.2. The majority of partners recognize the leading role played by the EC/EU, although some 
believe that the EC/EU tries to always first consider its own point of view. 
The current issue of targeting funds, geographically and by sector, now called a new dialogue 
between donors and between donors and the central government (the current trend leads to a 
questioning of the equalization system and equity in access to funds). 
Ind 4.2.3. Ŕ There is a joint funding of the PNACT, including joint financing of the national fund to 
support local authorities FNACT (see also the FICT). 
The table below summarises the financial contributions to the FNACT over the period 2001-2010. 
  Amount in Fcfa % 
Government  16 467 193 064 11% 
EDF 49 972 885 896 34% 
Other DPs 80 276 394 493 55% 
Total - DT 146 716 473 453   
It is noteworthy that the support from the EDF was actually larger in the early years, reaching 73% in 
2003. A gradual introduction of other donors in the system and the transfer of part of the sector funds 
reduced the proportion represented by the EDF contributions. 
Ind 4.2.4. Interviews with EUD staff as well as government representatives confirmed an active 
participation of EUD staff in national decentralisation fora, such as the “revue conjointes annuelle” 
between EC/EU and the government and the “Assises de la decentralisation”. 
3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
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 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors 
such as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment 
into decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1. Education and health are not focal sectors of the EC/EU cooperation with Mali. But the 
infrastructure sector is one, and, in this sector, the "communes" level is barely taken into account. In 
particular, it is not planned that the projects of infrastructure development related to the functions of 
the LG are managed by the LG themselves. This would actually be contrary to the law. This 
contradiction also appears in the programme ADERE and now PARADER regarding the financing of 
regions. 
Ind 4.3.2. Gender is generally included in the decentralisation programmes. One of three key 
indicators on the improvement of service delivery (in both PARAD and PARADER budget supports) is 
the enrolment ratio for girls. 
The environment is taken into account with the possibility for LG to fund environmental activities within 
the funds received; environmental management is one of the function transferred to LG. 
Ind 4.3.3. There are no specific indicators related to decentralisation in the context of General Budget 
Support. In the context of budget support, a section is devoted to public finance management (with the 
programme PAGAM). Improving public financial management is a crosscutting and crucial issue. It will 
have a direct impact on all sectors and the financing capacity of the state. That said, it is regrettable 
that this programme does not take into account the local public finance. 
It is noteworthy that the results in terms of improving public financial management are not satisfactory, 
prompting questions about the continuation of General Budget Support. This could influence the 
decision on whether to continue SBS or not. 
3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to 
implement decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.1.1: From the start of the decentralisation process, the transfer of functions and powers was a 
central concern in policy documents and programmes. A national strategy for transfers was quickly 
set. And the first direct support of the EC/EU did contribute in the development of these guidelines. 
Ind 5.1.2. Entities in charge of decentralisation were supposed to be guarantors of the implementation 
of the decentralisation policy. In the early years, the positioning of the instance in charge of 
decentralisation, MDRI, and the political support to decentralisation have given the necessary weight. 
The fact that decentralisation was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, 
becoming the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Government (MATCL), aimed to 
empower the ministry in the conduct of decentralisation. The creation of the DNCT within the 
department responded to the need to have an operational entity to monitor the implementation of 
decentralisation and coordination of planned actions. Later, the establishment of the Commissioner of 
Institutional Development was to provide an overall consistency of the various aspects of state reform 
including decentralisation and deconcentration. Policy documents cited above (Document national 
policy framework for decentralisation 2005-2014), and related programs produced by these 
administrations (the PNACT, the Institutional Development Program-PDI-) confirms the initial 
orientations. 
But, from 2004 / 2005, a decoupling gradually took place between the government and the reality of 
technical orientations of political power. Speeches and official documents made fewer cases of 
decentralisation. Witness the transfer of skills and resources that have not materialized in a decade. 
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The EC/EU, through the consultation bodies, has always tried to address the issue of transfers, but 
without significant influence. Through institutional support to the CDI, the EC/EU tried to offer support 
to line ministries to work on aspects of decentralisation / devolution. The response has been very 
limited. Both aspects are treated separately, purely formal, with persons with low-motivation and 
capacities to carry out this type of exercise. One cannot expect that an administration successfully 
conducts from in-house such an important reform that challenges the prerogatives and power-sharing 
existing within it. 
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.2.1: The 1992 Constitution laid the foundation for decentralisation. Law 93-008 defines 
conditions of the "free administration of Local governments" ("libre administration des collectivités"). 
This text was supplemented by a series of other texts on the status of elected officials and staff, local 
finance, election law, the code community... We can say that the legal corpus of decentralisation is 
relatively complete. The EC/EU has significantly contributed to the development of the legislative 
framework for decentralisation, especially through the first interventions it has funded. 
 
Ind 5.2.2: Three decrees D02-313, 314 and 315 were made in relation to transfers in the areas of 
education, health and hydraulics. 
LG have taken up the functions that recognised by the law and, mainly with external funds, they have 
invested in various sectors, especially education. But central administrations have not played the 
game: none planned, organized and implemented the transfers despite the decrees. It is only in late 
2008 that the Prime Minister gave a strong impulse by requesting the various ministries to actually 
implement the transfer of functions and resources to local governments based on a plan of transfers. 
An Inter-Ministerial Commission to monitor the transfer process was set up to ensure the proper 
implementation of this decision. Support units on decentralisation and devolution were established in 
around ten ministries. However, it seems that these units are actually not really operational. 
A real transfer of resources and functions has only taken place in the education sector (in 2010); the 
process has mainly focused on teachers management. But this transfer has actually not been properly 
accompanied: overnight, LG found themselves empowered in the management of thousands of 
teachers without that adequate structures had been established for this purpose.  
The Ministry of Health has realized the transfer of community health centre (CSCOM), but they only 
have a status of "association". Like the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health is now using the 
ANICT to channel the funds for the investment projects of LG. Specific "counters" ("guichets") were 
created for this purpose. 
In the hydraulic sector it is considered that the equipments have been transferred to LG, and that, as a 
consequence, there is nothing more to transfer. This is a simplistic view that summarizes the transfers 
made in terms of equipments. A proper transfer of functions should also ensure that the LG have the 
means to exercise these functions and that a proper accompaniment system is put in place. Once the 
central government makes the transfer, the relevant line ministries should still ensure monitoring and 
provide overall guidance in the sector and ensures that each actor is able to perform its duties. The 
services in charge of hydraulics in Mali are unfortunately not willing to understand this system. 
Regarding other areas, no major breakthrough is noted. Each year an assessment is made on the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Prime Minister; this assessment always leads to the 
same observation: stagnation. The transfer plans prepared or being prepared by the Ministries are 
generally inconsistent and do not reflect a real sector strategy to ensure consistency between 
decentralisation, deconcentration, transfer of financial resource, human resources adjustment and 
changes in procedures. 
In summary, at sector level, apart from education, sectoral legislation is far from being aligned with 
the legislation on decentralisation. Despite some efforts to improve the situation, the EC/EU has not 
managed to make the change happen regarding the problems of sector alignment. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that it is thanks to the support of the ANICT (to which the EC/EU has strongly 
contributed) that the LG have managed to assume most of their new functions with respect to public 
investments in a number of key sectors. 
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3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments’ fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total 
public expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes 
and increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.3.1: Concerning human resources, the overall capacity is considered low. A distinction must be 
done between elected officials and LG staff. The level of elected officials is very low because of the 
high percentage of illiterate elected officials in rural areas (more than 55% of elected herders and 
farmers). This is a logical situation in a largely rural country. In addition, there is the high turnover of 
elected officials each term (over 60% of turnover), which requires systematically the training of these 
new elected officials. It is noteworthy that the part of teachers among the elected officials gradually 
increases from one term to the next one, reaching 10% in the 2009 elections. 
This weakness could be overcome with a well-trained and stable administration that would ensure 
institutional continuity. Yet, this is not the case. The poor resources of LG do not allow them to recruit 
good staff, often only the Secretary General (SG) has a "baccalaureat" or university degree. The 
remaining staff consists of an assistant to the mayor, an accounting manager and one or two officers 
and cleaners. It is different in large urban LG with an organisation better structured and a 
management staff generally better trained. It is noteworthy that there is a high turnover of staff for two 
main reasons: general shifts at local elections (the new mayors prefer to surround themselves with 
people of their obedience) or late payments and lack of attractiveness of wages. 
A major effort has nevertheless been made in recent years under the leadership of DNCT: 
 a special civil service for LG ("fonction publique territoriale" - FPT) was established with 
several branches: administration, finance and technical area. Minimum criteria are required to 
integrate the FPT, improving the level of management staff and ensuring safety in 
employment. 2500 workers have already been part of the FPT so far. 
 New hires were made in 2008 with 721 managers who have followed refresher courses before 
joining their assignment, 
 a Training Centre for Local Authorities ("Centre de Formation des Collectivités Territoriales" - 
CFCT) was established in 2007 with a mandate to train and upgrade elected officials and LG 
staff. 
At "region" level, also highly disadvantaged in terms of staff, an effort has been made to enable the 
recruitment of 3 to 5 managers with university degrees for the positions of Secretary General, 
accounting and finance director, social affairs director and economic development promotion director. 
Programmes and support of the EC/EU have contributed to the improvement of human resources. It is 
noteworthy that the EC/EU is funding part of the CFTC (together with Germany). 
 
Ind 5.3.2. Concerning financial resources: LG resources come from local taxes and transfers from 
the state and donors via ANICT. By processing the data submitted by the Directorate General of 
Budget (Ministry of Economy and Finance) concerning the implementation of the budget over the 
period 2000-2010, we see that the state contribution represents only 20% of the direct support to LG. 
Table 2 Origin of transfers to local authorities (excl. LG’s own resources) 
Year  State budget 
External 
Resources 
Accumulation 
2000 957.500 3.407.000 4.364.500 
2001 2.350.000 3.401.000 5.751.000 
2002 2.300.000 16.108.639 18.408.639 
2003 2.492.000 10.310.000 12.802.000 
2004 2.755.260 5.837.000 8.592.260 
2005 2.755.260 9.946.000 12.701.260 
2006 2.755.260 12.274.690 15.029.950 
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2007 3.272.260 10.786.593 14.058.853 
2008 3.036.877 13.877.100 16.913.977 
2009 3.652.239 24.203.307 27.855.546 
2010 3.307.538 9.794.773 13.102.311 
Total 29.634.194 119.946.102 149.580.296 
% 20% 80%   
Sources: General direction of the treasury, Ministry of finances - DGB (Currency: Thousands of CFA,) 
The analysis of the mobilization of ANICT drawing rights (for the investment financing of LG) shows 
that the contribution of the state on its own investment budget is only 11% over the last 10 years. 
Table 3 Contribution to local investment fund: Contribution by stakeholders 
Year Other donor EDF State - BSI
18
 total 
Other 
donor 
EDF 
State - 
BSI 
2001 218.965.189 247.540.406 112.392.700 578.898.295 38% 43% 19% 
2002 2.059.352.767 8.470.657.939 1.508.762.358 12.038.773.064 17% 70% 13% 
2003 2.058.853.646 8.402.012.814 985.161.011 11.446.027.471 18% 73% 9% 
2004 1.954.236.838 3.241.075.582 749.340.770 5.944.653.190 33% 55% 13% 
2005 4.090.559.016 2.951.400.907 1.574.500.560 8.616.460.483 47% 34% 18% 
2006 3.228.952.469 8.204.768.755 1.332.054.452 12.765.775.676 25% 64% 10% 
2007 20.087.659.651 5.758.756.046 1.625.383.859 27.471.799.556 73% 21% 6% 
2008 18.498.903.746 5.414.425.303 2.596.568.993 26.509.898.042 70% 20% 10% 
2009 17.012.159.921 5.110.867.094 3.799.601.053 25.922.628.068 66% 20% 15% 
2010 11.066.751.250 2.171.381.050 2.183.427.308 15.421.559.608 72% 14% 14% 
Total 80.276.394.493 49.972.885.896 16.467.193.064 146.716.473.453 55% 34% 11% 
Sources: ANICT calculation on demand of the evaluation mission (Currency: CFA) 
In 2010, a new transfer (of 80,6 billion CFA francs) is operated for the benefit of the LG in education. 
This is actually related to the transfer of teachers' salaries. This figure should not create an illusion of 
volume because no additional resources are actually granted: amounts transferred correspond to 
amounts for payments of charges already defined and these transfers provide no additional financial 
flexibility to municipalities. The opposite can be expected as there will be additional costs associated 
with the management of these financial flows and nothing is planned for that. 
A report on local taxation was released in 2011 but it unfortunately only gives figures from 2007. The 
finding in terms of local taxation is an average of 1013 CFA francs per capita of tax revenue. Own 
revenues represent 92% of operating expenses. Wages represent an average of 40% of operating 
expenses, the figure is much higher in small municipalities. The 2011 assessment report on 
decentralisation19 indicates that the local taxation accounts for 75% of own revenues in 2007. 
Trainings of elected officials have systematically concerned the improvement of local revenues. In LG 
supported by specific programmes, an assessment of potential sources of tax revenues was made. 
Improvements were noted where elected officials had a proactive approach in this area. However, a 
general observation is the lack of correlation between the improvement in tax revenues and the 
improvement of the level of investment and services (although this was an assumption that 
underpinned the reasons for decentralisation).  
It is noteworthy that the local taxation system is not included in the state budget system. There is 
therefore no visibility. Existing data came mainly from the OISE database that fuelled the database on 
local finances (FILOC). But the latter is no longer updated since 2007. 
The 2011 assessment report on decentralisation notes that "Compared to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), these block transfers of the state are extremely low, less than 1% throughout the period 2005-
2008. Compared to total state revenue, the transfer made to LG is only 0,48% in 2009. " 
Moreover, behind these numbers lies a great disparity in the distribution of funds among LG. This 
disparity is due to the fact that ANICT is receiving more and more "targeted" funds, to a sector and / or 
a geographic zone, to the detriment of unrestricted/ discretionary funds. In the early years of ANICT, 
only 20% of funds were targeted. Today the trend is reversed: more than 80% of the funds are 
targeted. As a consequence, the equalization system can no longer function. 
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It should be noted that the transfer related to funds for investment in health and education operated 
through ANICT from 2007 onwards (15 billion per year on average) can explain the situation: there 
has been an important influx in quantitative terms of sector targeted funds (mainly for PISE / 
education). 
Table 4 Overview of the evolution of the use of discretionary & non discretionary funds for 
local investments 
 
Source: Study on fungibility, AHT-Betico, ANICT, 2011; note: the data DT are slightly different than the data 
provided by ANICT (Currency: Thousands of CFA francs) 
This table shows the changes between the discretionary funds ("general funds") and the funds 
allocated (geographically or sectorally) here called "special funds". The percentage of unrestricted 
funds increased from 86% in 2001 to 16% in 2010. The autonomy of the "Communes" is thus 
increasingly challenged. 
The 2011 assessment report on decentralisation mentions such distortions "for the transfer of the 
state, the disproportion is very strong between the sparsely populated Communes and the 
municipalities with large populations (e.g., 613 CFA / capita for the Kidal region against 118 CFA / 
capita for the Sikasso region), - there is no correlation with the amount of own resources / capita 
(Sikasso has the highest rate of own resources / capita, 2358 FCFA, is entitled to a transfer of 118 
CFA / capita while Mopti has 538 CFA of own resources / capita is entitled to a transfer of 545 CFA / 
capita). " 
Several observations emerged: 
 the operation of joint depends primarily on the own revenues, including local taxation; 
 their own investment capacity is also dependent on the local taxation; 
 transfers of the state are limited, 
 financing of investment depends to 90% from outside. 
 significant distortions between the LG and the equalization system does not play. 
Today, decentralisation is funded primarily by external resources. 
Moreover, it is the sustainability of LG which is at stake and the way they are financed. Financing can 
realistically only be based on local taxation. While flexibility exists in terms of financial recovery it is far 
from covering all the needs. It all boils down to the starting point on the mismatch between the 
functions transferred and the available resources. 
The EUD is well aware of the existing problem. This is why it was planned to work on the reform of 
local taxes in the PARAD programme, through its support to the CDI. Yet, it would have been 
appropriate to have previously carried out a detailed analysis of the cost of decentralisation and the 
means to finance it. 
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that 
are discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in HRM: the extent to which LGs can hire and fire or 
otherwise manage personnel. 
 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local 
government’s degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.4.1: In fact, the financial autonomy of LG did not improve (see also JC5.3/ Ind 5.3.2). Local 
taxation should be reviewed and the contributions of the state actually depend on investment to 90% 
from outside. Autonomy of LG to choose their investment is also limited by the system of allocation of 
funds. Through an active policy dialogue at sector level, the EC/EU has made some efforts to improve 
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the situation and to advocate for more transfer of resources from the state to the local20 level but 
without significant success to date. 
Ind 5.4.2: While LG have the right to hire and fire staff, actually, in practice, the weakness of their 
resources makes this autonomy rather theoretical. 
Ind 5.4.3: The division of powers between different levels of local governments is not a major problem. 
However, the issue of the ownership of public investments made by a higher level local government in 
the territory of a lower level local government remains. 
 
3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and 
reform implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & CSO) that capacities of key central government 
bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation have improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of M&E system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.1.1. & Ind 6.1.4. With respect to the capacity of the national structures in charge of 
decentralisation, mainly the DNCT, it appears that the capacity to formulate policy exists, as illustrated 
by the national policy framework document on decentralisation.  
However, if we look at the upper tier of the government and the issue of inter-ministerial initiatives, it is 
quite different: capacities are actually quite low.  
Overall, the DNCT (for the "decentralisation reform") and the CDI (for the "state reform") are 
considered as weak structures to be further strengthened. Through the PARAD and PARADER 
programmes, the EC/EU has provided substantial support to these two structures. But this support 
can not compensate for the lack of will at the Prime Minister's Office and Presidency level to 
develop "inter-ministerial initiatives". The attempt to establish an inter-ministerial commission on the 
transfer of functions and powers has illustrated the "decoupling" between the different levels of 
authority. The choice to put the DNCT in charge of the inter-ministerial commission could only 
condemn the initiative, its institutional and political weight being insufficient. 
The number of qualified officers is limited at the DNCT (it can be considered that there is a core group 
of 4 or 5 persons). With respect to the CDI: a flowchart has been redefined with an enhanced number 
of officers to meet the needs of conducting the reform of the state. Unfortunately, some of these 
positions are still vacant, illustrating the low motivation of the state to develop efficient structures. 
Ind 6.1.2. For representatives of local authorities and civil society, there is no doubt that there is little 
enthusiasm by the government to boost the decentralisation process. 
Ind 6.1.3. A system of monitoring and evaluation has been developed relying mainly on the OISE 
database, strongly supported by the EU. However, since the cessation of CCC in 2007, the database 
is actually no longer functional. There was a failure to transfer it to the local authorities. Currently, the 
DNCT carries out the collection and centralisation of hard copies used for some of the data collection. 
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
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 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local councils 
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of 
information produced at local level 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.2.1. The 2011 assessment report on decentralisation21 points out weaknesses in the capacity of 
local authorities. Mismanagement of public funds is often cited. But this is not based on a detailed 
analysis which would highlight any potential evolution in the management capacity of LG. The report 
actually mentions the perception of the citizens about the management capacity of LG. 
Ind 6.2.3. Interviews with resource persons who have been supporting the LG for several years, gave 
a more mixed picture. Although the rotation of elected officials is a reality, it seems that there is a 
significant improvement in the capacity of the elected officials who are in their second term. Elected 
officials assert they are no longer afraid to talk to state services on any aspect.  
The level of human resources has been significantly improved with the LG civil service ("fonction 
publique territoriale"). But this shift of status from LG employee to civil servant has been accompanied 
by an improvement in their remuneration and benefits without the resources of LG being increased. 
Consequently, the share of the operating budget for salaries increased at the expense of other budget 
lines, e.g. operations and investments.  
Overall, although weaknesses remain, LG have the minimum level of staff that allows them to operate 
and assume their basic functions: administration and overall management of the institution, services 
related to the civil status, monitoring of investments, 
The capacity of LG also depends on support available, support supposed to balance the weaknesses 
of their human resources. The system "Centres de Conseils Communaux" (CCC) was established 
when the "Communes" were created (in 2000), mainly with funding from the EU. This system was 
intended to be temporary (3 years), the time that elected representatives and local administration got 
used to their new functions and define a suitable and sustainable way of working.  
But the CCC was maintained until 2007 and the phasing out from the CCC system was not sufficiently 
prepared. The development of "pools of decentralized technical units" (available upon request of LG) 
does not work. Several reasons may explain this situation. First of all, efforts in this area are hampered 
by the low motivation of central government officers. For these officers, support to LG is not an 
obligation and it is a way to request high fees for their services at a level which is often prohibitive for 
LG. This brings us back to the issue of the low commitment of the central government to accompany 
the decentralisation process and the weak coordination between the central government bodies and 
the various stakeholders at the decentralised level. The second factor is the low capacity of the 
deconcentrated services' staff itself which is not prepared to play this role of support and advice to LG. 
Finally, LG need to prepare a three-year plan of their need in terms of support and technical advice. 
This plan is required to obtain a Provision for Technical Support (managed by the ANICT) which 
enables them to pay for specific technical support. Few LG manage to produce these plans, and they 
appear more like a series of training rather than a real plan for capacity building with an analysis of the 
needs of these LG to improve their action. 
A self-assessment system had been introduced in the early years of the decentralisation process. This 
system allows LG to measure their strengths and weaknesses and identify actions to strengthen their 
implementation capacity. This tool, developed by SNV and other partners, has been well used in the 
LG supported by the DPs. Unfortunately, it seems no longer used. 
An interesting action for capacity development of LG has been the establishment of the Training 
Centre for Local Authorities, the CFCT ("Centre de Formation des Collectivités Territoriales"). The 
centre has been supported by Germany and the EU. It provides an essential response to capacity 
development as a sustainable tool for basic training and refresher courses for LG staff and elected 
officials. However, it has faced several problems: it is designed to train "category C" employees. 
Management officers, "category B" and "category A", are trained at the ENA, the national school of 
administration. The partners had asked before starting financing the CFTC that this issue should be 
solved so that the CFCT could form all types of LG employees. An agreement was reached, but only 
for three years: the problem will thus appear again. Another issue is that the funding of the CFCT 
depends on the ANICT. The CFCT should have an autonomous budget and not depend on the 
goodwill of the management of the ANICT to finance its operations. It is indeed noteworthy that the 
ANICT depends essentially on external funding. 
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Ind 6.2.2 Regarding the planning capacity: all LG have their PDESC development plan ("plan de 
développement économique et social"). In most "Communes", specific support has been provided by 
various organisations to design these plans. Results have been heterogeneous, depending on the 
capacity of the consultancy or the NGO involved. In many cases, involved organisations substituted 
for LG in the design of these plans instead of accompanying them in this work.  
The main criticism of the PDESC concerns the poor match between the plans and the resources 
available. But can elected officials really be blamed for proposing a vision of development of their 
territory in line with the competences they are given and in line with the expectations of their citizens? 
It appears that elected official are actually not responsible for the lack of consistency in public policy. 
The weak capacity of LG is pointed out in the external audits22 carried out in the framework of the 
ANICT-funded projects. Observed weaknesses, without putting in question the relevance of the 
instruments, called for better control and the clear identifications of responsibilities in these failures in 
order to take the right corrective actions. The result of these audits is quite negative. It is for example 
explained that: 
 For 11% of the LG "the compliance with financial procedures for payment of public 
expenditure is deemed insufficient", 
 For 88% of the LG in the sample "the compliance with administrative and control of 
procurements procedures is deemed insufficient (taking into account documents submitted)" 
(against 96% for the reference year before :2006-2007),  
 For 41% of the LG "technical studies are considered insufficient",  
 For 71% of the LG "control and monitoring of implementation are considered inadequate",  
 For 75% of the LG "construction works present defects", etc. 
While these figures give a clear picture of the results of the audit, they are to be taken with caution in 
terms of the conclusions to be drawn. Indeed following aspects need to be considered: (i) the often 
late release of the drawing rights which leads the LG to go very fast in the achievements of the project 
in order not to lose the benefits of their endowments, (ii) the absence of control of the national 
authority in charge of following the sector but also of the ANICT.  
More regular checks of the functioning of LG would certainly have limited the errors or abuses. The 
advantage of this audit is to lay bare the shortcomings and push the actors to understand their causes 
and take action to improve them. It is noteworthy that, following the audit, an action plan has been 
designed to initiate corrective actions. It is however regrettable that this type of tracking system was 
not established earlier and is not integrated into the monitoring and evaluation system. 
Ind 6.2.4. Concerning the system of monitoring and evaluation, it is important to note that the OISE 
database was theoretically also intended to provide information to local LG and not just to the national 
level. However, during the period when it was functional, LG were asked to feed the database but no 
information was returned to them.  
In terms of lessons learnt, it would be necessary to review the monitoring and evaluation systems in 
order to make them less complex (the OISE database was certainly too exhaustive). Moreover, they 
should be used as tools for a dynamic dialogue between stakeholders on the shortcomings identified, 
their cause and the existing solutions. 
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.3.1 Overall, associations of locally elected officials or of LG have failed. An association of 
Municipalities of Mali (AMM) and an association of "Cercles et Regions" have been created. But the 
latter was eventually split into two distinct groups: one for the "Cercles" administrative division and one 
for the "Regions".  
In recent years, these associations have not been successful in defending the interests of LG. They 
received support from several donors (including the EU), especially the AMM. The record is not 
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 This external control system was recommended following the 2004 and 2005 evaluations of the instruments for 
technical and financial support but was only put in place in 2008. 
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satisfactory and donors have preferred to withdraw their support to these associations. The 
conclusion is that the elected head of these associations are also members of the ruling party and do 
not want to criticize the government's action in decentralisation for fear of being marginalized within 
their party. This applies also to the Members of Parliament as well as to the High Council for LG 
("Haut Conseil des Collectivités" - HCC). The national context is characterised by on the one hand the 
lack of political will of the central government and on the other hand the lack of initiative, proposals of 
change and advocacy skills by locally elected officials. 
Ind 6.3.2 Regarding community-based organizations working with the "Communes" for service delivery 
and local governance, efforts have been made in the areas of education and health, where users' 
associations are now more empowered and their relationship with the "Communes" are rather well 
defined. Yet, regarding local governance, the evaluation team has not identified cases showing the 
involvement of NGOs in the long run. 
Ind 6.3.3 There is no systematized research studies carried out on issues related to local governance. 
There are occasional, very specific and small analysis carried out by certain NGOs. 
3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.1.1. Mali has experienced three local elections: 2000, 2004 and 2008 (which were supported by 
the EU). The elections went well and show the maturity of the country in this area (44% of participation 
at the last election). A potential illustration of the interest of citizens in these elections is the high 
turnover of elected officials with a lot of "votes sanctions" against teams considered to be failing in 
their management. 
Ind 7.1.2. The planning process of LG is a rather participatory approach. A wide consultation with civil 
society is organized on the occasion of the design or update of the PDESC. The system of "Centres 
for local advice" (CCC Ŕ "centres de conseil communaux") largely funded by the EC/EU, focused on 
supporting participatory planning. But the situation is heterogeneous, depending on who provides 
support for the development of the PDESC: some remain at a purely technical level paying little 
attention to participation.  
The 2011 assessment report on decentralisation23 highlights a large weakness in the articulation 
between the levels of LG and the stakeholders. In particular, there are still several inconsistencies 
between LG programmes and sectoral programmes prepared by central governments. 
The citizens' perception survey reveals that the vast majority of them feel that they are not involved in 
decision-making and are misinformed. However, they are generally quite satisfied with the 
improvement of the accessibility and the quality of public services. 
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with 
citizens (notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.2.1: The accountability of elected officials vis-à-vis their citizens is not granted. While the council 
meetings are open to the public, little advertising given and few incentives are provided for such 
participation. Some argue that cultural factors should be taken into account as it is not usual to hold 
accountable the chief. 
Nevertheless, efforts have been made to advertise budgets and the results of assemblies' discussions 
on signboards in town halls. Unfortunately, this practice is not systematic. The 2011 assessment 
report on decentralisation notes that public debate has not become a common practice yet. 
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 Etude sur le bilan et les perspectives de la décentralisation au Mali (2011). 
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3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) 
provided to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.3.1: See JC 8.1. 
Ind 7.3.2. LG are informed about the grants they will receive from ANICT. But there is no induced 
effect on the information to the citizens, except regarding the official communication of the budget. 
3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) 
in local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.1.1 Funds for LG investments are channelled through ANICT. The evolution of these amounts is 
described in details in EQ5. 
It is noteworthy that, over the period 2001-2010, 147 billion CFA (223 mEUR) were allocated to and 
mobilized by LG. Between 2002 and 2006, the average was 10 billion FCFA / year (15mEUR). From 
2007 onwards, the average increased with the shift to sector fund in education and health up to 25 
billion CFA francs / year (38mEUR). On average, this corresponds to 50 000 EUR per LG but, as 
explained above, there are actually huge disparities between LG. 
In the 2001-2010 period, the contribution of the EC/EU amounted to 76 mEUR (Drawing Rights 
mobilized Ŕ "Droit de Tirage"). This represents 34% of the funds raised via ANICT. The contribution of 
other donors during this period accounts for 55% of the funds and the central government for 11%. 
It is important to note that the contribution of the EC/EU has been instrumental in the first FICT 
("Fonds d’Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales") managed by the ANICT. During the 2001-
2005 period, this contribution amounted to 70% of the funds. Without the EC/EU support, the FICT 
would not have reached a substantial level and would not have covered the whole country. The ratio 
was then reversed with the introduction of specific sector "drawing counters" ("guichets sectoriels") in 
2007. 
Today, thanks to EC/EU budget support and the fact that the EDF funds for ANICT are not targeted, a 
minimum of equalization can continue. LG which do not received targeted funds can benefit from a 
minimum level of drawing rights. 
It is noteworthy that there is no consolidated data to assess the share of investment excluding ANICT 
funds. A qualitative study in 2004 (PADC feasibility financed by the AFD) was carried out on a limited 
sample of LG and revealed that 72% of funding registered as "LG investment" in the period 2001-2004 
came from the ANICT. Yet, when all actual investments project carried out in the administrative 
division were considered, only 40% of the investments had been funded by the ANICT. This fact was 
explained by the investments for which funding did not go through the LG budget. These investments 
actually often reflected the dynamism of the Mayor to raise funds from other sources. There is no 
evidence whether this situation has prevailed in subsequent years. 
Ind 8.1.2. The following criteria are used to calculate the drawing right (DT) of each LG: 
 Population, 
 Remoteness, 
 Level of equipment. 
During the first period (FICT1), small LG were clearly favoured, it was to compensate for their under-
equipped situation. 
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A fourth index was been considered and corresponded to the rate of recovery of the "TDRL" (tax per 
capita, the main financial resource of the LG). This index was not applied during the FICT1 and its use 
during the FICT2 has encountered some difficulties. 
In fact, there is no pre-determined formula to allocate budget to LG. Each year, the Board (based on a 
proposal of the DG of the ANICT) decides the weight to be attributed to each of these criteria. 
A formula was proposed for the FICT 2 (2004 ANICT study)24. It seems that this formula could not be 
applied because of the difficulty in calculating the indices, the multiplication of drawing counters 
("guichets") and the fact that funds became targeted sectorally and / or geographically.  
In general, the development partners now complain about the lack of transparency in the current 
method of calculation. The EC/EU support had limited influence on the choice of the method to 
calculate the drawing rights.  
Ind 8.1.3. There is no real public-private partnership for the delivery of basic public services in Mali. 
The system that prevails is more a system of co-management with the users. For example in the 
health sector, they are user groups that manage community health centres (CSCOM Ŕ "Centres de 
Santé Communautaire") and a "partnership framework" has been established between these 
associations, LG and the deconcentrated health services. Regarding schools, a management 
committee involves the school principal, the parents and a representative of the LG. 
 
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
It is very difficult to assess any contribution of the EC/EU to the improvement of local infrastructures 
maintenance, especially given the fact that the aid was delivered in the form of budget support. The 
EC/EU has indeed supported the CCC ("Centres de Conseils Communaux") which plaid an active role 
in this area providing specific guidance for the improvement of LG maintenance system. Overall, it 
appears that maintenance of local infrastructures is still a major problem in Mali. 
Ind 8.2.1.  
Although the external audit reports25 note that in the 2008-2009 sample 16% of investment projects 
are not completed and not functional, there are few fully implemented investment projects that are not 
functional. But the same report indicates that 55% of infrastructures are not subject of a maintenance 
policy. It notes that for 41% of investment projects there are insufficient technical studies (although 
there was a significant improvement as it was 67% of insufficient studies in 2006-2007). Construction 
defects are numerous (71%) showing a significant weakness in terms of control. Hydraulic 
infrastructures are the ones with the most defects. 
Ind 8.2.2. The central government formulated a directive in order to oblige LG to allocate 15% of their 
budgets for maintenance operations. This seems however difficult to be applied given the limited 
budgets of LG (which is largely used to pay salaries and to cover the financial requirements for new 
investments). There is no consolidated study giving the exact share of LG budget for maintenance. 
Recent qualitative studies indicate either an absence of expenditures for maintenance or a very low 
level of expenditures.  
In Mali, LG generally consider that the responsibilities for maintenance of buildings and equipments 
lies at the level of the management committees and that costs should be covered by the budget of 
these committees (e.g. school management committee, health facilities users associations). The issue 
of maintenance of local infrastructures is indeed still a real problem to date. 
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 "La détermination des droits de tirage de chaque collectivité territoriale résulterait de l‟application de la formule 
suivante: 
• Droit de tirage = droit de tirage pour l‟ensemble de la région x (indice synthétique de la collectivité /  indices 
synthétiques de toutes les collectivités de la région); 
• Indice synthétique = Indice population + indice éloignement + indice équipement + (recettes TDRL recouvrées / 
prévisions de recettes TDRL)." 
25
 Contrôle externe des investissement des Collectivités Territoriales (2008). 6 rapports semestriels entre 2008 et 
2010 ont été réalisés par le bureau d‟audit SOCOTEC financés par la EUD Mali. Marché no : 
038/S/2008/ON/FED/ MLI. 
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3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for 
vulnerable groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 Ind 8.3.2. Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.3.1. Ŕ Thanks to the projects financed via the ANICT, LG were able to substantially increase 
their "credibility" as well as the level of equipment which have included classrooms, equipment for 
local administration, economic equipments26 and to a lesser extent to health facilities. 
The table below shows the number of ANICT funded projects in different sectors for the period 2001 to 
2010. It is important to note that the EC/EU contribution amounts to 76 million EUR (which has 
enabled to finance not less than 7.466 local infrastructure projects). 
Table 5 Number of ANICT funded projects by sector 
Code Label Amount EDF 
Amount 
other DPs 
Nr of 
Projects 
EDF 
Nr of 
Projects 
other DPs 
Total amount 
Nr of 
Projects 
total 
101 
Territorial planning - 
economy 
1.458.360.432 2 652 773 632 139 146 4.111.134.064 285 
106 Equipment Ŕ economy 21.265.091.916 16 606 702 812 3.259 1.503 37.871.794.728 4 762 
202 Sanitation Ŕ environment 36.282.796 39 150 062 6 5 75.432.858 11 
203 
Living conditions Ŕ 
environment 
80.769.929 651 955 261 9 18 732.725.190 27 
207 
Natural resource 
managementŔ 
environment 
1.894.471.954 1 281 613 789 211 88 3.176.085.743 299 
304 Culture Ŕ social 1.161.331.978 694 149 884 139 41 1.855.481.862 180 
305 Education Ŕ social 14.574.666.533 59 437 453 934 2.289 3.541 74.012.120.467 5 830 
308 Hydraulic Ŕ social 3.753.416.794 5 271 764 729 578 271 9.025.181.523 849 
309 Health Ŕ social 5.690.031.233 9 925 312 347 828 573 15.615.343.580 1 401 
310 Sports Ŕ social 58.462.331 182 711 107 8 8 241.173.438 16 
TOTAL 49 972 885 896 96.743.587.557 7 466 6.194 146.716.473.453 13.660 
Source: ANICT 
Ind 8.3.2. The Statistical Yearbook "Malikunnafoni" 2002-2008 produced by the technical unit of the 
PRSP provides interesting background information. Knowing that the social indicators measured relate 
directly to services provided at local level (usually under the responsibility of LG despite incomplete 
transfers), it can be considered that these potential improvements are due in large part to the 
implementation of decentralisation.27  
The rate of assisted deliveries increased from 40 to 61% between 2002 and 2008, the coverage of 
antenatal care increased from 54 to 84%. The percentage of population with access to a health facility 
within 15 km from 68 to 86% (for the same indicator but for a radius of 5 km, it increased from 44 to 
58%). 
The number of primary schools increased from 3923 (incl. 3441 public schools) to 4687 (incl. 3921 
public schools), which represents an increase of 14% of public schools. The level of enrolment 
increased from 1,3 to 1,8 million pupils in primary education. The gross enrolment rate increased from 
67 to 80% between 2002 and 2008 and the net rate from 51% to 61%. The student/ teacher ratio 
decreased from 57 to 52. The percentage of households with access to safe water increased from 
57% to 71%. 
The result of the citizens perception survey (conducted as part of the 2011 assessment report 
decentralisation) confirms the positive opinion in terms of LG improving the level of service provided. 
Apart from the management of water points, more than 50% of the population is satisfied with the 
quality of decentralized services, 72% for school construction. 
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 Market place, transport hub, veterinary facilities, etc. 
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 For example, very few newly built schools are not under the responsibility of LG. 
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For example, the following table taken from a 2009 study on decentralisation in the education sector28 
shows the contribution of LG and "Cercles" councils to education (sample of 16 LG in three regions). 
This contribution of 15 EUR per student at LG level (21.000 EUR per year globally) is not negligible 
given the low budgets of LG. As a comparison, the effort of the central government in education for 7 
to 15 year-old students was 56 EUR per student. 
Table 6 Contribution of LG to the level of expenditures per student  
(amount per student and in CFA) 
"Conseils 
de Cercle" 
LG LG > 2000 
inhabitants 
LG from 
10000-20.000 
inhabitants 
LG < 10000 
Operating expenses      
Teachers‟ salaries 
Other expenses (subv. ECOM, 
facilitators, etc)* 
Costs of organizing the exams* 
Allocation of school supplies 
Sub-Total 
75 
- 
 
121 
211 
407 
525 
545 
 
301 
343 
1 714 
45 
345 
 
183 
375 
948 
285 
179 
 
201 
73 
738 
1 245 
1 110 
 
521 
580 
3 456 
Investment expenses      
Classroom construction 
Other constructions 
Expenses on school furniture 
Other expenses 
Subtotal investment 
1 645 
332 
156 
- 
2 134 
5 920 
2 064 
811 
- 
8 796 
2 975 
447 
- 
- 
3 422 
5 175 
809 
1 050 
- 
7 034 
9 610 
4 937 
1 384 
- 
15 932 
Total (operating+investment) 2 541 10 510 4 370 7 771 19 388 
* declarative elements that could not be verified in the administrative accounts  
As already noted above, the contribution of the EC/EU was instrumental in the provision of 
funds that have increased the level of services. 
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 I&D 2009. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Mali; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
31 
 
4 Conclusion concerning the hypotheses to be tested and main 
challenges to be discussed in the synthesis phase 
The Mali case is characterised by a paradox: move from a decentralisation process supported 
politically by the national government to a decentralisation process driven by Development 
Partners. 
Decentralisation was a major focus closely linked to the revival of the Malian society following the fall 
of the dictatorship of Sekou Toure in 1991. The orientations and actions of the government led by 
Professor Alpha Oumar Konare as well as the contents of the new constitution have ensured a strong 
political support to initiate the decentralisation process. It is noteworthy that the Malian authorities 
have received broad support from international donors to support this process. 
Ten years after the establishment of local authorities, the situation has surprisingly reversed. The 
political will is lacking, decentralisation seems to have stalled, and many indicators illustrates the 
situation (for example, financial transfers from the state to LG stagnate and remain at a low level and 
an alternatives to temporary technical support system have not been established). Decentralisation is 
now actually supported by Development Partners rather than by the national government. DPs finance 
around 80% of the decentralisation process. A pause in donor support would definitely halt the 
decentralisation process. 
However, LG are now rooted in the political landscape of the country and there have been three 
rounds of local elections. They somehow work in spite of several weaknesses and they have managed 
to significantly improve the level of services on their territory. Despite the incompleteness of transfers, 
they have assumed their new functions thanks to external financing. Yet, today, the limited financial 
resources as well as the brakes to the transfer of functions are an obstacle for them to operate 
efficiently and improve the quality of services they are supposed to provide. 
Other achievements are noteworthy as: the establishment of the territorial civil service, the Centre for 
Training of Local Authorities and the devolution of the administration of the Treasury. 
A major role of the EC/EU in the decentralisation process. 
The EC/EU has supported since the start the Malian authorities in carrying out this process, 
implementing the necessary instruments (legislative, technical support facility, funding mechanism) 
and financing these instruments. 
The EC/EU has managed to work over the long run and adapt its intervention. It has expanded its 
intervention from decentralisation to state reform which led to a better integration of both processes. 
Decentralisation can not be conceived independently of the evolution of the state in which it is 
situated, the synergy between decentralisation and devolution is indeed essential. 
The EC/EU has been the spearhead for the design, implementation and funding of national tools. It 
has supported the system for technical support to LG and the creation of the National Investment 
Agency of Territorial Authorities (ANICT). It showed the example and the majority of partners have 
followed its path and join forces to support these various measures. The EC/EU financial contribution 
has been crucial for the sustainability of these systems and to support equalization of funds for LG. 
The EC/EU was able to play the role of leader of DPs on decentralisation and became the main actor 
in the "sectoral" dialogue with national authorities. Thanks to its action, decentralisation has remained 
on the top of the agenda. The EC/EU has supported the national bodies in charge of decentralisation 
and state reform (DNCT and CDI) ensuring them to have a minimum of means and technical 
assistance despite the difficult environment.  
An appropriate choice in terms of aid so far, but questions for the future. 
The support of the EC/EU has evolved from a project approach to a sector budget support to finance 
the facilities for technical and financial support, coupled with a project approach for targeted 
institutional support. The results, in terms of achievements over the past ten years, are indisputable, 
despite the obstacles encountered in recent years and the lack of political support. Only the support 
for regions has been in the form of specific commitments of the EC/EU without an own management 
ensured by LG, a system that could be perhaps discussed. 
The initial project approach modality has built the instruments of decentralisation and has supported 
their installation. 
Budget support has strengthened this momentum and ensured the further development of national 
instruments to carry out decentralisation. This budget support has ensured (i) the fact that these 
instruments were functioning properly, (ii) equalization mechanism (between LG financial resources), 
especially in the early years, (iii) the establishment of another form of dialogue between DPs and the 
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national government on the implementation of decentralisation and state reform, putting it in front of its 
responsibilities. In addition, the disbursement rates are extremely good (over 90%) and key indicators 
have been achieved. 
Despite these achievements, SBS is being seriously questioned. The two main reasons are: the lack 
of political will that results in solving the non-critical issues (which are the transfer of functions and 
financial transfers to LG) and the more global challenges in the reform of public finances that impact 
on the overall capacity of the State in all sectors. 
Lessons learnt 
The choices of the EC/EU have generally been relevant. But several lessons can be learned from the 
past experience: 
 The support to the establishment of a temporary technical support to LG ("centres de conseil 
communaux" - CCC) was adapted to a situation of quick start-up of the "Communes". Neither 
the newly elected officials nor the hostile local administration were initially prepared for that 
change. Results of the CCC activities to develop the capacities of LG are generally assessed 
positive. 
 But, stakeholders relied too much on this system and attempts were made to extend the use 
of this temporary system instead of working with all involved actors on a sustainable solution. 
The removal of this system in 2007 was done without the establishment of a satisfactory 
replacement solution. 
 In this kind of process, it would be desirable to involve more the local administration from the 
start and ensure that it will have the resources to work with the new LG rather than relying on 
temporary project mechanisms. Project mechanisms cannot replace the advisory role to local 
actors which is required; they can only accompany the whole process. The cost of traditional 
project support could largely exceed the costs of setting up a sustainable system for LG 
capacity building. 
 At its start, ANICT proved to be a powerful tool which allowed a rapid provision of funds to LG 
across the country. Without this instrument, and of course the financial support by DPs, LG 
would not have had the means to invest and improve the level of services on their territory as 
they did. 
 The weaknesses observed in the field are primarily the result of a lack of monitoring by 
administrative bodies in charge of following-up LG and by ANICT's regional agencies. This 
problem could have been largely minimized if simple measures of control and monitoring had 
been implemented. For future similar support, it should be kept in mind that a proper 
monitoring system which would help to identify, trace and deal with problem areas must be 
established from the start and taken as a condition to continue the whole process. 
 The traditional mechanisms for "static" M&E which consist in "photographing" a situation are 
insufficient to monitor the dynamics in place and to correct deficiencies. Monitoring tools of 
institutional capacity that can meet such needs exist and are well known but unfortunately not 
used. 
 Over time ANICT became an all-powerful entity, whose mode of governance as well as its 
intermediation costs are increasingly questioned. The act of getting all the grants to 
municipalities through this single channel at the expense of using Treasury channels raises 
questions. LG lose financial independence, the abundance of their budget depends on (i) the 
decisions of the ANICT and (ii) conditions related to the use of these funds. Furthermore, the 
disproportionate increase in targeted funds (geographically or sectorally) compared with the 
unrestricted funds skews the "equalization scheme", and thus the equal opportunity for LG in 
access to finance, and reduce the decision-making power of LG in investment decisions on 
their territory. 
 The ability to guide this process is key. The contribution of the EC/EU to the DNCT and CDI 
was instrumental in trying to develop and maintain a minimum of capacity at technical level. 
But this capacity could affect the decision-making and political level, the lack of effective inter-
anchor is a major deficit. Weak associations of elected officials has not remedied this deficit. 
These associations consist of elected officials from majority party and are not ready to oppose 
themselves to the government. 
 The experience of the SBS is certainly mixed, but its limitations are mainly due to the weak 
political situation of the moment. Sectoral dialogue is weak, but the experience on the choice 
of indicators and their assessment as well as the combination of fixed and variable tranches 
should improve the mechanism. The introduction of "conditionalities" could be suggested on 
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the most critical determinants for the continuation of the process and a stronger connection 
with the conditionality of budget support should be ensured. The logic of pursuing SBS is to 
continue to work on the long run in favour of an enhanced service delivery at local level, which 
goes through the capacity building of LG to provide these services and therefore the existence 
of sustainable instruments and resources at their disposal. The low current political support 
should not make stakeholders deviate from this direction. 
 The continuation of the SBS could focus on the following: 
 A work more focused on decentralisation and deconcentration in the sectors (health, 
water, education...). It is indeed at the sector level that the transfer of functions and 
resources and the development of new procedures between LG, decentralized 
government services and users are important. The development and implementation 
of "2D" (decentralisation and deconcentration) operational plans could be an answer, 
provided: (i) they are not superficial plans and that all stakeholders are involved, (ii) 
both aspects of 2D are adequately integrated in a single plan. Initiatives carried out 
through the CDI are following this direction but they still need to be consolidated. 
 A work focusing on territorialization of public policies through the regional level. This 
work is complementary to the previous point. The aim is to get the actors in the 
different sectors to reflect on the implementation of national policies at regional level 
as part of a dialogue with the regions and other LG on the territory. 
 The choice of indicators to reflect real progress in the process and not just a one-off 
assessment. This is one of the difficulty to be resolved to improve the dialogue within 
the framework of the SBS. 
 It is desirable to maintain the state reform and decentralisation at the top of the agenda of the 
dialogue between DPs and Government. The SBS can help for that. 
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5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: List of people interviewed 
Last name First Name Organisation Designations 
Date of 
interview 
Adama Sissouma DNCT Directeur de la DNCT 11/05/2011 
Dr. Brahima Fomba CFCT Directeur CFCT 11/05/2011 
Aguissa A. Aziz CDI Commissaire Adjoint 11/05/2011 
Elly Prosper Arama Confed Coordinateur 12/05/2011 
Bounafou  Touré 
Cellule d‟Appui à la 
Réforme des 
Finances Publiques 
 
Coordinateur 
11/05/2011 
Ousmane Coulibaly 
Cellule d‟Appui à la 
Réforme des 
Finances Publiques 
Chef de division S&E 
11/05/2011 
Marimpa Samoura 
Cellule d‟Appui à la 
Réforme des 
Finances Publiques 
Chef de division études 
11/05/2011 
Mr. Ballo 
Cellule d‟Appuil à la 
Dec. 
 12/05/2011 
Abdoulaye Toure 
Ministère des 
finances 
Directeur Général du Budget 12/05/2011 
Ibrahim Coulibaly Ader Nord Coordonnateur national, 12/05/2011 
David 
MOGOLLO 
HUERTA, 
EUD Mali 
Chef de section 
développement rural et 
décentralisation 
12/05/2011 
Christophe Casas EUD Mali Chargé de décentralisation 12/05/2011 
Tierry LAMBORION Consultant 
Assistant technique de la UE 
à la DNCT 
 
Mathias Robert EUD Mali 
Chargé de programmes, 
économie du développement, 
 
12/05/2011 
 Habas Josette Consultante  12/05/2011 
Youssouf S. Konate MATCL 
Conseiller Technique chargé 
de la décentralisation 
13/05/2011 
Siaka Camara Tresor, DNCTP  13/05/2011 
Mr. Traore CPS/MATCL  13/05/2011 
FOFANA Fily 
Ministère de 
l„Education 
CADDE-Education 13/05/2011 
Modibo Dolo Plan  13/05/2011 
 Ibrahim 
 
Mohamed 
Association des 
Régions du Mali 
(ARM),  
Président ARM,président AR 
de Tombouctou 
16/05/2011 
SEKOU Fantamadi 
Association des 
Régions du Mali 
(ARM), 
Président AR de Koulikouro  
Michel Francoys CTB Chargé de décentralisation 16/05/2011 
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DICKO M. Allaye PACT/GIZ coordonnateur national 16/05/2011 
CAFFERINI Lionel AFD Directeur adjoint 16/05/2011 
Boubaca BA 
Association des 
Municipalités du Mali 
Président AMM et maire de la 
commune V 
17/05/2011 
Youssouf Diakite 
Association des 
Municipalités du Mali 
Secrétaire permanent 17/05/2011 
Allaye Touré 
Association des 
représentants de la 
société civile 
Président 17/05/2011 
Sidibé Souleymane CADD Hydraulique chef Cellule 
17/05/2011 
Bréhima Thiero 
CADD Hydraulique 
 
17/05/2011 
Amadou Imnar 
CADD Hydraulique 
 
17/05/2011 
Youssouf DIAKITE SP 
Association des 
Municipalités du Mali 
(AMM) 
 
17/05/2011 
Ahmad Fawaz Socotec 
Responsable de la mission de 
contrôle externe ANICT 
 
17/05/2011 
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5.2 Annex 2: List of documents consulted  
Catek Gouvernance Développement / Direction nationale des collectivités territoriales (2011), Etude 
sur le bilan et les perspectives de la décentralisation au Mali. 
Catek Gouvernance Développement/ Commissariat au Développement institutionnel (2010) : Enquête 
Légère sur le Niveau Actuel de Satisfaction des Usagers des Services Publics Ŕ Rapport définitif. 
CDI, Flizot, Stéphanie (2010) : Etude sur la révision du système de fiscalité locale. 
Commission Européenne (2011): Convention de financement entre la CE et la République du Mali. 
Programme d‟Appui à la Réforme Administrative, à la Décentralisation et au Développement 
Economique Régional (PARADER). Annexe Dispositions techniques et administratives. 
Commission Européenne (2000) : Convention de financement entre  la CE et la République du Mali. 
Programme d‟appui au démarrage des communes. 
Commission Européenne (2003): Stratégie de Coopération et programme indicative 2003-2007 
Appendice 6 : La politique de décentralisation. 
Commission Européenne (2005) : Convention de financement entre la CE et la République du Mali. 
Appui au développement des régions du Nord (Adere-Nord). 
Commission Européenne (2006) : Convention de financement entre la CE et la République du Mali. 
Programme à la reforme administrative et à la déconcentration (PARAD). 
Commission Européenne (2011) : Evaluation des opérations d‟aide budgétaire au Mali 2003-2009. 
Rapport de synthèse, version provisoire.  
Commission Européenne /EGEVAL, Sofreco (2006) : Evaluation Stratégie Pays Mali Ŕ Rapport Final.   
Coordination des Partenaires Techniques et Financiers Ŕ Mali (2009) : Cadre des Ressources a 
Moyen Termes 2010-2012 (CRMT) Note Technique CM Mali-PTF. 
Délégation de l‟Union Européenne au Mali; Goby, Michèlle et al. (2009). Evaluation à mi-parcours du 
programme d‟appui au développement des régions du Nord (ADERE Nord). Rapport final.  
Délégation de l‟Union Européenne au Mali; Goby, Michèlle et al. (2009). Evaluation à mi-parcours du 
PARAD. Rapport final. 
Délégation de l‟Union Européenne au Mali/ Gouvernement du Mali (2007) : Compte Rendu De La 
Revu E Annuelle Conjointe UE Ŕ Autorités Maliennes 2007. 
Délégation de l‟Union Européenne au Mali/ Gouvernement  du Mali (2010) : Compte rendu de la revue 
annuel développement institutionnel et décentralisation, 2010. 
Délégation de l‟Union Européenne au Mali/ Gouvernement  du Mali (2009) : Compte rendu de la revue 
annuel développement institutionnel et décentralisation, 2009. 
DER (2009) : Etude sur la Stratégie de développement économique régional  et sur la faisabilité d‟un 
guichet. 
Gouvernement du Mali (2002) : CSLP Final Ŕ Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté 
Gouvernement  du Mali (2006): CSLP 2ème Génération 2007-2011 Ŕ Cadre Stratégique pour la 
Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté. 
Gouvernement  du Mali (2008): Plan National d‟action sur l‟efficacité de l‟aide au développement 
2008. 
Gouvernement  du Mali ; Communauté Européenne (2003) : Mali Ŕ EU Stratégie de Coopération 
Indicatif 2003-2007. 
Gouvernement  du Mali ; Communauté Européenne (2007) : Mali Ŕ EU Document de stratégie pays et 
programme indicatif national pur la période 2008-2013. 
Gouvernement  du Mali (2002): Décret N° 02-313/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des 
compétences transférées de l‟Etat aux Collectivités Territoriales en matière d‟éducation. 
Gouvernement  du Mali (2002): Décret N° 02-314/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des 
compétences transférées de l‟Etat aux Collectivités Territoriales des niveaux, commune et cercle en 
matière santé. 
Gouvernement  du Mali (2002): Décret N° 02-315/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des 
compétences transférées de l‟Etat aux collectivités Territoriales en matière d‟hydraulique rurale et 
urbaine. 
I&D Institutions et Développement/ Diawara et al. (2004) : Evaluation du dispositif d‟appui aux 
collectivités territoriales du Mali Ŕ Rapport définitif.  
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MATCL (2009) : Rapport de synthèse des résultats officiels des élections communales du 26 avril 
2009. 
Ministère de l‟administration territoriale et des  Collectivités Locales/DNCT (2005): Document cadre de 
politique nationale de décentralisation. 
Ministère de l‟Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales, Direction Nationale des 
Collectivités Territoriales (2005) : Document Cadre de Politique Nationale de Décentralisation 2005 Ŕ 
2014. 
Ministère de l‟administration territoriale et des Collectivités Locales (2005): Programme National 
d‟appui aux collectivités territoriales 2006-2010. 
Ministère de l‟administration territoriale et des Collectivités Locales/Secrétariat Général (2009): 
Programme National d‟appui aux collectivités territoriales 2010-2014. 
Ministère de l‟Economie et des Finances/ Secrétariat General (2010) : Plan d‟Action Gouvernemental 
pour l‟Amélioration et la Modernisation de la Gestion des Finances Publiques : Phase II Ŕ Rapport 
final. 
Ministère De La Fonction Publique, De La Reforme de l‟Etat et des Relations avec les Institutions/ 
République Du Mali (2006): Programme De Développement Institutionnel Plan Opérationnel 2006 Ŕ 
2009.  
Ministère du Développement Social, de la Solidarité et des Personnes Agées/ Observatoire du 
Développement Humain Durable et de la Lutte contre la Pauvreté (2003) : Décentralisation & 
Réduction de la Pauvreté Ŕ Rapport National 2003 sur le développement humain durable au Mali. 
Ministère Du Travail, De La Fonction Publique et de la Reforme De l‟Etat ; République Du Mali 
(2008) : Audit Organisationnel Des Services Publics Du Ministère De L‟administration Territoriale Et 
Des Collectivités Locales (Administration Centrales Et Déconcentrées) Ŕ Rapport Final. 
Ministère Du Travail, De La Fonction Publique et de la Reforme De l‟Etat ; République Du Mali 
(2008) : Ministère de l‟administration territoriale et des Collectivités Locales Ŕ Rapports de 
Présentation et Projets de Textes de Réorganisation.  
Ministère MATCL (2008) : Rapport d‟audit du Ministère MATCL, Mai 2008 Agence Nationale 
d‟Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales (2006) : Mission d‟Audit organisationnel et financier de 
l‟Agence Nationale d‟Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales. 
Ministère MTFPTE (2008) : Rapport d‟audit du Ministère MTFPTE, Mai 2008. 
Ministère TFPRE (2008) : Rapport d‟audit du Ministère TFPRE, Mai 2008. 
Plan d‟Actions de Mise en Œuvre des Recommandations issues du Contrôle externe des 
Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales. 
Primature/ Cabinet du Premier Ministre (2008): Instruction N° 08-0003 / PM Ŕ RM du 21 novembre 
2008 du Premier Ministre relative à la mise en œuvre des transferts de compétences et de ressources 
de l‟Etat  aux collectivités territoriales. 
Primature/Ministre délègue à la reforme de l‟Etat et aux relations avec les institutions (2003) : 
Programme de développement institutionnel.  
Programme de Développement Institutionnel PDI (2009) : Plan Opérationnel 2010-2013. 
Programme de Développement Institutionnel PDI (2010) : Etude sur la révision du système de fiscalité 
locale.  
Programme de Développement Institutionnel PDI/ Flizot, Stéphanie (2010) : Etude sur la révision du 
système de  fiscalité locale. 
République du Mali (2007) : Mali Synthèse Rapport de Suivi des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le 
Développement.  
République du Mali/ Système des Nations Unies (2009) : Deuxième Rapport de Mise en œuvre des 
Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement au Mali Ŕ En route vers l‟horizon 2015 Ŕ Version finale.  
SNV, ECDPM, REDL (2007) :Mali: Comment évaluer les impacts de la décentralisation?  
SNV,CEDELO (2004): Decentralisation in Mali: Putting Policy into Practice. 
Union Européenne ; Warnier, Jean-Marcel ; Kreff, Martine (2006) : Mission d‟Audit organisationnel et 
financier  de l‟Agence Nationale d‟Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales - Rapport Final De 
Mission. 
World Bank/ Shah, Anwar, Theresa Thompson and Heng-Fu Zou (2004): The Impact of 
Decentralisation on Service Delivery, Corruption, Fiscal Management and Growth in Developing and 
Emerging Market Economies: A Synthesis of Empirical Evidence. CESifo DICE Report 2(1): 10-17. 
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount29 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry point 
Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid 
modality 
Main contracting 
party 
Support for the start-up of 
communes in Mali 
2000 - 2005 40,25 40,25 FED/1999/014-626 Top-down N 
Grant to 
GoM 
Government, 
Republic of Mali 
ADERE-North 2005 - 2011 5,87 5,21 FED/2005/017-650 Bottom-up L 
Grant to 
GoM 
Private 
companies/ Dvpt 
agencies, 
Cooperation 
Technique Belge 
Ctb Sa 
Support program for administrative 
reform and decentralisation 
(PARAD) 
2005 - 2012 71,82 64,5 FED/2006/017-914 Top-down N 
Sector 
Budget 
Support + 
Grant for 
capacity 
building 
Government, 
Republic of Mali 
Indirect interventions         
Roundtable decentralisation 2005 0,04 0,04 FED/2003/016-487     
Supporting the development of 
municipal health strategies in 
Bamako and Ouagadougou 
2009 0,93 - 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2009/021-
107 
    
 
 
                                                     
29
 This amount corresponds to the contracted amount as indicated in the EC CRIS database. 
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
5.4.1 Intervention 1 
Title: Programme D’appui Au Démarrage Des Communes  
Budget: 40.245.826 EUR 
Start date: 2000 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: 
 Help to improve the services of proximity ensured by the newly established local governments 
("communes") with the overall objective of fight against poverty. 
Specific objectives: 
 Capacity-building of new municipalities (local level): 
 Development of the capacity (esp. "Maîtrise d'ouvrage") to manage the services on 
technical aspects, including participatory planning,  
 Development of the capacity (esp. "Maîtrise d'ouvrage") to manage the services on 
financial aspects (in particular, mobilization of local resources). 
 Strengthening of the capacities to plan, coordinate and monitor the reform at the central level. 
Expected results: 
 The municipalities plan and implement their development programmes; 
 The municipalities have adequate financial resources and implement investment budgets; 
 Institutional capacity for consultation, planning, participatory planning, monitoring and 
execution of the process of decentralisation are strengthened at the level of the central 
government and its decentralised bodies. 
Activities: 
 The establishment of "local counselling centres" Centres de Conseil Communaux (CCC) to 
provide assistance to the local governments for the overall management of projects/ services 
("Maîtrise d'ouvrage"). 
 The establishment of the National Coordination Unit (Cellule de Coordination Nationale - 
CCN) of the CCC. 
 The establishment and staffing of the National Agency for Local Governments' Investment 
Projects (Agence Nationale pour l'Investissement des Collectivités - ANICT), the well-
functioning of its structures, and the implementation a financial support facility for Local 
Governments' Investment Projects. 
 Capacity building of line ministries ("services de tutelle" such as "Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Security") and the Treasury. In addition, awareness campaigns are 
planned.  
 The development, implementation and monitoring of procedures and management tools at the 
central level. 
5.4.2 Intervention 2 
Title: ADERE-Nord  
Budget: 5.766.969 EUR 
Start date: 2005 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: 
 Promoting new regional development dynamics in the region of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal and 
its possible replication in other regions of Mali. 
Specific objective: 
 Assist in the development of a network of institutional stakeholders, communities and actors of 
the private sector, 
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 Help them to work together so that they play their respective roles and develop common 
strategic plans of regional and local development that will be implemented thanks to the 
corresponding action plans. 
Expected results: 
1. To support the decentralisation at regional level 
 The strategic development plans of the three northern regions are developed and the 
corresponding action plans are defined in a participatory sense; 
 Regional assemblies of the three Northern Regions are reinforced; 
 The central and decentralised territorial administration services have enhanced responsibility 
for their role in steering the reform and supervision; 
 The private sector and non-state actors are mobilized, consulted and involved in regional 
development; 
 The development partners work together to coordinate their actions around a shared 
approach. 
2. To support the base municipalities 
 Community initiatives are integrated into municipal development plans and the capacities of 
communities to make themselves heard are reinforced; 
 Municipality initiatives are supported by sensitized municipalities, ensuring proper training of 
these initiatives in a strategic framework; 
 The municipalities have enhanced powers to assume control of work in difficult areas for the 
benefit of Dhaka and Community Initiatives; 
 The private sector and communities are mobilized, consulted and involved in the development 
of their municipality; 
 Partners in development are associating to coordinate their actions around a shared 
approach. 
Activities: 
An advisory support at two levels: 
1/ at central level, with the establishment of a "central unit support" to the DNCT in charge of: 
 supporting the DNCT in reflections and production of notes and methodological techniques for 
the recognition of the territorial approach of the region; 
 controlling and coordinating the activities of regional support units of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal 
and especially to provide them with methodological support for the implementation of strategic 
development plans and the integration of community initiatives in the municipal development 
plans (elaboration of conceptual and strategic documents, notes and methodological tools to 
aid decision making); 
 defining and monitoring the implementation of a strategy of training and communication of 
regional and local actors; 
 coordinating and strengthening the support system at startup of Communes (NCC and CCC) 
and this especially in the context of actions for municipalities in favour for them 
 promoting replication in other areas of development tools at the service of the 3 northern 
regions and their municipalities; 
 supporting the three units in the regional develop specifications and coordinate programmes 
this year between the 3 regional units; 
 ensuring coherence, synergy and complementarity between the different actions of 
development partners involved in the North. 
2/ at the level of each region, through a regional support cell (ARC) to be established in order to 
provide: 
 support to decentralisation at the regional level; 
 support to grassroots communities.  
A financial support that is organized into two components: 
 Resources for institutional strengthening in the Northern Regions to enable funding of 
technical studies, training, communication actions, accompanying measures and preliminary 
studies for community initiatives and small equipment for the benefit of regional institutions 
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(decentralised and devolved) as well as activities relating to the definition of strategic plans of 
regional development. 
 Particular attention will be given to supporting participatory process aimed at maintaining 
peace and the prevention of conflicts. 
 A fund (8 million EUR), intended to co-financing of regional investment and community 
initiatives, housed at FICT and implemented by the ANICT. 
5.4.3 Intervention 3 
Title: Support progamme for administrative reform and decentralization (PARAD)  
Budget: 71.821.305 EUR 
Start date: 2005 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective:  
 Improvement of service delivery ensured by local authorities. 
Specific objectives: 
 Strengthen the capacity of the supervisory authority in matters of council control.  
 Steering and coordination of decentralisation. 
Expected results: 
 Participation of LG‟s representation at central level is facilitated. 
 LG receive institutional support and closer monitoring by the deconcentrated state services as 
well as of the ministry of the local governance. 
 DNCT features, uses and disseminates regular and detailed information of all aspects of the 
LG's activities (capacity control and coordination). 
 DNCT provides material, financial and human resources, to realise its annual programs of 
activities, covering implementation, coordination and monitoring of the component 
"decentralisation" of PARAD. 
Activities: 
 Permanent technical assistance at ANICT and expertise mobilised on request of ANICT. 
 Revision by the ANICT of criteria for determining the drawing rights of LG 
 Training of agents of ANICT and decentralised services of the Treasury 
 External audit of investments financed through permanent funding of the FICT fund: The audit 
shall cover the following issues:  quality, cost, accessibility, attendance 
 Revision of the feasibility criteria of the drawing rights for investment of the ANICT governed 
funds to take better into consideration participation and consistency with the sector policies 
and funds 
 Development of criteria by ANICT of modulation of the amount of the contribution of 
communities according to national sectoral policies 
 Developing and testing provisions governing the participation of communities for the 
programming of investments (in synergy with the ADERE program) 
 Development of modalities for implementation of inter-communalities for some equipments 
 Studies on the local economy for the development of income-producing investments 
 Exchange operations with African and European communities: identification of good practices, 
mobilising expertise, training, other exchanges 
 Study and consultation necessary for the implementation of procedures of coordination 
between initiatives of LGs and sectoral actions (including Hydraulic, health and education) 
 Development of technical manuals for major equipments, for use by communities and works of 
masters (modeles plans and specifications detailed, current faults) 
 Institutionalising participatory budgeting methods 
 Development of manuals for managing services (direct management, Delegate and 
community) to use by communities 
 Revision by ANICT of feasibility criteria of the applications of investments for a better 
consideration of the management services (financial and organizational feasibility) 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Mali; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
42 
 Formulation of national strategy for local resource mobilization 
 Office supplies for LG representation association: AMM ACCRM and HCC 
 Meetings, trainings and study tours AMM ACCRM et HCC 
 Organisational audit plan and deconcentration of MATCL Plan transfer of resources to 
decentralized services 
 Texts, manuals and training activities related to support and control in the use of decentralized 
services, local expertise 
 Equipment and logistics of decentralized services (identification, acquisition, implementation). 
Computer: PO coordination and funding. 
 National consultation of elected representatives on technical support and evaluation of CCC 
 Finalization of the organisation of the support and institutional authority  
 Periodic assistance to local and external development and sustainability of the base OISE 
 Additions / update existing data 
 Development of new ratios, adding new fields, on the basis of ANICT;  
 Development and management of an organization perennial (1) for data collection, (2) 
for the dissemination of data (internet publications and periodicals) 
 Setting up the system of collecting data of the OISE base  
 Training of operators responsible for collecting and processing OISE data. 
 Training of central and decentralized services involved in the inheritance and use of OISE 
data 
 Perpetuation of institutional positioning of the system for collecting, processing and 
dissemination of data about decentralization 
 Ongoing technical assistance to DNCT and specific expertise mobilized at demand 
 Communication actions necessary for coordination (publications, workshops and seminars, 
website maintenance)  
 Equipment of the central services 
 Exchanges with administrations supervising the sub-region (study tours, sub-regional 
workshops)  
 Annual, mid-term review, annual PARAD audits. 
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
5.5.1 Introduction 
The following text serves the purpose of tracing the evolution of the decentralisation process in Mali 
and providing the reader of this country note with an insight into the major institutions of 
decentralisation and their functions. Thus, the text is a summary of the following documents: 
 Catek Gouvernance Développement /Direction nationale des collectivités territoriales (2011), 
Etude sur le bilan et les perspectives de la décentralisation au Mali,  
 Délégation de l’Union Européenne au Mali; Goby, Michèlle et al. (2009). Evaluation à mi-
parcours du programme d’appui au développement des régions du Nord (ADERE Nord). 
Rapport final.  
 Délégation de l’Union Européenne au Mali; Goby, Michèlle et al. (2009). Evaluation à mi-
parcours du PARAD. Rapport final. 
 Ministère de l’administration territoriale et des  Collectivités Locales/DNCT (2005): Document 
cadre de politique nationale de décentralisation. 
 Ministère de l’administration territoriale et des Collectivités Locales/Secrétariat Général 
(2009): Programme National d’appui aux collectivités territoriales 2010-2014. 
 Primature/Ministre délègue à la reforme de l’Etat et aux relations avec les institutions (2003) : 
Programme de développement institutionnel.  
 Commission Européenne (2011) : Evaluation des opérations d’aide budgétaire au Mali 2003-
2009. Rapport de synthèse, version provisoire.  
 Instruction N° 08-0003 / PM – RM du 21 novembre 2008 du Premier Ministre relative à la mise 
en œuvre des transferts de compétences et de ressources de l’Etat  aux collectivités 
territoriales 
 CDI, Flizot, Stéphanie (2010) :  Etude sur la révision du système de fiscalité locale. 
 Commission Européenne (2003): Stratégie de Coopération et programme indicative 2003-
2007 Appendice 6 : La politique de décentralisation. 
 Diawara, Diouf, Logie, Majerowicz, Pousse (2004) : Evaluation du dispositif d’appui aux 
collectivités territoriales du Mali. Rapport définitif. 
 Convention de financement entre la CE et la République du Mali. Appui au développement 
des régions du Nord (Adere-Nord). 
 Convention de financement entre la CE et la République du Mali. Programme à la reforme 
administrative et à la déconcentration (PARAD). 
 Convention de financement entre la CE et la République du Mali. Programme d’Appui à la 
Réforme Administrative, à la Décentralisation et au Développement Economique Régional 
(PARADER). Annexe Dispositions techniques et administratives. 
Where considered appropriate, the most eloquent passages were extracted literally. 
5.5.2 History and overview of the development of the decentralisation process in Mali 
According to the introductory words of the strategic framework document of the decentralisation 
process (2005 DCPND): "Decentralisation in Mali is the culmination of a long quest, which dates back 
to pre-colonial times. Since then, the various regimes that have succeeded have been working in the 
search for a decentralised model suited to socio-cultural realities of the country. Several models have 
thus been developed and some tested. All sought, in varying degrees, to adapt the Administration to 
the political context and to achieve a better harmony between the state and the citizen."
30
 
It was only after the democratic revolution of March 1991 and the collapse of the centralised state, 
sole manager of public affairs, that a new vision of a political and institutional system of public 
management was possible.
31
  
To understand the current political developments in Mali (2000-2010), one must go back to the 
revolution of March 1991 which allowed for the first time the full democratic opening. The country was 
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 Ministère de l‟administration territoriales et des Collectivités Locales/DNCT (2005): Document cadre de 
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then led by the Transition Committee for the Welfare of the People (CTSP) headed by Colonel 
Amadou Toumani Toure. By April 1991, a transitional government was appointed and political parties 
were allowed unrestricted. This movement was known as the "full democracy" (« démocratisation 
intégrale »). The CTSP has been organising the National Conference from July 29 to 12 August 1991. 
It has brought together 36 parties and 1070 associations and adopted notably a draft Constitution, a 
charter party and an electoral code. The Constitution of the Republic was adopted by referendum with 
98,35% of the vote on 12 January 1992. It definitely avouches the multiparty system in its Article 28 
and many other civic and social rights. Decentralisation is from this time on enshrined in the new 
Constitution (Article 97-8). As well explained by Catel Governent Development, decentralisation "is 
seen as a strategic axe for building the "future" of the nation of Mali. Indeed, this choice made for the 
decentralisation reflects a broad consensus in society as it is seen as a response to the request for 
change, the emergence of a new government more democratic and for local economic 
development."
32
 
5.5.2.1 Phase 1: Designing decentralisation 
Key elements of the institutional and territorial dispositions, such as the establishment of local 
governments and their democratically elected bodies, started to emerge in 199333. The implementation 
of the decentralisation reform in Mali is characterised by two major impulses:  
 On the one hand the reform of decentralisation has been driven by strong political will 
manifested through the establishment of a project mission: The ‘Mission of Decentralisation 
and Institutional Reform (MDRI)’. The MDRI, whose work was completed in 2000, was 
mandated to design and prepare the implementation of decentralisation. In this context, it 
conducted baseline studies, initiated the legal arsenal of the reform and worked in the 
mobilisation and involvement of all stakeholders (state services, civil society organisations, 
community leaders and technical partners and financial) in the reform.
34
  
 On the other hand, there was a willingness to involve stakeholders in the process of designing 
the reforms and the delimitation of the new territorial entities. Thus, institutional reform has 
been discussed with the entire social body including the political class across the reference 
group (national level) and study groups as well as mobilisation groups (regional and local 
level). The geographic definition and delimitation of different territorial entities were conducted 
in a participatory process.
35
 
Until 2001, decentralisation took shape through a series of significant developments in the field of 
legal, administrative, institutional and political planning
36
 : 
In the field of legal planning: An arsenal of legislative texts and regulations have been developed and 
adopted, making a total of around twenty laws and decrees, substantially influencing the political, 
administrative and institutional set. 
In the field of administrative planning: The country‟s territorial organisation was significantly reviewed. 
In particular, the definition and geographic delimitation of different territorial entities have been carried 
out in a participatory process: the institutional reform has been broadly discussed with the civil society 
including the political class through the "reference group" (at national level) and the "study and 
mobilisation groups" (at regional and local level, highlighting 761 local governments divided into three 
categories: the "Commune" (703 entities), the "Cercle" (49 entities) and the "Region" (8 entities), as 
well as the District of Bamako (assimilated as a region). With the first local elections of 1999, the 761 
local governments were equipped with legislative and executive bodies that still ensure to this day 
their functioning. 
In the field of institutional planning: in 2000, the reform process lead to the creation of the "Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Local Governments" (MATCL) and the attached "National Directorate of 
Local Governments" (DNCT). The MATCL is the supervisory authority of local governments. The 
DNCT has a key role in the design and implementation of the decentralisation process: it does not 
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 See also : Ministère de l‟administration territoriale et des Collectivités Locales/DNCT (2005): Document cadre 
de politique nationale de décentralisation  p. 7-9. 
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only watch over the application and development of the regulatory framework applicable to the Local 
Governments (LG) but is also responsible for strengthening the decentralisation process, by: 1) 
supporting the LG so that they can carry out better their functions and 2) enhancing the cooperation 
between the LG and between the LG and other institutions. In addition, a "National Agency for Local 
Governments‟ Investment Programmes" (ANICT Ŕ "Agence Nationale d’Investissements des 
Collectivités Territoriales") was created (and attached to the MATCL). The High Council of Authorities 
(HCC), set up in April 2001, ensures the representation of authorities at national level. 
In the field of political planning: The management of the new local governments is ensured by elected 
bodies (for a five-year term; elections correspond to direct universal voting, for municipalities, and 
indirect voting, for "cercles" and regions). 
5.5.2.2 Phase 2: Implementation of the decentralisation process 
The second phase in the process of decentralisation is the operationalisation of the reform, which 
starts with the establishment of institutional bodies, in particular the installation of deliberative councils 
of elected representatives as well as the taking over by permanent structures, ensuring the relay of the 
MDRI, notably the MATCL, the DNCT and ANICT. The challenge of this second phase was the 
initiation of decentralisation, with the definition of the outlines of the process with its objectives, 
strategic axes, programmes and action plans. 
But it is only in 2005, with the adoption of the "2005-2014 Framework Document of the National 
Decentralisation Policy" (DCPND), that Mali adopted a strategy of decentralisation for the following 10 
years. This document describes the overall strategic and operative system of implementation of the 
decentralisation reform. It aims to investigate the connection and consistency with sectoral policies 
and in particular the reform of deconcentration of the government.37. 
The DCPND (2005-2014) is articulated around four key strategic axes: 
 capacity building of political and administrative staff in the of decentralised local authorities; 
 improvement of deconcentration of governmental administrative and technical services; 
 development of local citizenship; 
 capacity building of private service providers of local level. 
Systems implementing the DCPND are divided into two separate action programs, one aiming at 
decentralisation, the other at deconcentration: 
 The National Program of Support to LG, of which Phase III began in 2010 (part 
decentralisation); 
 The Institutional Development Program (PDI) (part deconcentration).38 
Regarding the transfer of power at sectoral level, three decrees from 2002 are ordering the transfer of 
power to local authorities in the three priority sectors: education, health and water. However, the 
actual transfer of functions and resources is only to be set up in a third phase of the decentralisation 
process. 
5.5.2.3 Phase 3: Consolidating Decentralisation and accelerating Deconcentration 
As the evaluation report of the SBS indicates: « Radicale dans sa conception de l’autonomie locale, 
immédiate dans sa généralisation (décentraliser tout le pays et en même temps ), mais progressive 
dans sa mise en œuvre, la décentralisation doit aujourd’hui répondre à des exigences en matière : 
 d‟affermissement de la démocratie locale (libre administration et gestion démocratique), 
 de renforcement des moyens des LG comme acteurs du développement (transferts de 
compétences et de ressources par l‟Etat, effectivité de leur maîtrise d‟ouvrage, mobilisation de 
ressources locales),  
 d‟amélioration de leur contribution à la réduction de la pauvreté (accès des populations aux 
services de base, création et pérennisation d‟équipements, de richesses et d‟emplois 
locaux) »
 39
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Commission Européenne (2011) : Evaluation des opérations d‟aide budgétaire au Mali 2003-2009. Rapport de 
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Voir aussi : Ministère de l‟administration territoriale et des Collectivités Locales/DNCT (2005): Document cadre 
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synthèse, version provisoire, p. 62 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Mali; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
46 
The Ministerial Instruction no 08-0003 of November 21, 2008 "related to the transfer of state 
competences and resources towards local authorities"
40
 provides new impetus to the process of 
transfer of competences which began to falter. One factor behind this slowdown is the weakening of 
political support at President Amadou Toumani Toure‟s assumption of office. The instruction from 
2008 sets up the administrative and institutional measures as well as measures related to financial 
and human resources transfer, such as: 
 The implementation of three-year-plans for the transfers of state competences and resources 
to local governments. These plans are established within each sector ministry 
 The establishment of a support unit of the decentralisation and deconcentration in each 
sectoral ministry 
 Preparation of draft decrees laying down details of the transfer competences in sectors 
concerned
41
 
5.5.3 Legislative and regulatory framework for decentralisation in Mali 
The strength of the Malian decentralisation process is the inclusion of the decentralisation principle in 
the Constitution of the Third Republic (art 97-8) as the mean of administrating the country. Thus, the 
foundations for all future legislation and institutional organisation are established. 
5.5.3.1 Legislation 
The decentralisation reform is supported by a legislative and regulatory infrastructure. The table below 
lists the most important ones. 
Table 7 Selection of most important decrees and laws regarding decentralisation 
1993-2001 
The principle and conditions for the administration of local government (Law 93-008 of 11 February 1993, 
amended December 1996); 
Law No. 95-035 of 12 April 1995 Local Authority Regulations; 
Officials of the Local Authorities (Law No. 95 022 of 30 May 1995); 
Conditions of appointment and duties of state officials in Local Authorities (Law No. 95,210 of May 30, 1995); 
The special status of the District of Bamako (Act No. 96 of February 2, 1996); 
The conditions and terms of provision of Local Authorities of the decentralised services of the State (March 
1996); 
The establishment and management of the Local Authorities (Law No. 96 050, 16 Octobre 1996). 
The fiscal resources of local authorities (the fiscal resources of municipalities (Act No. 044 of July 7, 2000),   
Décret 313, 314, 315, 4-6-2001 : fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l‟Etat aux LG en matière 
d‟éducation, santé, hydraulique rurale et urbaine 
 
2002-2011 
Décret N° 02-313/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l‟Etat aux Collectivités 
Territoriales en matière d‟éducation  
Décret N° 02-314/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l‟Etat aux Collectivités 
Territoriales des niveaux, commune et cercle en matière santé.  
Décret N° 02-315/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l‟Etat aux collectivités 
Territoriales en matière d‟hydraulique rurale et urbaine,   
Loi n° 07-072 du 26 décembre 2007, art.4: dotation d'investissement des LG, dotation pour la garantie des 
emprunts des LG, dotation pour les appuis techniques, dotation pour l'appui au fonctionnement des LG, dotation 
pour l‟intercollectivités. 
5.5.3.2 Election of 1992, 1999, 2004 and 2009 
Since the start of reform, four elections were held: in 1992 for the 19 urban municipalities only, in 
1998/1999, 2004 and 2009 for all local governments.  
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The installation of local bodies totalling 10,752 elected representatives and numerous development 
activities that the elected representatives carried out have helped to entrench the democratic process 
in Mali.  
The local elections mobilise the entire political class and a considerable number of voters (in 2009 
44.61%42
 
of voters were counted) with a consistently higher participation of women. 
The proper functioning of the elections, the voter participation rate and an impressive renewal of the 
elected in the elections of 2004 and 2009 are indicators of the continuity of local authorities as an 
institution. Local authorities have begun their third term in 2009 which allows observing developments, 
in particular to note the increased awareness by citizens of the existence of local institutions. 
The high turnover of elected representatives from one election to another (at least 60% in the national 
average) helped to strengthen the role of the institution "local authority" regardless of the persons who 
embody it. This high turnover has however obvious drawbacks, the loss of capacity and experience, 
which is seen by residents concerned about the proper management and development of their LG. 
5.5.4 The actors and institutions of decentralisation 
The diagram below illustrates the institutional framework of decentralisation in Mali. The roles and 
function of various institutional actors of decentralisation are described in more detail in this chapter. 
The law 96-059 from November 4, 1996 establishes LG, which materialises in 703 local authorities, 
including 682 new municipalities which where added to the existing ones in Bamako. The community 
is a voluntary association of several villages and nomadic groups. The municipality has the 
responsibility to provide a forum for consultation, arbitration and coordination to promote local 
development. The 703 municipalities are integrated within a wider local government composed of 49 
"cercles", 8 regions and the Bamako district. 
Despite their categorisation of urban or rural and their practical diversity (size and area), the 
municipalities obey to the same model: as they are equal in rights they have the same organs and the 
same powers as set out in the Code of Local Authorities as a general competence clause (article 14 of 
the local authority code). Such a clause legitimates their intervention in all areas affecting their 
development. 
This also holds for "cercles" and regions (local authority code art. 83 or 131). Their mandate of local 
authorities is submitted to the electors every 5 years.
43
 
The "study on the local tax system" describes well the situation in terms of territorial fragmentation: 
"A major challenge for the management of the town is now the size of municipalities. 523 
municipalities have less than 20 000 inhabitants, three quarters of Communes). Small municipalities 
(fewer than 10,000 inhabitants) alone represent 36% of municipalities, more than a third. Indeed, the 
small size of some municipalities is an impediment to their viability. 
The 2009 census include: 
 8% of municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants (62 municipalities) 
 25% of Communes between 5000 and 10 000 inhabitants (191 municipalities) 
 36% of municipalities between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants (270 municipalities) 
 22% of municipalities between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants (168 municipalities) 
 Only 9% of municipalities with more than 50 000 inhabitants." 
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  Number of communities by stratrum 
8% 
25% 
36% 
22% 
9% 
Less than 5000 Habitants Between 5 000 and 10 000 inhabitants Between 10 000 and T 20 000 inhabitants 
Entre 20 000 ET 50 000 Habitants More than 50 000 inhabitants 
 
Source: ANICT, calcul : Flizot, Stéphanie : Etude sur la révision le système de fiscalité locale , 7 
 
The functioning of local authorities 
The Constitution stipulates that local authorities are self-governing through elected representatives 
assemblies or elected councils and that their deliberative bodies elect their own executive bodies: 
At the "communes" level: The communal council is elected by direct universal suffrage on the basis of 
list of candidates. The voting system is proportional. The number of Councillors to be elected depends 
on the population of the "commune". The range of Councillors ranges from 11 to 45 members. Once 
the board is in place, it elects Mayor and the deputies who constitute the board or the municipal 
executive body. Like the number of Councillors, the executive body size varies between 3 and 5 
depending on the population of the "commune". 
At the "cercles" level: The district council is composed of communal councillors elected by local 
councils by secret ballot. The range is 2 to 5 representatives. The council of the "cercle" shall elect, 
once in place at its first meeting, the executive body: the Chairman and two Vice-Presidents. 
At the "regions" level: The Regional Assembly, a body of free administration of the region is composed 
of Councillors from "cercles" elected by secret ballot by the elected councils of "cercle" level in the 
region. The number of representatives per "cercle" council depends on the demographics and varies 
from 2 to 4. The Regional Assembly shall elect its chairman and two Vice-Presidents. 
Local authorities are endowed with financial autonomy and legal personality. As such, they identify 
and organise hierarchically independently their development priorities, develop and implement their 
budgets in accordance to the rules of public accounting. Following this principle, no local authority may 
exercise tutelage or hierarchy over another. 
If each local authority is autonomous in its management, the fact remains that the powers are 
exercised under the control of the state and under the conditions laid down by law. This means a legal 
control exercised by the government representative on the actions and bodies of local associations. 
This control is either a priori or a posteriori. There may never be an arbitrary control. In addition to the 
control of legality, the authority is supposed to support and advice the LG. 
5.5.4.1 Functions and powers of local governments
44
 
General functions, belonging to all categories of local government without distinction, are the following: 
 drawing a development program and management plan of land or space; 
 preparation, voting and implementing the budget and accounts; 
 creation and management of customised services and agencies; 
 setting tax rates and taxes to the extent permitted by law; 
 loans, loan guarantees and equity participation; 
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Figure 2 Institutional organisation of decentralisation in Mali SCHEMA INSTITUTIONNEL DE LA DECENTRALISATION AU MALI 
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 regulation of the administrative police; 
 acceptance or rejection to legacy. 
Specific functions
45 
related to the position and role of each category of local authorities in the territorial 
administrative hierarchy are listed in table below. It is to be noted that there is today in many cases a 
transfer under the law but which has not yet been complete in practice. Indeed, the progressive 
transfer is planned and adjusted, in particular in targeted areas such as education, health, water and 
natural resource management. 
Commune Cercle Region 
Preschool education Second cycle of basic education Secondary, general, technical 
and vocational education 
Literacy Health centres Special education 
First cycle of basic education Infrastructure in the cercle Regional hospitals 
Clinics and maternities  Solidarity towards vulnerable 
populations 
Community health centres  oad infrastructure in the region 
Roads in the municipality  Tourism 
Public transport  Energy 
Rural and urban water supply   
Fairs and markets   
 
The resources allocated to local associations
46
: 
The resources of local authorities include: 
 The budgetary resources from the state transferred to the LG: 
 the general decentralisation fund based on the principle that any transfer of 
competence from the state to the LG must be accompanied by a transfer of resources 
 special grants from the state for the operation and / or investment. 
 Fiscal resources: 
 State tax transfers to decentralised authorities 
 direct taxes and indirect. 
 Products by nature: 
 operating income and tariff revenue 
 financial products and income from field. 
 Loans for investment and cash flow (gross revenue collection of the operating section of the 
budget allocated to the investment community). 
 Donations and bequests and other resources (grants of the national investment agency 
ANICT, partners and other subsidies). 
The body representing local authorities at central level: 
The presence of authorities at national level is ensured by two kinds of bodies representing different 
status and functions: 
 The High Council for LG (HCC) is one of eight institutions of the Republic fixed by the 
Constitution of 1992 (art. 99-105). Its role is to ensure the institutional representation of 
territorial LG. Being elected by all councillors and having an advisory role on all policies of 
regional and local development, it can also make proposals to the Government in matters 
concerning environmental protection, improving the quality of life within LG. 
 Association of the Regions of Mali (ARM) and the Association of Municipalities of Mali 
(AMM). These common law associations assume the following roles: 1) representation and 
advocacy of their members, 2) support and advice in the areas of information, training and 
communication, 3) promotion of partnership between the Malian and foreign LG. 
                                                     
45
 See also: Décrets 313, 314 et 315 du 4 juin 2002 fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l'Etat aux 
collectivités territoriales en matière d'éducation, de sante et d'hydraulique rurale et urbaine. 
46 See also : Commission Européenne (2003): Stratégie de Coopération et programme indicative 
2003-2007 Appendice 6 : La politique de décentralisation, p. 56-58 
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5.5.4.2 The main national bodies 
The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Government (MATCL) and the National 
Directorate of Local Authorities (DNCT) 
Existing department to decentralisation reform, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local 
Government (MATCL) is the supervisory authority of local governments. Its role is that of assistance 
and advisory support to local councils and the judicial review at the regional level.  
Established in 2000, the National Directorate of Local Authorities (DNCT) plays an important role in 
the design and implementation of the decentralisation process. More specifically, it is responsible for: 
 Developing, monitoring and enforcing regulations to local authorities. 
 Conducting studies to improve and strengthen the decentralisation. 
 Preparing documents for guardianship of the Minister and to ensure the lawfulness of actions 
taken by the supervising state officials. 
 Promoting and organising support to local authorities in the areas of administration and 
development. 
 Ensuring implementation of the staff regulations of local authorities. 
 Promoting and organising cooperation between local authorities and between them and the 
partners. 
However, the DNCT does not have its own representations at a regional and local level and the 
question arises at this time to establish a General Direction and to devolve to the regional level.  
The Institutional Development Commissariat (IDC) 
Created by Ordinance No. 01-22/P-RM 20 March 2001, the Institutional Development Office's mission 
is to develop the state reform and the implementation of the devolution of services of the State and to 
ensure coordination and oversight in its implementation. Major mission to strengthen 
 the process of democratisation under way with the emergence of a civil society to participate 
more in public policy development,  
 the institutional and organisational capacity of state and local governments taking into account 
the policies of decentralisation, devolution and privatisation. 
As a service within the Ministry of Labour, Civil Service and State Reform (MTFPRE), the IDC is 
responsible for developing the elements of the modernisation of the State, for ensuring coordination 
and monitoring its implementation. It must therefore give new impulsions but also watch over synergy 
between stakeholders. This is questionable when seeing its current status, the location within the 
ministerial hierarchy and the own limited response capacities. 
5.5.4.3 National systems of support to local authorities  
To support the decentralisation process and more specifically at the territorial level, initially two 
instruments of financial and technical support to local authorities were created. They support LG in 
carrying out their responsibilities, especially in project management.  
The financial arrangements 
On a financial level, the National Investment Agency of Territorial LG (ANICT) was established in 
2000. ANICT is a national institution of an administrative nature, endowed with legal personality and 
financial autonomy, oriented sustainable, financially responsible for supporting all three levels of local 
government. It is under the supervision of the MATCL. 
To this end, the Agency receives different financial resources, of these are major grants from the state 
and its development partners. Originally designed to administer the grants allocated to the 
implementation of the investments under management responsibility of the LG under the Investment 
Fund for Local Authorities / FICT, ANICT expanded its role. Since 2007 it manages the endowments 
of the National Fund for Support to Local Authorities / FNACT, successor to the FICT, in principle 
through five wickets: 
 Provision of Technical Supports FNACT (DAT) 
 Provision of Investment FNACT (DIN) 
 Staffing of the Inter Community FNACT (DIC) 
 Support Operation (DAFCT)  
 Guarantee of borrowings (DGECT) 
However, only two are functional allocations to date:  
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 The DIN (formerly FICT), which has historically benefited the most from general, sectoral or 
geographical state funding as well as from technical and financial partners; It is based on the 
same principle as before the FICT, i.e. the investment in project management of LG 
 The DAT which was created following the retirement of the CCC to allow councils to ask for 
technical support as needed. 
The other three allocations of the FNACT have no resource and remain ineffective so far. 
Each LG has a right to draw for the mobilisation. This requires the expression of a demand from the 
LG for an investment that has to be carried out within the boundaries of the community and has to be 
included as investment in the local development programme that has to be approved by the local 
council representation.  
The National Guidance Committee, established in 2000, comprises representatives of local 
authorities, ministries and professional organisations and civil society organisations. The NOC is 
responsible for setting policy action of the support to LG. It has branches at the regions and "cercles", 
the Regional Committees and Local Orientation (CRO, CLO). The role of these is the decision of 
investment financing by the ANICT at different territorial levels as well as coordination and supervision 
of the technical to the municipalities, the municipal council centres. 
The technical arrangement 
The Centres for Communal Councils (CCC): In parallel to the financial mechanism, a support 
system to control the municipal authority was established in 2000, the Centres for Communal 
Councils. These were introduced on "cercles‟ level" and their expertise was to be mobilised at the 
request of local municipalities. This device had the objective of assisting the municipal authorities, 
newly established and not prepared, even hostile, to the decentralisation process.  
The CCC was designed as a transitional device until a final takeover by the municipalities. This 
technical support facility marked therefore the will of the government and its partners to build 
community support for their daily implementation work in order to be able to manage immediately the 
funds and investments that allow the LG to realise the first actions of the communal life.  
Originally scheduled for 3 years, the device has finally come to an end at the end of 2007. 
Box 2 Centres for local advice (CCC – "centres de conseil communaux") 
Analysis extracts made in the assessment of support mechanisms for local governments in Mali: 
This device is particularly ambitious and original installation. Rather than replace the LG and local 
services that can take on, it was preferred to enhance the skills present in the medium to promote 
the sustainability of the support. Similarly, and in continuity with this original approach, the CCC 
were identified among the structures operating in different "cercles" to take advantage of their 
knowledge of the environment and its actors. Thus a twenty-funded operators fifteen separate DPs 
is responsible to perform the functions assigned to CCC in the 49 "cercles" making up the country. 
The cost of a CCC, composed of 3 to 4 frames, which follows from 12 to 15 municipalities, 30 
million returns each year to be between 2 and 2.5 million per municipality per year. 15 of 49 CCC 
was funded by the 8th EDF. 
Each CCC was entrusted to an operator already established in the "cercle", or NGOs, consultancy 
or project, selected on the basis of precise specifications. 
The end of the mandate of the CCC has been resulted for many local authorities in a deficit in 
technical support. 
Following the end of the CCC different option have been adopted to provide local authorities with 
needed support and advice. One has been the creation of technical services at the governors and 
prefects. One thing is though, that state officials, which are making up poles are inadequately trained, 
supervised and equipped to provide assistance and advice. 
Another way chosen by the LG was to group municipalities in regional inter-organisational unions. To 
date there 46 unions exists.  
However we must still note the lack of knowledge of the local actors of principles and procedures 
when it comes to creating, organising and running of the inter-organisational structures. Common 
services created difficulties in operation due to the weakness of their own technical capabilities and 
lack of technical and financial support. 
Enabling LG to have clean and efficient technical services also involves initial and continuing training 
of their agents. With this in mind, the Training Centre of the Local Authorities (CFCT) was 
established in 2007.  
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Monitoring and evaluation 
To monitor the performance of local authorities, the DNCT has established a monitoring and 
evaluation mechanism built around a Computerized Monitoring and Evaluation Tool (Outil 
Informatisé de Suivi Evaluation - OISE). The database OISE is the reference tool at national, 
regional and local levels to drive the device to support local authorities and provide the information 
needed to drive the decentralisation.  
The database OISE is an ambitious tool and it has been les less and less used since the end of 
mandate of the CCC, due to a lack of capacity of actors within the LG information.  
5.5.4.4 Instances of consultations and meetings multi-stakeholder  
The design and implementation of a reform such as decentralisation and reform of the state affecting 
all levels of government and a majority of sectors and involving a multitude of actors, requires steering 
bodies, coordination and exchange.  
Thus, there are consultative bodies at different levels and involving multiple actors in policy dialogue, 
e.g.: 
 The panel of decentralisation and reform of the state, held biannual, is a place of exchange 
between the government and sectoral ministries. It also includes DPs. 
 Annual Review of decentralisation and institutional development. 
 The sectoral Roundtable of decentralisation brings together official representatives of 
decentralisation in the DPs. 
5.5.5 Deconcentration and state reform 
To succeed, the decentralisation process - initial engine of reform of the state - must fit into a broader 
movement to modernise central, devolved and decentralised governments.  
The finding of a consubstantial relationship between decentralisation and deconcentration led Mali to 
see the reform of the state as the major axis of its overall policy. Thus, the Strategic Framework for the 
Fight against Poverty (PRSP) in Mali, approved in 2002, defines institutional development, improved 
governance and decentralisation as its first line of intervention. It thus confirms the decentralisation 
and institutional development in their role as tools to fight poverty. 
The component 'devolution' of this reform movement is realized through the Institutional Development 
Program (PDI), adopted in 2003. It forms the counterpart of PNACT, dedicated to supporting 
decentralisation. 
The PDI 2003-2013, adopted in 2003 by the government is part of a new sectoral policy that the 
Malian government has made in governance and modernization of the functioning of government. It 
aims to initiate a process of institutional reforms with particular emphasis on the reform of the 
devolution of central services essential to the success of decentralisation. 
The five strategic areas of PDI:  
 Reorganisation of central government and strengthening public management (6.1),  
 Strengthening devolution (6.2),  
 Consolidation of the decentralisation (6.3),  
 Upgrading and strengthening human resource capacity (6.4),  
 Communication and relationships with users (6.5).  
The PDI is driven by the Commissioner of Institutional Development and operationalized in multi-
annual operational programs, the PO-PDI 2006-2009 and 2010-2013.
47
 
 
The Government Action Plan for Improvement and Modernisation of the Public Finance Management / 
PAGAM-GFP, adopted April 20, 2005 is the component "Public Finance" in the PDIs. The relationship 
between these two programs is essential since the decentralisation and deconcentration / effective 
state reform are in need of an adapted public finance framework. Indeed, the mobilisation of financial 
resources from LG depends crucially on the financial services reform in the state on the territory. 
                                                     
47 Voir: Primature/ Ministre délégué à la reforme de l’Etat et aux relations avec les institutions (2003) : 
Programme de développement institutionnel.  
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Technical enterprise is more impervious to the eyes of the people that decentralisation, state reform 
inevitably encounter resistance to change, both in civil society, especially in departments slow to 
mobilise. She now faces a deficit in capacities of structures responsible for its implementation and a 
lack of vision shared by all players. 
To reinvigorate the reform process including the transfer of skills and resources sectors, the Prime 
Minister in November 2008 published a statement on the implementation of transfer of skills and 
resources to the development establishment of an Inter-ministerial Commission for controlling the 
transfer. Following this statement, units supporting decentralisation (CADD) were created in 
departments whose responsibilities have been transferred by law to LG (including health, education 
and water). The CADD has as objective to develop and implement triennial plans to transfer skills and 
resources.  
The diagram below shows the institutional process of decentralisation and deconcentration. 
Figure 3 The Reform of the Malian State  
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5.5.6 Progress to date 
Nearly 20 years after the launch of a comprehensive project to reform, decentralisation has become 
an institutional reality, the process is irreversible and the gains for stakeholders, including local 
authorities are indisputable.  
However, if a legislative and institutional framework for decentralisation is existing, there is now the 
major constraints that hinder the effectiveness and efficiency of operation of a state with several 
territorial levels. The challenge in coming years will be the acceleration of the effective transfer of 
financial and human resources and improving the knowledge and skills of those territorialized, both 
services of local authorities and decentralised services of the State of Mali. Decentralisation is now 
heavily funded by the scope and technical and financial partners of Mali. To ensure the viability and 
autonomy of LG on a financial plan, it will be essential to raise own tax revenues to municipalities in 
the coming years.  
5.5.7 EC/EU support 
The European Commission has contributed early in the process of decentralisation in its 
implementation and its development through funding and technical support, including the 
decentralisation mission and institutional reforms.  
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Following the first elections in 1999 and the effective implementation of local authorities, the EC/EU 
contributes to strengthening the capacity of the Malian state and provides technical support and 
financial services to municipalities created through the project « Appui au démarrage des 
communes ». This project finances then both counselling centres and municipal investment fund, 
FICT, which is distributed through the ANICT.  
Mali was the first country in the world for which the EC/EU has used the SBS-specific decentralisation 
and reform of the state: the SBS „support program for administrative reform and decentralisation 
(PARAD)’. The SBS Decentralisation aims to strengthen the institutional framework of governance in 
a context of poverty reduction through improved administrative capacity to design, manage and 
coordinate policies and actions in favor of establishing effective decentralisation. This budget support 
is accompanying a component of institutional support and is completed by a specific support project 
for the three northern regions, the program ADERE North.  
The EC/EU support through a sector budget support continues in the program PARADER (2010-
2014). The aim of this SBS is to continue to fuel the reform of decentralisation and the state by adding 
a component to „regional economic development‟. This should allow local governments to make 
infrastructure investments and develop the local economy. 
5.6 Annex 6: Mali in brief 
5.6.1 Overall information 
Mali is a vast landlocked country with an area of 1.241.238 km2. It is located in the Sudano-Sahelian 
region of West Africa and shares 7.000 km border with Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania. Its estimated population in 2011 is nearly 14 million people. It knows 
four major agro-climatic conditions that are: 
 the Sudano-Guinean south, 6% of the country with 800 to 1200 mm of annual rainfall; 
 The Sudanese zone in the centre, 17% of the country with 600 to 1000 mm of annual rainfall;  
 the north Sahelian zone, 26% of the country with 200 to 600 mm of annual rainfall;  
 the Saharan zone, north of Timbuktu and Gao, 51% of the country with 200 mm rainfall. 
On a hydrographical level, Mali is watered in its southern and central part by the Niger river (about 1 
700 km) and Senegal river (800 km) and tributaries. 
 
Figure 4 Map of Mali 
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Table 8 Essential facts and figures 
The main ethnic groups in Mali % of population 
Mandé 35 % 
Soninke 15 % 
Fulani 17 
Sonrhaïs 6 % 
Tuaregs and Moors 10 % 
Others 5 % 
Religions in Mali  
Islam 90% 
Pure animism 9% 
Christianity 1% 
The main languages  
French (official)  
Bambara 80% 
Source : World Factbook CIA  
5.6.1.1 Demography 
Mali is characterised by: 
 A very young population: the median age is 15 years and the cohort of 0-15 year olds 
represent 48% of the population while those over 60 years are 3%; 
 A population that consists mostly of women: women represent 52% and they live on average 
51 years against 47 years for men;  
 A high birth rate: a crude birth rate (49.5 per thousand) and a fertility rate (6.4 children per 
woman); 
 A high mortality rate but declining (16 per thousand). Infant mortality (0-5 years) remains a 
concern at 107 per thousand; 
 Concentration of people in the South: the population distribution according to the eight 
administrative regions of the country is as follows: Sikasso (18%), Ségou (17%), Koulikoro 
(16%), Mopti (15%), Kayes (14 %), District of Bamako (10%), Gao (4.9%), Timbuktu (4%) and 
Kidal (0.4%); 
 Low incidence of family planning with 7% and excision remains a widespread practice. 
5.6.1.2 The Malian economy 
In economics, it should be noted that despite the global economic crisis and an unfavorable regional 
context (insecurity in the Sahel, political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire), Mali remains on a growth trajectory 
with an appreciable rate which rose by 4.5% in 2009 to 5.8% in 2010. This increase in growth between 
2009 and 2010 is attributable mainly to primary and tertiary sectors whose growth rates were 
respectively 11.5% and 4.5% in 2010 against 5.6% and 3.5% in 2009. 
 Regarding the service sector, the continued progress in the fields of mobile telephony and 
information technology and communication (ICT) partly explains the good performance of the 
sector. 
 As for the role of the primary sector in the economic growth, this is also a constant in Mali: the 
primary sector occupies about 85% of the population and provides about 80% of national GDP 
(about $ 400 per capita).  
 Even if the secondary sector is somewhat in recession over the past three years, Mali remains 
the third largest African producer of gold after South Africa and Ghana with an output of 46 
tons in 2010. 
5.6.1.3 The weight of agriculture in the economy 
Agriculture represents 22% of Mali's exports and is practiced by 630 000 small family farms of 9 to 10 
people.  
 Three million hectares annually are highlighted, with 90% for crops (millet, sorghum, and rice 
mainly). These cereals are the staple diet of the Malian population, however, remaining 
heavily dependent on a more and more erratic rainfall. 
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 Livestock is the second largest sector of rural production. The types of livestock farming are 
sedentary and nomadic grazing which is nomadic or semi nomadic with nearly 75% of the 
livestock (cattle, small ruminants and camels). Livestock production is estimated at 277.1 
billion CFA. It is the main source of income for 30% of producers.  
 The contribution of fisheries to the national economy is estimated at about 22.1 billion or 3.4% 
of GDP in 2008. The average national production of fish is estimated at 100,000 tons per year, 
which makes Mali one of the leading producers of freshwater fish in Africa. The fishing 
industry would employ 500,000 people, of these 120,000 fishermen. 
5.6.2 Socio-economic data 
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Note: 2008 data are preliminary estimates. 
* The diamonds show four key indicators in the country (in bold) compared with its income-group average. If data 
are missing, the diamond will be incomplete 
Source:  Development Economics LDB database. 
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5.7 Annex 7: Other annexes 
5.7.1 Indicateurs PARAD 
D
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Population access to basic services covered by the LG 
1 Villages with at least a functional point of drinking water 
2 Prenatal consultations 
% of women having at least one consultation during their 
pregnancy 
Average number of prenatal visits / woman 
3 Girls‟ schooling  
Decentralisation policy 
4 
Quality of local 
governance 
% of regular meetings held by local councils 
% of PV drafted by the municipal executive and forwarded to the 
parent 
% of administrative accounts produced by the community 
5 Own rescources per inhabitant LG 
6 Transfers from the state to LG 
Interdependence decentralisation-devolution 
7 
Assistance in project 
management of LG 
%  of LG having access to assistance 
% of  LG satisfied with the assistance 
8 
Budgetary decentralisation 
of ministries (operating 
funds) 
MATCL (hors DNAT) 
MEF (hors DGBE et DGCE) 
DNPD (ex-MPAT)  
MA 
MEA 
9 
Decentralisation of 
ministries‟ employees 
MATCL 
MEF 
MPAT 
MA 
MEA 
S
ta
te
 
R
e
fo
rm
 
State Reform 
10 Commissioning of 31 revenue-Perceptions 
11 Computerisation of administration 
12 Deadlines for public procurement 
 
5.7.2 Frameworks for the decentralisation and state reform 
Common Frameworks 
Monitoring Committee 
for State Reform / 
CSRE (2006) 
 Chair : Prime Minister 
  Members : all concerned 
ministries 
 Biannual frequence 
 Oversee the implementation of programs of 
decentralisation and state reform 
 Oversee the implementation of PARAD 
Panel of donors (2006)  Alternative chair : CDI et DNCT 
 Biannual frequence 
 Promote information and donor coordination 
in the field of state reform and 
decentralisation 
State Reform 
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Coordination 
Committee of the 
Programme of 
institutional 
development / CCPDI 
(2006) 
 Chair MTFPRE 
 Members: Representatives of the 
State of LG, the private sector, 
trade unions and civil society 
 Frequency Quarterly 
 Ensure coherence of reform policies and their 
implementation by relevant stakeholders 
 Assisting the Minister for Reform of the State 
in the implementation of PARAD 
Decentralisation 
National Orientation 
Committee of technical 
support to LG / CNO 
(2000) 
 Chair MATCL 
 Members: ANICT, DNCT, DNP, 
MA, ministries, OP, civil society 
 Biannual frequency 
 Coordinate, direct, monitor and evaluate the 
necessary technical support to LG 
 Participate in Ccpdi 
 Participate in Steering Committee PARAD 
PARAD 
Steering Committee 
(2006) 
 Chair alternating CDI DNCT, Vice 
President DGB 
 Members: CDI, DNCT, ANICT, 
MA, ACCRM, HCCT, MEF, PRSP, 
sectoral ministries, DUE 
 Quarterly Frequency  
 Monitor program performance 
 Review monitoring reports 
 Alert the political authorities if necessary 
 Make recommendations 
Annual Review 
(2006) 
 Joint Forum State / EU 
Commission 
 Check the satisfaction of general conditions 
and 
 specific tranches and the achievement of 
indicators 
 Determine the amount of tranches 
 Make adjustments 
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5.7.3 Extracts from the assessment report about budget relief in Mali 2003-2009 
Table 9 Budgetary efforts of the Malian government for the decentralisation policy from 2000 to 2010 (domestic financing of the state budget) 
Designations 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Ordinary expenses 
Grants to local LG 0 1.350.000 1.400.000 1.442.000 1.485.260 1.485.260 1.485.260 1.435.260 1.402.239 1.402.239 1.507.538 
Support of supervisory  structures of LG 0 625.000 800.000 824.000 848.720 782.795 1.000.744 1.025.762 1.065.463 1.050.053 1.120.604 
National Directorate of Local Authorities 5.768 45.981 51.360 82.153 66.887 65.092 75.184 113.953 102.375 100.569 99.708 
National  Agency for Investment in  
territorial LG 
0 0 50.000 50.000 51.500 51.500 71.500 73.500 71.127 76.000 76.000 
Center for territorial community education 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.000 114.839 
Credits transferred from the Ministry of 
Education to LG within the financial law 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80.599.924 
 
Crédits transférés par le Ministère de la 
Santé aux collectivités dans la loi de 
finances 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.554.000 
 
Total ordinary expenses 5.768 2.020.981 2.301.360 2.398.153 2.452.367 2.384.647 2.632.688 2.648.475 2.641.204 2.728.861 85.072.613 
Investment expenses 
Support of the National Directorate of Local  
Authorities 
28.500 30.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Support fort he estalishment of LG 957.500 1.000.000 900.000 1.050.000 1.270.000 1.270.000 1.270.000 1.837.000 1.634.638 2.250.000 1.800.000 
Réhabilitation des infrastructures de tutelle 
des collectivités 
0 750.000 630.000 700.000 700.000 700.000 900.000 970.000 915.530 700.000 750.000 
Multi-Sectoral Development Programe for 
the Decentralisation in Koulikoro 
9.500 10.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Support programme for the 
decentralisation in the region of Koulikoro 
0 0 0 0 0  100.000 0 0 100.000 40.000 
Construction Center of Elected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112.361 150.000 100.000 
Project for the support of economic and 
regional Development and decentralisation 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.000 100.000 
Total capital expenditure 995.500 1.790.000 1.530.000 1.750.000 1.970.000 1.970.000 2.270.000 2.807.000 2.662.529 3.300.000 2.790.000 
Grand Total 1.001268 3.810.981 3.831.360 4.148.153 4.422.367 4.354.647 4.902.688 5.455.475 5.303.733 6.028.861 87.862.613 
Grant for  LG + implemented support
 
 957.500 2.350.000 2.300.000 2.492.000 2.755.260 2.755.260 2.755.260 3.272.260 3.036.877 3.652.239 3.307.538 
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Table 10 External financing included in the state budget for the decentralisation (2000-2010) 
Designations 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Project support to the rural LG of   
Tombouctou 
995.000 756.000 524.000 523.000 0 420.000 0 0 0 0 0 
Project support to the rural LG of  
Mopti 
0 1.083.000 306.000 482.000 395.000 150.000 60.000 0 0 0 0 
Multi-Sectoral  Development 
programme  for the Decentralisation 
in  Koulikoro 
212.000 140.000 140.000 212.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Support-Program for the development 
circle in Menaka   
1.500.000 1.022.000 586.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Promotion of decentralisation 700.000 400.000 400.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Support for the implementation of 
communes / ANICT 
0 0 14.152.639 8.293.000 5.303.000 9.376.000 1.816.000 2.931.000 4.781.000 14.562.000 5.422.000 
Projet d'Appui au processus de 
décentralisation au Mali 
0 0 0 0 139.000 0 134.000 0 0 0 0 
Project to support  the local 
development of the 7th region 
0 0 0 800.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Program to support decentralisation in  
Koulikoro 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1.148.000 351.000 1.492.000 1.141.000 54.000 
ANICT/FICT/FAT/AC 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.116.690 7.504.593 7.008.180 4.878.307 2.509.035 
Support for the regional development 
of the north 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 595.920 525.000 442.771 
Support program  for  economic and 
regional Decentralisation and 
development 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.097.000 1.350.000 
National Directorate of Local 
Authorities (PACY) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.967 
Total48 3.407.000 3.401.000 16.108.639 10.310.000 5.837.000 9.946.000 12.274.690 10.786.593 13.877.100 24.203.307 9.794.773 
Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance (for the "Grant for LG + implemented support": recalculation by the team). 
 
                                                     
48
 Cumul période 2000-2010: 119.946.102. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons and to provide recommendations to help 
for opportune and timely support to decentralisation processes; it shall cover aid delivery over the 
period 2000-2009 taking into account the different entry points used by the European Commission 
(EC)/ European Union (EU) to delivery its support to decentralisation processes. This evaluation is 
partly based on a number of country missions to be carried out during the field phase.1 
The field visit to Peru had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. By no means, this note should be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered at the single country level, as they are 
formulated to be answered on the global level using the whole information collected from the desk 
study and the different field phase country studies. 
The reasons for selecting this country as one of the field studies were: 
 Example of interventions following a bottom-up entry point; 
 Continuity in the support to decentralisation over the past decade; 
 Illustration of the context of EC/EU support in South America. 
The field visit was undertaken between 13/06-22/06/2011. The evaluation team was composed of 
Philip Bottern (team leader), Tino Smail (evaluation consultant) and Ricardo Vergara (national 
consultant).  
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research foci 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Peru has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
 The implementation and results of a regional decentralisation programme ("Programa de 
Apoyo al Desarrollo Socioeconomico y a la Descentralizacion den las Regiones de Ayacucho 
y Huancaveloca", AGORAH) implemented in two regions in Peru (Huancavelica and 
Ayacucho);  
 The approaches followed in EC/EU sector programmes in the framework of a decentralised 
public sector in development.  
Based on the above, two working hypotheses have been made for the field visit to Peru.  
The Delegation of the European Union (EUD) has implemented the AGORAH programme from 2004 
to 2008 in two regions of Peru with the objectives to “contributing to the improvement of the living 
conditions in the regions of Ayacucho and Huancavelica through the application of a model of socio-
economic development with a regional scope2”. The intention for the EC/EU with bottom-up 
programmes is however also to draw lessons that can be used in national programmes. This had led 
to the first hypothesis for the field phase:  
 Hypothesis 1: The bottom-up entry point gives the EC/EU valuable experiences on 
decentralisation processes, which can be used later in formulation and implementation of 
national decentralisation programmes. 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
2
 Some smaller projects are also financed by the EC/EU to support development at the local level (regions, local 
government), which also have a bottom-up entry point.  
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The second hypothesis is based on the information from the EC/EU during the desk phase that there 
has been a continuous support to decentralisation for the last 10 years starting with the "Programa de 
Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria", PASA (1997-2007): 
 Hypothesis 2: The continuous support of the EC/EU to decentralisation has enabled it to 
have an influential role on the decentralisation policy agenda and has allowed the EU to 
intervene in support to decentralisation through a multi-level approach.  
1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
development partners, as well as the overall decentralisation process in Peru.   
During the field phase, the team, in addition to continued document review, also interviewed key 
persons in ministries, development partners, non government organisations (NGOs) and research 
institutions with relevant and extensive knowledge of the decentralisation process in Peru. 
A few interviews were carried out as focus group meeting, but the preferred technique was individual 
in-depth interviews focused on the relevant EQs and the working hypotheses. The de-briefing, the final 
day of the mission, was arranged with participation of a large group of the key staff in the EU 
delegation3. A list of people met can be found in Annex 2. The information deemed of critical 
importance was subjected to a process of triangulation to ensure validity and internal consistency.  
Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field phase, prioritisation was necessary 
and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ reviews/ monitoring missions that had 
already been undertaken. The team relied extensively on the related reports attempting to extract 
more general findings, trends and recurring themes that are of relevance to a broader audience. The 
dialogue also centred around distilling broader lessons and themes rather than focussing on the 
minute details of the selected projects.  
To reiterate, this country note is thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of 
the overall decentralisation portfolio of the EC/EU. Rather it is an attempt to learn from the Peru 
experience and to encourage wider reflections on how best to structure and focus EC/EU assistance 
to decentralisation processes. 
                                                     
3
 In the meeting the team’s findings and different aspects of decentralisation including EU’s evolving policy 
approach during the last 10 years were discussed and the implications of the different interventions from the 
EC/EU in Peru related to decentralisation.   
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2 Short description of the country context  
2.1 Short description decentralisation process in the country  
The country has faced the dilemma of being a decentralized state virtually since the beginning of the 
Republic (1821). The efforts initiated by the various governments for decentralisation were eventually 
dropped or failed to lead to concrete decisions until recently. In 2002, a constitutional reform was 
initiated and completely changed the chapter of the constitution on decentralisation from 1993. This 
new situation established a path for implementing the decentralisation process and an independent 
body, the National Council for Decentralization (CND), was established at central level to lead the 
process. 
At that time, the most important transformation was the creation of an intermediate level of 
government by the establishment of “regions” through voluntary aggregation of departments. For this 
purpose, it was decided, as a first step, to create elected regional governments and as a second step, 
it was proposed to hold referendums to approve the aggregation of departments in regions. The first 
step was implemented without problems. But, in the referendums held in 2005, the population rejected 
the formation of regions and, as a result, the intermediate level of government consists of “regional 
governments” installed in “departments”. The formation of regions remains an open issue. 
The structures of the various levels of government (incl. their powers and functions) were gradually 
defined through the enactment of a number of laws between 2002 and 2007. The table below gives an 
overview of the evolution of the legislative framework related to decentralisation in Peru over the past 
decade. 
Table 1. Evolution of the legislative framework related to decentralisation 
Year Law (and short description) 
2002 Ley de Bases de la Descentralización – LBD   
2002 Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales  
2002 Ley de Elecciones Regionales 
2002 Ley Marco de Promoción de la Inversión Descentralizada 
2003 Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades 
2003 Ley Marco de Presupuesto Participativo 
2004 Ley de Descentralización Fiscal 
2004 Ley de Incentivos para la Integración y Conformación de Regiones 
2007 
Ley Orgánica del poder Ejecutivo (precisa la organización del Gobierno Nacional y 
se enumeran las competencias de este nivel de gobierno) 
Departments (and their named regional governments) form the intermediate level of government. 
Municipalities form a third level of government at “local level”. However, Municipalities actually belong 
to three different levels: the provincial municipalities, the district municipalities and the town (“centros 
poblados”) municipalities. This situation, coupled with the vast heterogeneity that exists in the size of 
the provinces and districts, makes it difficult to get a coherent policy for the local level of government.\ 
After the referendums to form regions failed, the new national government elected in 2006, 
deactivated the CND and replaced it by the National “Decentralisation Secretariat” under the direct 
supervision of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. It is expected that this institution that will 
lead the future progress of decentralisation. 
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Figure 1 Organisation of the state in Peru 
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Ministros
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Source: Particip analysis (based on information available at www.peru.gob.pe). 
2.2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions  
The evaluation team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in this specific country 
through a number of interventions. The table below summarises the major EC/EU-funded 
interventions directly aiming at supporting the decentralisation process in Peru. 
Table 2: List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision Nr. 
Comment 
Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo 
Socio-Económico y a la 
Descentralización en las Regiones 
de Ayacucho y Huancavelica - 
AGORAH 
13,0 ALA/2003/005-758 
Grant to Government of Peru 
(GoP), with a component of 
targeted Budget Support to 
the two beneficiary Regions 
Fortalecimiento de capacidades 
nacionales y regionales para la 
implementación, seguimiento y 
evaluación de políticas públicas 
multisectoriales 
0,92 DCI-ALA/2007/019-475 
Grant to GoP, support to the 
national “Decentralisation 
Secretariat” (under the 
Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers) 
Fortalecimiento de Capacidades en 
la Oferta y la Demanda de la gestion 
por resultados en 4 Regiones 
0,350 
DCI-ASAPVD/2008/157376 Consortium de Investigacion 
Economica y Social - CIES  
Fortalecimiento de Capacidades de 
Autoridades y Funcionarios Locales 
de la Region Puno 
0,15 
DCI-NSAPVD/2011/236-682 Gobierno Regional Puno 
Fortalecimiento de Gobernabilidad: 
Gobiernos Regionales con Mayor 
Capacidad de Gestion Transparente 
0,139 
DCI-NSAPVD/2009/205-138 Transparencia 
Fortalecimiento de Capacidades a 
Actores Estatales de 
Municipalidades Rurales y Urbano-
Marginales en Primera Infancia 
0,138 
DCI-NSAPVD/2010/236-681 Kallpa 
Fortalecimiento de Gobiernos 
Locales para la Gestion del 
0,133 DCI-NSAPVD/2010/236-684 
Centro de Investigacion y 
Capacitacion Campesina 
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Desarrollo en el Marco del Proceso 
de Descentralizacion en La 
Mancomunidad de Saywite 
Choquequirao Ampay de la Region 
Apurimac  
Desarrollo de capacidades de 
autoridades y funcionarios 
municipales y de la Sociedad Civil 
para el ejercicio de la 
gobernabilidad democrática en los 
municipios 
0,13 
DCI-NSAPVD/2008/020/083 Promocion y Capacitacion 
para el Desarrollo 
Associacion  
Fortalecimiento de Capacidad de 
Gestion para el Desarrollo de la 
Mancomunidad Azucarera de la 
Region Lambayeque-Marel 
0,123 
DCI-NSAPVD/2009/205-147 Mancomunidad Azucarera de 
la Region Lambayeque 
 
The evaluation team has also considered a number of other interventions, in particular sector 
interventions with a dimension related to decentralisation, e.g.: 
 the food security programme PASA,  
 the support to the modernisation and decentralisation of the Health sector AMARES,  
 the health Sector Budget Support EURO-PAN.  
A detailed list is provided in Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs  
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national stakeholders in 
partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 1.3.1:  
All national stakeholders met during the field mission (e.g. the Ministry of Economy and Finance - 
MEF, the Decentralisation Secretariat - SdD, the Ayacucho Regional Government) had no particular 
knowledge of a particular EC/EU approach to decentralisation.  
Ind 1.3.2:  
Other international donors (e.g., United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
German Development Agency (GIZ), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), CTB) met 
during the mission were not aware of any particular EC/EU approach/policy to decentralisation.  
Ind 1.3.3:  
The EC/EU strategic framework to support decentralisation (incl. guidelines and reference documents) 
is not well known by the EUD staff. Only few of the staff are aware of the existence of the 2007 
reference document on EC/EU support to decentralisation and when the document is referred to, the 
few staff members who recall it, considered it as a general document with no specific use to the 
context of Peru. 
Moreover, EUD staff members consider that the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) are very open 
papers that permit all kind of actions.   
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3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing with 
sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) or 
disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.1.1: 
Some EUD staff members expressed that it was difficult for the EC/EU to sometimes take a more 
active role in the decentralisation sector as no specific budget is available for more punctual activities 
e.g. meetings, conferences, events or development of studies on decentralisation.  
The usefulness of the CSP is challenged as it does not follow the changes in Government priorities 
and policies. There would be a need for a tool that follows the same time frame as the governments 
(e.g. 2006 to 2011 and 2011-2016).  
According to the EUD, it seems like government institutions of Peru find the EC/EU guidelines and 
procedures during the evaluation period rather bureaucratic and if procedures are too complicated 
they might not use some opportunities of funding.  
An example is the Programme for Modernisation of the State (PMdE), where the implementation has 
been very slow as the state institutions need to present their budgets and operational plans before 
funds can be released, so although approved in 2007 activities only started in 2010 in the 
Decentralisation Secretariat (Secretaria de Descentralizacion, SdD) linked to the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, PCM)4.    
As actors change in the EUD programmes – "Programa de Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria" (PASA), 
"Apoyo a la Modernización del Sector Salud y su Aplicación en una Región del Peru"  (AMARES), 
"Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socioeconimico y a la Descentralizacion den las Regiones de 
Ayacucho y Huancaveloca" (AGORAH), "Programa Articulado Nutricional" (Euro-PAN) – regional 
governments, local governments, ministries and implementation agencies, it seems difficult for the 
EUD to establish stable strategic partnerships for decentralisation. In recent years, the main national 
partner seems to have been the MEF.  
Among the development partners no specific partnership exists.  
Ind 2.1.2: 
Communication between staff for decentralisation and staff with responsibilities for sectors take place 
at staff meetings and informal meetings. No formal mechanism is established to coordinate actions 
related to decentralisation. The coordination is however still well articulated according to the survey 
sent to the EUD. 
Ind 2.1.3: 
No specific team for decentralisation exist at the EUD. Decentralisation is dealt with by a staff member 
with the overall responsibility and some staff members with specific tasks (e.g. the NSA-LA 
programme, see also indicator 2.2.1)  
Ind 2.1.4: 
No negative or positive incentives were observed during the mission for EUD to develop specific 
approaches in decentralisation. 
                                                     
4
 The PMdE was also delayed due to changes in staff in the PCM administration and some political obstacles 
from the government as the programme was agreed upon with the former government (2001 to 2006).    
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3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.2.1:  
One person in the EUD is responsible for decentralisation – less than 25% of her time is spent on 
decentralisation. Before 2007, more time was spent i.e. up to 50% as the EUD at that time was 
dealing with a specific programme (AGORAH). Another two/three persons deal with the programme 
for non state actors and local authorities (NSA-LA); they mainly spend time on the evaluation of 
project applications and monitoring (about six projects with local or regional governments are 
implemented currently but these persons are in charge of many other projects involving Non State 
Actors in a variety of sectors).  
Ind 2.2.2:  
The staff member responsible for decentralisation has good knowledge of the issue by a long 
experience in decentralisation in Peru including in the EUD since 2006. She participates in the “Mesa 
de Descentralización” (the decentralisation group of the donors).  
Ind 2.2.3:  
The EUD staff has not participated in any particular training on decentralisation. They plan to 
participate in a regional EC/EU training on budget support etc., which might also relate to 
decentralisation.  
3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) or 
systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, issues 
papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote the 
effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.3.1: No specific monitoring instrument exists in the EU delegation. Almost all projects and 
programmes are monitored by the results oriented monitoring (ROM) system.    
Ind 2.3.2: No specific working group exists. Some exchanges of experiences take place occasionally 
at meetings. 
Ind 2.3.3: No driver of change exists in the EUD for decentralisation.  
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3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies? 
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational procedures 
related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds to 
LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant CSP sections on decentralisation and local governance 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Apart from the "Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socioeconimico y a la Descentralizacion de las 
Regiones de Ayacucho y Huancaveloca" (AGORAH), the other relevant programmes ("Programa de 
Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria - PASA", "Apoyo a la Modernización del Sector Salud y su 
Aplicación en una Región del Peru - AMARES" and EURO-PAN) are actually not designed to directly 
support decentralisation. However, the institutional entities involved in the implementation of the 
programme are (apart from central government bodies) regional and local governments and in this 
way programmes the programmes have an indirect element of support to decentralisation.  
Ind 3.1.1:  
The EUD is not carrying out specific analyses on decentralisation in Peru. Analyses of programme 
implementation are more related to sector issues for the programmes (PASA: food security and local 
socio-economic development; AMARES and EURO-PAN: health) and these are clearly structured 
according to where the decentralised governments (regional and local) have a role. However, for 
AGORAH, the local governments were not included as implementers of infrastructure investments in 
the programme although it is their mandate to identify relevant investments in the planning process.    
Ind 3.1.2: 
Funds of EUD sector programmes which deal with supporting LGs and/or regional governments 
(PASA, AMARES, AGORAH and EURO-PAN) are all using the national transfer system, from the MEF 
down to ministries, regional governments and local governments.  
Ind 3.1.3 
The communication with the government in the framework of sector budget support (SBS) (e.g. during 
the formulation of the EURO-PAN "Programa Articulado Nutricional") is of high quality. It is mainly 
carried out with other development partners and the MEF in the “Mesa de Finanzas Publicas” (working 
group on public finances) established in 2009 (see also JC4.1). The group is chaired by the MEF and 
the EUD is presently heading the "secretariat" for the meetings of the working groups. According to 
EUD staff, the dialogue has improved with the establishment of the "mesa".  
The EUD has also established better dialogue on specific projects with NSA and Local Authorities by 
establishing information meetings about the funding opportunities and lessons learnt from past 
experience.    
Ind 3.1.4 
The CSP 2002-2006 contains presentation of GoP policies and strategies of decentralisation: “The 
EC's strategy will be established in areas where the Community has the widest experience and the 
greatest credibility: aid for the rule of law and strengthening of governability, and support for integrated 
social development in specific regions, by supporting the decentralisation process in Peru” (CSP 
2002-2006, p. 27). But, in the description of the areas of cooperation, decentralisation does not feature 
anymore as a high priority. 
In the CSP 2007-2013, decentralisation seems to have been given a higher attention and is seen as 
the wheel to support development in priority areas. The CSP 2007-2013 also mentions explicitly 
bottom up approaches to support decentralisation actors and programme for the modernisation of the 
state and decentralisation. 
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“In addition to social cohesion, the objective is to support, from the bottom up, Peru’s decentralisation 
process by empowering local players and strengthening their position vis-à-vis the State. The EC will 
promote participation by the regional and local authorities, decentralised sectoral bodies and civil 
society in the design, implementation and follow-up of the projects and actions defined.” (CSP 2007-
2013, p.30) 
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as “How should existing interventions best evolve?” are addressed 
in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Since 1997, the EC/EU together with the GoP have implemented four large programmes with some 
indirect support to decentralisation (PASA, AGORAH, AMARES and EURO-PAN). PASA started in 
1997 with the support to education, health, agriculture and economic development, thereafter the 
focus for the EC/EU programmes has been eventually narrowed to health in AMARES and EURO-
PAN, while AGORAH was a regional programme for support to regional governance & economic 
development. All programmes have taken into account parts of the decentralised structures in their 
implementation i.e. regions, provinces and districts. 
Ind 3.2.1: The EUD’s approach to decentralisation in AGORAH and in six projects financed from the 
NSA-LA programme is bottom-up with regions and local governments as implementers of various 
sector activities.  
There is no top down approach to support decentralisation and there is actually no direct support 
given to the development of the decentralised structures.  
The approach of the EC/EU sector interventions follows the national context well. And the PASA with 
its early start in 1997 may have played a role in the evolving structures for decentralisation.    
Ind 3.2.2: There are no specific considerations raised on how to support decentralisation in the sector 
support programmes (PASA, AMARES, EURO-PAN), more accurately questions are raised on how 
programmes can best be implemented in the existing decentralised structures.  
The AGORAH was developed to give support to the regional level for capacity development and 
infrastructure development.  
3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support decentralisation 
and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme to 
be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as “When 
and how to use sector budget support?” or “what are the risks related to the”) are addressed in 
project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid delivery 
methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.3.1: Apart from AGORAH and specific small projects funded by the NSA-LA programme, the 
EUD is not supporting decentralisation directly. So there is no evolving approach to support 
decentralisation.  
Ind 3.3.2: The AGORAH programme was not adjusted after the CND ("Consejo Nacional de la 
Descentralización") closed in 2006, which resulted in a de-linking of the AGORAH programme to the 
central government. Thereafter the AGORAH implementation was very slow for two years and the 
infrastructure projects were implemented mainly in the final year by the AGORAH unit with limited 
participation of the regional governments. This affected the results of the capacity building of the 
regional administrations.  
The modernisation of the state programme (MdE) was signed with the GoP in 2007 (before the GoP 
2002-2007 resigned) and implemented from 2007-2011 with a new GoP. Implementing has however 
been slow as the new GoP does not have the same obligation and priorities as the former one.  
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Ind 3.3.3: Programme documents present SBS as the appropriate modality for EC/EU programmes as 
the GoP has the capacity to work with this modality. But no direct support to decentralisation has been 
delivered so far in the form of SBS.  
Ind 3.3.4: The EC/EU assesses different modalities with the conclusion that modalities must be simple 
and manoeuvrable for the GoP, otherwise implementation will be to slow.   
“Peru no necesita fondos de la Unión Europea para hacer su trabajo” (EUD staff member). This 
underlines that if procedures are too complicated the GoP will not use EU funding. 
An example is the Modernisation of State Programme, which among other supports the 
Decentralisation Secretariat (“Secretaria de Descentralización”) in the PCM. The modality 
(presupuesto por programa) implies that the participants shall present their budgets and operational 
plans before funds can be released and as of 2010 only 2 m Euro (EUR) of 17 mEUR allocated in 
2007 has been released and the programme will end in 2011. 
3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of the 
role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.4.1 
The CSP 2003-2007 and the CSP 2008 to 2013 include analyses of the decentralisation process and 
the stakeholders in the process. The CSPs and programme documents do not include an in-depth 
analysis of decentralisation actors (e.g. national institutions like PCM, the Asamblea de Presidentes 
de Gobiernos Regionales - Association of Regional Presidents, the former CND etc.)    
Ind 3.4.2 
The EC/EU works with different actors in the decentralised government structures (ministries, regions 
and municipalities) mainly in the framework of sector programmes. The EUD does not have a specific 
objective related to decentralisation, rather it applies the decentralised structures for implementation of 
sector programmes.   
3.4 EQ4 - 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarity 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance issues 
among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor approaches, 
when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.1.1 
In addition to the traditional international organisations active in the region such as the World Bank 
(WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), a number of other international organisations 
have plaid a significant role in the development landscape of Peru during the period 2000-2010. These 
include: United Nations (UN) agencies such as UNDP, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and 
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Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the EC/EU, the Andean Development Corporation (CAF)5 
and various cooperation agencies from “bilateral” donors such as USAID, Economic Cooperation and 
Development Division at the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO)6, Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), GIZ & German Bank for Reconstruction (KfW), CTB7. 
Peru has been characterised by an increasingly well coordinated donor community illustrated by the 
recent initiative of various UN agencies to start a “Joint Programme”8 under the leadership of the 
PCM9. Various donor coordination mechanisms have been established over the years. Two 
mechanisms are of particular relevance for this evaluation: 
 Mesa de Finanzas Públicas: this working group focusing on Public Finance Management 
(PFM) was created shortly after the 2008 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
(PEFA) exercise. It is lead by the MEF with active participation of a number of donors such as: 
WB, International Monetary Fund (IMF), CAF, KfW/GiZ, SECO, USAID, CTB, JICA and the 
EC/EU.  
 Mesa de Descentralización: this working group was established shortly after the creation of 
the “donor group on governance” and the related “sub group on modernisation of the state” in 
2002. 
It is noteworthy that the two donor groups work at different levels. In the group on PFM the GoP (via 
the MEF) take an active (leading) role and the group has created a space of policy dialogue between 
donors and the GoP, while the group on decentralisation has a more technical focus. This explains 
that, in the donor group on decentralisation, the dialogue with the GoP is reduced to introductory 
meetings organised when a new Secretary is appointed at the National Secretary of Decentralisation. 
That said, it appears that the group on decentralisation has initiated some direct dialogue with the 
Assembly of president of regional governments to discuss the main challenges of the decentralisation 
process in Peru.  
Ind 4.1.2 
The minor role (see indicator 4.1.3 below) played by the EC/EU in decentralization in Peru probably 
also explains why the evaluation team has not identified any record of EC/EU resolving 
inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and member states ones or other donors ones  
Ind 4.1.3 
The EC/EU has not had a lead role among donors during the evaluation period. For instance, the 
group on decentralisation has been lead by GiZ (Germany) for more than two years and opinions on 
the EC/EU participation in this group range from “quite active” to “not very active”. Moreover, on 
matters related to PFM, it seems that the EC/EU has followed the WB although it seems much more 
active in this area than in the area of decentralisation. The EC/EU has a more limited role in the 
platform of exchange on decentralisation compared to other EU member states such as Spain and 
Germany. The latter consider that “EU bilateral donors have played a much more important role than 
the EC in the area of decentralisation in Peru” and they point out at the same time that “support from 
bilateral donor is not sufficient to address the needs of Peru in terms of decentralisation. For instance, 
the EU could play a complementary role to bilateral donors in crucial areas such as the development 
of the civil service framework”.   
The limited role plaid by the EC/EU in decentralisation has been confirmed by the various actors 
interviewed (Government, other non-EU donors, EUD itself). One interviewee (a non-EU bilateral 
donor) pointed out the fact that because of its internal rules and despite regular participation in the 
regular meetings: “the EU cannot compromise itself when a decision is taken by the group”. Moreover, 
the EUD does not have the possibility to quickly mobilised funds to participate in initiatives launched 
by the working groups.  
Two cases illustrate this situation: 
 In 2005, a group of experts was mandated to analyse the situation of the country in terms of 
Human Rights, Justice and Decentralisation and to organise a forum to discuss the results. 
The EC/EU could not contribute directly to the organisation of the event. 
                                                     
5
 Corporación Andina de Fomento. 
6
 Economic Cooperation and Development Division at the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. 
7
 Coopération Technique Belge. 
8
 Programa conjunto de las naciones unidas “mejorando la nutrición y la seguridad alimentaria de la niñez del 
Perú: un enfoque de desarrollo de capacidades” 
9
 Secretaría Técnica de la Comisión Interministerial de Asuntos Sociales (ST-CIAS) de la Presidencia del 
Consejo de Ministros. 
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 In 2010, a group of experts was mandated by the working group on PFM to provide new ideas 
and high level analysis to improve PFM in the country. The EC/EU was not able to contribute 
to the joint efforts of MEF, GIZ, CTB and SECO.  
Ind 4.1.4 
The evaluation team has not find any evidence of important cooperation project or activity where the 
EC/EU has joined efforts with other donors to support decentralisation in the country. This is likely also 
because of the limited role plaid by the EC/EU in the coordination of activities within decentralisation.  
 
Overall, it seems that the EC/EU has taken part to various coordination mechanisms but has not 
contributed to actively develop these coordination mechanisms with EU Member States and major 
donors on decentralisation. 
 
3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarity between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and other 
donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finance decentralisation programmes with Members States and major donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes and 
policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.2.1 
It appears from interviews with EUD and other donors that the EUD regularly exchanges with other 
donors and key stakeholders during all stages of the programming and implementing process. As 
mentioned above, the main platform for dialogue between donors on programming are the donor 
working group on decentralisation (Mesa de Descentralización) and the Group on Public Finance 
(Mesa de Finanzas Públicas) chaired by the MEF. 
Ind 4.2.2  
One interview with a key actor in the region of Ayacucho showed there was during 2006-2009 an 
informal division of role in terms of activities related to the development of capacities at local level: 
USAID was focusing on civil society participation and local governance; the EC/EU focusing on 
technical aspects of decentralisation (such as planning) at the level of the regional government; 
UNICEF and CTB were directly looking at sectoral aspect related to poverty reduction. Yet, this 
division seems rather fortuitous rather than planned. Interviews showed that, in general the knowledge 
of the various stakeholders on the EC/EU cooperation activities was actually rather limited.  
Ind 4.2.2 
A donor matrix exists and seems to help avoiding overlaps between donors. In general, the various 
actors interviewed underline a good coordination and complementarity in the area of the support to 
decentralisation. Yet, a clear and formal division of tasks and role among donors in this area does not 
seem to exist.  
Ind 4.2.3 
As described above in JC4.1, the EC/EU does not jointly finance decentralisation programmes with 
Members States and major donors. 
Ind 4.2.4 
The evaluation team did not find evidence of the EC/EU policy officials and EUD personnel participate 
in joint programmes and policy forums (both internationally and nationally), expect training 
programmes organised by the EC/EU Head Quarters. 
 
Overall, there is complementarity between the EU action and other donors support in the area of 
decentralisation but this is more due to the limited direct support to decentralisation provided by the 
EU rather than a clear strategy to divide tasks and responsibilities among donors in the area of 
decentralisation.  
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3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors such 
as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment into 
decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in general budget support (GBS) performance 
assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1 
As detailed in Annex 3 and Annex 4, a number of sector interventions integrate components on 
decentralisation. Therefore it can be stated that the EC/EU support to decentralisation in Peru is fully 
coherent with cooperation strategies in other sectors (such as Health, Education, Rural development, 
etc.).  
Ind 4.3.2 
Issues such as gender and environment do not appear prominently in the project documentation. The 
projects financed by the NSA-LA thematic budget line (such as “Proyecto Fortalecimiento de las 
capacidades de Gestión por Resultados en 4 regiones” - DCI-NSAPVD/2007/019-404 // 157-376) that 
were reviewed during the field phase do not mention these cross-cutting issues neither in the 
Logframe / Project proposal nor in the progress reports.  
Ind 4.3.3 
The EU is not providing GBS to Peru. It is interesting to note that, although the Euro-PAN programme 
seems to consolidate in a certain manner the decentralisation process in Peru due to its original 
implementation modality, there are no indicators on decentralisation in this SBS and decentralisation 
does not feature in its specific objectives / expected results (see also Annex 4).  
 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Peru; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
15 
3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to implement 
decentralisation reform 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.1.1: Surprisingly, no policy document exists that define the Peruvian decentralisation policy.  
The GoP’s approach to decentralisation has been an evolving process starting a long time back (see 
details in Annex 5). For the present context, the process took off in 2002-2003 with an amendment to 
the Constitution in 2002 and the elaboration of a number of key laws to define the decentralised 
system (regional, municipal functions, elections etc) and again in 2007, when the new government re-
forced the process by demanding all key ministries to devolve their functions to the regional 
governments by a presidential decree. The efforts of the government in 2005 to reduce the number of 
regions, which was rejected in a referendum in 17 departments, should also be mention and the de-
facto establishment of the departments as regions.     
Ind 5.1.2: No strong actors exist to coordinate the decentralisation process, this is mainly done by the 
MEF and the PCM and the president.  
From 2002 to 2006, the CND coordinated the process and it had its own minister, who participated in 
the cabinets’ meeting and it had an important role on the management of the regional affairs including 
funding and the legal framework.  
With the new government from mid 2006, the CND was changed to the SdD ("downgraded" from a 
ministry level to a secretariat level) and placed under the PCM i.e. a lower status without its proper 
minister and direct access to the Cabinet.  When the president in 2007 announced the full 
devolvement of all functions to regions as stipulated in the laws, an inter-ministerial commission (IMC) 
was established to coordinate the process with IMCs in each ministry together with some guidelines 
from SdD. This did however not function well and the regions formed an Assembly of Regional 
Governments to enter into the coordination.     
The MEF is in charge of the fiscal part of the decentralisation process. EUD has supported the CND 
only slightly in the AGORAH and the SdD in the present Modernisation of the State programme.  
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.2.1: A legal framework exists and was mainly developed in 2002 to 2003. The table below shows 
the main laws related to the decentralisation process.  
Table 3 Evolution of the legislative framework related to decentralisation 
Year Law (and short description) 
2002 LBD (establece el derrotero general del proceso) 
2002 
Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales (detalla las funciones y otros aspectos de 
la gestión) 
2002 Ley de Elecciones Regionales 
2002 Ley Marco de Promoción de la Inversión Descentralizada 
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2003 Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades 
2003 Ley Marco de Presupuesto Participativo 
2004 Ley de Descentralización Fiscal 
2004 Ley de Incentivos para la Integración y Conformación de Regiones 
2007 
Ley Orgánica del poder Ejecutivo (precisa la organización del Gobierno Nacional y 
se enumeran las competencias de este nivel de gobierno) 
 
The legal framework has the limitation that it was designed to a situation with approximately 8 regions 
instead of the 26 present regions. A similar problem is the fact that the law on municipalities only deals 
with one type of municipality i.e. with urban characteristics and in reality four different types of 
municipalities exist including a large number of rural municipalities and there are also many 
municipalities with very few inhabitants (as low as 161 inhabitants). 
The EC/EU has not supported the development of a good legal base for decentralisation.  
Ind 5.2.2: There is no major problem with contradictions between sectors laws and the 
decentralisation laws. EC/EU has not supported the legal framework for decentralisation.  
3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. local governments (LGs)  
share of total public expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the 
assignment of taxes and increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.3.1:  
Below is presented the development in the expenditures of regional and local governments for 
personal and their relative share of the total public sector.    
Table 4 Sub-national governments’ exp. for salaries  
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local Goverments n/a n/a 1.147 2.055 
Regional Governments n/a 5.850 7.045 7.068 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultant’s own calculations (for details see Annex 8 
Note : 2010 constant price; in million Soles 
Local governments’ expenditures on staff have almost doubled from 2007 to 2010 in constant prices, 
while regional governments’ expenditures increased with 21% from 2004 to 2010.  The figures show a 
large increase in the number of staff in regional and local governments, which was also confirmed in 
interviews with various stakeholders.      
Table 5 Sub-national governments’ share of public exp. for salaries  
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 100% 56% 51% 56% 
Local Governments  0% 7% 10% 
Regional Governments  44% 42% 34% 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultant’s own calculations (for details see Annex 8 
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This has however not resulted in a relative higher importance of the regional governments as their 
share of all expenditures for salaries has decreased.  
The EC/EU has not supported more staff in the regions and local governments directly through 
support to decentralisation but the programmes (PASA, AMARES and EURO-PAN) have some minor 
effect in Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac for staff in the health sector and maybe some 
planners in the LGs.  
Ind 5.3.2  
The local and regional governments have more resources than before, which follows from the table 
below, which show the real development in transfers and local revenues from 2001 to 2010.  
Table 6 Transfers to sub-national governments 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local governments 2.232 4.257 10.079 11.965 
Regional governments n/a  615 2.407 3.181 
TOTAL 2.232 4.871 12.486 15.146 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultant’s own calculations (for details see Annex 8 
Note : 2010 constant price; in million Soles . 
For the collection of local revenues, LGs have increased their collected from 2004 to 2010 with almost 
70%, but the collection is still very limited with only approximately 93 soles per inhabitant. In 2010 
roughly half (1.235 million Soles) was collected in the Lima region (of which 470 million Soles alone in 
Lima municipality.   
Table 7  Sub national governments’ own revenues 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local Goverments n/a   n/a   1.383 2.317 
Regional Governments n/a   327 416 478 
Total  327 1.800 2.795 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultants own calculations (for details see Annex 8 
Note : 2010 constant price; in million Soles. 
All expenditures of each level of governments are presented below. The figures show that LGs’ 
expenditures have more than doubled in constant prices from 2007 to 2010 and those of regional 
governments, increased with 75% from 2004 to 2010.  
Table 8 Total expenditures of the Public Sector 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 42.643 49.337 43.731 54.148 
Local Governments n/a  n/a  6.898 17.707 
Regional Governments n/a  9.158 12.776 16.177 
Total 42.643 58.495 63.405 88.032 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultant’s own calculations (for detaisl see Annex 8 
Note : 2010 constant price; in million Soles. 
So in essence, the resources of regional and local governments have increased substantially during 
the evaluation period. 
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that are 
discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in human resource management (HRM): the extent to which LGs 
can hire and fire or otherwise manage personnel. 
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 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local governments 
degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.4.1:  
The regional and local governments have been given autonomy for budgeting and the municipal 
organic law defines also the local governments’ autonomy for collection of revenues (property taxes, 
service fees, licenses etc). The regional government has very few sources i.e. licenses and fees for 
services provided.  
The EC/EU has not supported regions and LGs finance directly. An indirect and smaller support is the 
EURO-PAN’s support to the establishment of own budgets for execution agents in three regions 
(Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac) in the health sector. 
Ind 5.4.2: 
Regional and local governments have autonomy in their staff management. EC/EU has not supported 
the development of decentralised human resource management and development (HRM/D). 
Ind 5.4.3: 
The functions of each level of governments are described well in the legal framework. EC/EU has not 
supported the definition of functions of each tier of government.   
 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Peru; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
19 
3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and reform 
implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & CSO) that capacities of key central government 
bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation have improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The key state actor for coordination and development of decentralisation was the CND up to 2006, 
and from 2007 SdD in the PCM.       
Overall, the EC/EU has not significantly contributed to the building up of central government’s 
capacity for implementation of decentralisation or decentralisation reforms during the evaluation 
period as the EC/EU has only supported this aspect in a limited extent.   
Ind 6.1.1 
All stakeholders interviewed agree that the SdD in PCM is not an effective institution to carry out the 
coordination for decentralisation. The former CND was better and also better positioned in the 
decentralisation system with its own minister. The EC/EU supported the CND as implementer of the 
AGORAH programme ("Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socioeconimico y a la Descentralizacion 
den las Regiones de Ayacucho y Huancaveloca) up to 2006 and later the SdD in the PCM. The PCM 
is from 2008 supported by the Modernisation of the State (PCM) Programme, 2007 to 2010 (Activity 
3.1: Strengthening the decentralisation process by supporting the functions of the Decentralisation 
Secretariat for the intergovernmental coordination). 
Ind 6.1.2 
The interviewed persons at the regional level (Ayacucho) did not present any major problem in the 
central levels’ capacity to coordinate the decentralisation process. But, as mentioned above, the 
EC/EU has contributed only in a rather limited extent to the improvement of capacities at central level. 
Ind 6.2.3 
A systematic M&E system for decentralisation does not exist. The only national monitoring is the 
financial information managed by MEF (http://ofi.mef.gob.pe/transparencia).  
The EC/EU provides no support for the development of an M&E system for decentralisation.  
Ind 6.1.4 
As explained in JC5.1, an IMC has been established in 2007 to coordinate – inter alia – 
decentralisation and IMCs have also been established in 7 line ministries. But the EC/EU has not 
supported the inter-ministerial coordination.     
 
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of information 
produced at local level 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Apart from activities in AGORAH, the EC/EU has not supported financial management, planning, 
HRD/M or M&E in regional or local governments during the evaluation period. According to 
meetings with the present regional administration in Ayacucho and former AGORAH staff the 
AGORAH did not lead to any significant results regarding the capacities of the regional 
governments in terms of PFM, HRD and M&E as the programme mostly dealt with implementation 
of infrastructure investments with little involvement of the regional administration and LGs.  
Ind 6.2.1 
In general, there is no strong evidence of improved financial management in regional or local 
administrations over the evaluation period. A key to improvements is that the national audit institution 
(Auditoria de la Republica) will be able to carry out betters audits. Yet, the EUD has not supported 
audits or financial management in regions or LGs.  
Ind 6.2.2. 
It seems that the planning mechanism and its implementation have improved. The PASA has 
supported the participative planning mechanism at the local level in three regions (Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica and Apurimac) and may have contributed to improving capacities in this regards. But 
overall impact during the evaluation period seems rather limited. 
Ind 6.2.3 
Almost all senior staff members were changed in regional and local governments after the elections in 
2002 (only LGs), 2006 and 2010, so capacity was lost after each election. Interviews with regional 
administrations and ministries confirm that staff is often rotated in the public sector e.g. between 
regional governments, local government and ministries. So capacities are not lost completely but 
transferred to other government entities.  
Ind 6.2.4 
No official M&E system exists at the regional and local level. Regional and local government use their 
own system, Interviews with staff in the regional government in Ayacucho indicates that information is 
not well organised e.g. it was not possible to provide information on AGORAH. 
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.3.1 
At national level, four associations of municipalities exist: 
 Table 9  National Associations of Local Governments  
Name of Association Abreviation Homepage 
Asociacion de Municipalidades de Peru AMPE www.ampeperu.gob.pe 
Red de Municipalidades Urbanas y Rurales de Peru  REMURPE www.remurpe.org.pe 
Federacion de Municipios Libres de Peru FEMULP www.femulp.org 
Red de Municipalidades de Peru MUNIRED www.munired.org 
 
The most acknowledged are the AMPE and REMURPE, while FEMULP and MUNIRED have fewer 
members, less support and contacts. All associations have their functioning homepage. 
The existence of four associations has created an unstable situation where municipal associations 
discuss internally instead of directing their activities to the central government and their members.      
At regional level many associations exist as well and some of these are linked up to the national 
system. In Ayacucho exists e.g. the Rural Association of Municipalities (la Red de Municipalidades 
Rurales de Ayacucho). 
The EC/EU has not supported the establishment or functioning of national Local Government 
Associations (LGAs). 
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Ind 6.3.2 
A number of NGOs exist to support LGs and also in support to service delivery. It cannot be said if the 
number has increased as no data exists on this. The EC/EU has not supported NGOs directly as 
service providers, but a number of projects with NGOs are financed from the NSA-LA programme.    
Ind 6.3.3 
Many organisations deal with research in local government issues and two examples are "Servicios 
Educativos Rurales" and "Consortium de Investigation Economico y Social", which were both visited 
by the mission. Only the second is supported by the EC/EU in the framework of a NSA-LA project. 
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3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.1.1 
Elections for local government has been carried out every third year since 1980 and from 2002 (with 
the new Organic Municipal Act every fourth year.) The regional governments had their first election in 
2006 and again in 2010. In 2010 the system was different as the president of the regions was elected 
separately from the regional councillors giving him a status similar to the president at the national 
level.  
The EC/EU has not supported the development of local elections. 
Ind 7.1.2 
The regional and local planning process includes that the governments shall invite all citizens for 
meetings to discuss the municipal development plan, the budget and the budgets execution in a 
participatory manner. A study10 shows that about 36% of all investments in rural municipalities 
("distritos") are identified in the participatory planning process. 
The EC/EU has given some limited support to the participatory planning process in three regions 
(Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac) in the PASA programme, where investments for economic 
development were identified by the Participatory Planning (PP) mechanism in local governments. 
Information received during the mission gives different impressions on how the PP is functioning and 
the level of participation. According to a study presented below financed by USAID, participation has 
declined from 1998 to 2010 as only 11,6% in 2010 responded that they have participated in a council 
or public meeting while 20,6% responded positively to this in 1998.  
Table 10: Citizens’ Participation in Local Governments Activities, pct. 
 1998 2006 2010 
Participation in a municipal council meeting or public meeting 
(session municipal o cabildo abierto)  
20,6 14,7 11,6 
Willingness to pay more taxes  19,7 14 18,5 
Participation in the preparation of the municipal budget  4,3 5,0 
Source: Source: USAID (2010), Cultura Politica en la Democracia de Peru 
(http://www.vanderbilt.edu/atoz/tagged.php?id=research) 
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens 
(notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards etc) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.2.1 
Accountability mechanism is also established in the planning cycle as described in indicator 7.1.2 
above, with arrangement of regional and local councils’ meetings with the citizens to discuss the 
budget’s implementation and the development plan. Important is also the watch committees (Comite 
de Vigilance), which are elected from the citizens at meetings to monitor the work of the councils.  
                                                     
10
 Banco Mundial (WB, 2011), Evaluacion del Presupuesto Participativo y su relacion con el presupuesto por 
resultados.  
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To give the citizens access to all information about all public finances, the information for all local and 
regional governments can be found on the MEF homepage: http://ofi.mef.gob.pe/transparencia - 
called "consulta amigable" - user friendly consultation11.  This is a very comprehensive and rather user 
friendly page and all financial data in the present report has been retrieved from the MEF page.   
The EC/EU has not supported the development of more transparency at local level except from in a 
few projects with local NGOs. 
3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) provided 
to the citizens 
The EU has not support the transfer system or information system to citizens on transfers. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.3.1 
The MEF provides funds for regional government and local governments. At least five different kind of 
grants from the central government to regions and local governments exist:  
i) Transfer from the general fund (2% of the value added tax (IGV)) 
ii) Transfers from the taxes on mining and natural resources   
iii) Ordinary transfers from specific programmes and investments 
iv) Transfers to support specific institutional development plans 
v) Transfers for other programmes    
The MEF has developed formulae for transfers to local governments through a detailed system with at 
least five different kind of transfers to local governments. The formulae are mainly based on 
population and criteria like e.g. age distribution or poverty level are not used. For the regions the 
distribution is more based on historic needs (according to some: ad hoc) – but according to MEF 
regions without mineral resources are favoured. A proposal has been developed12 supported by some 
development partners (but not the EUD) for new and better formulae.  
The EC/EU has not supported the development of the transfer system to regional and local 
governments, however some indirect support is given by the application of the official system for 
transfers, through MEF to three regions (Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac) in different 
programmes (PASA, AMARES y EURO-PAN).   
Ind 7.3.2 
Information on all transfers can be found in the friendly consultation ("consulta amigable") at the 
homepage at http://ofi.mef.gob.pe/transparencia. On this page all kind of information on public finance 
can be found. The EC/EU has not supported mechanism to provide information to citizens on public 
finance.   
                                                     
 
12
 GIZ, AECID, PCM (2010); Propuesta Tecnica de Descentralizacion Fiscal.   
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3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) in 
local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.1.1 
During the evaluation period the expenditures of the regional and the local governments’ have 
increased substantially as shown below: 
Table 11 Total expenditures of the Public Sector 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 42.643 49.337 43.731 54.148 
Local Governments   6.898 17.707 
Regional Governments  9.158 12.776 16.177 
Total  42.643 58.495 63.405 88.032 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultant’s own calculations(for details see Annex 8) 
Note : 2010 constant price; in million Soles . 
The EC/EU has not supported decentralisation programmes with funds for regional or local 
governments’ expenditures. EC/EU Sector programmes (PASA, EURO-PAN and AMARES) and 
Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socioeconimico y a la Descentralizacion den las Regiones de 
Ayacucho y Huancaveloca, AGORAH in the three priority regions (Ayacucho, Huancavelica y 
Apurimac) have however supported this indirectly by providing support to LGs, regional governments 
and ministries at regional level.       
Ind 8.1.2 
According to table 12 below, regional and local governments receive more funds from the centre for 
service provisions.  
The EC/EU has not directly supported the development of general transfer system from the centre to 
the regional or local governments.  
Table 12 Transfers from the Central Government to Regional and Local Government 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
  2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local governments 2.232 4.257 10.079 11.965 
Regional Governments   615 2.407 3.181 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultant’s own calculations (see Annex 8) 
Note: 2010 constant price; in million Soles . 
Ind 8.1.3 
The EC/EU has not supported the establishment of public private partnership.  
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
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 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc) 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.2.1 
No data exist on LGs’ or regions’ allocations for operation and maintenance in MEF’s homepage. The 
EC/EU has not supported funds for better maintenance and operation of services provided from 
regional or local governments directly.  
Ind 8.2.2 
Stakeholders met informed that regions and local governments provide more funds for maintenance 
and operation of local investments. The EC/EU has not supported funds for better maintenance and 
operation of services provided from regional or local governments directly. 
3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for vulnerable 
groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 8.3.2 Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.3.2 
Table 13 below indicates that citizens’ are more satisfied with local services in 2010 compared with 
1998 and 2006.  
Table 13 Citizens’ attitude to local services in 1998, 2008 and 2010. Pct. 
  Year Very Good or good Regular Bad or very bad 
1998  12.8 64.2 23.0 
2006 14.1 60.3 25.6 
2010 18.4 58.6 23.0 
Source: Source: USAID (2010), Cultura Politica en la Democracia de Peru 
(http://www.vanderbilt.edu/atoz/tagged.php?id=research) 
The EC/EU has not supported this directly – only indirectly through sector programmes (PASA, 
AMARES and EURO-PAN). 
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4 Conclusions and main challenges to be discussed in the 
synthesis phase 
The first hypothesis developed during the desk phase is:  
Hypothesis 1:  The bottom-up entry point gives the EUD valuable experiences on decentralisation 
processes, which can be used later in formulation and implementation of national decentralisation 
programmes. 
For Peru the hypothesis can be rejected as the experience from the AGORAH programme in 
Ayacucho and Huancavelica did not give the EC/EU much experience to be used for supporting 
decentralisation in Peru. The idea was that the  CND should function as interlocutor between the 
regions and the central level – but it did not work after the institutional set-up was changed by the GoP 
in 2006. Further the programme was not followed up with a new initiative to support decentralisation 
by the EC/EU. 
The second hypothesis formulated is:  
Hypothesis 2: The continuous support of the EC/EU to decentralisation has enabled it to have an 
influential role on the decentralisation policy agenda and has allowed the EC/EU to intervene in 
support to decentralisation through a multi-level approach. 
The hypothesis can also be rejected as the EC/EU does not have an influential role on 
decentralisation among development partners in PERU and EC/EU does not support decentralisation 
directly.  
However, the close analyses carried out during the mission of various EC/EU programmes in Peru has 
revealed that EC/EU direct support to decentralisation is very limited (only AGORAH and some project 
from the NSA-LA programme), while other programmes (PASA, AMARES and EURO-PAN) provide 
an indirect support to decentralisation by applying and strengthening the decentralised structures 
during programme implementation.  
Below follows overall findings from the mission following the eight evaluation questions. 
EQ 1. Clarity of EC/EU policy/strategies on decentralisation.  
The staff at the EUD have little knowledge about the specific EU policies on decentralisation 
developed during the last 10 years. Officials from the government and other development partners are 
not well aware of any specific policy to decentralisation either.  
EQ2. The institutional capacity for decentralisation in the EC/EU 
In the EUD some 4-5 staff members apply a limited time on decentralisation – (max 25% at the most 
for the person who is coordinating with other development partners). This has created some (informal) 
institutional capacity with enough capacity to incorporate aspect of decentralisation into sector support 
programmes. 
EQ3. EC/EU support to decentralisation processes’ responsiveness to national contexts and 
aligned with national regulations and policies  
The EC/EU has only given limited direct support to decentralisation. The indirect support through large 
sector programmes (particular in health) has been designed in alignment with the decentralised 
structures in Peru.     
EQ 4. Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence 
EC/EU does not play any particular role in the support to decentralisation among development 
partners. Its indirect support activities to decentralisation are well coordinated with other donors.    
EQ5 Programme results on transfer of functions to local councils   
The EC/EU has not supported the establishment of legislation for decentralisation or the transfer of 
functions to LGs or regional governments.   
EQ6 Programme results for capacity of stakeholders  
The EC/EU has supported the development of regional and local governments capacities indirectly by 
supporting participative planning in the PASA programme and decentralised entities of ministries (in 
particular health) at regional level via sector programmes.  
Direct support to decentralised capacities has been implemented to national institutions for 
decentralisation (National Decentralised Council) and the Decentralisation Secretariat (at the 
Presidency of the Council for Ministries).  
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EQ7 Programme results on local governance  
The EC/EU support to good governance has been limited to some support to local participation in 
three regions by the PASA. The last ten years in Peru has in general seen a restoration of local 
governance with elections held in 2002, 2006 and 2010 for local governments and 2006 and 2010 for 
regional governments.   
EQ8 Programme result on service delivery 
The expenditures for regional and local governments have increased during the last year in constant 
prices, which indicates that local services are better than before.  
The EC/EU has only supported this indirectly through sector programmes. 
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5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: The list of people interviewed 
Last name First name Organisation 
Date of the 
interview 
Amanda Valdez  Luz  
USAID: Prodescentralización 
(Ayacucho) 
Th. 16/06 
Anicama  Juan Dirección Regional de Salud Fr. 17/06 
Baertl Helguero Andrea 
CIES, Consortium de Investigation 
Economico y Socia 
Ma. 20/06 
Bermúdez  Violeta  
USAID: Prodescentralización 
(Directora adjunta) 
Tu. 14/06 
Castillo  Severino 
(Gerente Regional de Desarrollo 
Económico) Gobierno Regional de 
Ayacucho 
Th. 16/06 
Condori Carlos  
Mesa de Concertación y Lucha contra 
la pobreza Ayacucho (Coordinador de 
la MCLCP) 
Fr. 17/06 
Gallard  Patrick  EUD / Programme Advisor Tu. 14/06 
Gandolfo Marco  
AGORAH - Jefe de equipo de 
asistencia técnica  
We. 15/06 
Garcia Tatiana  EUD / Programas temáticos We. 14/06 
Gonzales Paucar Julio  
Municipalidad de Ayacucho (Gerente 
Desarrollo Económico Local)  
Th. 16/06 
Gonzales Vigil José  UNDP  (Director de Programa)  Mo. 20/06 
Ljunggren-
Bacherer 
Malin  EUD/ Programas temáticos We. 14/06 
Maravi Guillermo 
CTB-financiado: Programa de Centros 
de Servicios empresariales no 
financieros en el corredor Ayacucho- 
Apurimac- Huancavelica (gerente 
general a la Ayacucho) 
Fr. 17/06 
Miraval Huamán Alicia  
Dirección Regional de Salud de las 
Personas 
Fr. 17/06 
Molina Chavez Ernesto  
Presidente anterior del Gobierno 
Regional de Ayacucho 
Sa. 17/06 
Noriega Lopez María del Pilar 
Secretaría Nacional de 
Descentralización (Jefe de Oficina - 
Desarrollo de Capacidades y 
Articulación Intergubernamental)  
Tu. 14/06 
Ore Walter  
Gobierno Regional de Ayacucho (Sub-
Gerente Regional de Desarrollo social)  
Th. 16/06 
Paulsen Harmut GIZ  Tu. 21/06 
Pezantes  Micaela 
CIES, Consortium de Investigation 
Economico y Social  – Program advisor 
Mo. 20/06 
Salazar Jaime  
PASA - Ingeniero/ Promotor de 
inversiones económicas locales PASA 
Ayacucho 
Th. 16/06 
Sanchez Carlos 
CTB-financiado: Programa de Centros 
de Servicios empresariales no 
Fr. 17/06 
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financieros en el corredor Ayacucho- 
Apurimac- Huancavelica (coordinador 
en Huancavelica) 
Suarez-Ognio Leonor  EUD We. 14/06 
Torres  Samuel  
Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas 
(Dirección de Presupuesto territorial)  
We. 15/06 
Torres Javier  
NGO: Servicios Educativos Rurales 
(Director) 
Mo. 20/06 
 
Participants in the de-briefing 22 July 2011  
Malin Ljunggren EUD 
Tatiana García EUD 
José-Luis  Arteaga EUD 
Patrick Gallard EUD 
Leonor  Suarez EUD 
Jean Charles Fiehrer EUD 
Oscar  Boije EUD 
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5.2 Annex 2: The list of documents consulted  
EU (2002); Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 
EU (2002); Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 
Commission Europea y el Consejo Nacional de Descentralizacion (2004), Programa de Apoyo al 
Desarrllo Socioeconomico y a la Descentralizacion en las Regiones de Ayacucho y Huancavelica Plan 
Operative Global 2004-2007 
EU (2006); Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socio-Económico y a la Descentralización en las 
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC/EU-funded interventions related to decentralisation in Peru 
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry point 
Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid 
modality 
Main contracting 
party 
Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo 
Socio-Económico y a la 
Descentralización en las Regiones 
de Ayacucho y Huancavelica – 
AGORAH 
2003 – 2006 13 13 ALA/2003/005-758 Bottom-up L 
Grant to 
GoP, with a 
component 
of targeted 
Budget 
Support to 
the two 
beneficiary 
Regions 
Government, 
Republica del 
Peru 
Fortalecimiento de capacidades 
nacionales y regionales para la 
implementación, seguimiento y 
evaluación de políticas públicas 
multisectoriales 
2008-2011 0,92 0,74 
DCI-ALA/2007/019-
475 
Top-down N 
Project/ 
Grant 
Government, 
Republica del 
Peru 
Indirect interventions         
Programa de Apoyo a la Seguridad 
Alimentaria – PASA 
1997-2007 123 74 
Multiple financing 
decisions 
Bottom-up/ 
Sectoral 
L 
Project/ 
Targeted 
“budget 
support” 
Government, 
Republica del 
Peru 
Proyecto de apoyo a la 
modernización del sector salud y 
su aplicación en una región del 
Peru (AMARES) 
2002 - 2007 9,8 9,8 ALA/1997/001-026 Sectoral S Grant to GoP 
Government, 
Republica del 
Peru 
Programa de apoyo 
presupuestario al Programa 
Articulado Nutricional – EuroPAN 
2010-2013 60 25 
DCI-ALA/2009/021-
564 
Sectoral S 
Budget 
Support  
Government, 
Republica del 
Peru 
The evaluation team has also considered a number of projects financed under the NSA-LA budget line, which are presented in table 2 in the document.  
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
List of interventions detailed in the sub-sections below: 
 Intervention 1: Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socio-Económico y a la 
Descentralización en las Regiones de Ayacucho y Huancavelica - AGORAH. 
 Intervention 2: Programa de Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria - PASA. 
 Intervention 3: Fortalecimiento de capacidades nacionales y regionales para la 
implementación, seguimiento y evaluación de políticas públicas multisectoriales  - 
“Modernización del Estado PCM” (2007 AAP). 
 Intervention 4: Desarrollo de capacidades de autoridades y funcionarios municipales y 
de la Sociedad Civil para el ejercicio de la gobernabilidad democrática en los municipios. 
 Intervention 5: Fortaleciendo la gobernabilidad: gobiernos regionales con mayor 
capacidad de gestión transparente. 
 Intervention 6: Proyecto de apoyo a la modernización del sector salud y su aplicación en 
una región del Perú (AMARES). 
 Intervention 7: Programa de apoyo presupuestario al Programa Articulado Nutricional – 
EuroPAN. 
5.4.1 Intervention 1 
Title: Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socio-Económico y a la Descentralización en las 
Regiones de Ayacucho y Huancavelica - AGORAH 
Budget: 12.974.938 EUR 
Start date: 2003 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: Contributing to the improvement of the living conditions in the regions of 
Ayacucho and Huancavelica through the application of a model of socio-economic development 
with a regional scope. 
Specific objective: Contributing to socio-economic development of the regions of Ayacucho and 
Huancavelica through capacity building of regional and local governments and the development 
of economic and social infrastructure (of regional character). 
Expected results: 
 Regional and provincial governments are better trained and equipped to promote 
regional economic development and tackle the tasks assigned to them by the 
Decentralisation Act. This means increasing the capacity of LG to identify and prioritize 
participatory socio-economic projects and to formulate & execute them. 
 The coverage of regional interest services is improved and the supply of temporary 
employment has increased in the poorest districts in these two regions through the 
construction of economic and social infrastructures (with a regional scope). 
Activities: 
 Strengthening capacities for planning of regional and provincial governments. 
o Improve diagnostic processes; 
o Support the process of identifying priority projects; 
o Support participatory planning and land management (especially in urban areas); 
o Training of public employees and the supervisory bodies of civil society. 
 Increase the capacity to prepare and supervise projects. 
o Pre-feasibility and feasibility study; 
o Training courses; 
o Provision of equipment and materials necessary to ensure complementary and 
proper functioning of the regional and local governments’ technical units; 
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o Training regarding the main tasks for the implementation of the infrastructure 
projects (preparation of calls for tenders, supervision of the execution of works, 
accountability); 
o Promoting inter-departmental and interprovincial partnerships. 
 Improve financial management. 
o Support the reinforcement of regional and provincial tax systems; 
o Support the implementation of a financial information system (cost, 
organizational and operational manuals, internal controls and accountability, 
etc.); 
o Implementation and improvement of urban cadastre. 
 Financing socio-economic infrastructure. 
5.4.2 Intervention 2  
Title: Programa de Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria (PASA)13 
Budget: more than 120 mEUR committed (see table below). 
Starting date: 1997 
Introduction: 
In 1995, the GoP focused its social policies on health, education and justice. In addition, in order 
to mitigate the quite explosive social situation in the country, the GoP decided to implement a 
series of social programmes, among which two initiatives are the pillars of each PASA 
components: 
 Improvement Plan for Basic Social Spending (PMGSB), which constituted the 
"backbone" of the strategy to combat poverty in the government. Two component 
programmes: Basic Education for All and Health for All, in addition to the Complementary 
Food programs for Major Risk and Justice Basic Program. 
 The Ministry of the Presidency (PRES), which created the Task Force for Social 
Investment (ETIS), which objective was the development of a "Focused Strategy to 
Combat Poverty" (EFLCPE). The novelty of the strategy are the introduction of Local 
Development Plans (LAPs) and / or District Development Plans (PADs), which prioritized 
development actions according to the Poverty Map and involve an increased participation 
in the management of local development. 
Summary of the programme: 
In June 1997, the Government of Peru and the European Commission signed the Financing 
Agreement for the implementation of “Programa de Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria - Perú - 
Comisión Europea" (“Support to Food Security, European Commission Peru” - PASA PERU-CE) 
which established the following components: 
1. Investment in human capital: component used to support activities in the sectors of 
health and education and to increase the capacity of the poor through increase access to 
basic education and health. 
2. Social and productive investment: component which aimed at supporting the 
implementation of social and productive infrastructure in districts of extreme poverty in a 
perspective of strengthening local capacity, thereby increasing household incomes and 
local employment. 
3. Institutional support: This component aims to strengthen the capacities of public 
institutions responsible for the implementation of the programme, in addition to 
strengthening local capacity for management and execution of investments. 
The programme adopted the social policies and programmes defined by the government, 
identifying the actions that it considered would best respond to social demands and focusing on 
those geographical areas that, according to the Poverty Map, had the highest concentration of 
                                                     
13
 This programme corresponds to multiple financing decisions between the EU and the GoP. 
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poverty14. The programme actually corresponds to 21 financing agreements between the EC/EU 
and Government institutions15 signed and executed between 1997 and 2007. 
Financial modality: 
Financial support was provided through “targeted budget support”. The funds granted by the 
EC/EU were transferred to the relevant line ministries. Specific agreements were actually signed 
between the EC/EU and each ministry, defining the actions that the EC/EU co-financed and the 
amounts to be transferred (according to a financial plan). The ministry that had signed a financing 
agreement with the EC/EU received the financial support only after official approval of the public 
expenditures by the Directorate General of Budget. The transfer of funds of EC/EU consisted in 
an extension of the line ministry’s official budget and actually corresponded to a reimbursement 
of the relevant expenditures identified in the financial agreement. 
The table below gives an overview of the yearly commitments & disbursements related to the 
“PASA PERU-CE” programme.  
Table 1 PASA - Overview of yearly Commitments & Disbursements  
Year Total commitment Total disbursement 
1998 26.560.385 4.672.678 
1999 28.172.476 11.033.773 
2000 - 12.161.179 
2001 20.843.137 10.396.746 
2002 12.447.815 9.653.281 
2003 8.197.604 2.432.759 
2004 7.945.794 6.251.134 
2005 11.992.970 6.615.467 
2006 6.709.981 9.246.890 
2007 - 1.521.072 
TOTAL 122.870.162 EUR 73.984.980 EUR 
5.4.3 Intervention 3 
Title: Fortalecimiento de capacidades nacionales y regionales para la implementación, 
seguimiento y evaluación de políticas públicas multisectoriales  - “Modernización del Estado 
PCM”- DCI-ALA/2007/19-475 (AAP 2007) 
Budget: 920.974 EUR 
Start date: 2008 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: Contribute to the modernization of the state as an instrument of social 
cohesion. 
Specific objective: Government's institutional capacities for the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of multi-sectoral public policies in an environment of democratic governance have 
been strengthened. 
                                                     
14
 Major interventions were expected to be carried out in the departments/ regions of Huancavelica, 
Apurimac, Ayacucho and Loreto which were considered as very poor; minor interventions were planned in 
Junin and Puno which were considered as quite poor. 
15
 Main ministries involved: MED: Ministerio de Educación - MINSA: Ministerio de Salud – MINAG: 
ministerio de Agricultura – MIMDES: Ministerio de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Económico y Social. 
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Expected results: 
 The National Agreement (Acuerdo Nacional) has become an important forum for 
coordination between state and society, at national, regional and local levels. 
 4 pilot and prioritized multi-sector national policies have been formulated and 
implemented. 
 Capacities for decentralized governance and implementation of policies through public 
investment programmes have been created, in an environment of prevention of 
corruption. 
Activities: 
 Activity 1.1: Consolidate processes based on a culture of dialogue and consensus 
building within the National Agreement. 
 Activity 1.2: Promote the consensus reached by the National Agreement so as to 
influence government policies. 
 Activity 1.3: Promote comparative views of regional development and integrate the 
results reached in the regional and local participatory planning processes. 
 Activity 1.4: Linking the National Agreement to other sectors through new strategies. 
 Activity 2.1: Develop and implement a pilot intervention of the multi-sector policy to 
combat drugs and promote alternative development. 
 Activity 2.2: Develop and implement a pilot intervention of the multi-sector policy to 
combat chronic child malnutrition. 
 Activity 2.3: Develop and implement a pilot intervention of the multi-sector policy on 
Development at Borders. 
 Activity 2.4: Develop and implement a pilot intervention of the multi-sector policy on 
reparations to victims of political and social violence. 
 Activity 3.1: Strengthening the decentralisation process by supporting the functions of the 
Decentralisation Secretariat for the intergovernmental coordination. 
 Activity 3.2: Capacity building of regional and municipal governments and implementation 
of the National Capacity Development plan with special emphasis on institutional 
management and programming of investment projects. 
 Activity 3.3: Improve the capacity and skills of local governments in terms of 
management and internal control through training programmes implemented by the 
National Audit Institution and support to the Regional Audit Office (“Órganos Regionales 
de Control”) under the mandate of the Auditor General of the Republic (“Contraloría de la 
República” - CGR). 
5.4.4 Intervention 4 
Title: Desarrollo de capacidades de autoridades y funcionarios municipales y de la Sociedad 
Civil para el ejercicio de la gobernabilidad democrática en los municipios - DCI-
NSAPVD/2008/020-081 
Budget: 125.000 EUR 
Starting date: 2009 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: The strengthening of transparent and participatory governance at the regional 
level. 
Specific objective: Regional governments Junín, Huancavelica and Piura manage to establish 
new channels of communication with citizens, including vulnerable groups, based on transparent 
management and access to information. 
Expected results: 
 Increase in capacity of regional governments in matters of transparency of public 
management and in communication strategies with citizens. 
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 Accountability mechanisms strengthened for effective interaction between authorities and 
citizens. 
 Principles of ethics and integrity govern the behaviour of the regional authorities during 
the 2010 election campaign. 
 Most vulnerable populations in the regions, including indigenous peoples, women, 
children and adolescents, the elderly, victims of internal conflict and people with special 
needs are taken into account by the regional authorities when providing information on its 
management and way of functioning. 
Activities:  
 Advice on working with vulnerable populations 
 Development and implementation of web workforce 
 Training of regional authorities (and future) on transparency and access to information. 
 Monitoring quarterly web portals of the authorities 
 Organization of training workshops on communication strategies to authorities 
 Organization of workshops for regional media  
 Monitoring the management of regional governments on specific issues 
 Organization of meetings for Good Government 
 Training workshops for key officials for the regional government mechanisms for 
transparency and neutrality in election time.  
 Organization of thematic exhibitions of citizens  in each region 
 Advice in publishing and ease of use of data on vulnerable populations. 
5.4.5 Intervention 5 
Title: Strengthening local governance and transparency (“Fortaleciendo la gobernabilidad: 
gobiernos regionales con mayor capacidad de gestión transparente”) - DCI-NSAPVD/2008/020-
081 
Budget: 241.830 EUR 
Start date: 2010 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: Promote democratic governance in local governments in the north-eastern 
region of Peru for sustainable development and poverty reduction. 
Specific objective: Municipal authorities and civil society are better managing their development 
by practicing democratic governance in 8 poor districts in the north-eastern part of the 
Department of Cajamarca. 
Expected results: 
 Strengthened capacities of municipal authorities and officials to ensure stability and 
continuity of municipal management. 
 Municipal associations constituted and fortified with technical secretaries for the 
concerted management of development  
 Civil society representatives able to lead inclusive local development processes which 
consolidate participatory municipal management. 
 Municipal associations manage projects to achieve agreed objectives of development 
plans. 
Activities: 
 Training and technical assistance for the improvement of Municipal Governance. 
 Social Marketing of Municipal Management. 
 Awareness and information to civil society on local governance. 
 Training programmes for local leaders.  
 Construction of "proposals and agreements for Local Development". 
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 Information Programme “Municipal Elections 2010”. 
 Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth Conformation in Cutervo. 
 Organization and Implementation of Technical Secretariats for Municipal Associations. 
 Technical assistance for the project management of 2 Municipal Associations. 
 Technical Secretariat provides technical assistance to local governments in development 
projects. 
5.4.6 Intervention 6 
Title: Proyecto de apoyo a la modernización del sector salud y su aplicación en una región del 
Peru (AMARES) 
Budget: 9,8 mEUR 
Start date: 2002 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: Contribute (with the GoP) to the improvement of the health status of the 
beneficiary population in the area of intervention. 
Specific objective: The Ministry of Health, regional and local governments, as well as 
institutions, organizations and communities involved in health activities in the areas of 
intervention of the project have been strengthened in order to contribute to the development of 
the reform process and the modernization of the health sector. 
Expected results: 
 The Ministry of Health, regional and local governments have implemented specific 
strategies in the intervention area of the project with respect to decentralisation and 
improved management in relation to health. 
 The Ministry of Health, the DIRESAS, networks and micro-networks of health in the 
Project have and apply a more integrated system of health information that allows staff 
and technical equipment to use the information for decision-making. 
 The Ministry of Health, the DIRESAS, networks and micro-networks of health in the 
Project have improved their management capacity in health human resources with a 
focus on continuous training on health. 
 The Ministry of Health, the DIRESAS, networks and micro-health networks in the area of 
the project have developed and started implementing the new health care model focused 
on quality improvement that considers intercultural and increased capacity to meet the 
priority health needs of the population using new mechanisms of co-management of 
health services. 
 Facilitate the exchanges and the convergence between regional governments, DIRESAs 
and Regional Offices of Education, communities, networks, micro-networks and 
educational and health facilities to develop and promote a healthy environment at all 
these levels and incorporate these principles to the regional and local development.  
Activities related to Expected result 1: 
 1.1 Technical support to strengthen technical planning at the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
and its units. 
 1.2 Support to the modernization of the management at DIRESAs and Health Networks 
level, focusing on the use of management agreements. 
 1.3 Technical support to the decentralisation process of the health sector. 
 1.4 Strengthening national and regional capacities for negotiation and evaluation of 
International Cooperation. 
 1.5 Support to the formulation of mechanisms for budget allocation and investment in 
health. 
 1.6 Implement proposals for modernization of MINSA. 
 1.7 Support and encourage discussion, development and socialization of health sector 
reform proposals. 
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5.4.7 Intervention 7 
Title: Programa de apoyo presupuestario al Programa Articulado Nutricional – Euro-PAN - 
ALA/DCI//2009/021/-564 
Budget: 61 mEUR 
Start date: 2009 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective of the “Articulated Nutritional Programme” (“Programa articulado nutricional”): 
Improve the living conditions in rural areas. 
Specific objective of the “Articulated Nutritional Programme”: Decrease chronic malnutrition of 
children under-five from 25% in 2005 to 16% in 2011. 
Objective of Euro-PAN: contribute at both technical and financial level to the implementation of 
the national “Articulated Nutritional Programme” with the goal to accelerate the decrease of 
chronic infantile malnutrition and fight against poverty in Peru. 
Activities: 
 Financial transfer to the National Treasury 
 Policy dialogue on the implementation of a macroeconomic policy that aims at supporting 
stability, better public financial management and the fight against poverty through the 
national Articulated Nutritional Programme. 
 Technical assistance and complementary support.  
Remarks: 
Measurement of results 
Indicators of results are supposed to be measured only for the bottom fifth of the population in 
terms of poverty: it corresponds actually to 54 districts in 3 of the poorest “departments” of the 
country. 
Payment modality: 
Budget support with fixed and variable tranche as well as technical assistance (TA) component. 
Presupuesto Indicativo 2009-
2010 
2011 2012 2013 Total 
Total 25,2 11,2 11,2 13,2 60,8 
Tramos Fijos 25 5 2 2 34 
Tramos Variables - 6 9 11 26 
Ayuda complementaria 
(Asistencia Técnica, 
Visibilidad, Auditoria 
Evaluación y Medidas de 
Apoyo Suplementarias) 
0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,8 
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
5.5.1 Overall introduction 
Since the Republic of Peru was established, opinions were divided between those who favour a 
federalist option and those who support a centralized country. The discussions on federalisation 
already appeared in the Constitutional Congress of 1827. However, federalisation was finally 
deemed inappropriate and the process was consequently postponed.  
At that time, the country's administrative division defined three sub-national levels: departments, 
provinces and districts. But the departments were not really corresponding to a “local 
government” since the authority at this level was embodied by the Prefect who was in charge of 
monitoring public order, was depending from the “Ministry of Policy and Governance” (“Ministerio 
de Gobierno y Policía” – now the Ministry of Interior) and was appointed by the President of the 
Republic. On the other hand, local governments existed (although this was actually only partially 
the case) in the form of “municipalities” at provincial and district levels.  
Municipalities began to be democratically elected in 1963. And, in fact, only two elections took 
place in a row (1963 and 1966) before the 1968 military coup. A new reformist approach was 
then adopted and the situation lasted until 1980. Municipal authorities started again to be 
democratically elected only after the restoration of democracy in the country in 1980. During the 
1970s, the socialist-oriented military government thoroughly reformed “ownership” in key sectors 
of the country: agriculture (development of cooperatives), fishing and mining (state ownership) 
and industry (obligation of co-ownership with workers).  
Table 2 List of presidents of Peru over the past 30 years 
Period in office President 
1980-1985 Fernando Belaúnde Terry 
1985-1990 Alan García Pérez 
1990-2000 Alberto Fujimori 
2000-2001 Transitional government 
2001-2006 Alejandro Toledo 
2006-2011 Alan García Pérez 
2011-… Ollanta Humala Tasso  
 
In 1979, as part of the process of preparing the return to democracy, a Constituent Assembly was 
established. The process included a new reform that was supposed to be implemented by future 
democratic governments: the regionalisation.  
In 1984, a National Regionalization Plan was approved and formed the basis for the 
establishment and development of regions. This was accompanied by the enactment of a Law on 
Regional Elections and Designation of Representatives.  
The regions and related departments defined in the plan are detailed in the table below. 
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Table 3 Peru’s regions and departments 
Region Departamentos 
Andrés Avelino Cáceres Pasco , Junín, Huánuco 
Arequipa Arequipa, 
Chavín Ancash 
Grau Tumbes, Piura 
Inca Cuzco, Madre de Dios, Apurimac 
José Carlos Mariategui Puno, Moquegua y Tacna 
La Libertad La Libertad 
Loreto Loreto 
Los Libertadores Wari Ica, Ayacucho, Huancavelica 
Nor Oriental del Marañón Lambayeque, Cajamarca y Amazonas 
San Martín San Martín 
Ucayali Ucayali 
Notes: 1/ In several cases, the department annexation marked the division of the departments. For example 
Apurimac, whose provinces of Andahuaylas and Chincheros became part of the Region Los Libertadores 
Wari. 2/ The conditions for Lima and Callao has never been clearly defined. 
In order to maintain the power at central level, a series of measures was actually adopted which 
weakened the regionalisation process:  
a) The indirect election of the “Regional President” who was elected by the Regional 
Assembly. 
b) The universal and direct election of only 40% of the members of the Regional Assembly. 
c) The participation of provincial mayors. 
d) The participation of the elected representatives of social, cultural and productive 
organizations. 
e) The Regional Assembly could pass laws but could only do so through “express 
delegation” by the national legislature; moreover, the National Executive had to actually 
enact them and kept the right to veto. 
Regionalisation was short-lived as, just two years after its creation, a coup organised by the 
President of the Republic himself suspended the process of creation of regional 
governments (April 1992). The decision came in the middle of a national crisis characterized by 
the burst into a civil war coupled with a deep economic downturn. In this context, it was finally 
decided to establish in each department a Transitory Council of Regional Administration (CTAR) 
chaired by an official appointed by the central government. 
In 1993, a new Constituent Congress was organised. It decided to establish at regional level 
democratically elected presidents supported by Coordination Councils composed of “provincial 
mayors” (“alcaldes provinciales”). Elections were planned to be organised no later than 1995. But 
this plan was never carried out and the regime in place collapsed shortly after. In the meanwhile, 
the CTAR lost functions, powers and resources becoming an irrelevant political body. 
A new evolution occurred during the mandate of President Toledo. In March 2002, an 
amendment to the Constitution completely modified the chapter on decentralisation. The new 
proposal planned a gradual process so as to ensure proper transfer of responsibilities and 
resources to “regional and local governments”. 
The process began with the election and installation of “regional governments” in each of the 
departments (as well as in the “constitutional province” of Callao16). “Regions” had to be created 
by the union of two or more contiguous departments. And, to this end, the constitutional reform 
                                                     
16
 The portuary area of Lima. 
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had planned that a referendum would be organised to present suggestions of departmental 
aggregation. 
The first attempt to form regions occurred in 2005 when five proposals involving sixteen 
departments were submitted to a referendum. However, none of the proposals were eventually 
accepted by the citizens. In 2009, the scheduled dates for the subsequent referendum for other 
departments were cancelled. 
5.5.2 Structure of sub-national governments 
It is commonly agreed that three levels of government exist: National, regional and local. This is 
also the classification used by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. However, in the 
constitutional reality this division is actually more complex. Article 189 of the constitution states 
that "The territory of the Republic is composed of regions, departments, provinces and districts, 
along which the government is organized at national, regional and local levels, in the terms 
established by the Constitution and the law, preserving the unity and integrity of the state and the 
nation. The scope of the regional government level is the regions and the departments. The 
scope of the local government level is the provinces, the districts and the urban centres17. " 
Since there are not yet established regions, the country is actually divided into three levels: 24 
departments, 195 provinces and 1.838 districts. In each of these jurisdictions, three levels of 
government exist: 
 “regional governments” at department level,  
 “provincial municipalities” at provincial level,  
 “district municipalities” at district level.  
Thus, any district corresponds to four hierarchical levels of elected officials. The name of “local 
governments” (“Gobiernos locales”) is usually adopted to designate the provincial and district 
municipalities. 
With the cancellation of the deadlines for the formation of regions, departments have already 
begun to be called regions. On the other hand, at local level, maintaining the coexistence of three 
hierarchical levels established a continuum from rural to the metropolitan governments. The lack 
of this distinction in the country creates serious problems when defining roles and responsibilities 
as the enormous heterogeneity prevents to apply consistent rules at municipal level. Under the 
last census, the largest district municipality18 had 898.443 inhabitants while the smallest19 had 
only 161 inhabitants. 
The figure below summarises the current structure of the Peruvian state. 
                                                     
17
 Los centros poblados no constituyen una subdivisión jurisdiccional de carácter universal; ellas son 
creadas mediante una ordenanza de la municipalidad provincial, que determina además: su  delimitación 
territorial, su régimen de organización interior, las funciones que se le delegan, los recursos que se le 
asignan y sus atribuciones administrativas y económico-tributarias. Art. 128 de la Ley de Municipalidades. 
18
 San Juan de Lurigancho. 
19
 Santa María del Mar. 
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Figure 2 Organisation of the state in Peru 
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Source: Particip analysis (based on information available at www.peru.gob.pe). 
 
The structures of the various levels of government were gradually defined through the enactment 
of a number of laws between 2002 and 2007. The table below gives an overview of the evolution 
of the legislative framework related to decentralisation over the past decade. 
Table 4 Evolution of the legislative framework related to decentralisation 
Year Law (and short description) 
2002 Ley de Bases de la Descentralización – LBD  
2002 Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales  
2002 Ley de Elecciones Regionales 
2002 Ley Marco de Promoción de la Inversión Descentralizada 
2003 Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades 
2003 Ley Marco de Presupuesto Participativo 
2004 Ley de Descentralización Fiscal 
2004 Ley de Incentivos para la Integración y Conformación de Regiones 
2007 Ley Orgánica del poder Ejecutivo  
 
5.5.3 The actors of decentralisation 
During the first government involved in decentralizing reform (government of Alejandro Toledo), 
the decentralisation process was entrusted to the CND which was created in 2002 by the Law on 
Decentralisation “Ley de Bases de Descentralización”. This council was created to work as an 
independent body under the PCM. Its role was to implement, monitor and evaluate the transfer of 
powers and functions of central government to regional and local governments. Later, in early 
2007 (under the government of Alan García Pérez), the CND was absorbed by the Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers which created the “Decentralisation Secretariat”. This Secretariat 
received much less power and fewer resources than the former CND and was organised as an 
administrative in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, PCM. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Peru; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
43 
In response to the decision of the executive to deactivate the CND, a group of Presidents of 
Region met on 2 February 2007 to create the “National Assembly of Regional Governments” 
(“Asamblea Nacional de Gobiernos Regionales “) that is an association of Presidents of Region 
and is devoted to coordinate the action of regional governments in the political arena. 
The Intergovernmental Coordination Council (CCI) was subsequently created to develop an 
institutionalised space to allow exchanges between the three levels of government and the 
development of a consensus on the national policies on decentralisation. The CCI is chaired by 
the President of the Council of Ministers and include all other ministers, the presidents of the 25 
regional governments, the mayors of the Municipality of Lima and of the Provincial Municipality of 
Callao, and a representation of local governments directly elected by district and provincial 
mayors. The first election of representatives of local governments took place only in April 2011. 
However, it should be mentioned that, between 2009 and 2011, seven ministries have already 
set up Intergovernmental Committees for the decentralised management linked to the sector they 
cover. 
Finally, the “Juntas de Coordinación Interregionales (JCI)” (interregional coordination bodies) and 
the “Mancomunidades Regionales” should be mentioned:   
The “Juntas de Coordinación Interregionales” is defined in Article 91 of the Organic Law of 
Regions as spaces for coordination of projects, plans and actions, whose orientation is the 
consolidation of economic corridors and the development of axes to create “macro-regional 
spaces”. The “Law on Incentives for Integration and Creation of Regions” state that the JCI have 
the objective to form strategic management agreements and materialize regions through specific 
cooperation agreements on production and service delivery projects. Four JCI have been created 
and cover 21 regional governments: “Internorte” formed by the governments of Ancash, 
Cajamarca, La Libertad, Lambayeque, Piura and Tumbes; “Junta Amazónica”, formed by the 
governments of Amazonas, Loreto, Madre de Dios, San Martin and Ucayali; “Junta del Centro”, 
formed by the governments of Ayacucho, Huanuco, Huancavelica, Ica, Junín and Pasco; “Junta 
del Sur”, formed by the governments of Arequipa, Cusco, Moquegua and Tacna. 
The “Mancomunidades Regionales” are instances of voluntary integration involving several 
neighbouring regions/ departments. They aim is to promote sustainable development based on 
the complementarity of regional potential. This functional articulation is intended to implement 
projects and roles that are of common interest. 
5.5.4 The powers and functions of regional governments 
According to the Organic Law of Regional Governments No. 27867 and the amendment No. 
27902 (Article 9), regional governments have the following constitutional powers: 
a) Approve their internal organization and budget. 
b) Develop and approve the regional development plan agreed with the municipalities and civil 
society. 
c) Manage regional assets and income. 
d) Regulate and grant permits, licenses and fees on services of their responsibility. 
e) Promote and implement regional economic development plans and programmes. 
f) Establish the rules inherent in regional management. 
g) Promote and regulate activities and / or services in agriculture, fisheries, industry, 
agribusiness, trade, tourism, energy, mining, transportation, communications, education, health 
and environment, according to the law. 
h) Promote competition, investment and financing for projects and infrastructure works of regional 
scope and impact. 
i) Present legislative initiatives on issues and matters within its competence. 
j) Exercise other powers according to law. 
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Figure 3 Functions and role of regional governments 
 
In addition, under Article 10 of the same document, they have exclusive and shared competence 
as defined in the “Article 35 of the Organic Law of the basis of Decentralisation”.  
The exclusive competences include:  
a) To plan the development of their region and implement appropriate social and economic 
programs in line with the National Development Plan. 
b) To develop and approve the Regional Development Plan (agreed with municipalities and civil 
society in their region). 
c) To adopt its internal organization and institutional budget under the Budget Management Act 
and the laws of the State Annual Budget. 
d) Promote and implement a regional public investment plan in road infrastructure projects, 
energy, communications and basic services at the regional level, with strategies of sustainability, 
competitiveness, private investment opportunities and to stimulate markets and profitable 
activities. 
e) Design and implement regional watersheds, economic corridors and intermediate cities. 
f) To promote business formation and regional economic units to arrange production and service 
systems. 
g) To facilitate processes aimed at international markets for agriculture, agribusiness, handicrafts, 
forestry and other productive sectors, according to their potential. 
h) Development of tourist circuits that can become areas of development. 
i) Reach agreements with other regions to promote economic development, social and 
environmental. 
j) Managing and allocating urban land and state-owned vacant lots in their jurisdiction, except for 
municipally owned land. 
k) Plan and approve the technical files on territorial demarcation activities in their jurisdiction, 
according to the law of matter. 
l) Promote the modernization of small and medium regional companies, linked to the tasks of 
education, employment and technological upgrading and innovation. 
m) To issue rules on cases and matters within its responsibility, and propose appropriate 
legislative initiatives. 
n) Promote the sustainable use of forest resources and biodiversity. 
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o) Other competences determined by specific laws. 
 
The shared competencies include: 
a) Education. Management-level education services, primary, secondary and higher non-
university, with criteria designed to promote intercultural education development. 
b) Public health. 
c) The promotion, management and regulation of economic and productive activities in their area 
and level for the agriculture, fishery, industry, commerce, tourism, energy, hydrocarbons, mining, 
transport, communications and environment. 
d) Sustainable management of natural resources and improving environmental quality. 
e) Preservation and management of protected natural reserves and regional areas. 
f) Dissemination of culture and empowerment of all regional arts and cultural institutions. 
g) Regional competitiveness and the promotion of productive employment at all levels, arranging 
public and private resources. 
h) Public participation, encouraging dialogue between the public and private interests at all levels. 
i) Others as delegated or assigned under law. 
 
It should be noted that according to the plan initially envisaged the powers and functions would 
be transferred after the formation of regions. However, given the negative results obtained in the 
referendum, the government decided in 2006 to implement a "decentralisation shock" with the 
transfer of 180 out of the 185 functions (specified in the Organic Law of Regional Governments) 
by 31 December 2007. The goal has not been met so far.  
Similar situation occurred with respect to transfers scheduled in the Medium Term Plan 2006 - 
2010 which should be completed by no later than December 2010.  
It should be recognized that significant progress was made in the transfer, so that by mid-2010, 
the administrative transfer of 95,6% of sector functions to regional governments had been 
implemented. 
 
5.5.5 The powers and functions of local governments 
In accordance with Article 73 of the Municipalities Act, Local governments assume (exclusive or 
shared) powers in the following areas: 
1. Organization of physical space  
1.1. Zoning. 
1.2. Urban and rural cadastre. 
1.3. Urban empowerment. 
1.4. Physical healing legal settlements. 
1.5. Territorial organization. 
1.6. Urban renewal. 
1.7. Basic urban infrastructure and rural. 
1.8. Road. 
1.9. Historical, cultural and scenic. 
2. Local public service delivery 
2.1. Environmental sanitation, hygiene and health. 
2.2. Transit, traffic and public transport. 
2.3. Education, culture, sport and recreation. 
2.4. Social programs, defence and promotion of rights. 
2.5. Safety. 
2.6. Supply and marketing of products and services. 
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2.7. Civil Registry, in recognition of an agreement with the National Registry of 
Identification and Civil Status, according to the law. 
2.8. Promoting local economic development to generate employment. 
2.9. Establishment, maintenance and administration of zonal wind, zoos, botanical 
gardens, natural forests, either directly or through concessions. 
2.10. Other public services not reserved for public regional or national character. 
3. Environmental protection and conservation 
3.1. Formulate, adopt, implement and monitor plans and local environmental policies, in 
accordance with the policies, standards and regional plans, sector and national levels. 
3.2. Propose the creation of conservation areas. 
3.3. Promote environmental education and research in the area and encourage citizen 
participation at all levels. 
3.4. Participate and support regional environmental commission in carrying out their 
duties. 
3.5. Coordinate with various levels of national government, sectoral and regional levels, 
the correct application of the instruments of local planning and environmental 
management in the context of national and regional environmental management. 
4. In terms of local economic development  
4.1. Planning and provision of infrastructure for local development. 
4.2. Encouraging private investment in projects of local interest. 
4.3. Promoting job creation and development of micro and small enterprises urban or 
rural. 
4.4. Promotion of handicrafts. 
4.5. Promoting sustainable local tourism. 
4.6. Promoting rural development programs. 
5. In terms of local participation 
5.1. Promote, support and regulate resident participation in local development. 
5.2. Establish monitoring tools and procedures. 
5.3. Organize the records of social and neighbourhood organizations within their 
jurisdiction. 
6. In terms of local social service delivery 
6.1. Manage, organize and implement local programs to combat poverty and social 
development. 
6.2. Manage, organize and implement local assistance programs, protection and support 
to the population at risk and others who contribute to the development and welfare of the 
population. 
6.3. Establishing channels of dialogue between the neighbours and social programs. 
6.4. Disseminate and promote the rights of children, adolescents, women and the elderly, 
offering opportunities for participation at the level of municipal bodies. 
7. Prevention, rehabilitation and anti-drug 
7.1. Promote prevention and rehabilitation in cases of drug abuse and alcoholism and 
create eradication programs in coordination with the regional government. 
7.2. Promote international cooperation agreements to implement programs to eradicate 
illegal drug use. 
 
5.5.6 The development of human resources at sub-national levels 
Given the fact that there was no significant increase in wages, spending in personal at regional 
and local level can been considered as a proxy of the increase in regional and municipal 
employees which is: 25,3% and 107,5% respectively.  
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There has been no national assessment on the quality of staff at both levels of sub-national 
governments. But it is assumed since the beginning of the decentralisation process that it is 
necessary to heavily train staff as part of the transfer of functions. 
The CND prepared and approved on 13 October 2003, the National Plan for Capacity building 
and Technical assistance in Public Administration to strengthen regional and local governments. 
This document set a time horizon of three years and aimed to establish the general framework 
and basis for developing guidelines for training activities and technical assistance necessary to 
improve the management capacities of regional and local governments in the process of 
decentralisation. Unfortunately, the progress in the implementation of the plan has been quite 
low. 
In 2008 (Decree No. 1025), Standards for Training and Performance in the Public Sector were 
approved. They aimed is to establishing a voluntary accreditation system of programmes in 
public administration, public policy, development and project management. However, the 
regulation that should allow the effective implementation of these standards has never been 
approved.20 
On 12 January 2010, a plan for "National Capacity Development for Public Administration and 
Governance of Regional and Local Governments" (PNDC) was approved with the objective of 
"Improving Public Management with a focus on results, efficiency, effectiveness and 
transparency in the context of decentralisation and modernisation of the state." This plan also 
has four specific objectives: 
 Develop management skills desirable for public officials at the regional and local level (in 
the context of decentralisation and state modernization). 
 Strengthen the link between supply and demand of training in Public Management 
according to the skills necessary for the process of decentralisation. 
 Promote the management and production of knowledge and information in Public 
Management with the aim to improve decision making. 
 Promote the strengthening of inter-institutions networks so to enhance the sustainability 
in the implementation of the PNDC. 
Finally, there is the initiative "SERVIR" created to "improve the civil service in a comprehensive 
and continuous services to the citizens", which has given rise to the Body of Public Managers 
(CGP) that seeks to ensure a high quality management in strategic positions of the State and is 
now operating in central government and regional governments. The PCM performs selection 
process to fill places of managerial positions through merit-based and transparent public tenders, 
and its members have a system and a special remuneration scale, financed both by SERVIR, for 
the target entity. The most striking feature of the body is a requirement for public managers 
assigned to meet specific goals and indicators as a requirement to remain in the position 
assigned. 
5.5.7 Finance at sub-national level 
The changing structure of national spending allows highlighting the percentage increase of the 
total share related to sub-national governments. 
 
                                                     
20
 Proceso de descentralización 2009 - Balance y Agenda Crítica – PRODES (p.90). 
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Table 5 Level of expenditures of sub-national governments 
NIVELES 2004 2007 2009 
National 34.420,8 39.650,2 49.171,1 
Regional 7.848,9 11.570,9 14.992,1 
Local 5.737,2 9.007,8 16.042,6 
TOTAL 48.006,9 60.228,9 80.205,8 
% of PIB 20,2 17,9 21,1% 
National 71,7% 65,8% 61,3% 
Regional 16,3% 19,2% 18,7% 
Local 12,0% 15,0% 20,0% 
TOTAL 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Note: En millones de nuevos soles. 
The increase was mainly due to the effect of the “canon” (redistribution of revenue from the mine 
industry). This hides huge differences within each sub-national government. Seven departments 
account for almost 70% of transfers from the “canon”, and only 15 of the 194 provinces account 
for more than 50% of the total transfer to local governments. The level of inequality is also very 
high among local governments: 15 municipalities concentrate 25% of the total transfer to the local 
governments between 2006 and 2010.21 
Table 6 Structure of Regional government expenditures  
Grupo de gasto 2004 2007 2009 
Recurrent  7 006,1 8 916,8 10 310,9 
Capital 850,5 2 681,3 4 681,2 
Debt amortization  0 3,4 n.d. 
TOTAL 7 856,6 11 601,5 14 992,1 
Recurrent  89,2% 76,9% 68,8% 
Capital 10,8% 23,1% 31,2% 
Debt amortization 0,0% 3,4% 0,0% 
TOTAL 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Note: En millones de nuevos soles. 
                                                     
21
 “Propuesta Tecnica de descentralización Fiscal”. Secretaría de Descentralización. Pág, 63 
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Table 7 Structure of “Local government” expenditures  
Grupo de gasto 2004 2007 2009 
Recurrent  3.402,9 4.564,8 6.618,3 
Capital 2.064,2 4.277,9 9.424,4 
Debt amortization 270,1 165,0 n.d. 
TOTAL 5.737,1 9.007,8 16.042,6 
Recurrent  59,3% 50,7% 41,3% 
Capital 36,0% 47,5% 58,7% 
Debt amortization 4,7% 1,8% n,d 
TOTAL 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Note: En millones de nuevos soles. 
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5.6 Annex 7: Political structure of decentralised government in Latin 
America  
PAÍS SISTEMA DE 
GOBIERNO 
NIVEL DE 
GOBIERNO 
FORMA DE ELECCIÓN DE LOS NIVERLES 
DE GOBIERNO 
ARGENTINA Estado 
representativo, 
republicano y 
federal 
Gobierno 
Nacional,Gobiernos 
Provinciales, 
municipales y 
comunas 
El presidente es elegido por sufragio universal 
por 4 años con posibilidad de reelección. La 
provincia cuenta con su propia constitución 
política y su autoridad máxima es el 
Gobernador elegido por 4 años. Los 
municipios y las comunas son regidos por los 
intendentes y los concejales respectivamente 
elegidos por sufragio directo con un período 
de 4 años con posibilidad de reelección 
BOLIVIA Gobierno Unitario Nación,departamen
tos, provincias y 
secciones 
Elección del presidente por sufragio universal 
por 4 años. Designación presidencial al 
Prefecto (departamento), subprefecto 
(provincia), corregidores (cantón). Elección 
directa de alcaldes por 5 años 
BRASIL República 
Federativa, 
Estado de 
Derecho 
Nación, Estados y 
municipios 
El presidente de la república es elegido 
democráticamente por sufragio universal para 
un período de 5 años. Los gobernadores son 
los representantes de los estados federados 
elegidos por un período de 4 años. Los 
municipios (prefeitos) son elegidos por 
sufragio universal por 4 años y están 
considerados dentro de los Estados 
Federados 
CHILE  Estado Unitario  Nación, Gobierno 
Regional, 
Municipalidad 
Votación Universal al presidente por 6 años. 
El Gobierno Regional (Intendente) y Municipal 
(Gobernador) son elegidos por el presidente 
de la República bajo el título de cargo de 
confianza. El Concejo Regional es elegido por 
los Concejales Municipales y el alcalde (repr. 
del concejo municipal) es elegido 
directamente por 4 años 
COLOMBIA País 
descentralizado 
unitario. Estado 
de derecho 
democrático 
Nación, 
departamento y 
municipio 
Elección directa del presidente por 4 años. 
Los Gobernadores,Asambleas 
Departamentales, Alcaldes, Concejos 
Municipales y Juntas Locales (3 años) 
PERÚ Estado unitario, 
representativo y 
descentralizado 
Nación, Gobierno 
Regional, Gobierno 
Local 
El presidente es elegido directamente por un 
período de 5 años con posibilidad de 
reelección. El Gobierno Regional y Municipal 
son elegidos por sufragio universal por un 
período de 5 años 
Source: Cortés, Patricia: Descentralización y Desarrollo Local: Una Mirada desde América Latina. 
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5.7 Annex 8: Aid at a glance - Peru  
 
5.8 Annex 9: Detailed Financial Information  
Total expenditures of the Public Sector, mSoles 
   2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 34.373 42.224 39.487 54.148 
Local Governments 
  
6.229 17.707 
Regional Governments 
 
7.838 11.536 16.177 
Total  34.373 50.062 57.252 88.032 
     Total expenditures for salaries, mSoles 
    2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 9.259 6.399 7.609 11.447 
Local Governments 
  
1.036 2.055 
Regional Governments  5.007 6.361 7.068 
Total 9.259 11.406 15.006 20.570 
  
   
  
Transfers from the Central Government, mSoles 
   2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local governments 1.799 3.643 9.101 11.965 
Regional Governments   526 2.060 3.181 
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Total 1.799 4.169 11.161 15.146 
     Own Revenues of Regiona and Local Governments, mSoles 
  2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local governments     1.249 2.317 
Regional Governments   280 376 478 
Total 1.799 280 1.625 2.795 
 
Total expenditures of the Public Sector, mSoles 2010 prices 
  2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 42.643 49.337 43.731 54.148 
Local Governments 
  
6.898 17.707 
Regional Governments 
 
9.158 12.776 16.177 
Total  42.643 58.495 63.405 88.032 
     Total expenditures for salaries, mSoles 2010 prices 
   2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 11.487 7.477 8.427 11.447 
Local Governments 
  
1.147 2.055 
Regional Governments 
 
5.850 7.045 7.068 
Total 11.487 13.327 16.619 20.570 
  
   
  
Transfers from the Central Government, mSoles 2010 prices 
  2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local governments 2.232 4.257 10.079 11.965 
Regional Governments   615 2.407 3.181 
Total 2.232 4.871 12.486 15.146 
     Own Revenues of Regional and Local Governments, mSoles 2010 prices 
  2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local governments     1.383 2.317 
Regional Governments   327 416 478 
Total 1.799 327 1.800 2.795 
     Inflation Index 2001 2004 2007 2.010 
www.econstats.com 100,25 106,44 112,3 124,37 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the thematic global evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons and to provide 
recommendations to help EC/EU generally to improve its support to decentralisation processes; it 
shall cover aid delivery over the period 2000-2009 taking into account the different entry points used 
by the EC/EU to delivery its support to decentralisation processes. This evaluation is partly based on a 
number of country missions to be carried out during the field phase.1 
The field visit to the Philippines had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. By no means, this note should be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered at the single country level, as they are 
formulated to be answered on the global level using the whole information collected from the desk 
study and the different field phase country studies. 
The primary reasons for selecting the Philippines as one of the field studies were: 
 As illustration of Asia region, (only one country for Asia is included in the overall evaluation 
because direct EC support to decentralisation generally is minimal in Asia compared to Africa 
and Latin America), 
 As illustration of EC work with the entry point (health) sector intervention in a highly 
decentralised context as dominant mode of operations. 
In addition, the Philippines case: 
 Illustrates transitions in aid modalities from project interventions towards SBS, 
 Provides experiences with use of other entry points and aid modalities such as call for 
proposals for smaller projects in support of local governance as well as project support for 
PFM, 
 Finally, the Philippines case also provides some experiences with work in conflict situations 
(Mindanao). 
The field visit was undertaken between 06/06 and 14/06/2011. The evaluation team was composed of 
Per Tidemand (Team Leader) and Edmund S. Tayao (National Consultant). 
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research foci 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Philippines has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
Table 1 Research foci 
Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
Institutional capacity of EC for support to decentralisation – has the general EC/EU 
framework for support to decentralisation facilitate relevance of (sector) 
interventions in a decentralised context? 
2 
Documentation of results of health sector programme (and Strategic Project 
Facilities) on the decentralisation process and the relative importance of EC/EU 
support. 
5-8 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
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1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
The case study is based on 11 days of work (7 days of field work, 4 days of travel, documentary 
review and report writing), which obviously limits the extent to which detailed assessments can be 
provided. However, the data collection was eased by the significant existing relevant literature 
including previous documentation of health sector interventions (recent evaluations of recent overall 
policy review etc), the recent overall evaluation of the EC/EU Country Cooperation Strategy as well as 
the rich documentation of the Philippines decentralisation reforms generally (see Annex 2 for details). 
In addition to studying the documentation, the team also interviewed key informants with relevant 
knowledge on the chosen interventions, as well as informants offering broader insights into the 
evolution of the decentralisation context in the country.  
Fieldwork in the Philippines included several focus group discussions including one held with several 
representatives of central government ministries, another with the key donors active in the 
decentralisation sector working group as well as one held with a group of research, NGO and local 
government associations (Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) and Citynet; League of 
Cities of the Philippines). Individual meetings were held with Department of Health, Local Government 
Academy, several NGO representatives and donors. Field work was undertaken in Province of Negros 
Occidental, where meetings were held with the Governor, the Provincial Health Officer, Provincial 
Environment and Management Office, Planning and Finance staff as well as with members of 
Barangay Minuyan, Murcia, Negros Occidental and one NGO (Quidan – Kaisahan). A list of people 
met is included as Annex 1.  
The information deemed of critical importance was subjected to a process of triangulation to ensure 
validity and internal consistency. 
Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field phase, prioritisation was necessary 
and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ reviews/ monitoring missions that had 
already been undertaken. Rather the team relied extensively on the related reports and attempted to 
extract more general findings, trends and recurring themes that are of relevance to a broader 
audience. The dialogue with in-formants also centred around distilling broader lessons and themes, 
rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. To reiterate, this country note is 
thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of the overall local governance or 
health portfolio of the EU Delegation. Rather it is an attempt to learn from the Philippines experience 
and to encourage wider reflections on how best to structure and focus EC/EU assistance to 
decentralisation processes 
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2 Short description of the country context and EC support to 
decentralisation 
2.1 Short description of the decentralisation process in the country2 
The Philippines is classified as a lower middle-income country with a GDP per capita of about 
US$1,847 in 2008. The country has not seen the same level of economic growth as many of its 
neighbours, averaging only about 1,5 % per year in per capita terms over the period 1960-2008. As a 
consequence, the Philippines has been overtaken by several of its peers including China and Thailand 
both of which had lower GDP per capita rates than the Philippines in the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
overall economic growth has still made the Philippine classified as lower middle-income country, which 
likely will effect on future levels of EC/EU support. 
With an estimated population of about 94 million people, the Philippines is the world's 12th most 
populous country3. An additional 11 million Filipinos live overseas. Multiple ethnicities and cultures are 
found throughout the islands. The Philippines is divided into three island groups: Luzon, Visayas, and 
Mindanao. These are divided into 17 regions, 80 provinces, 138 cities, 1,496 municipalities, and 
42,025 Barangays. 
Local government in the Philippines is divided into four levels: 
 Autonomous regions; 
 Provinces and cities independent from a province; 
 Component cities and municipalities; 
 Barangays. 
All divisions below the regional level are called "local government units (LGUs). The history of elected 
local governments in the Philippines is very long by regional and even international standards as the 
first elections for provincial and municipal councils were introduced as far back as in 1898 under the 
Malolos Constitution.  
The principles of decentralisation are also written into the current Constitution (of 1987) that stipulates 
that the LGUs "shall enjoy local autonomy", and in which the president exercises "general 
supervision". However, the most significant step in recent history towards decentralisation was in 1991 
when the Congress enacted the Local Government Code of 1991 "which shall provide for a more 
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization 
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local 
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, 
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, 
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of local units.". The Act assigned a 
number of local functions to the LGUs just as the health sector was devolved (but not education 
sector).  
Section 284 of the LGC indicates that 40% of the central government’s gross internal revenue (IRA) in 
the third preceding fiscal year be transferred to the LGUs as IRA. Provinces and cities receive 23% 
each from the total transfer, municipalities 34%, and Barangays 20%. The share of each province, 
city, and municipality is computed using the horizontal distribution formula composed of three 
determinants namely, population: 50%, land area: 25%, and equal sharing: 25%. 
IRA has increased in both absolute and relative importance as source of financing LGUs and currently 
constitutes around 60% of LGUs total revenue (for details see annex 5). 
Box 1 Functions assigned to LGUs by 1991 LG Code 
Province 
 Agricultural research extensions and onsite research services 
 Enforcement of forestry laws 
 Hospitals and tertiary health services 
 Social welfare services 
 Infrastructure funded from provincial funds 
                                                     
2
 For details see annex 5.  
3
 Wikipidia  
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 Low-cost housing 
 Telecommunication services for provinces and cities 
 Low-cost housing projects for province and cities 
 Investment support services, industrial research and development services for provinces 
 Tourism promotion 
Municipality 
 Agricultural extension and onsite research services 
 Community-based forestry projects and management of communal forests 
 Primary health care services and access to secondary and tertiary health services 
 Public works and infrastructure projects funded out of local funds 
 School buildings projects 
 Social welfare services 
 Information services 
 Solid waste disposal system and environmental management system 
 Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks and sports facilities 
 Tourism facilities and promotion 
City 
 All the services and facilities of the municipality and province above 
Barangay 
 Agricultural support services including collection of produce and buying stations 
 Health centre and day care centre 
 Solid waste collection 
 Villages justice system 
 Roads and infrastructure funded by the Barangay 
 Information and reading center 
Source: Milwida M. Guevara, “The Fiscal Decentralization Process in the Philippines: Lessons from Experience”, 
2004 
2.2 List of the major EC/EU -funded interventions  
The evaluation team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in this specific country 
through a number of large interventions supporting health sector development in “a decentralised 
context” and smaller local governance projects. 
The table below summarises the major EC/EU-funded interventions considered in the analysis. 
Table 2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision Nr. 
Comment 
Health sector    
Philippine Health Sector Policy Support 
Programme 
24,28   ASIE/2005/017-638 
Sector budget support 
Mindanao Health Sector Policy Support 
Programme (MHSPSP) 
3,66  ASIE/2006/018-016 
Sector budget support 
with a focus on one 
region. 
Local governance    
Dialogue on Governance: Strategic 
Projects Facility 
6,5 
DCI-ASIE/2007/018-
937 
Project facility to enhance 
local governance and 
strengthen the benefits of 
the decentralisation 
process (still ongoing). 
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EU-Philippines Economic Co-operation 
Small Projects Facility 
2,4 ASIE/2002/002-472 
 
A detailed list is provided in Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs  
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national 
stakeholders in partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international 
donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 1.3.1.and 1.3.2  
The EC/EU is only marginally working in direct support to decentralisation reforms. It primarily works 
with “decentralisation issues” within the health sector programme interventions that are implemented 
in a “decentralised context”. In addition, the EC/EU is supporting a range of smaller projects in support 
of local governance through the SPF2 and is about to initiate new PFM support.  
National stakeholders (both government and NGOs) as well as development partners all recognise 
that the EC/EU support only to a limited extent explicitly target “decentralisation reform” as a priority 
but that decentralisation and local governance issues are themes dealt with in e.g. the health sector 
and SPF2 – just as development partners and government expect the forthcoming PFM support to 
provide relevant support in this area. None of the national stakeholders were aware of the global 
EC/EU policy documents (the various communications or e.g. the 2007 Reference document on 
decentralisation).  
Ind 1.3.3.  
4 EUD staff members were interviewed; in general they were not aware of most of the specific official 
EC/EU communications/ strategy documents on decentralisation. However, several staff members 
were aware of the 2007 reference document, but didn't find any specific guidance on how to approach 
decentralisation reforms in the Philippines generally or within the health sector in particular. Staff felt 
that orientations towards aid modalities like sector budget support (and SBS) and PFM issues had 
been given attention within the EC/EU and facilitated the programming in the health sector – however 
they didn't find that existing EC/EU guidance was particular clear on supporting decentralisation 
reforms or health sector reforms in a complex and relatively decentralised context as in the 
Philippines.  
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3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing 
with sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) 
or disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind2.1.1  
The EC/EU operational procedures are generally considered adequate by EUD staff for programming 
relevant interventions in support of “sector support in decentralised context”. However, staff felt that 
internal EC/EU resources and knowledge on decentralisation issues are very weak:  
“We wouldn't know who to ask in HQ on decentralisation – now the health specialist for Asia has 
also left… Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB) are much better equipped with 
knowledge and can more easily engage various studies – they have therefore accumulated 
significant insight into decentralisation reforms over they years – we draw on their knowledge in 
the sector working group”. 
Ind2.1.2.  
Decentralisation and Local Government issues are recognised by the EUD as of obvious importance 
in the Philippines. Staff working on various aspects of the health sector programme as well as staff 
working on PFM and the local governance programme interact significantly and e.g. share 
participation in the sector working group on decentralisation and local governance. 
Ind2.1.3. NA 
Ind 2.1.4  
The EUD has been encouraged by HQ to focus on fewer areas – the prioritisation of Health was 
encouraged from HQ. Significant support to decentralisation “outside” the sector isn’t encouraged 
beyond what can be managed by smaller interventions like the SPF. Several staff members felt that 
time wasn't sufficient for “strategic thinking” – but that “innovation” certainly was welcomed – 
disbursement pressure was e.g. not considered an impediment. 
3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of 
decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind2.2.1. Within the EUD in the Philippines there is not one person 100% designated as working on 
“decentralisation”, but several staff members working with the health sector programme three (3) are 
significantly involved in work on institutional and finance issues of the health sector programme just as 
one staff member working on governance spent significant time in projects working in support of local 
governance/ decentralisation (the SPF).  
Ind2.2.2. Staff within the EUD had sought specific information on the Philippines local government 
system and related local governance, institutional and finance issues as they were widely recognised 
of key importance to e.g. the health sector reform programme. However, staff had not explicitly been 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - The Philippines; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
8 
recruited on the basis of knowledge or expertise in local government reforms or decentralisation 
issues. In contrast, staff has recently been recruited with PFM expertise. 
Ind2.2.3. One staff member had participated in training (January 2011) on decentralisation issues and 
found it “interesting” but also “a bit too general”. In contrast, staff found it more useful to gain insight 
into various models for performance based grant systems – it was felt that in particular Australian Aid 
and WB have been useful to disseminate relevant experiences.  
“The support from Brussels on decentralisation issues has in general not been so useful – this 
can be contrasted with Brussels support to Budget Support modalities where lots of useful 
inputs have been received. It was noted that within budget support seminars brief mentioning 
on local government/ decentralisation issues were made – but not in manner that was of direct 
operational relevance in the Philippines”. 
3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) 
or systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, 
issues papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote 
the effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Programmes are generally monitored thorough ROM system. In the Philippines, various recent 
evaluations and mid-term reviews have also been undertaken very recently, including a general 
Country Strategy Evaluation (2011) as well as a Mid Term Policy Review of the health Sector.  
The sector-working group on decentralisation and local government has a general working plan and 
undertakes some general M&E of activities within the field.  
“Decentralisation issues” have in various ways and to a varying extent been analysed as part of these 
systems. In general it can be observed that:  
 ROM reports focus on the degree of achievement of specific project objectives and is 
generally considered by EUD staff as “not bringing significant new insights”, but “useful in 
dialogue with HQ in particular when discussion of programme adjustments”; the level of details 
in ROM reports is very limited, 
 The most detailed assessment of “decentralisation issues” that brings significant new insights 
are found in the general health sector policy review and more specific decentralisation studies 
(primarily funded through ADB TA). 
3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies? 
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational 
procedures related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds 
to LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant CSP sections on decentralisation and local governance 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind3.1.1 
EUD includes significant background analyses on decentralisation reforms on all its health sector 
interventions as well as in the SPF support. The level of details in the analysis tends to be more 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - The Philippines; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
9 
sophisticated over time and there is a clear “learning from experiences” in working within a highly 
decentralised context well exemplified by the recent formulation of the “Support to Local Government 
Units for more effective and accountable Public Finance Management” (CRIS reference: DCI-
ASIE/2011/022-691) where e.g. past relative narrow institutional focus is rectified. The quality of 
analysis appears partly due to the TA provided within the health sector programme and partially the 
use of decentralisation sector analyses by other DPs such as ADB and WB rather than significant 
separate decentralisation analyses by EC/EU. 
Ind3.1.2  
Within the health sector, the EC/EU modalities for funds transfers have developed from a project 
approach to SBS with transfers through treasury. The project approach included transfers to selected 
provinces.  
Ind3.1.3  
Dialogue between the EC/EU and national stakeholders generally appears well developed – an 
example is the significant engagement of the Philippines' stakeholders in the dialogue on the CSP4 
and is generally well documented (see the recent country evaluation).  
Partner dialogue within the health sector has primarily been with DoH, but appears to have 
increasingly been broadened over time as reflected in the above mentioned new support for PFM.  
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as "How should existing interventions best evolve?" are 
addressed in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU interventions of relevance to this assignment have over the evaluation period 
encompassed health sector interventions and the “micro project” type of interventions lately supported 
under SPF.  
The type of entry points have included special initiatives to support the conflict areas of Mindanao as 
well as modalities of wider health sector support that gradually is developing into general SBS. In 
realisation of the problems of addressing wider PFM issues within the health sector programme the 
EC/EU has recently decided to support a specific PFM intervention.  
Direct support to decentralisation remains limited with the various small projects under the Strategic 
Project Facility (SPF). The SPF was designed as follow up to the Small Projects Facility (2004-2007) 
where the mid term evaluation endorsed the continuation of “a more focused governance programme 
and specific instrument in the CSP 2007 – 2013”. However, the question remains as to exactly how 
“focused” or strategic the instrument is. Annex 4 presents a description of 14 ongoing projects under 
the SPF – each with their own merits: piloting multiple initiatives for improved local governance in 
various areas (with relative emphasis on environmental management but also wider LG policy issues). 
The Strategic Projects Facility (SPF) is a demand-driven governance instrument where local 
stakeholders formulate applications for typically two or three year interventions. 
The approach of the EC/EU to decentralisation support is pragmatic and in line with national context – 
Government appetite for additional major “decentralisation” reforms is limited. The World Bank 
informed that they have undertaken a “political economy analysis of decentralisation reforms” (kept 
confidential within WB) that had convinced them that scope for major reforms was limited and that WB 
instead should work on a more piecemeal approach to reforms within specific sectors. The EC/EU 
approach is sound within this context although not based on significant independent assessments.  
3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support 
decentralisation and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme 
to be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
                                                     
4
 Mid-Term Review Consultation of the Philippines Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 with civil society and local 
development partners on 23/02/2009 (Cebu), 27/02/2009 (Davao) and 9/03/2009. 
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 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as 
"When and how to use sector budget support?" or "what are the risks related to the") are 
addressed in project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid 
delivery methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Within the health sector support, the aid delivery methods have gradually developed towards SBS in 
line with national as well as global EC/EU priorities. However, for direct local governance support, the 
SPF instrument has remained a “demand driven” project facility. Alternative instruments have not been 
significantly explored (or at least not explicitly discussed in e.g. SPF Action Fiche etc). 
3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of 
the role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The analysis of decentralisation and local governance issues at CSP level is fairly general with no in-
depth stakeholder analysis (see annex 5.9). The EC/EU generally relies on other DPs analyses rather 
than initiate independent assessments.  
The main partners in the health sector support have primarily been the DoH, DBM and Provincial 
Governments. The recent PFM support includes broader stakeholder involvement in realisation of 
shortcomings under past PFM support within the health sector (see bow below). 
Box 2 Lessons learnt - extract from Action Fiche for PFM Support 
The analysis is strongly confirmed by reports under the PFM component of the recently completed EU-
funded HSPSP (2007-2010), which have specifically identified the following issues constraining local 
service delivery and governance: 
 Need to involve the other oversight agencies as PFM responsibilities are not exclusively within 
DBM mandate. 
 Need for involvement of Local Chief Executive and awareness creation at that level. Weak political 
awareness concerning the need for a more solid, coordinated and aligned PFM-LGU system. PFM 
reform is a political process and involvement of the Sangunian Palawan
5
 (SP) should be pursued.  
 Need for PFM leadership within LGUs. It is difficult to pin down leadership accountability as PFM is 
lodged with the Local Finance Committee (LFC) or PFM Committee, which are collegial bodies. 
 Ineffective/out-dated administrative set-up at LGUs. The current set-up should be re-structured to 
promote better work efficiency, avoid proliferation of unnecessary positions and enhance a more 
professional, career-oriented, responsive and stable corps of LGU employees.  
 Lack of effective internal control and monitoring & evaluation. Reluctance to establish these new 
functions because of personnel services limitation, non-appreciation of the value of an internal 
audit service (IAS), or differences in appreciation / understanding of internal audit. 
Source: Support to Local Government Units for more effective and accountable Public Finance Management -
CRIS reference: DCI-ASIE/2011/022-691 
 
                                                     
5
 Legislative local body 
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3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarity 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance 
issues among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor 
approaches, when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Donor coordination is generally assessed as good in the Philippines (see box below). 
Box 3 CSP Self Assessment of Donor Coordination 
EU coordination meetings between MS and the EC take place on a monthly basis at Heads of 
Mission, Development and Commercial Counsellors meetings. There are various thematic 
coordination mechanisms that have gained momentum in the preparation of the Philippine 
Development Forum (PDF)26. The Strategic review felt that “(EC) dialogue with GoP is good and 
healthy” and that “the Delegation has reinforced the dialogue with MS on development cooperation” 
while “bilateral dialogue with multilateral institutions is on an operational level.” 
 
A Working Group on Decentralisation and Local Government has been established – Department of 
the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and WB are conveners of the working group. It meets 
regularly with active participation of all member DPs (including EUD).  
“The group is among the most active and the overall plan captures to a large extent all DP 
funded activities in the sector – we are generally aware of what we do and know each other – 
better than other groups” (Interview with WB) 
It has developed an overall work plan that captures different donor funded interventions in support of 
decentralisation and local governance. All activities of e.g. EUD support through SPF are captured 
here. Membership, agendas, key documents, etc are shared on the website: 
http://pdf.ph/decentralization_1.htm  
Information is shared through the working group – the ADB and the WB have probably been the most 
proactive players, actively engaged in various core decentralisation studies, whereas EUD has been 
more of a “silent partner”. The EC/EU is seen primarily active through its health programmes (and 
health sector issues are not discussed in the group), the SPF and (in particular, in future) PFM support 
at LGU levels. 
Through the working groups, the Government and DPs have shared information for coordination but 
not developed substantive co-financed programmes. A Dialogue fund has been established as WB 
trust fund. It is funded by AUSAID and CIDA and managed by the WB with involvement of all DPs and 
the league (agreement assigned last week of 2009). Because of different financing agreements and 
rules of donors it is difficult to co-fund activities – at present the trust fund is with 1,5 million USD and 
just started to fund one activity. 
Donors generally agree that there are many systemic reform problems (expenditure assignments and 
related levels of financing, need for improved tax collections, need for LGU amalgamation, etc) 
“However plan and DP activities need to be realistic – the reform process in the Philippines is old and 
many issues have been discussed for long”.  
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3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarity between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and 
other donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finances decentralisation programmes with Members States and major 
donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes 
and policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU is focusing on health sector largely because it is seen as an appropriate “niche” generally 
(in view of the size of EC/EU support and other donors' engagement). 
Ind 4.2.2 
EC/EU support to decentralisation is captured in overall sector plan and agreed with other partners  
Ind 4.2.3 
Through the working groups, the Government and DPs have shared information for coordination but 
not developed substantive co-financed programmes. A Dialogue fund has been established as WB 
trust fund. It is funded by AUSAID and CIDA and managed by WB with involvement of all DPs and the 
league (agreement assigned last week of 2009). Because of different financing agreements and rules 
of donors it is difficult to co-fund activities – at present the trust fund is with 1,5 million USD and just 
started to fund one activity. 
3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors 
such as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment 
into decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1 
The support to SPF and health sector is not very complementary. The SPF currently supports some 
14 initiatives – mainly related to piloting of innovative general governance issues (general LGU 
planning and capacity building) or support to local governance issues where environment is a special 
focus. There is no initiative supporting local governance in relation to health, which is probably a 
missed opportunity. 
Ind 4.3.2  
Various crosscutting issues are included in the SPF – in particular environment and support to 
indigenous groups. Gender issues are less profiled but included in e.g. the projects piloting more 
participatory planning processes at LGU levels.  
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3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to 
implement decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.1.1.  
Decentralisation reforms in the Philippines were to some extent a “big bang” major event marked by 
the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991 that transferred significant functions, powers 
and responsibilities from the national to the local governments. The enactment increased the financial 
resources available to local government units by significantly increasing their internal revenue shares. 
It also transferred close to 70,000 national government agency personnel to local governments.  
The devolution ushered in by the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 was a 
defining moment that ushered in fundamental and radical changes in the history of national-
local relations and local autonomy in the Philippines6.  
Several of the basic structures of local governments had developed gradually long time prior to 1991, 
e.g. with introduction of elected officials at municipal and provincial level as far back as 18987. 
The Government has since 1991 not pursued an additional explicit “decentralisation policy” beyond 
the broad intentions of the Act which by many stakeholders also have been interpreted as “if it is not 
prohibited then it must be allowed”8 which in this manner has encouraged multiple local interpretations 
of how the law and its policy intentions should be interpreted. 
Support from the EC/EU has not directly aimed at supporting an overall decentralisation process but 
mainly focused on implementation of health sector programme in a “decentralised context”.  
Ind 5.1.2.  
The national (central) government structures for coordination and oversight of decentralisation reforms 
in the Philippines are generally considered weak. Within the health sector it is for instance recognised 
that the DOH still performs mainly functions directly and only to a limited extent has sought to 
reorganise itself into an institution that primarily would provide policy guidance and monitor 
performance of the LGUs.  
3.5.1 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
There have been no major legal reforms since 1991. EC/EU support to the health sector has not 
addressed LGU related legislation. 
3.5.2 JC5.3. Local governments fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
                                                     
6
 Alex Brillantes, Jr., Gilbert Llanto, James Alm, and Gaudioso Sosmena 2009: Decentralisation and devolution in 
the Philippines; Status, Triumphs, Tests and Directions- an in depth study sponsored by ADB. 
7
 See annex 5 for details.  
8
 Brilliantes et al op cit, p. 15. 
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 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total 
public expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes 
and increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
In general, EC/EU has not sought significantly to influence overall resource allocations to LGUs. For 
general patterns of LGU staff and finance – see annex 5.  
EC/EU support to health sector has included some additional levels of funding for provinces.  
3.5.3 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that 
are discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in HRM: the extent to which LGs can hire and fire or 
otherwise manage personnel. 
 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local 
government’s degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
In general, LGU are relative autonomous with significant degree of fiscal autonomy – most of the 
transfers (the IRA) is e.g. discretionary rather than in the form of conditional grants. EC/EU has not 
significantly sought to influence or increase LGU autonomy. To some extent one could argue that the 
earmarked support under health sector projects has sought to centralise some decisions making (see 
sections on planning below). EC/EU concerns have been more focused on e.g. PFM issues at LGU 
levels than their overall levels of autonomy.  
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3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and 
reform implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & CSO) that capacities of key central government 
bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation have improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of M&E system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
In general, the arrangements for central government oversight and decentralisation policymaking are 
widely recognised by stakeholders as weak (NGO FGD) (Ind 6.1.2).  
It has until recently not been an area that EC/EU has targeted, but with the new PFM project9 much 
more emphasis is on LG oversight and reform bodies (see bow below). (Ind 6.1.1 and 6.1.4) 
The role of the oversight bodies with regard to local PFM is further described in the Joint 
Memorandum Circular 2007-1 (JMC 2007-1), issued by DILG, National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA), Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and DOF. The JMC 2007-1 clarified 
the roles of the four oversight bodies in local planning, investment programming, budgeting, 
expenditure management and revenue administration, while trying to link these activities into an 
integrated cycle. Furthermore, it also serves as a springboard for reconciling existing and subsequent 
policies as well as guides the oversight agencies in providing continuous and coordinated capacity 
building programs for LGUs.  
At the end of 2009, the Coordinating Committee on Decentralization (CCD) was created to replace 
the abandoned JMC 1 committee. The CCD has become the body for policy and program coordination 
as well as harmonization of capacity building among the oversight agencies and the LGU Leagues. 
The CCD is best described as a collegial body of oversight agencies, consisting of DILG (chair), 
NEDA, DBM, DOF, the League of Provinces, the League of Cities, the League of Municipalities, the 
League of Barangays
10
, and the Union of Local Authorities
11
. The CCD is meant enforce the JMC 
2007-1 and direct and oversee its implementation to ensure that its intent and purpose are carried on. 
Currently there is no equivalent coordination forum at regional level which could provide a crucial role 
in reinforcing coordination and communication between central and local levels.   
To interface with the LGUs the oversight bodies rely on their Regional Offices
12
 (ROs). The mandate 
of the ROs includes: (i) The provision of policy advisory and support services to the Central Office of 
their respective Department, Regional Development Councils s and other regional policy-making 
bodies to promote sound PFM; (ii) Monitoring the fiscal, financial and budget performance of LGUs to 
ensure compliance with the LGC; (iii) Provision of advisory and technical assistance and support 
services to LGUs. To date regional offices have focused mainly on their monitoring function to ensure 
compliance with the LGC.  
                                                     
9
 Support to Local Government Units for more effective and accountable Public Finance Management- CRIS 
reference: DCI-ASIE/2011/022-691 
10
 Barangays are the smallest administrative entity with a population of minimum 2000 persons. 
11
 LGU are three-tiers structure: 1) Provinces (81), Independent Component Cities (5) and Highly Urbanized Cities 
(33), 2) Municipalities (1 511) and Component cities (87) and 3) Barangays (42 008) 
12
 The ROs cover the 16 administrative regions with an average of 6 provinces per RO 
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Recent efforts/developments in the areas of revenue forecasting, performance based budgeting, 
Internal Control Systems (ICS) / Internal Audit Services (IAS) and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
are new territory for ROs. If strengthened, ROs could potentially play a crucial role with regard to the 
roll-out of capacity building programmes, provision of policy advice and back-stopping support to 
LGUs. 
Source: PFM Action Fiche 
Ind6.1.3. 
There have been multiple systems for M&E in existence for many years in Philippines (see box below). 
The system has not been well maintained and it for instance not possible to generate aggregate data 
trends for the long period it has been working. However, with the introduction of the PBGS it is likely 
that more attention will be paid to the use of this data, as it will influence fiscal allocations to LGUs.  
Box 4 Performance measurement 
The Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS) is a self-diagnostic tool allowing 
LGUs to track their performance in various areas of governance and compare this with other LGUs. In 
2009, DILG and BLGF agreed to incorporate 11 out of the 19 Local Government Financial 
Performance Monitoring System (LGFPMS) financial indicators in the LGPMS. Besides the financial 
indicators, there are currently no other indicators to gauge LGU performance in PFM or to evaluate the 
linkages between and effectiveness of plans and budgets. The LGPMS has now become one of the 
bases for decision making on loans granted by the Municipal Development Fund Office (MDFO) and 
the Performance-Based Grant System. The government also launched the Performance Challenge 
Fund for LGUs in 2010. This fund aims to recognize good governance performance particularly in the 
adoption of "good housekeeping" in the areas of planning, budgeting, revenue mobilization, financial 
management and budget execution, procurement and resource mobilization. A new tool the "Seal of 
Good Housekeeping" was also launched in 2010.  
Source: Action Fiche Support to Local Government Units for more effective and accountable Public Finance 
Management 2011 
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local councils 
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of 
information produced at local level 
Main findings from the field mission: 
In general, it can be observed that LGUs in the Philippines have been granted significant autonomy in 
management of their affairs and that they are established with significant different structures and 
resource endowments. LGU capacity variations therefore are of great magnitude. In addition, it can be 
observed that Central Government supervision and monitoring of LGUs is restricted to the Provinces 
(80) which in turn are supposed to undertake some monitoring of municipalities (1496) which in turn 
have some oversight of the Barangays (around 42,000). Central Government institutions for LGU 
oversight are furthermore rather weak and consolidated statistical indicators on LGU performance are 
therefore very scanty. Most of the academic literature on LGUs is therefore also based on case 
studies rather than aggregate data.  
In the following sections we explore key areas of LGU capacities with particular emphasis on areas 
where EC/EU through the health sector interventions (incl PFM) and SPF have sought to address 
capacity issues.  
Ind 6.2.1.  
As mentioned earlier, there are no comprehensive benchmarking or e.g. Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability Assessment (PEFA) scores of LGUs over time that would allow a systematic 
assessment of financial management practices across the many LGUs in Philippines.  
EC/EU support has primarily focussed on PFM within the health sector at provincial levels and the 
impact of the support on overall PFM in LGUs appear to date to have been limited. (See extracts from 
the 2009 MTR of Health Sector Policy Support Programme (HSPSP) below): 
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Box 5 Extract from MTR 2009 (on PFM) 
HSPSP extends support to DOH, DBM and Provincial Local Government Units (PLGUs) for the 
improvement of overall public finance management (PFM) with health sector development as the initial 
focus or entry point. Sector budget support at the local level is a new development financing approach 
introduced by the EC aimed at boosting the sector wide development for health in accordance with the 
national F1 agenda…. 
At the local level, PFM activities were determined in consideration of the PLGUs’ different levels of 
development, resource availability, absorptive capacity and competence. Specific interventions are 
defined in line with the devolution concept and the sector development approach to health (SDAH) 
and spelled out in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and Service Level Agreement (SLA) between 
the Department of Health and the concerned PLGU.  
There was an observed general increase (from a low of 3% to a high of about 7%) in participating 
PLGUs’ annual budgets for health from 2007 to 2008. These increases were on top of the HSPSP 
budget support to the provinces. Local Chief Executives (LCEs) appeared encouraged to step up local 
investments on health as a result of the programme. However, the LGU’s need for focused assistance 
in developing their capabilities for revenues generation to support increased investments was likewise 
apparent. 
Tremendous delays in initial fund releases were experienced due to the following: a) circuitous and 
lengthy processes involved in complying with the requirements for programme fund disbursements; 
and b) an observed lack of levelling of understanding of the programme implementation operational 
procedures. In addition, insufficient attention was given to tap and develop the potentials of the CHDs 
and DOH Reps in programme coordination and monitoring. As a result, the desired PFM and PFM-
related intermediate results were not realised within the time frame specified in the Financing 
Agreement. The dampened enthusiasm and support of LCEs and other programme stakeholders was 
likewise observed. (from MTR 2009, executive summary) 
It appears as if the Health Sector Support to PFM was constrained by wider PFM issues within the LG 
sector that could not easily be dealt with in a health sector programme – like the overall budget 
constraints of the LGUs (the MTR notes “the LGU’s need for focused assistance in developing their 
capabilities for revenues generation to support increased investments was likewise apparent”) and 
wider institutional and fiscal constraints for e.g. creating an LGU internal audit unit, which the MTR 
notes is “neither financially nor operationally feasible, given resource and institutional constraints, 
which restrict most LGUs from legally setting-up a new office with the desired personnel complement 
and attendant operational budget support, when they have already reached or exceeded the 
mandated ratio of personal services budget to total budget”. 
The MTR recommended further use of performance-based mode of funds disbursement to the as key 
instrument for inducing e.g. better LGU PFM  
Ind 6.2.2.  
EC/EU support to improved LG planning has within the health sector foremost been support for 
Province-wide Investment Plans for Health (PIPH). The EC/EU support has been instrumental in 
developing this approach but the effective implementation of plans is still to be seen (see below 
section from recent health sector policy review) just as the degree of effective local participation also 
has been limited (see section below from MTR) 
Implementation of Province-Wide Investment Plans: Until recently, there was little planning capacity 
for health in LGUs. This problem is being addressed with the roll-out of the Province-wide Investment 
Plans for Health (PIPH). The PIPH has become the principal instrument to coordinate and consolidate 
the fragmented strands of resource mobilization by the province as it lays out the multi-year 
investment plan based on needs identified and the various financing sources (IRA, commodity self-
reliance plans relying mostly on locally-generated revenues, reimbursements from PhilHealth, 
additional central government grants, LGU’s own loans, commodity and in-kind support, and external 
assistance, if any). Lower-level localities are also undertaking their own city and municipal investment 
plans for health. It remains to be seen how far these local health investment-planning initiatives can 
generate additional resources for health, allocate them properly, and result in a rationalized efficient 
service delivery system. WB 2010: page 32: 
With programme support, all the 16 F1 LGUs were able to prepare their PIPH and Annual Operation 
Plans (AOPs). One of the important contributions of the programme to this process is the technical 
assistance provided to the provinces in the preparation of rationalisation plans for the provincial 
network of health facilities. The programme also supported the conduct of courses designed to 
improve the skills of LGU health care providers for selected health programmes. Many local health 
officials felt that the planning framework used by the DOH in the preparation of the PIPH and AOP 
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was too narrow and highly focused on national health priorities. Officials of two of the provinces 
requested more support by the programme to address LGU-specific health problems. (Mid-Term 
Review of the Health Sector Policy Support Programme, page 6)  
 
Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
HRM is almost fully devolved in the Philippines: LGUs have full responsibility for hiring and firing etc, 
although Central Government maintains a significant role in e.g. setting overall service conditions. 
LGUs face several key challenges regarding their HRM, this includes evidence of relative overstaffing 
(compared to fiscal resources available), problems related to payment of the stipulated health staff 
incentives (The Magna Carta for health workers) and special challenges for poorer and more 
marginalised LGUs in attracting and retaining sufficient skilled health staff. The EC/EU has through its 
support supported HRM through training and capacity building but not addressed the above broader 
and more fundamental challenges as that is beyond what can be done within a health sector specific 
intervention.  
Box 6 General HRM issues in LGUs 
The World Bank notes that, as a rule of thumb, when the expenses for personal services (PS) of the 
public sector rises over 25% of total spending, governments risk reducing their effectiveness by cutting 
down expenditure for nonwage costs such as those for goods and services, maintenance, and capital 
expenditure. In the Philippines, PS accounted for an average of 45% of total LGU spending in 2000-
2007 while Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) and (Capital Outlays) CO accounted 
for 37% and 18%, respectively. The budget share of PS was highest for municipalities (53%), followed 
by provinces (46%) and cities (41%). Lower income class municipalities tend to have higher PS 
spending. The situation is worse in LGUs which use job order hirees (who are charged against 
MOOE) to work on tasks that would normally be assigned to regular employees in order to avoid 
exceeding the PS cap. Section 325 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that 1st to 3rd 
income class LGUs should not budget more than 45% of its total annual income from regular sources 
in the preceding fiscal year on PS. For 4th to 6th class LGUs, the limit is 55%. Many LGUs fail to 
comply with the PS cap. Fifty-eight percent of provinces, 40% of cities and 75% of municipalities 
exceeded the PS cap prior to the application of the waivers in 2007 on certain PS expenditure items 
from the computations to measure compliance with the PS cap. Regardless of level of local 
government, the percentage of LGUs that are not able to meet the PS cap requirement tends to be 
higher for LGUs belonging to the lower income categories than for those belonging to the higher 
income categories (ADB TA Report 2010, Paper on “Efficient and Effective Mobilization and 
Management of Resources by LGUs” page 8)  
Box 7 Specific health sector HRM issues  
There are shortages in the availability of physicians and nurses despite the fact that the Philippines is 
one of the largest exporters of health personnel in the world. The Magna Carta for health workers, 
which was created to provide incentives for health workers has reduced financing flexibility for LGUs, 
and created inequities vis-à-vis both national and LGU levels and distorted incentives for health and 
other local workers. Dual practice of public physicians and balanced billing impacts on public sector 
access, efficiency and overall health system and OOP costs. (WB 2010, page 83) 
ADB 2010 TA Report13: 
Under the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers (Republic Act 7305), PHWs are granted subsistence 
allowance, laundry allowance, night-shift differential, hazard pay, and longevity pay. These benefits 
being substantial, many LGUs have not been giving them all and/or in full. Less than 50% of 
provinces, cities and municipalities gave the subsistence and the laundry allowance at the prescribed 
rates in 2007. The number of LGUs giving the hazard pay at the correct rates is even smaller. 
The Magna Carta of PHW is a especially sensitive matter at the local level as it creates conflict 
between the LCE and other officials, on one hand, and the PHWs, on the other, when the Magna 
Carta allowances are not granted in full or not granted at all. There are many reports of cases filed in 
the courts or Ombudsman against LCEs and other officials by PHWs due to non-implementation of the 
Magna Carta benefits. 
Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of information 
produced at local level 
                                                     
13
 paper on “Efficient and Effective Mobilization and Management of Resources by LGUs” 2010, page 11. 
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While information and data management systems are in place at the LGU, hospital and Rural Health 
Unit (RHU) levels (Hospital Management Information System (HOMIS), Community Health Information 
Tracking System (CHITS)). There is a very serious deficit in the available information for monitoring 
the performance of the service delivery system, which impacts the capacity of DOH in policy 
formulation in this important area. The information which is collected is not shared, analyzed and used 
effectively. (WB 2010, page 83) 
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The Philippines has a complex organisation of inter-local government associations in the form of the 
local government leagues – the League of Provinces of the Philippines (LPP), the League of Cities of 
the Philippines (LCP), the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP), the Liga ng mga 
Barangay (LnB), and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines.  
EC/EU is supporting various inter-LGU collaborations in the health sector and various NGOs are 
working with local governance under the SPF, but EC/EU does not provide direct support to the LG 
associations (Ind6.3.1). 
The EC/EU support through the SPF works primarily with NGOs working with local governments for 
service delivery and improved local governance (6.3.2). Many separate interesting initiatives are being 
supported. However, it is difficult to see the “strategic outlook” – there is no substantive local oversight 
(e.g. in the form of an NGO umbrella organisation) - the activities supported are relative disconnected. 
Several government and NGO organizations conduct research into local government issues. The SPF 
supports e.g. the Local Government Academy and the University of the Philippines – however, the 
support is in the form of short and limited interventions that don't form part of a clear long term 
strategy. (Ind6.3.3) 
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3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind7.1.1 
Local government elections are held every three-year in cycles that correspond to the six year national 
elections for President. Every 3 years, the LG elections also coincide with elections of half of the 
senators (12). The elections have been held regularly since the introduction of the LG Code and 
broadly follow the same patterns of participation. The EC/EU support has not attempted to support 
activities in relation to this (such as civic education for LG elections etc). The EC/EU has not 
supported LG elections directly. 
Ind7.1.2 
The SPF supports various initiatives for increased local participation – supporting selected smaller 
LGUs. However it is not clear how the rather small micro interventions can be up-scaled. 
EC/EU support to health sector planning has not stressed local participation (see Ind6.2.2.).  
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators:  
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with 
citizens (notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens (notice boards with budgets, use of 
citizen score cards, etc) has not been systematically promoted by the health sector programme but 
piloted in various ways by the SPF.  
There have been many official initiatives over they years to strengthen the role of (the relative strong) 
NGO sector in local governance (see box below). 
Box 8 Local Government Relations with NGOs and Civil Society 
Our consultation have shown that local governance is constantly being redefined at the local level with 
the participation of civil society in the process of local governance as enabled by the Local 
Government Code. However, not all local governments have active civil society groups to enable them 
to fulfil the ¼ requirement in the local development council. It was frequently suggested that such a 
requirement must therefore be eased. Congruent issues on local governance across the consultative 
workshops include a weak local bureaucracy due to the presence of various overlapping developing 
councils, too many LGU institutions, ineffective composition of the LFC and other Special Bodies. 
Furthermore, it was conveyed that the lack of public awareness about decentralization, as well as the 
absence or lack of mechanisms for people participation, inhibits true participatory governance. Across 
the workshops, a desire for a more accountable and responsive local government administration was 
consistently expressed. 
SBN 1252 filed on July 18, 2007 proposes the strengthening of the Local Development Council by 
compelling the local chief executives to convene their respective LDCs, as well as to mandate the 
leagues of LGU’s, in order to ensure improved compliance via monitoring and submitting periodic 
reports to Congress through the Oversight Committee. Furthermore, SBN 1156 filed on July 4, 2007 
by Aquilino Pimentel proposes the inclusion of Senior Citizens, Parents'-Teachers' Association, and 
War Veterans in the local health board and the local development councils in the different local 
government units, as well as the addition of public agricultural as members of the provincial and local 
development councils.  
Source: Brilliantes et al 2009: Decentralisation In Depth Study, page 49-50. 
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3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) 
provided to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The Philippines has for long had a formula based LG grant system in place in the form of the IRA (see 
below) – over the years since 1991, this has not been reformed significantly although it creates some 
imbalances by not considering fiscal equalisation and by creation of incentives for LGUs to strive to 
change LG status (see annex 5). ADB and JICA have supported various analytical work with the aim 
of reforming the IRA – EC/EU has not supported this area.  
Box 9 Main features of the IRA  
Section 284 of the LGC indicates that 40% of the central government’s gross internal revenue in the 
third preceding fiscal year be transferred to the LGUs as IRA. Provinces and cities receive 23% each 
from the total transfer, municipalities 34%, and Barangays 20%. The share of each province, city, and 
municipality is computed using the horizontal distribution formula composed of three determinants 
namely, population: 50%, land area: 25%, and equal sharing: 25%. This IRA distribution formula is 
considered too simple to respond to the already existing imbalances in the fiscal capacity among the 
LGUs. Thus, there is a clamor to revise it to achieve a better fiscal balance at the local level. In other 
words, the current formula needs to be revised in order that the IRA distribution would be made based 
on an accurate estimate of the financial needs and revenue potential of local government as well as 
on the disparity in development situation. 
Source: From JICA 2009 
The law provides avenues for citizen access to financial information at LGU levels, but LGUs have not 
always been very forthcoming with information. 
The government has recently introduced a new system that may strengthen better LGU adherence to 
good local governance. The Performance Based Incentive Policy (PBIP) is an incentive framework to 
rationalize National Government (NG) intergovernmental fiscal transfers to LGUs towards improving 
overall LGU performance in governance (including their disclosure of LG finance information). On 20 
February 2009, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee approved the above-mentioned 
policy to be implemented to Investment Coordination Committee (ICC) approved projects with 
Performance Based Grant System (PBGS) component. 
Donors have generally encouraged this initiative – and the WB financed analytical work in support of 
this PBGS back in 2005 – however, results have only recently been taken up by Government and are 
entirely funded by government.  
Similar systems have been introduced in the health sector (with EC/EU support) – however, the PBGS 
in the health sector appears to approach the financing instrument in response to a perception of health 
largely being a delegated rather than devolved LGU responsibility (see below).  
Implementation of Performance-Based Financing Approaches 
In F1, performance based financing (PBF) means that budget allocations and releases will be 
conditioned on the achievement of performance targets. F1 aims to install a performance-based 
budgeting system for hospitals, public health facilities, and regulatory agencies which necessitates 
reforms in the respective agencies’ management and procurement system and implementation of a 
performance audit and review system. DOH is now shifting to contractual mode of dealing with LGUs. 
It enters into service-level agreement with LGU when it provides resources to implement a component 
of the Province-wide Investment Plan for Health. The agreement specifies the rights and 
responsibilities of the DOH and LGU and the performance benchmarks to be used to measure 
compliance. This approach is in contrast to the previous unconditional provision of drugs and other 
inputs. DOH contracting of leptospirosis cases with a number of private hospitals also exemplifies the 
use of PBF in a public/private partnership arrangement. (WB 2010, p.35)  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - The Philippines; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
22 
 
3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) 
in local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.1.1. and 8.1.2. 
From recent policy review (see extract below) it is concluded that public resources allocated for health 
only has increased marginally – and mainly driven by increased DOH resources rather than added 
resources by the LGUs. However, it should be noted that fiscal data on aggregate LGU spending is 
very poor. Some initiatives – such as the special congressional funds for health have leveraged 
additional LGU allocations (see box below). During the field visit to Negros Occidental, it was found 
that Provincial health allocations generally had increased and currently constituted 40-50% of total 
provincial expenditures (different figures were quoted during interviews). 
EC/EU support for fiscal aspects of the health reforms have focused on the wider aspects of general 
sector financing including the  
Box 10 Extracts from Health Sector Policy Review 2010 (on Health Financing) 
Low levels, Fragmentation and Inequity in Health Financing 
In 2005 at the beginning of F1, the Philippines spent only 3 percent of its GDP on the health sector 
while other Southeast Asian countries spent, on average, about 4-5 percent. This number has grown 
very slowly (there has been slight increase in national government financing for DOH) but the shares 
(percentages) between government, social insurance, private insurance and private OOP have hardly 
changed.  In fact, as the Review points out, private OOP spending is growing in the Philippines. 
Fiscal Space and Health Spending. The low levels of public spending on health are partly related to 
fiscal space issues in the Philippines. Fiscal space for health refers to the ability of a country to 
increase public spending for health without jeopardizing the government’s long-term fiscal 
sustainability (Heller 2006). From a macro-fiscal perspective, the prospects of availability of additional 
public resources for health in the Philippines have been traditionally low. As Chapter 2 showed, the 
revenue to GDP ratio in the Philippines is below the average for other middle-income countries, 
including in East Asia, and the health sector has not been traditionally accorded a high priority – as 
indicated by the elasticity of public spending on health. Moreover, with almost 50 percent of the 
population of the country working in the informal sectors, it has been hard to mobilize resources from 
this group through the PHIC’s Individual Program. In most LMICs such as the Philippines, achieving 
universal coverage has required long periods of time, and substantial dependence on general budget 
revenues to finance universal health insurance coverage (Langenbrunner and Somanathan, 2010, 
Gottret and Schieber 2006).  
Overall trends in DOH, LGU and PHIC Financing: After declining in real terms for nearly a decade, the 
DOH budget has increased its spending on health as a percentage of government expenditures. As a 
result, government expenditures on health have increased from 6 percent in 2002 to 6.8 percent in 
2007. In particular, spending for public health interventions such as vaccines, anti-tuberculosis drugs, 
and the upgrading of government health facilities to provide emergency obstetric care has increased in 
the past two years. However, the increase has largely been limited to central government 
expenditures, while LGU expenditures on health have declined in real terms. Also, PHIC’s share of 
health expenditures has hardly grown since it was established in 1995 (this is discussed in greater 
details in the next section).  
Inequity in LGU Financing and Absorption Capacities – LGUs are at different states of natural 
endowments, economic development, and institutional capacities. This impacts their revenue-raising 
capacities as well as the ability to absorb resources.  Moreover, the inequity in the internal revenue 
allotment (IRA) among provinces, cities, and municipalities translates into highly variable health 
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services. Changes in the IRA are beyond the control of the DOH and require intervention at a higher 
level of government. Wide regional and provincial variation in LGU health spending occur mainly 
because of LGUs’ heavy reliance on IRA, which does not take account of health needs. The inequities 
in LGU allocation are exacerbated by the fact that highly urban cities can generate additional 
resources from their large tax base (property and business taxes) while poor, rural municipalities and 
provinces cannot do the same. Because the IRA allocation favors cities, there has been a flurry of 
municipalities wanting to be cities. The proportion of the IRA going to health is not nearly enough to 
fund the cost of devolved health functions, a situation that has left many health facilities in a poor state 
of repair.  
Fragmentation in Financing- Devolution has led to the fragmentation of service delivery as public 
health functions and primary care (the responsibility of municipalities) were de-linked from primary and 
secondary hospitals (the responsibility of provinces) which were in turn de-linked from tertiary and 
national referral hospitals (the responsibility of DOH). The lack of inter-jurisdictional payment system 
for referrals, the mobility of patients, and frequent bypassing of primary care and district hospitals to 
start with, has led to the fraying of the financing and delivery system, manifest in overcrowded 
provincial and DOH hospitals, and underutilized health centres and district hospitals. The “network 
model” that existed prior to devolution – based on the district catchment area and district health 
structure that responds to it – has all but disappeared.  
Recent efforts under F1 – Fourmula 1 carried out several initiatives to correct some of the inherent 
weaknesses of devolution. To ease the problems of service fragmentation, lumpiness of investment, 
and externalities (spill-over effects), some municipalities have organized themselves into inter-local 
health zones (ILHZs) so that they can share resources and benefits together. As of end-2009, as 
many as 274 ILHZs have been organized in 72 provinces for various reasons, although little has been 
done to empirically evaluate their effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.  
Until recently, there was little planning capacity for health in LGUs. This problem is being addressed 
with the roll-out of the Province-wide Investment Plans for Health (PIPH). The PIPH has become the 
principal instrument to coordinate and consolidate the fragmented strands of resource mobilization by 
the province as it lays out the multi-year investment plan based on needs identified and the various 
financing sources (IRA, commodity self-reliance plans relying mostly on locally-generated revenues, 
reimbursements from PhilHealth, additional central government grants, LGU’s own loans, commodity 
and in-kind support, and external assistance, if any). Lower-level localities are also undertaking their 
own city and municipal investment plans for health. It remains to be seen how far these local health 
investment planning initiatives can generate additional resources for health, allocate them properly, 
and result in a rationalized efficient service delivery system. To measure provincial health 
expenditures, Local Health Accounts are also being piloted in 11 provinces.  
Source: World Bank – Health Sector Policy Review 2010- pp 75 
Special Congressional funds for health  
Since 2007, the National Government through the DOH has leveraged LGUs to provide resources to 
specific public health programs through specially grant allocations. In 2007, Congress appropriated 
Php 150 million to be used by LGUs for family planning and reproductive health services. In the 
following year, Congress also appropriated Php 2 billion to be used by LGUs for Maternal, Neonatal 
and Child Health And Nutrition (MNCHN) services. In both cases, the governing rules require that the 
LGU should first show that it has spent some of its own resources to these programs before it can 
access the Congressional grants, to indicate that the LGU does consider these programs as a priority. 
As a result, the annual budgetary appropriations to the DOH have ballooned in recent years. This is an 
important development for it reinstates the DOH and the regional Centers for Health Development 
(CHDs) as key players in local health financing, an influence DOH lost with devolution.  
Source: World Bank – Health Sector Policy Review 2010- pp 33 
 
Ind8.1.3. Public Private partnerships 
Box 11 Extracts from Health Sector Policy Review 2010 (on PPP) 
Hospital bed capacity in the Philippines is below the average for East Asian countries and below the 
rates of other MICs such as China and Thailand. The capacity gaps are most prevalent in rural and 
hard to reach areas, which means that the gaps in service delivery most affect poor families that live in 
these areas. Few new hospitals and hospital beds are being added, and the hospital system is being 
over-run by population growth, the rise of non-communicable diseases, the frequency of accidents, 
other trauma and an aging population. Public-private partnerships are often limited to medical imaging. 
Inequity and variance is growing between the well-endowed private sector and autonomous 
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government hospitals that are able to pass the highest levels of global accreditation and ill-endowed 
public and private hospitals. 
The majority of the public hospitals system (with the exception of a few DOH managed centers of 
excellence in Manila) have not undergone systematic investment and upgrading since before 
devolution, even though the population has grown and the role of hospitals has changed substantially 
in the past 25-30 years. Under “Fourmula 1”, provinces have received financing to upgrade parts of 
their hospitals. In most provinces, funds available for investment are limited, and upgrading has 
focused mainly on minimum standards for emergency obstetric services. Provinces have been asked 
to prepare rationalization plans for the hospitals in their area as a pre-requisite for investment, in an 
attempt to ensure new investment is consistent with efficient, sustainable operation of hospitals. But 
the available investment resources are too limited to finance major expansion and upgrading of 
hospital capacity in areas that need increased capacity. In spite of DOH efforts to insist on rational 
investment criteria, external intervention in hospital investment continues to undermine these efforts, 
leading to a non-sustainable investment that is not consistent with a high quality, modern hospital 
system. There is a need for nationwide analysis of the gaps in hospital capacity and planning for how 
to fill these – through a combination of public and private sector investment.  
With regards to hospital autonomy, Some central hospitals have Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health 
And Nutrition (GOCC) status. DOH retained hospitals were given some fiscal autonomy since 2004. 
But an accountability framework for GOCC hospitals and fiscally autonomous DOH hospitals was not 
put in place before they were given autonomy. Many LGU hospitals do not have fiscal autonomy and 
are not able to retain PhilHealth revenues. The hospital autonomy framework is not comprehensive: 
there are gaps in relation to autonomy over personnel and capital investment, gaps in relation to 
information systems for performance monitoring, weak accountability framework and gaps in policies 
for financing social functions of the hospital more explicitly.  The DOH has begun to develop some of 
the building blocks for increasing the accountability of hospitals through attempts to develop a hospital 
score card. However, because of the lack of robust hospital information systems in most hospitals, the 
basic foundations for a hospital score card are not yet in place.  
Private hospital capacity is concentrated in Metro Manila and other major metropolitan areas. A 
substantial share of private hospital beds is found in very small hospitals. Many if not most of these 
are probably not functioning at the standards usually expected for secondary care hospitals.  
However, “inflation” of the categories of hospital license has occurred to such an extent that it is 
difficult to assess how much private hospital capacity exists at secondary and tertiary levels in the 
Philippines, in the sense in which secondary and tertiary levels are understood internationally. Inflation 
in the categorization of hospitals is motivated by in part by the payment system used by PhilHealth 
(and Health Maintenance Organization (HMOs)/private health insurers) which pays at higher rates for 
tertiary level hospitals, even for the same procedure.  The fact that PHIC (and HMOs/private health 
insurers) only cover drugs and diagnostic tests for inpatients may be driving unnecessary hospital 
admissions in low-level hospital facilities for patients who could be diagnosed and treated in outpatient 
settings. The fact that PhilHealth sets reimbursement ceilings per hospitalization and permits hospitals 
to balance-bill means that patients are not protected from catastrophic costs. It also means that 
hospitals are not subject to pressures to minimize costs and increase efficiency. Patient choice is not 
an effective driver of hospital efficiency, because patients have limited scope to compare prices for 
hospital treatment. There is good evidence that PhilHealth reimbursement leads to inflation in private 
hospital costs.   
As is the case in many countries, patients routinely bypass first –contact care to seek care in more 
expensive hospital settings. First-contact (primary care) in the Philippines is largely perceived to be 
providing public and preventive, rather than curative, services and therefore patients prefer to seek 
care at the next levels. (World Bank 2010 op cit page 82-83) 
Source: World Bank – Health Sector Policy Review 2010- pp 33 
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Within the health sector, O&M is integral part of overall budget allocations and service provisions and 
therefore discussed under section 8.1 and 8.3.  
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3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for 
vulnerable groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 Ind 8.3.2. Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Given the EU emphasis on health sector (and since e.g. education is not defined as devolved service), 
we will in this case study focus on health sector services. 
In general, it can be noted that overall health service access and quality has improved. There are 
significant problems regarding outreach to the poorer sections of society. The recent health sector 
policy also notes the following critical issues:  
 There are capacity constraints as health sector inputs have not kept up with population 
growth. The bed-to-population ratio is roughly 1 per 1000 inhabitants, lower than in other East 
Asian countries such as China (2,6 beds per 1000 inhabitants), Vietnam (1,2 beds) and 
Thailand (2,2). Moreover, many of these hospital beds are clustered in large city centres and 
better-off LGUs. This is particularly true for private hospital beds, which account for 
approximately half of all hospital beds in the country. The availability of skilled health sector 
staff is also a problem, especially in the public sector. While the Philippines do not have a 
problem with the overall supply of doctors and nurses, there is large scale out-migration. The 
Philippines is one of the largest suppliers of trained nurses in the world. (World Bank 2010, op 
cit page 5) 
 Poor households largely rely on public hospitals, whose quality of care is problematic and 
client responsiveness is low. Consumer surveys conducted in 2005 and 2006 indicated that 
people chose private hospitals over public ones since they perceived the latter as providing 
better quality care. Due to financing barriers, however, poor people do not have access to 
private hospitals, creating inequity in access to care. Public hospitals (DOH and LGU) suffer 
from many problems, including inadequate financing, poor allocation of resources, lack of 
quality benchmarks and standards, and limited accountability. Access to good quality first 
contact care is also uneven, and when available, people often bypass first (primary care) level 
to seek care in hospitals, as there is no effective referral system and penalties are not applied 
for bypassing the less costly first contact level. Global experience shows that high utilization of 
good quality first contact care is equity-enhancing and cost-effective for the health system. 
(World Bank 2010, op cit page 6) 
Box 12 Summary of Health Service Trends in the Philippines 
1/ At the aggregate level, the Philippines has made steady and significant progress in its population 
health outcomes over the past several decades. Life expectancy increased to almost 72 years in 
2007, up from 53 in 1960. Childhood mortality also continues to decline in the Philippines. The infant 
and under-five mortality rate during the 2004-2008 period stood at 25 and 34 per 1,000 live births 
respectively. This is lower than the rates of 29 and 40 per 1000 live births in 2003 (DHS, 2008, DHS, 
2003). The country is “on-track” to achieving Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 4, which calls for a 
two-thirds reduction in the under-five mortality rate over the period 1990-2015.  
2/ On maternal and reproductive health, progress has been less than expected and regional and 
income related disparities across all health outcomes are persistent and potentially widening. Maternal 
Mortality Rate (MMR) has improved more slowly than expected (162 per 100,0000 live births in 2006) 
and the country is not expected to reach the MDG 5 goal of three-quarters reduction in MMR between 
1990 and 2015, as well as universal access to reproductive health services. According to the 2008 
National Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS, 2008), child mortality indicators are four times 
higher among the lower income quintiles as compared with higher income quintiles. Life expectancy in 
2006 in some provinces of the Philippines (La Union) was similar to high middle-income countries 
such as Chile and Slovenia. In comparison, provinces such as Sulu and Tawi-Tawi have life 
expectancy levels similar to low-income countries such as Ethiopia and Guinea. 
3/ While there is an unfinished agenda with the MDGs, the burden of disease is rapidly changing in the 
Philippines and non-communicable diseases (MDG Plus Agenda) are emerging as a health sector 
challenge. Projections show that by 2030, Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) will account for 87 
percent of the disease burden in the Philippines. Currently, deaths from cardiovascular conditions are 
one of the top 10 causes of reported deaths. Moreover, injuries are also a major contributor and the 
number of road traffic accidents in the Philippines is increasing. Poor households are as vulnerable to 
NCDs as non-poor households.  
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Financial protection from the costs of ill-health, a key outcome of the health sector, and measured in 
terms of out-of-pocket payments, is getting worse in the Philippines. This is despite the 
implementation of universal health insurance (UHI). In 2006 (the last year for which comprehensive 
household level OOP data are available), the share of health spending in per capita expenditures was 
at its highest levels in the past 18 years. Poor households in the Philippines are spending a higher 
share of their disposable income on health care as compared to the better-off. While expenditures on 
drugs and medicines account for the biggest share for both poor and rich households, there is an 
increasing shift towards OOP financing hospital charges. Out-of-pocket spending as a share of total 
health spending is very high and has increased.  
There are large income-related disparities in the utilization of health services. For example, skilled 
birth attendance among the highest income quintile is 94 percent as compared with 25 percent in the 
lowest income quintile. Only 13 percent of all births in the lowest quintile occur at the facility level 
compared with 84 percent in the highest quintile. Similarly, immunization coverage is only 70 percent 
among the lowest quintile as compared with 84 percent in the highest quintile.  Some prominent 
reasons affecting the decision to seek care (in public and private facilities) include: (i) economic 
barriers, (ii) geographic distance, (iii) quality of care concerns such as the unavailability of drugs; 
Source: World Bank 2010: Transforming the Philippines Health Sector: Challenges and Future Directions 
(Philippines Health Sector Review), Report No. 54934 – PH, (Final), October 27th, 2010 
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4 Conclusions concerning the hypotheses to be tested and main 
challenges to be discussed in the synthesis phase 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Philippines has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support to decentralisation – has the general EC 
framework for support to decentralisation facilitated relevance of (sector) 
interventions in a decentralised context? 
2 
Documentation of results of health sector programme and (SFP) on the 
decentralisation process and the relative importance of EC/EU support 
5-8 
4.1 Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support to decentralisation  
EC/EU support in the Philippines has primarily been health sector support “in a decentralised context” 
although some support has also been provided (mainly to NGOs) for various smaller initiatives in 
support of local governance (the SPF). 
The general EC/EU framework for support to decentralisation has only marginally facilitated the health 
sector interventions: the documentation is not all known to EUD staff and only provides very general 
guidance. Decentralisation training interventions have in a similar way not impacted significantly on 
how decentralisation issues have been addressed by the EUD. Staff have generally used their 
“common sense” and learned from documentation and experiences generated from within the 
Philippines and/or from other development partners such as the World Bank, ADB etc.  
Existing EC/EU reference document, training opportunities and HQ support on decentralisation are not 
sufficient for relative advanced countries (as in the Philippines). 
Staff in the EUD didn't request for specific additional HQ guidance, but saw quality of their work being 
impacted by lack of time and financial resources for more strategic thinking. One staff member 
commented: 
“we always run being preoccupied with immediate operational issues including many 
bureaucratic reporting issues, etc – however we have no time to stop and think strategically – 
we also don't have means to generate independent analyses (as e.g. World Bank) - in house 
expertise on decentralisation issues are limited – we are poorly equipped for in-depth policy 
dialogue”.  
The EC/EU has to a significant degree approached “health sector interventions in a decentralised 
context” through learning by doing rather than guided by specific EC/EU internal guidance. 
4.2 Results from EC/EU support on overall decentralisation reforms  
The Philippines is a middle-income country where donor dependence is relatively limited (compared to 
e.g. most Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) countries). Furthermore, it can be noted that 
decentralisation reforms in the Philippines are relatively natural (compared to the other nine country 
case studies for our evaluation) and that several aspects of possible future reform directions have 
been subject to various technical studies and intense political debate (already for years). Donor 
support is therefore relative less influential on decentralisation reforms than in e.g. highly aid 
dependent African counties where decentralisation reforms are in initial stages.  
The discussion of results (EQ5-6-7-8) clearly indicates that wider impact on decentralisation reforms 
by EC/EU support have been limited. The objectives of EC/EU support have in fact also been modest 
and only to a very limited degree sought to influence wider reforms or changes in the relationship 
between central and local governments.  
Of relevance to the wider global evaluation, it can be noted that: 
 (Health) sector programmes in decentralised contexts can improve sector specific planning 
and capacities but only marginally contribute to wider decentralisation results (political, 
administrative, finance). 
 Although it is difficult to assess, the EC/EU could maybe have been more proactive within its 
health sector programme in supporting elements of IGFT – e.g. by some conditional grant for 
marginal areas for their staffing or other aspects of public sector financing at LGU level. 
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 On the other hand, successful health sector developments impinge on overall decentralisation 
reform (e.g. overall PFM, LG finance arrangements (transfers and own source) HRM, etc – 
thus additional general (non-health specific) interventions are required in these areas, - in the 
Philippines the EC/EU therefore is embarking on wider PFM support. 
 PBGS appears as very promising instruments for strengthening of decentralised service 
delivery and improved local governance. 
 Smaller interventions like SPF can contribute to development of innovative practices, capacity 
building at community (Barangay, etc) levels, etc. But challenges of up scaling, replication and 
strategic linkages for wider reform remain – it is noticeable that the SPF doesn't have specific 
linkages to health sector interventions in the Philippines (maybe, something to consider in 
possible future support). 
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5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: The list of people interviewed 
Last name First Name Organisation 
Date of 
interview 
Eric  Galvin Delegation of the European Union 06/06/2011 
Camilla  Hagström Delegation of the European Union 06/06/2011 
Anja  Bauer Delegation of the European Union 06/06/2011 
Ma Rita  Bustamante Delegation of the European Union 06/06/2011 
Manuel  Gotis 
Bureau of Local Government Development – 
Department of the Interior and Local Government 
(BLGD - DILG) 
07/06/2011 
Angie  Martir 
Field Operations Services – Department of 
Agriculture (FOS– DA) 
07/06/2011 
Beth  Estrada 
Agricultural Training Institute – Department of 
Agriculture (ATI – DA) 
07/06/2011 
Lynette  Bautista 
Policy Development and Planning Bureau – 
Department of Social Welfare and Development 
(DSWD) 
07/06/2011 
Emmanuel  Joseph Solis 
Decentralization Program, German International 
Cooperation (GIZ - DP) 
07/06/2011 
May  Wong 
Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) 
07/06/2011 
Lawrence  Tang World Bank (WB) 07/06/2011 
Wilfredo  Nuqui Mindanao State Development  07/06/2011 
Maria Cynthia Nona Razo 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
07/06/2011 
Maria Rendon 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
07/06/2011 
Staff of the MinDA  Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) 07/06/2011 
Brenda  Candries Delegation of the European Union 08/06/2011 
Roland Cabigas La Liga Policy Institute 08/06/2011 
Rachael Morala La Liga Policy Institute 08/06/2011 
Lawrence  Tang World Bank (WB) 08/06/2011 
Daphne  Purnell Local Government Academy (LGA) 08/06/2011 
Silvestre, Jr. Barrameda Local Government Academy (LGA) 08/06/2011 
Joel  Cruz Local Government Academy (LGA) 08/06/2011 
Alfredo  Marañon Province of Negros Occidental 09/06/2011 
 Aleta  Nuñez 
Provincial Environment and Management Office – 
Province of Negros Occidental (PEMO) 
09/06/2011 
Roy  Balicas 
Consultant on Admin and Finance – Province of 
Negros Occidental 
09/06/2011 
Maria Lina  Sanogal 
Provincial Planning and Development Officer – 
Province of Negros Occidental 
09/06/2011 
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Ernell  Tumimbang 
Provincial Health Officer – Province of Negros 
Occidental 
09/06/2011 
Imelda  Villacin Quidan – Kaisahan Negros Occidental 09/06/2011 
Members of the 
Barangay 
Development 
Council 
 Barangay Minuyan, Murcia, Negros Occidental 09/06/2011 
Raymund  Fabre Asian Development Bank (ADB) 10/06/2011 
Marwynn  Bello 
Bureau of International Health Cooperation – 
Department of Health (BIHC – DOH) 
13/06/2011 
Monina  Camacho Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) 13/06/2011 
Patricio  Quiros Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) 13/06/2011 
Catherine  Tiongson Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) 13/06/2011 
Susanne  Stephan 
Democratic Partnership for Local Governance in 
South East Asia (DEGOSEA) 
13/06/2011 
Sven  Herpig 
Democratic Partnership for Local Governance in 
South East Asia (DEGOSEA) 
13/06/2011 
Joy  Aceron 
Government Watch (G- WATCH) – Ateneo School of 
Government (ASoG) 
13/06/2011 
Mary Jane  Ortega Citynet; League of Cities of the Philippines 13/06/2011 
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5.2 Annex 2: The list of documents consulted  
World Bank and Asian Development Bank. December 15, 2004. Decentralization in the Philippines: 
Strengthening Local Government Financing and Resource Management in the Short Term 
Alex Brillantes, Gilbert Llanto and Edmund Tayao. Unpublished (To be published soon, 2011). A 
Colloquium on the Impact of Decentralization.  
Department of Health, Republic of the Philippines. (2010 Health Sector Assessment Report). 
Performance in Health Reforms under FOURmula ONE for Health 2010  
European Commission, Philippines, November 2010. Mindanao Health Sector Policy Support 
Programme (MHSPSP) Mid-Term Review.  
World Bank, October 27th, 2010. Transforming the Philippines Health Sector: Challenges and Future 
Directions. Philippines: Health Sector Review.  
EU-Philippines., 2007/018-937. Action Fiche for Dialogue on Governance: Strategic Projects Facility 
(SPF II).  
EU Philippines, Manila, 21 June 2010. Standard Explanatory Note: Request for Amendment Including 
Extension of Commission Decisions and/or Financing Agreements.  
EC and the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008. Financing Agreement.  
EC Philippines, Country Governance Profile.  
EU- Philippines, March 2011. Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation with the 
Philippines, Draft Final Report-Final Version, Executive Summary. 
EU- Philippines. Volume 1, March 2011. Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation with 
the Philippines, Draft Final Report-Final Version. 
Identification Fiche for Project Approach 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. March 31, 2005. Decentralization in the Philippines: 
Strengthening Local Government Financing and Resource Management in the Short Term.  
EU-Philippines, Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2011-2013. Mid-term Review, The Philippines. 
Annex I: EU/EC Cooperation Objectives 
The EC-Philippines Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013. 
National Indicative Programme (2007-2010) Philippines 
Hiroko Uchimura and Yurika Suzuki, July 2009. IDE Discussion Paper No. 209, Measuring Fiscal 
Decentralization in the Philippines., Institute of Developing Economies. 
Outline for an Initial Performance Assessment Manual for the Performance Based Grant System 
(PBGS) in the Philippines, Draft January 2008 
Classification of LGUs in the Philippines 
Classification Database 
Indicative Construction and Maintenance Cost for the PBGS Menu 
Capacity Building Supply and Demand Side and Costs Examples 
Republic of the Philippines- Deparment of Finance. Preliminary Analytic And Design Work for the 
Development of a Performance Grant System for LGUs. Final Report, Vol. III-Preliminary Design 
Report. January 31, 2008, Nordic Consulting Group, DK and IDP Consult. 
Preliminary Analytic and Design Work for the Development of a Performance Grant System for LGUs. 
Final Report, Vol. I- Analytical Findings. January 2008 
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Table 3 Detailed list of EC-funded interventions related to decentralisation in the Country 
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry 
point 
Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid 
modality 
Main contracting 
party 
Philippine Health Sector Policy 
Support Programme 2006-2011 
24,28   19,69 
ASIE/2005/017-638 
Sectoral 
approach 
N BS 
REPUBLIKA NG 
PILIPINAS 
Mindanao Health Sector Policy 
Support Programme (MHSPSP) 2006-2010 
3,66  1,89 
ASIE/2006/018-016 
Sectoral 
approach 
L BS 
GRM international 
BV 
Indirect interventions 
Start 
 date 
Planned 
amount 
 CRIS Decision Nr.     
Dialogue on Governance: 
Strategic Projects Facility 
2007 3,2
14
    
DCI-
ASIE/2007/018-937 
    
LGUs capacity building  2003 0,18  ASIE/2003/005-030     
Integrated forest conservation 
with local governance in the 
Phillipines  
2000 1,27    ENV/2000/005-039     
Strengthening of democratic 
processes in local governance 
and the promotion of 
sustainable integrated area 
development for marginalized 
sectors in Negros Occidental, 
Biliran+Northern Mindanao 
2003 0,71  CDC/2003/005-002     
Small Projects Facility 2002 0,46  ASIE/2002/002-472     
                                                     
14
 1,5mEUR committed in 2009 (out of an overall envelope of 6,5 mEUR). 
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
The section below presents some details on following EC/EU-funded interventions: 
 Philippine Health Sector Policy Support Programme, 
 Mindanao Health Sector Policy Support Programme (MHSPSP), 
 Dialogue on Governance: Strategic Projects Facility. 
5.4.1 Intervention 2 
Title: Philippine Health Sector Policy Support Programme 
Budget: 24,28 mEUR 
Start date: 2006 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall Objective: 
To contribute to the improvement of the health status of the population especially the poor and to 
achieve health related MDGs 
Programme Purpose: 
Increased utilization of affordable and financially sustainable, quality essential health services and 
population programs by the poor through the progressive implementation of the government’s Health 
Sector Reform Agenda. 
Expected results: 
 Improved financial sustainability of national health insurance and extended insurance cover of the 
poor;  
 Improved governance, operational efficiency and service provision in public hospitals;  
 Increased utilization of cost-effective public health programs and primary health care services;  
 Improved quality, accessibility and safety of health care related products, facilities and services; 
 Improved governance in the health sector through (i) more efficient local health systems based on 
Inter-Local Health Zones and partnerships with the private sector; (ii) increased public 
accountability; (iii) improved health sector planning, monitoring and evaluation and (iv) increased 
efficiency and effectiveness of public health spending, (v)improved public finance management.  
Activities: 
1. Budgetary support to Provinces demonstrating good compliance with Philippines Public 
Finance Management legislation 
2. Budgetary Support to the DBM 
3. Administrative Agreement with the WB for a multi-donor trust fund delivering support to the 
Department of Health and provinces not eligible to budgetary support  
4. Technical Assistance service contract managed by the Delegation 
5.4.2 Intervention 3 
Title: Mindanao Health Sector Policy Support Programme (MHSPSP) 
Budget: 3,66 mil EUR 
Start date: 2006 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall Objective: 
To contribute to the overall improvement of the health status of the population especially the poor, the 
women and other vulnerable groups and to the achievement of health-related MDGs in the 
Mindanao’s Conflict-Affected Areas (CAAs) and the ARMM 
Project purpose: 
Increased utilization of improved priority primary health facilities, through a pre-SDAH accession 
programme implementing selected, doable elements of government’s health sector reform. 
Expected results: 
1. Governance 
Overall capacity of regional, provincial and municipal governments and other relevant institutions with 
respect to health governance strengthened, including: 
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 Strengthened stakeholder involvement in and oversight of health services management, 
 Financial management and procurement functions in LGUs strengthened, 
 Sector-wide, participative planning established, including health facility rationalisation, 
 Improved information systems, monitoring and evaluation and coordination in accordance with 
SDAH, 
 Improved management of health human resources and health human resource development. 
2. Financing 
 Increased enrolment of indigents into PhilHealth, based on formal poverty mapping,  
 Increased resources for RHUs from PhilHealth Capitation fund, 
 Increased allocation to health sector by LGUs. 
3. Regulation 
 Improved access to enhanced sustainable drugs supply. 
4. Health Service Delivery 
 Increased number of RHUs accredited for the Outpatient Benefit Package, Emergency 
Obstetric Care and Tuberculosis Directly Observed Therapy (TB DOTs), 
 Strategically located Barangay Health Stations developed, 
 Innovative approaches to primary health care delivery tested, documented and advocated. 
5.4.3 Intervention 4 
Title: Dialogue on Governance: Strategic Projects Facility 
Overall description: 
Overall Objective: Contribute to the improvement of good governance to reduce poverty in the 
Philippines 
Project purpose: Enhance local democratic governance reforms. 
Results: Democratic governance reforms are effectively enhanced in particular at the local level. 
Activities: 1) Establish and support best practices in good governance, support their dissemination, 
and their institutionalization; 2) Support partnerships between State and Non-State Actors towards 
good local governance initiatives. 
Out of a financial envelope of 6,5mEUR, the EC/EU has committed 5,7 mEUR overt the period 
2009-2010 (and disbursed 2,5mEUR). 
The table below list the major Strategic Projects Facility (SPF) projects supported by the EC/EU to 
date: 
Table 4 Description of major SPF interventions 
Grantee Project Date of 
Implementation 
Local Government Academy  Strengthening Local Governance Resource Centers 
as harmonizing mechanism for effective local 
governance in the Philippines  
 
8/18//2009 to 
8/18/2012 
Agri-Aqua Development Coalition 
- Mindanao 
Building resilient coastal communities in Zamboanga 
Peninsula, Mindanao through stakeholders 
partnerships and mobilization 
 
1/1/2010 to 
1/1/2012 
Quidan/Kaisahan-Negros 
Occidental  
Reaching the Unreached and Serving the Under-
served in Negros Occidental 
 
12/7/2009 to 
12/7/2011 
La Liga Policy Institute Cementing Pathways to Financing the Millennium 
Development Goals  
 
1/8/2010 to 
1/8/12/2012 
Foundation For A Sustainable 
Society  
Integrating Forestry and Local Governance with 
Sustainable Enterprise in Isabela Province  
 
3/1/2010 to 
3/1/2012 
Bicol Consortium For 
Development Initiatives (BCDI)  
 Partnership for Sustainable Management of Municipal 
Waters in Bicol Region for the Benefit of 
Disadvantaged Sectors  
 
7/1/2010 to 
7/1/2012 
Provincial Government of Negros  Effective Natural Resources Governance through 
Inter-LGU Alliances in the Province of Negros 
 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - The Philippines; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
35 
Occidental  Occidental  7/1/2010 to 
7/1/2012 
South Palawan Planning Council  Building the Governance Structure and Strengthening 
Inter-LGU Collaborative Conservation and Resource 
Management Initiatives in Mt, Mantalingahan 
Protected Landscape  
 
4/1/2010 to 
4/1/2012 
Ateneo De Manila University/ 
Ateneo School of Government 
 Monitoring and Improving Service / Program Delivery 
of LGUs using Government Watch (G-Watch) as a 
Social Accountability Tool  
 
7/1/2010 to 
7/1/2012 
Lipasecu Baywide Management 
Council  
 Community-Based Integrated Coastal Resource 
Management and Poverty Reduction through 
Participatory Local Governance  
 
7/24/2010 to 
7/24/2012 
University of The Philippines 
Public Administration Research 
and Extension Services 
Foundation Inc (Center for Local 
and Regional Governance CLRG) 
 Assistance for the implementation of the Newly-
Elected Officials (NEO) Orientation Programme 2010, 
Component 3: Provincial Alliance Building  
 
6/29/2010 to 
3/29/2011 
Philippine Business for Social 
Progress 
 Linking Initiatives for Collaborative Coastal Resource 
Management and Governance 
 
2/1/2010 to 
2/1/2012 
ILOILO CAUCUS OF 
DEVELOPMENT NON-
GOVERNMENT 
ORGANIZATIONS (ILOILO 
CODENGOS) INC 
CORPORATION 
Institutionalizing Social Contracts for Transparent and 
Accountable Governance and Effective Population 
Health and Environment Service Delivery 
1/4/2010 to 
1/4/2012 
NON-TIMBER FOREST 
PRODUCTS 
EXCHANGEPROGRAMME 
INCORPORATED 
ASSOCIATION 
Improving Forest Governance and Sustainable Upland 
Development through Climate Change Mitigation 
Financing Strategies in Southern Palawan 
 
9/1/2010 to 
9/1/2012 
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
5.5.1 Decentralisation reforms in the Philippines  
For the past three to four decades countries in the Asian Pacific Region have undergone “structural 
changes” and new institutional arrangements within and among levels of the governments. This can 
be attributed to a highly centralized characteristic of administrative structure which is common to most 
countries in the region due to the following reasons: 1) the experience of colonization and monarchical 
rule; 2) the task of nation/state building during the pos-colonial period, and 3) the centralist theory of 
development in the 1950s and 1960s (Siedentopf, 1987, p. 7, cited by De Guzman and Reforma, 1998 
in Tapales, Cuaresma, & Cabo, 1998, p.25). It is in this regard that administrative reforms have 
become their major concern in terms of improving the effectiveness and efficiency in being able to 
meet the demands of the populace.  
According to Reforma (2003, p.355), “administrative reform first emerged in the Philippines following 
the grant of formal independence due largely to the realization and discontinuities between a colonial 
administrative system and the needs and demands of sovereign governments.” The Philippines’ long 
standing history and struggle for administrative reforms led to systemic and institutional changes in the 
government by using decentralization as a strategy and framework to be able to improve the delivery 
of service from the national to the local governments. 
When the Maura Law in 1883 was enacted by the Spanish government, it signified the start of 
decentralization in the Philippines with the establishment of tribunales municipales and juntas 
provincials (Brillantes, 2003). Under the First Philippine Republic and the Malolos Constitution in 1898, 
“it addressed a more structural and systemic dimensions of local administration as legislative 
assemblies were organized at the municipal level to fulfil basic criterion of local autonomy and whose 
delegates were indirectly chosen by the people; the municipal captains, on the other hand, elected the 
officials to the provincial assembly” (De Guzman and Reforma, 1998, p. 36). 
During the American occupation, a milestone in decentralization was achieved after years of being 
highly centralize when municipal and provincial councils were organized and chosen under the 
conduct of general suffrage. Other proclamations include the following: “the instruction of President 
McKinley to the Taft Commission; the incorporation of the City of Manila (Act 183 of the Philippine 
Commission in 1902); the establishment of the Moro Province (Act 787 in 1903); the organization of 
provincial governments (Act 1396 in 1905), and the extension of popular control, like the elimination of 
appointive members from the provincial board” (Brillantes, 2003, p. 4).  
When political independence was granted by the Americans to the Philippines in 1946, The First Local 
Autonomy Act (Republic Act (RA) 2246) was enacted in 1959, entitled “An Act Amending the Laws 
Governing Local Governments by Increasing their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial 
Governments.” (Brillantes, 2003, De Guzman and Reforma, 1998). Brillantes (2003) points out that 
this enables the city and municipal governments more fiscal, planning, and regulatory powers which 
also broadens their taxing powers within the parameters of the taxing; laws at the national level. It was 
also the same year when the Barrio Charter Act (RA 2370) was promulagted giving some taxing 
powers to the barrios. Ten years after the RA 5150 or the Decentralization Act of 1967 was enacted 
that would increase the financial resources and broadened the decision making powers of the local 
governments (Brillantes, 2003). 
During Martial Law in 1972, the long efforts of decentralization collapsed as the country went back to a 
highly centralized form of administration by the Marcos regime. However, De Guzman and Reforma 
(1998) argued that there were still some instances of decentralization during the period, these include: 
1) the creation of regional governments; 2) creation of regional offices of national government 
departments; 3) the creation of regional development councils; 4) the adoption of integrated area 
development approaches. 
In 1986, when Marcos was ousted from office and Corazon Aquino became the president, significant 
changes were made in the constitution primarily ensuring local autonomy with a specific portion in the 
Constitution devoted for the local government under Article X. 
The passage of the Local Government Code in 1991 was monumental and one of the most radical 
approach undertaken by the country towards decentralization. Devolved powers were given to LGUs 
in three dimensions: 1) Administrative; 2) Fiscal; and 3) partnership and participation of NGOs and 
People’s Organisation (Pos). The following according to Brillantes (2003) are the major features of the 
LGC:  
 It devolves to local government units responsibility for the delivery of various aspects of basic 
services that earlier were the responsibility of the national government. These basic services 
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include health (field health and hospital services and other tertiary services), social services 
(social welfare services), environment (community-based forestry projects), agriculture 
(agricultural extension and on-site research), public works (funded by the local funds), 
education (school building program), tourism, (facilities, promotion, and development), 
telecommunication and services and housing projects (for provinces and cities), and other 
services such as investment and support. 
 It devolves to local governments the responsibility for the enforcement of certain regulatory 
powers, such as reclassification of agricultural lands, enforcement of environmental laws, 
inspection of food products and quarantine, enforcement of national building code, operation 
of tricycles, processing and approval of subdivision plans, and establishment of cockpits and 
holding cockpit fights 
 The Code also provides the legal and institutional infrastructure for the expanded participation 
of civil society in local governance. More specifically, it allocates to NGOs and people’s 
organization (Pos) specific seats in local special bodies. These special bodies include the 
local development council, the local health board, and the local school board. The Code also 
opens the door for NGO and PO participation in governance, particularly in the areas of 
promoting local accountability and answerability, through the recall and people’s initiative 
provisions. 
 The Code increases the financial resources available to local government units by (1) 
broadening their taxing powers; (2) providing them with a specific share from the national 
wealth exploited in their area, e.g., mining, fishery and forestry charges; and (3) increasing 
their share from the national taxes, i.e., IRA, from a previous low of 11% to as much as 40%. 
The Code also increases the elbow room of local governments to generate revenues from 
local fees and charges. 
 Finally, the Code lays the foundation for the development and evolution of more 
entrepreneurial oriented local governments. For instance, it allows local governments to enter 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangements with the private sector, float bonds, obtain loans 
from local private institutions, etc. All these are intended to encourage them to ne “more 
businesslike” and competitive in their operations compared to “traditional” government norms 
and operations. 
It has been 20 years since the LGC was enacted and there are many more issues and challenges of 
local autonomy in the country. This invites scholars, policy makers, NGOs and POs to sit down and 
further review the code as well as the prevailing conditions of intergovernmental relations between 
national and local government and future direction of decentralization. The table below explains more 
transfer of powers from the National to Local governments via issuance of memorandums and 
Executive Orders for the past 10 years.  
Table 5 NGA Orders and Circulars for Local Authorities 
Year  NGA Orders and Circulars for Local Authorities 
2000  DILG conducted a nationwide survey on the status of devolution and the 
concomitant budgetary allocations at the local government units through MC 
2000 – 24 and 2000 –159 
2004  DOF issued the use of customized accountable forms by local government units 
2005  DILG declared the operational autonomy of local water districts through MC 
2005 –21. DOH issued directives to implement the Medium – Term Philippines 
Development Plans (MTPDP 2004 - 2010) and Medium – Term Public 
Investment Program (MTPIP2005 - 2010). In addition, DOH reiterated 
administrative order (AO) 70 Series 2003 through MC 2005 – 0060 
strengthening Internal Control Systems of all Government units. Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and DOH also issued a joint 
resolution containing the policies and guidelines on effective and proper handling 
collection, transport, treatment and disposal of health care wastes.  
2006  DOH adopted the policy of harmonizing certification standards of SentrongSigla 
(SS) and accreditation of PhilHealth standards for rural health units / health 
centers (RHUs/HCs) through MC 2005 - 0060. Same office issued directives for 
the adoption of the Bench book on Performance Improvement of Health Services 
through MC 2006 -0008 
2007 DILG implemented  Executive Order (EO) 305 series 2004 that devolves to 
municipal and city governments the registration of fishing vessels three gross 
tonnage and below through MC 2007 - 37 
2008 DILG issued MC 2008 – 003 that states the resetting the integrated 
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Organization Leadership and Reorientation 
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(ISKOLAR) and the Election and Meeting of SK National Federation 
2009  DENR prescribed guidelines for the systemic disposition of alienable and 
disposable residential lands through miscellaneous sales application under 
Republic Act No. 730 that permits the sale without public auction of public lands 
through MC 2009 - 05 
2010 DENR delegated the authority to issue mineral ore export permits to the 
directors, regional director of the mines and geosciences bureau concerned and 
the provincial governors / city mayors concerned among others through MC 
2010 - 07 
Source: Adaptation from Prof. Edmund Tayao’s presentation on Impact on Politics and Governance, “A 
Colloquium on the Impact of Decentralization" 
 
5.5.2 Issues, Challenges, and Concerns of Devolution in the Philippines  
There are three (3) major concerns in the devolution of functions among LGUs in the Philippines.  
1. Overlapping of powers and functions as well as services that LGUs provide;  
2. Income share of LGUs from the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment); and 
3. Conversion of a Town or Municipality to a City  
5.5.2.1 Overlapping of Services that the LGUs provide 
The Local Government Units in the Philippines are classified in to four (4): 
1. City 
2. Province 
3. Municipality 
4. Barangay 
Based on Section 3 of the Local Government Code (LGC) which is the Operative Principles of 
Decentralization states the coordination, allocation, and the effective use of powers and functions of 
by the LGUs are indicated in the following paragraphs of the section: 
 (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their 
respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources;  
 (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and 
dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs 
and service requirements of its communities; 
 (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be 
accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and 
effectively carry out their functions; hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden 
their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable 
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their 
respective areas;  
 (e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities 
with respect to component Barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are 
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions;  
 (f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, 
services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them;  
The LGC may provide the operative functions of the LGUs but it does not have a clear delineation as 
to what LGU will provide the services in the development of their respective localities. Areas such as 
agriculture and fishery, environmental management, health, education, social welfare, maintenance of 
public works, infrastructure development, and tourism are services and or functions common to all 
local government units based on Section 17 of the LGC. (see the table below) 
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Table 6 Overlapping of devolve services by LGUs 
 
 
5.5.2.2 Income share of LGUs from the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment) 
The primordial consideration of every LGUs in the Philippines is the sharing from IRA (Internal 
Revenue Allotment), the LGC specifically provides the explanation for the formula in computing the 
IRA of LGUs under Section 284 and 285.  
SEC. 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a share in the 
national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current 
fiscal year as follows:  
 (a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);  
 (b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and  
 (c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%). Provided, That in the event that the 
national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the 
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary 
of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to 
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the 
liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government 
units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of 
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year: 
Provided, further That in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government units 
shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment which shall include the 
cost of devolved functions for essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount 
equivalent to the cost of devolved personal services. 
SEC. 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local government units in the internal 
revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner:  
 (a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);  
 (b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);  
 (c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and  
 (d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)  
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the 
basis of the following formula:  
 (a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);  
 (b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and  
 (c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)  
Provided, further, That the share of each Barangay with a population of not less than one hundred 
(100) inhabitants shall not be less than Eighty thousand pesos (P=80,000.00) per annum chargeable 
against the twenty percent (20%) share of the Barangay from the internal revenue allotment, and the 
balance to be allocated on the basis of the following formula:  
 (a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code:  
 (1) Population - Forty percent (40%); and  
 (2) Equal Sharing - Sixty percent (60%)  
 (b) On the second year:  
 (1) Population - Fifty percent (50%); and  
 (2) Equal Sharing - Fifty percent (50%)  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - The Philippines; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
40 
 (c) On the third year and thereafter:  
 (1) Population - Sixty percent (60%); and  
 (2) Equal Sharing - Forty percent (40%). Provided, finally, That the financial 
requirements of Barangays created by local government units after the effectivity of 
this Code shall be the responsibility of the local government unit concerned.  
Sources of Revenue of LGUs include the following: 
 National Government 
 · Internal Revenue Allotment 
 · Share from taxes, fees and charges collected from the development and utilization of 
national wealth 
 · Other grants and Subsidies 
 · Debt Relief Program 
 Locally Generated 
 · Real Property Taxes 
 · Business Taxes 
 · Other Local Taxes 
 · Regulatory Fees 
 · Operation of Local Economic Enterprises 
 · Tolls and Users Charges 
 Other Sources 
 · Sales/Lease of Assets 
 · Credits 
 · BOT-BT Scheme 
With the devolved services given to LGUs (with the prevailing conditions of some duplication of 
functions and services as well), and the current formula in computing the IRA there is a very strong 
clamour according to Dumugho15 (2010) to revisit and re-examine the IRA sharing particularly the 
cities and municipalities due to alleging inequity in the allocation and distribution of shares which also 
favours the cities. There were serious efforts by the 10
th
 and 11
th
 Congress to amend the code to 
increase the shares of cities and municipalities. Dumugho (2010, pp.13-14) also points out that the 
allocation formula includes the combining of “the twenty-three percent (23%) allocation of the city with 
the thirty-four (34%) of the municipality, making the combined allocation to fifty-seven percent (57%) to 
be distributed to the individual cities and municipalities in accordance with the distribution scheme 
provided in the Code”. The provinces also made the necessary proposal for the reformulation of the 
allocation increasing its share from twenty-three percent (23%) to twenty five percent (25%). (See 
Table below) 
Table 7 Comparison of existing and proposed allocation 
 
                                                     
15
 Adaptation from Director Eleuterio Dumogho’s paper on “REVISITING THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
ALLOTMENT (IRA)”. 
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5.5.2.3 Conversion of a Town or Municipality to a City 
Income has been the primordial considerations of LGUs; they are classified based on their annual 
income from first to sixth class City, Municipality, and Province. (see Table below) With the 
institutionalization of the devolve functions given to LGUs, funding for the implementation of programs 
and projects are the immediate concern. 
The prevailing sharing scheme of IRA results to the struggles of some LGUs particularly the 
Municipality in addressing and meeting the growing needs and demands of basic services in their 
respective area of jurisdiction. This in effect results to opting of some municipalities in becoming a city.  
It has been their immediate solution to raise their allocation share as they become too IRA dependent. 
Section 450 of the LGC provides the following basis of the creation of cities: 
(a) A municipality or a cluster of Barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an 
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos 
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has 
either of the following requisites:  
 (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the 
Lands Management Bureau; or,  
 (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified 
by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land 
area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less 
than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.  
Table 8 Income classification of provinces, municipalities, cities 
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Source: http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/articles/con_income.asp 
 
The tables below show the income classification of the Philippines since the LGC was enacted in 
1991. 
Table 9 Income classification of Philippine cities (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005) 
1993 CLASSIFICATION 
A year after the start of the implementation of the Local Government Code in January 1, 1992, the 
Department of Finance updated the income classification of local government units. The DOF used 
the following income ranges in classifying the provinces and the cities: 
 
1997 CLASSIFICATION 
In 1997, a new set of income brackets for classification was implemented. According to the 
Department Order 24-97 of the Department of Finance, 91 percent of the provinces and 92 percent of 
the cities fell under the 1st class category as a result of the implementation of the 1995 classification 
scheme. Aside from this, DOF noted that LGUs received increases in their shares in the IRA and were 
able to their tax collection performance. 
The income ranges used for the 1997 classification of cities were as follow: 
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2001 CLASSIFICATION 
In 2001, the Department of Finance issued another income classification scheme. The DOF said the 
purpose of classification was nullified when it implemented the 1997 income classification because 
83% of the provinces and cities fell under the 1st class category. The 2001 income brackets were 
increased by 70 percent to net out the Internal Revenue Allotment increases in the LGU from 1996-
1999. 
The income ranges used for the 2001 classification of cities were as follow: 
 
2005 CLASSIFICATION 
When the DOF re-classified the LGUs in 2005, it released a new classification scheme. Just like in 
previous years, it cited the increase in IRA shares as the reason why the classification was revised. 
The 2005 income classification was as follow: 
 
NOTES: *Under Presidential Decree No. 465, the cities of Manila and Quezon City are classified as special cities. 
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SOURCE: Bureau of Local Government Finance, National Statistical Coordination Board 
(http://www.newsbreak.com.ph/democracyandgovernance/Income_Cities.html) 
In June 30, 2007, RA 9009 was promulgated as an amendment Section 450 of the LGC increasing the 
20 Million Pesos to 100 Million Pesos. This became the impetus of the controversy that stirred the 
LGUs in the Philippines as the Supreme Court made a ruling favouring the sixteen (16) municipalities 
the status of cityhood. These municipalities are Batac, Ilocos Norte; Tabuk, Kalinga; Tayabas, 
Quezon; Baybay, Leyte; Catbalogan, Samar; Borongan, Eastern Samar; Guihulngan, Negros Oriental; 
Bogo, Naga, and Carcar in Cebu; Tandag, Surigao del Sur; Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte; El 
Salvador, Misamis Oriental; Mati, Davao Oriental; Bayugan,Agusan del Sur; and Lamitan, Basilan. 
After granting the cityhood status, the IRA shares of the 16 municipalities dramatically increase which 
is depicted in the figure below. 
Figure 1 IRA comparison of the 16 new Cities (in millions) 
 
Source: LOGODEF 
The LCP strongly opposed the conversion because the towns covered by the various cityhood laws do 
not meet the requirement under the law that before conversion they must have a minimum income of 
P100 million (Capino, 2009). The ruling made by the Supreme Court is very crucial as it affects the 
overall shares of IRA of most cities which relatively becomes an integral part of their income. 
Based on the issues that were discussed it is essential for policy makers, the academic community, 
and the NGOs and POs to re-examine and re-evaluate the devolved functions and IRA sharing of 
LGUs. Substantive and procedural changes are needed so that a better framework could be crafted to 
pinpoint the future and direction of decentralization in the Philippines. 
5.5.3 Local Government Finances and the Political Economy of Decentralization 
5.5.3.1 Constitutional and legal basis of Fiscal decentralization in the Philippines 
Political decentralization always goes hand in hand with fiscal decentralization. There can be no 
meaningful decentralization if the central government still retains direct supervision and control over 
the disbursement of public funds. Hence a meaningful decentralization project should not only deepen 
political accountability but foster efficiency in the delivery of public service. Effective decentralization 
also allows for “the diffusing of social and political tension and ensuring local and political economy 
(Panadero, 2006, 37 cited in Revisiting Decentralization published by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
(KAS), Local Government Development Foundation (LOGODEF) and German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ)) which transforms the political project of decentralization into a conflict resolution tool that can 
be utilize in not only providing social service but lay down the foundation of long term peace.  
In the experience of the Philippines the principle of fiscal decentralization is imbedded in the 
constitution of 1987. Under the Article X, sections 5, 6 and 7 of the 1987 constitution “Each local 
government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, 
and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with 
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local 
governments. In addition Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by 
law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Section 7, Local governments 
shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the 
national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the 
same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits”. (Article X, Section 5,6, and 7, Local Government 
of the 1987 constitution) 
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Table 10 Outline of IRA provisions in the LGC 
 
Source. Local Government Code of 1991 (3 Current formula use in the computation of the IRA) 
The constitutional provision provided cited above revealed not only the enumeration of public funds 
that can be generated by LGU’s but also the recognition of the importance of LGU in the release of 
public funds. But the details on the mechanism was still lacking, therefore the constitutional provision 
only acted as the guide by which Congress can draft the specific details on the fiscal powers of the 
LGUs. It took congress almost half a decade to finally complete the specifics of the IRA mechanism. 
For the past twenty years there has been a relative increase in the amount allocated to the LGU. The 
table below shows the increase in IRA allocation for the past 8 years and comparing it with locally 
generated tax collection.  
The Table below illustrates the accumulated income total of LGUs in the Philippines from 2001 up to 
2008. It represents the overview on how the LGUs generated their both from external and internal 
sources. And the most remarkable overall view of LGUs fiscal situation is the dependency of the LGUs 
from the internal revenue allotment of the national government. This income pattern is consistently 
observed from 2001 to 2008. Despite relative increase in the pattern of local tax collection which 
includes real property tax, business tax and other non-tax revenue. The pattern remains virtually 
unchanged with the IRA allotment taking most of the share in terms of the resources LGUs need to 
maintain its day to day operation. While the past 20 years have resulted in the emergence of LGUs 
with the ability to decrease their dependence from the IRA the overall picture remains the same. A 
majority of the LGUs remain dependent to the IRA allotment from the national government. 
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Table 11 Accumulated income of LGUs (2001-2008) 
 
The three dimensional figures in the Table below clearly illustrate that taking into consideration the 
number of LGUs which have become almost fiscally autonomous. The number of IRA dependent 
LGUs outweighs the aggregate total of fiscally strong LGUs. In addition to external funding provided 
by the IRA, the code also provides that LGU’s can avail of funds from the capital market. According to 
the DILG study “despite the availability of financing facilities in government financial institutions (GFIs) 
LGUs borrowings remain low.  
Table 12 Fiscal autonomy of LGUs 
 
This could be traced to a number of factors. First, financing options for LGUs remain unclear, with 
wide variations in financing terms and uncertainty about availability of grants. The long approval 
process and tedious paper work are discouraging factors. There is lack of effective project 
development and implementation assistance provided by the GFIs and the line agencies to LGUs 
(Panadero, 2006, 121, Assessing the State of Decentralization in Revisiting Decentralization, KAS, 
LOGODEF and GTZ)”. In addition to the IRA, LGUs were given revenue shares from Mining and 
Corporations operating in the locality; share in the GOCC, credit financing, bonds and long term 
maturing loans, and local funds. The table below illustrates the numerous funding resources available 
to the local government unit. The Code also specifies the parameters on the computation and 
distribution of the funds available to the LGUs in the Philippines. As a result of these new spending 
powers, LGUs have been able to expand their spending allocation across a broad spectrum of public 
service. The discussion that will follow shall tackle the spending priorities of the LGUs under the 
current set up. Besides the IRA, the LGC also provided additional sources of LGU incomes. (see 
Tables below) 
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Table 13 Comparison of local income and IRA 
 
 
Table 14 Additional sources of income by LGUs 
 
Based on the data collected by the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF), the locally 
generated revenue for the LGUs has remained low. While possible sources of revenue have 
increased, actual local income collection of LGUs has remained very low compared to their share of 
IRA. Even though there have been cases of fiscally productive LGUs, the overall picture has remained 
unchanged. Below is a summary of LGU revenue sources as compared to the IRA allotment.  
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Figure 2 Classifications of locally generated revenue 
 
Consequently, analysis of locally generated revenue reveals that majority of LGUs has performed 
poorly in terms of raising their own income and thus, making them dependent on their IRA for the past 
20 years. 
The table below shows the average LGU spending on social and economic development. 
Figure 3 Aggregate income and spending of LGUs and amount of LGU generated income 
from local and national sources (2001-2008) 
 
Source: Bureau of Local Government Finance-DILG 
IRA As a Double – Edge Sword 
The IRA undoubtedly is an effective tool in empowering LGUs in its spending priorities. However, it has also 
become one, if not, the strongest impetus to the underdevelopment of some LGUs by making them totally 
dependent to the remittance of the national government. According to a study conducted by the LOGODEF and 
the BLGF using data from the quarterly statement of income and expenditures submitted to the DOF from 2002 to 
2005, the study concluded that provinces remain to be the most dependent on IRA relative to other LGU tiers, 
with a dependency ratio of 85 percent in 2005. At the other extreme are cities, which recorded a lower IRA 
dependency ratio of 45 percent for the same period (Panadero, 2006, pg. 116, Revisiting decentralization by KAS, 
Logodef and GTZ)”. 
In addition to the dependency created by the IRA, effective decentralization also faces another 
challenge: the lack of clear and effective monitoring mechanisms in the IRA formula computation as 
affirmed by both the national and local governments. LGUs hoping to increase their IRA allocation 
have used the law by using inaccurate Cadastral survey in order to justify increases in their IRA 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - The Philippines; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
49 
allocation. Clearly, the lack of proper mechanisms to validate this data undermines the purpose of the 
law. On the other hand, it has also been repeatedly argued that the national government has been 
short – changing the LGUs through the exclusion of other taxes (customs, sin, etc.,) and solely using 
the Internal Revenue as the base in its computation of IRA allocation for the past 20 years.  
With regards to the expenditure pattern of the LGUs another clear trend emerges. LGUs devote a 
majority of their fiscal resources to general public service. From 2001 to 2008 the spending for public 
service outspends all other devolved functions given to LGUs since 1991. This overall measure takes 
into consideration the various LGUs that have performed effectively in terms of providing basic social 
services. Consistently the LGUs have spent a majority of their funds for the maintenance and 
operations of the LGUs and only a small percentage of its income is devoted to other spending 
priorities.  
In some cases like the ARMM provinces spending for public services consumes all the IRA allotment. 
A stark example is Lanao del Sur, which in 2008 spent 100 percent of its IRA for public service. No 
provisioning was left for capital spending. According to LGU finance expert even though there is an 
increase in public spending by the LGU. It “did not automatically result in efficient spending as can be 
seen in the big gap between income and expenditure of local governments. It seems that local 
governments have been under spending relative to their incomes (Llanto, 2011, pg. 60, Colloquium on 
the Impact of Decentralization by the LOGODEF). This is true for social health and education and 
services while spending for general public service have increase far more rapidly. 
Figure 4 LGU Spending patterns 
 
Source: Bureau of Local Government Finance-DILG 
Besides spending on public service another trend that can be observed is the relative increase in the 
spending for social services. Looking at tables7 6 and 7, one can observe a clear rise on the amount 
spent on social services as the amount of allocated IRA is increased. While the same can be observed 
with regards to table 3 wherein as the national government transfers the health sector, its spending 
has decreased while there was a corresponding rise in the amount spent by the LGUs on health. 
According to a study conducted by the DILG they observed “from 1994 to 2004, revenues of LGUs 
increased by 11.2 percent, with revenues from local sources such as proceeds from real property tax 
collection expanding at a slightly higher rate that those from external sources. LGUs depend on 
external sources for the bulk of their revenue generation with only a third coming from own-source or 
local revenues. Among the categories of expenditures, health expenditures grew the fastest, followed 
by social services and labour and employment”8.  
In addition, experts on LGU finances observed that “expenditures at all levels of local government 
(with the exception of the cities) declined when measured relative to gross national product (GNP) in 
1998 and 1999 following the onset of the Asian financial crisis. There was a recovery in 2000, which 
was short-lived in 2001 (3.75% of GNP) and 2002 (3.42% of GNP) due to the adverse impact of NG 
fiscal restraints on LGU spending. In fact, in nominal levels, aggregate LGU expenditures in 2002 
declined by almost 1 percent. In the same presentation (Panadero, 2006, Revisiting Decentralization 
                                                     
7 Page 115, Panadero, Eugenio in Revisiting Decentralization in the Philippines 2006, KAS, LOGODEF and GTZ 
8 Ibid 
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in the Philippines, KAS, LOGODEF and GTZ)”, Manasan (2006) asserted that LGU spending on 
development expenditures (i.e. education, health, infrastructure) have been largely driven by the 
resources (i.e., IRA and own-source revenue) available to LGUs (Ibid). 
Besides spending on social services, the LGC also mandated that LGUs must perform the following 
responsibilities: Land use planning, agricultural extension services and research, community based 
forest management, solid waste disposal system, environmental management, pollution control, 
primary health care, hospital care, social welfare services, local buildings and structures, public parks, 
municipal facilities housing, communal irrigation, water supply, drainage, sewerage, flood control and 
inter-municipal telecommunications (Lanto, 2011, 37, Colloquium on Decentralization, LOGODEF)”. 
Again in separate assessments performed by the PIDS and the ADB), both are in agreement that 
there was a remarkable increase in LGU spending for locally provided services; however, critical 
observations were made in terms of efficiency in LGU’s delivery of public services in the following 
crucial sectors of Education, Health, Social Services and Capital investment.  
LGU spending in the social services has stagnated in 1998 to 2003. This stagnation of social services 
is worrisome because LGUs are mandated to provide basic health care and education services. In 
addition, LGU spending in transportation and communication contracted from 0.5% to 0.4% of GNP in 
2003 despite the devolution of responsibility of providing local infrastructure to LGUs. Finally, personal 
services had the largest share of total LGU expenditure. Despite already having a share of large share 
of LGU expenditure, the share of personal expenditure has continued to increase from 1991 to 2003 
(ibid)”.  
As a result, attempts by several national government agencies to “Renationalize” devolved services 
gains currency since available data shows that LGUs have poorly performed in the delivery of public 
services. However, while data points to an overall lethargic performance, one can also observe 
“islands of good fiscal governance” through the presence of highly urbanized cities, provinces and 
even, municipalities that are able to achieve stellar performance in delivering the mandate provided to 
it by LGC. In fact, according to the same studies cited above, some LGUs has also shown a decline in 
the amount of IRA received from the national government and has instead, totally generated self 
sufficiency through locally collected income.  
Trends in Education, Poverty incidence and income disparity also provide a mix record in terms of 
improvement since LGU spending increased through fiscal decentralization. Health expenditure as 
stated above did not result into a reduction of health expenditure by the national government. Instead 
Per capita health expenditures of LGUs increased by P114 per person between 1992 and 1997, 
reaching P140 by 1997 (Schwartz, 2000). However overall LGU real per capita expenditure on health 
declined in 1998-2002 (except in 2000) relative to peak level attained in 1997 (Manasan, 2006). 
Among the LGU tiers, the stagnation in real per capita expenditure on health in municipalities is 
minimal but the drop in real per capita health expenditure in provinces was very severe in 2002. 
Consequently health outcomes are also a function of health services available at the local level. The 
increase in health expenditures in the last 15 years by LGUs is partly reflected in the higher number of 
government health workers between 1996 and 2002, which rose by 21.1 percent in areas outside 
National Capital Region (NCR) (Table 22). The increase, however, was mostly due to more midwives 
and dentists being hired by government while the number of doctors and nurses has been reduced by 
3.3 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The decline in the number of doctors and nurses was 
notably in the Luzon area, particularly in Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) and the Ilocos region. 
In Mindanao, only Region XII suffered a drastic decline in the number of government health workers 
possibly due the insurgency problem during the period. In contrast, Eastern Visayas reported a very 
significant increase in the number of health workers (Lanto and Quimba. 2006, 114, In Llanto, Tayao 
and Brillantes et al: Colloquium on the Impact of Decentralization; three Essays, LOGODEF, 2011).  
The overall performance of LGUs 20 years after decentralization shows a very mix record. If measured 
in terms of spending and income generation, the LGUs have increased both their income and 
spending. Looking at the three tables above, it clearly shows a progressive increase. However looking 
closer at available data, it can also be observed that the increase in income is a result of the increase 
in LGU IRA share. This inevitably resulted in the increased dependence of LGUs to the allocation from 
the national government. In addition, increased spending has been concentrated in one particular 
sector. General public service continues to account for a large share of spending by the LGUs; while, 
other sectors such as education, social welfare, and health all have experienced stagnant growth in 
terms of the amount spent and thus, creating an uneven level of human development throughout the 
country (see Table 8 below).  
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Figure 5 Human development index on selected provinces and regions 
 
Source: Philippine Human Development Report 2006 
Consequently there are attempts to correct this underspending by the LGUs through enhancing their 
capacities in the effective utilization of the resources they have. Training programs initiated by the 
DILG, LGA, LOGODEF and other development organizations all attempts to capacitate Local 
Government staff and officials on development planning and financial management. The DILG also 
initiated the “Performance Enhancement Fund (PEF),” a project that provides additional funding to 
LGUs on top of their regular IRA allotment through reward/incentive system. However, the fact 
remains that several challenges remain to be resolved. 
First, there is a lack of serious financial accountability on the utilization of LGU’s resources. Until today 
national government agencies such as the Department of Finance and the DILG have not imposed 
strict accountability rules on the utilization of the funds provided to the LGU’s. Other government 
agencies such as the Department of Health and the Department of Social Welfare and Development 
utilize different indicators to measure service delivery by the LGU’s. But the lack of a comprehensive 
standard to measure LGU performance hampers any effort to exact fiscal accountability from the LGU. 
Secondly, despite the devolution of health, social services, and agriculture, the same national 
government agencies continue to receive increased appropriation from the national budget. This 
marks a sharp contradiction the goal of fiscal decentralization embodied in the Code. 
Figure 6 GALING POOK awards per region and poverty level reduction 
 
Source: Panadero, 2006, 112, Revisiting Decentralization in the Philippines 2006 KAS, LOGODEF and GTZ 
And finally, the uneven delivery of public service due to differing capacities of LGUs in terms of 
implementing their devolved functions. LGUs that are financially autonomous are able to function 
effectively making them less dependent on the IRA while, less developed LGUs have to rely more on 
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the IRA to function. Since these IRA dependent LGUs cannot function without it, they cannot get out of 
the cycle of IRA dependency hence, making it difficult for these LGUs to become fiscally autonomous 
from the national government. Even though there has been numerous best practices by highly 
effective local government all over the country (see table 4), these LGU’s remain simply as “islands of 
governance” and “pockets of development”. The imposed challenge for fiscal decentralization to 
become effective is how to transform these islands of governance into an archipelago of governance 
remains yet to be achieved.  
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5.6 Annex 6: Health Financing Reforms under F116 
The main objectives of FOURMULA1 under health financing are: ensuring sustainable financing, 
including mobilizing resources from extra-budgetary resources, focusing direct subsidies to priority 
programs and expanding the national health insurance program. F1 calls for increasing revenue 
generation capacities of health agencies without compromising the poor’s access to services. This 
may include revenues from income retention, e.g., user fees and charges for personal health care and 
regulatory services, and health facilities’ rationalized use of real property assets; social health 
insurance; and private sources such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, and other 
forms of public/private partnerships. In order to achieve this goal, the following efforts are supported 
under FOURMULA1.  
 Reducing the Fragmentation in Financing at the LGU Level: FOURMULA 1 carried out 
several initiatives to correct some of the inherent weaknesses of devolution. To ease the 
problems of service fragmentation, lumpiness of investment, and externalities (spill-over 
effects), some municipalities organized themselves into ILHZs so that they can share 
resources and benefits together. As of end-2009, as many as 274 ILHZs have been organized 
in 72 provinces, although little has been done to empirically evaluate their effectiveness, 
impact, and sustainability.  
 Implementation of Province-Wide Investment Plans: Until recently, there was little planning 
capacity for health in LGUs. This problem is being addressed with the roll-out of the Province-
wide PIPH (Table 2.8). The PIPH has become the principal instrument to coordinate and 
consolidate the fragmented strands of resource mobilization by the province as it lays out the 
multi-year investment plan based on needs identified and the various financing sources (IRA, 
commodity self-reliance plans relying mostly on locally-generated revenues, reimbursements 
from PhilHealth, additional central government grants, LGU’s own loans, commodity and in-
kind support, and external assistance, if any). Lower-level localities are also undertaking their 
own city and municipal investment plans for health. It remains to be seen how far these local 
health investment planning initiatives can generate additional resources for health, allocate 
them properly, and result in a rationalized efficient service delivery system. To measure 
provincial health expenditures, Local Health Accounts are also being piloted in 11 provinces.   
Table 2.1: Provinces with Province-wide Investment Plans for Health, by FOURMULA 1 Waves, 
2005-2010 
Region  F16 F15 + ARMM F44 
Cordillera Autonomous 
Region (CAR) 
Ifugao, Mountain 
Province 
Benguet Abra, Kalinga-Apayao 
Region I – Ilocos Ilocos Norte, 
Pangasinan 
- Ilocos Sur, La Union 
Region II – Cagayan 
Valley 
Nueva Vizcaya Isabela Cagayan, Quirino 
Region III – Central 
Luzon 
- - Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, 
Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, 
Tarlac 
Region IVA – 
CALABARZON 
- - Bataan, Cavite, Laguna, 
Quezon, Rizal 
Region IVB – 
MIMAROPA 
Oriental Mindoro, 
Romblon 
- Marinduque, Occidental 
Mindoro 
Region V – Bicol - Albay, Catanduanes, 
Masbate, Sorsogon 
Camarines Norte, Camarines 
Sur 
Region VI – Western 
Visayas 
Capiz - Aklan, Antique, Iloilo, Negros 
Occ., Guimaras 
Region VII – Central Negros Oriental - Bohol, Cebu, Siquijor 
                                                     
16
 Extract from WB 2010, health sector review, page 32-33. 
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Region  F16 F15 + ARMM F44 
Visayas 
Region VIII – Eastern 
Visayas 
Biliran, Eastern 
Samar, Southern 
Leyte 
- Northern Leyte, Northern 
Samar, Western Samar 
Region IX – Zamboanga 
Peninsula 
- Zamboanga del 
Norte, Zamboanga 
del Sur, Zamboanga 
Sibugay 
- 
Region X – Northern 
Mindanao 
Misamis 
Occidental 
Lanao del Norte Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis 
Oriental 
Region XI – Davao  - Compostela Valley, 
Davao Oriental 
Davao del Norte, Davao del 
Sur 
Region XII – 
SOCKSARGEN 
North Cotabato, 
South Cotabato 
Sultan Kudarat, 
Saranggani 
- 
Region XIII – CARAGA Agusan del Sur Surigao del Sur Agusan del Norte, Surigao 
del Norte, Dinagat Island 
Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) 
- Basilan, 
Maguindanao, Sulu, 
Tawi-tawi, Lanao del 
Sur 
- 
Source: DOH 
 
 Patient classification – In its desire to impose user charges for the non-poor as a way of 
mobilizing more funds for the health sector, F1 recommends client segmentation mechanisms 
and patient classification systems. These were done initially in localities that developed plans 
for contraceptive self-reliance (CSR) or CSR+ (contraceptives plus other health commodities). 
More than 300 municipalities now have CSR or CSR+ plans, which were capacitated to 
undertake proxy means testing using the results of the Living Standards Survey and applying 
them to their own specific populations. The same tool is being used in the identification and 
enrolment of indigents into the LGU-PhilHealth Sponsorship Program.  
 Special Congressional funds for health – Since 2007, the National Government through the 
DOH has leveraged LGUs to provide resources to specific public health programs through 
specially grant allocations. In 2007, Congress appropriated Php 150 million to be used by 
LGUs for family planning and reproductive health services. In the following year, Congress 
also appropriated Php 2 billion to be used by LGUs for MNCHN services. In both cases, the 
governing rules require that the LGU should first show that it has spent some of its own 
resources to these programs before it can access the Congressional grants, to indicate that 
the LGU does consider these programs as a priority. As a result, the annual budgetary 
appropriations to the DOH have ballooned in recent years. This is an important development 
for it reinstates the DOH and the regional CHDs as key players in local health financing, an 
influence DOH lost with devolution.   
 Giving Fiscal Autonomy to DOH Facilities: To address resource inadequacies, F1 has 
focused on turning health facilities into revenue-earning “economic enterprises,” which 
essentially entails making them fiscally and organizationally autonomous. All of the retained 
DOH hospitals have achieved fiscal autonomy, their income-retention capacity having been 
made possible through a special provision in the Annual General Appropriations Act. The next 
step for these facilities is to go for a full-blown hospital autonomy, with their own governing 
boards, essentially making them government owned and controlled corporations. LGU health 
facilities (RHUs, city health centers, and LGU-owned hospitals) do not yet enjoy fiscal 
autonomy, and the risk is that the additional resource they mobilize will just revert back to the 
LGU treasury and may not result in improved health services. 
 Reducing the price of drugs: In the absence of PHIC covering pharmaceutical benefits, 
outpatient drugs are a major source of expenditures for households. The enactment in 2008 of 
the Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act (RA 9502/2008) and in 2009 of 
the Food and Drug Administration Act (RA 9711), were important milestones in laying 
foundations for improving quality and reducing prices of medicines. The “Cheaper Medicines 
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Act” confers on the President the authority to regulate the price of medicines and drugs and 
empowers the DOH Secretary to establish a drug price monitoring and regulation system. 
Pursuant to this Act, the President issued Executive (EO) Order 821 (made effective August 
15, 2009) prescribing the maximum retail prices (MRP) for selected medicines that address 
some diseases which are common causes of morbidity and mortality in the country. The EO 
covered only five active pharmaceutical ingredients including some antihypertensive, 
antibiotics, and anti-ceroplastics/anti-cancer.  
 Negotiated Prices for Drugs with Selected Manufacturers: Some manufacturers 
negotiated with the Government to reduce prices of selected products voluntarily, rather than 
fall under mandatory price regulations. The DOH approved voluntary price reductions of up to 
50 percent for 16 molecules (or 41 drug preparations) in August 2009, and a further 97 
products in 2010. However, voluntary price reductions apply only to the products of 
participating manufacturers, not to alternative suppliers of generic substitutes. The DOH has 
established a process for monitoring and evaluation of the impact of these measures.  
 Implementation of Performance-Based Financing Approaches. In F1, PBF means that 
budget allocations and releases will be conditioned on the achievement of performance 
targets. F1 aims to install a performance-based budgeting system for hospitals, public health 
facilities, and regulatory agencies which necessitates reforms in the respective agencies’ 
management and procurement system and implementation of a performance audit and review 
system. DOH is now shifting to contractual mode of dealing with LGUs. It enters into service-
level agreement with LGU when it provides resources to implement a component of the 
Province-wide Investment Plan for Health. The agreement specifies the rights and 
responsibilities of the DOH and LGU and the performance benchmarks to be used to measure 
compliance. This approach is in contrast to the previous unconditional provision of drugs and 
other inputs. DOH contracting of leptospirosis cases with a number of private hospitals also 
exemplifies the use of PBF in a public/private partnership arrangement.  
 
5.7 Annex 7: Evolution of Local Autonomy in the Philippines 
Historical Period Significant Historical Development that affected Decentralization 
and Local Governance 
Pre-Hispanic Societies  The chieftain of native settlements exercised executive, judicial and 
legislative powers assisted by Council of Elders. 
 Monarchial chieftain called the datu, panginoo or pangolo heads an 
autonomous territorial and political units. 
Spanish Colonial Period 
(1521 – 1902) 
 Colonial governments consolidated autonomous villages into 
pueblos (towns), cabildos (cities) and provincias (provinces). 
 In 1893, the Spanish colonizers enacted the Maura Law. 
1st Philippine Republic under 
Malolos Constitution 
 In 1898, Malolos Constitution introduced “decentralization” and 
“administrative autonomy” by instituting localized law-making bodies 
through the municipal and provincial assemblies. Local officials were 
then elected on a popular basis. 
American occupation of the 
Philippines   
(1902 – 1935) 
 Promulgation of a number of policies promoting local autonomy 
 Largely because of security considerations, local affairs had to be 
under the control of the Americans 
Commonwealth period 
(1935 – 1946) 
 Local governments in the Philippines were placed under the general 
supervision of the President following the provision embedded in 
Article VII Section II of the 1945 Constitution. 
 President, by statute, could after the jurisdictions of local 
governments and in effect, create or abolish them 
 President Quezon preferred to appoint the chief officials of cities 
Post-war Era 
(1946 – 1972) 
 In 1959, the first local autonomy act (RA 2264) entitled “An Act 
Amending the Laws Governing Local Governments by Increasing 
their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial Governments” was 
enacted. This act vested in city and municipal governments greater 
fiscal, planning and regulatory powers. It broadened the taxing 
powers of the cities and municipalities within the framework of 
national taxing laws. 
 In 1959, The Barrio Charter Act (RA 2370) sought to transform the 
barrios, the smallest political unit of the local government system into 
quasi-municipal corporations by vesting them some taxing powers. 
Barrios were to be governed by an elective barrio council. 
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 “Decentralization Act of 1967” (RA 5185) It further increased the 
financial resources of local governments and broadened their 
decision-making powers over administrative (mostly fiscal and 
personnel) matters. 
Marcos Regime 
(1972 – 1986) 
 The imposition of martial law in 1972, which abolished local elections 
and vested in the dictator the powers to appoint local officials who 
were beholden to him, was a great setback for the local autonomy 
movement. 
 1973 Constitution rhetorically committed itself to a policy of local 
autonomy” 
 Local Government Code of 1983 (Batas Pambansa Bilang 337) 
which reiterated the policy of the State of local autonomy. 
    Post Marcos Era 
    (1986 – Present 
 
 1987 Constitution was promulgated. It included specific provisions 
guaranteeing autonomy to local governments. 
 The Local Government Code (also known as the Local Autonomy 
Act) was enacted in 1991. 
Source: Alex B. Brillantes, Jr. and Donna Moscare, 2002. Decentralization and Federalism in the Philippines: 
Lessons from Global Community 
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5.8 Annex 8: EUD CSP Analysis of Decentralisation and Local Governance 
The latest CSP include an annex (Annex XI) on Decentralisation and Local Governance 
Situation Analysis: The enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991 devolved the responsibility 
for the delivery of many basic and infrastructure services to the Local LGUs. This devolution came with 
some form of fund transfers from the national government to the LGUs called the Internal Revenue 
Allotment (IRA), although not always with the required amount or know-how transfer to ensure 
effective decentralisation of services. In the past 13 years of implementation of the Local Government 
Code, there have been significant changes in the way LGUs manage their local affairs and in the way 
national government relates with LGUs and in the way people, through CSOs participate in local 
governance. Many LGUs have also developed innovative practices in development planning in 
consideration of economic, environmental, social and cultural factors. However, such gains are not 
enough to achieve widespread progress and genuine decentralisation. Many parts of the country 
remain poor and the population deprived of basic social services. This may be attributed primarily to 
the limited IRA received by the LGUs. The IRA was low (40% of the internal taxes collected by the 
national government) and was not automatically given to the LGUs. In addition, there is an uneven 
level of capacity and capability of both civil society organisations and LGUs in good governance (e.g., 
management functions, technical skills in fiscal management, land use planning, resource valuation, 
policy development, etc.). The MTPDP acknowledges the key role LGUs should play in achieving the 
national priority agenda and recognizes the importance of good governance in addressing poverty. 
However, most of the MTPDP measures are focused on developing infrastructures rather than on 
capacity-building of LGUs. In the march 2005 PDF, Decentralisation and Local Governance was 
identified as a key area of concern to foster the partnership between national government and LGUs 
towards national socio-economic development. 
Challenges: Some of the key issues identified in the PDF were: 
a.) Local Governance Framework 
 • Need to harmonise capacity-building efforts for LGUs, including setting up a sustainable 
mechanism for rationalization of capacity building activities; 
 • Need to institutionalise performance benchmarking systems; Need to clarify roles between 
national line agencies and LGUs for the effective delivery of services (e.g.,in health, social 
services, etc.). 
b.) Local Finance 
 • Need to consider well-targeted performance grants without creating moral hazards (i.e., 
dependency on grants); 
 • Need to explore untapped LGU revenue base (e.g, centralised land valuation, privatisation of 
assets); 
 • Need to harmonise central government financial institutions on-lending terms of funds 
sourced from Official Development Assistance (ODA); 
 • Need to promote anti-corruption practices at the local level. 
c.) Legal Framework: 
 Need to conduct a broad review of the implementation of the Local Government Code 
particularly the review of the IRA formula to enable the LGUs to cover the cost of devolved 
functions. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons learnt and to provide recommendations 
for future support to decentralisation processes; it covers aid delivery over the period 2000-2009 
taking into account the different entry points used by the EC/EU to deliver its support to 
decentralisation processes. The overall thematic evaluation is partly based on a number of country 
case studies to be carried out during the field phase and the present report is a summary of findings 
from a field visit to Rwanda.1 
The field visit to Rwanda had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. This note should by no means be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered foremost at the single country level, but have 
been formulated for use at the global level and are a subset of the findings using the full set of 
collected data from the desk study and the different field phase country case studies. 
The reasons for selecting Rwanda as one of the field studies were: 
 The decentralisation support has increased in importance over the evaluation period. 
 Rwanda has embarked on an ambitious decentralisation process since early 2000s and the 
process has been implemented through a Decentralisation Implementation Plan (which is now 
in the 3rd phase).  
 Rwanda figures as one of the top recipients of DLG support over the evaluation period.  
The field visit was undertaken between 23/05 and 30/05/2011. The evaluation team was composed of 
Hans Olsen and Alexis Dukundane. 
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research foci 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Rwanda has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
Table 1 Research focus 
Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
What is the policy dialogue between the EC/EU and the Government of Rwanda 
surrounding the decentralisation reform process? 
1-2 
Why has the EC/EU selected not to prioritise support to decentralisation and local 
governance? 
5 
What has the outcomes of the EC/EU support been in terms of improved service 
delivery from local councils and capacity of key government institutions? 
6-8 
 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Rwanda; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
2 
1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
development partners, as well as the overall decentralisation process in the country.  
In addition to studying the documentation, the Team also interviewed key informants with relevant 
knowledge on the chosen interventions, as well as informants offering broader insights into the 
evolution of the decentralisation context in the country. Besides meeting all relevant staff of the EUD, 
the stakeholders met comprised key government officials as well as donor representatives, NGO/CSO 
platforms and groups, local government association and national research institutes active in the field 
of local governance.  
The preferred interview methodology was individual in-depth interviews focused on the relevant EQs 
and the working hypotheses. A list of people met can be found in Annex 1. The information deemed of 
critical importance was subjected to a process of triangulation to ensure validity and internal 
consistency. Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field phase, prioritisation was 
necessary and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ reviews/ monitoring 
missions that had already been undertaken. Rather the team relied extensively on the related reports 
and attempted to extract more general findings, trends and recurring themes that are of relevance to a 
broader audience. The dialogue with in-formants also centred around distilling broader lessons and 
themes, rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. To reiterate, this country 
note is thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of the overall 
decentralisation and local governance portfolio of the EU Delegation. Rather it is an attempt to learn 
from the Rwanda experience and to encourage wider reflections on how best to structure and focus 
EU assistance to decentralisation processes. 
Working hypotheses 
 Over the past years, Rwanda has, thanks to its energetic Government and with support from 
many development partners, engaged in the implementation of a number of important policy 
decisions and public sector reforms. These include the Local Administration Reform (initiated in 
2002 and implemented in 2005), which made the administrative structure much lighter by 
creating 30 districts, replacing the earlier 106 districts; and 4 provinces plus Kigali town 
replacing the former 12 provinces; as well as the Decentralisation Reform (initiated in 2000), 
which included revision of various laws defining organisation and functions of districts, sectors 
and cells, and which, in principle, provided the new local administrative units with an important 
number of service delivery obligations. 
 The EC/EU has not been at the centre of these reforms and has elected to support 
decentralisation and local governance more indirectly through bottom-up approaches and rural 
development. The best example of this is the support given to the Ubudehe community 
development initiative, which was a key part of the District support programme from 2003-2010.  
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2 Short description of the country context and EC/EU support to 
decentralisation 
2.1 Short description decentralisation process in the country  
The system of governance in Rwanda before, during and after colonization was mainly characterized 
by strong centralization of power that has impeded the participation of citizens in the decision-making 
process especially in the planning of actions for its own development. After the sad and deplorable 
events that Rwanda has been through (1994 and earlier) the Government of Rwanda has sought to 
find and adopt strategies to help the country out of this permanently disastrous and complex situation, 
and especially related to fighting poverty and other development problems.  
It is within this framework that certain strategies were adopted, including:  
 The establishment of well-coordinated, effective and efficient local administrative bodies;  
 The consolidation of national unity and strengthening the country's security;  
 The strengthening of close collaboration with private operators and civil society to facilitate 
and accelerate the development process; and 
 The promotion and adoption of strategies to promote transparent management of public 
affairs.  
In 1996-1997 after the massive return of Rwandan refugees in 1994, consultations on local 
governance was initiated in Rwanda, focusing on the causes of disunity among Rwandans. The 
findings of these consultations were given, among other recommendations, priority in the 
implementation of the formulation of the decentralisation and democratisation process, which aims at 
promoting public participation in the process of decision making both in the identification, 
development, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and control of community development and 
socio-political sustainability.  
One of the key findings in 1998 was that approximately 70% of Rwandans lived below the poverty line 
and most (nearly 90%) were living in rural areas. It was therefore necessary that policies for the poor 
were put in place so that resources were directed towards areas where poorer people live and to 
programmes that involve greater participation of the majority of Rwandans in the resolution of daily 
problems they faced.  
It is in this context that in May 2000 the Council of Ministers of Rwanda adopted the policy document 
and strategies for implementing the decentralisation policy. In the same context, in May 2001, the 
Community Development Policy was adopted, while the policy of fiscal and financial decentralisation 
was finalised in November 2001. In November 2001, laws and regulations governing the 
establishment, operation and financing of local government units was initiated and also saw the 
creation of the Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA).  
In January 2001, implementation of the decentralisation process was initiated as the first phase of the 
implementation of this policy, whose main task was setting up institutions for decentralisation and 
strengthening their coordination and project management in order to ensure local services. At the 
lowest level, this should be achieved through a participatory planning process with communities. The 
first phase (2000-2005) established democratic and community development structures and reinforced 
the core Local Government Authority (the District). To facilitate the functioning of these structures, a 
number of legal, institutional and policy reforms were undertaken during this period, including 
democratic elections for local leaders. The second phase (2006 to 2010) aimed to deepen the 
decentralisation process in line with the Local Administration Reform Policy adopted in 2005. This 
policy had the following objectives: 
 To promote and enhance effectiveness in service delivery by making the Sector a truly service 
delivery focal point with adequate human, material and financial capacity, and to improve 
collection of data and information at this level; 
 To streamline and strengthen the coordination of “public services” and local economic 
development at District Level by availing more technically competent personnel as well as 
financial resources to the District in order to ensure sustainability of decentralized fiscal 
regimes; 
 To streamline and strengthen the coordination of development at provincial level; 
 To establish and strengthen coherent monitoring and evaluation systems as well as 
institutionalize accountability tools and systems. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Rwanda; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
4 
After the first phase of the decentralisation process, various studies, evaluations and analysis that 
were made showed that despite the positive achievements of registration, with the establishment of 
various structures and the establishment of a set of procedures and mechanisms, some challenges 
still remained. Therefore, in the second phase of a few key steps have been taken such as:  
The review of decentralisation policies, focusing on community development, fiscal and financial 
decentralisation, and the review of the legal and regulatory framework;  
An administrative reform including administrative restructuring of the country: 
 11 provinces and Kigali City down to 4 provinces and Kigali City,  
 106 local governments (districts and cities) down to 30 districts  
 1956 down to 416 sectors  
 9165 cells down to 2148 and  
 14 975 entities created called Imidugudu / villages (50 to 200 households).  
The strategic priorities of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 2008-
2012) are the subject of three interrelated programs: (i) Sustainable Growth for Jobs and Exports, (ii) 
or Vision 2020 Umurenge VUP and (iii) Governance. The first puts forward a programme of public 
investments seeking to lower the operational costs of doing business in the country, which should 
stimulate private investment. Umurenge Vision 2020 is a programme of integrated rural development 
strongly decentralised, especially designed to accelerate the fight against extreme poverty. This 
programme sets the order of priorities for the expansion of non-agricultural activities that will increase 
the efficiency of services and enable better targeting of social safety nets.  
With the reformed local government administrative system in 2006 and the creation of the 30 new 
districts, each district now has an elected council, an executive office, headed by the elected mayor 
assisted by two deputy mayors and a chief executive who in turns is heading the administrative staff of 
around 35 people at districts level, plus a staff of five persons in each administrative sector. 
In legal terms, the process of decentralisation is guided by Law 29/2005 of 31/12/2005 determining the 
administrative entities of the Republic of Rwanda and Law 08/2006 of 24/02/2006 determining the 
organisation and functioning of the complemented by a Presidential order, which specifies the 
organisations and the functioning of the sectors, cells and villages. The EDPRS, for example, „makes 
a case for consolidating and extending the decentralisation of public expenditure when accompanied 
with robust accountability mechanisms‟ whilst also making reference to the electorate (being the 
clients of the public services) asking for patterns of public expenditure in line with local and citizens 
priorities. 
Two key points regarding decentralisation can be highlighted. Namely that so far, relatively little 
attention is paid to the role of the elected representatives (and elections) in the district councils, apart 
from the role of the mayor, even as Governance is one of the three flagship programmes of the 
EDPRS. And furthermore directly relating to fiscal decentralisation, it should be noted that the EDPRS 
largely defines its service delivery objectives as sectoral objectives, while relatively little being said in 
concrete terms about the proposed re-allocation of state functions from central government to districts. 
Clearly, and understandably given the longer-term history and the short period that decentralisation is 
promoted as an official policy, Rwanda started the process with a system that has the characteristics 
of de-concentration i.e. a system whereby line ministries considered districts as mere implementers. 
Based on the objectives of the policy the way the local governments are structured, with an elected 
council and an elected mayor (de facto as local governments), and statements as made in the EDPRS 
2008-2012, clearly imply a further shift towards the model of devolution. 
Law 08/2006 of 24/02/2006 determining the organisation and functioning of the District, for example, in 
article 5 states that districts are responsible (i) to implement government policies (ii) deliver and assist 
sectors deliver good quality services (iii) elaborate, coordinate and implement development 
programmes and (iv) promote solidarity and cooperation with other districts. Article 20 adds that 
districts are responsible for decision taking, policies and giving instructions with regard to the 
appointment of teachers and the approval of the establishment of nursery-, primary, secondary and 
technical schools and that districts can take action in case of poor performance. However, nowhere is 
it said that districts have been given the responsibility for delivery of nursery-, primary, secondary and 
technical education. 
The Rwanda Decentralisation Strategic Framework (RDSF – August 2007), tries to clarify further and 
notes that districts, as far as education are concerned are (i) to start nursery schools and monitor the 
way they operate (ii) start primary schools and monitor the way they function, (iii) monitor parents 
associations and teachers, (iv) build capacity and (v) mobilise resources. Hence, although not said 
explicitly in the law, it can be deduced from various documents that districts are, as part a 
decentralised system based on the principles of devolution, given the responsibility for the provision of 
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basic services in the district (health, education, water, road infrastructure and agricultural support 
services) and that, as stipulated in the fiscal decentralisation policy of 2006, the central government 
will assist districts to obtain the necessary resources for the delivery of these services. 
2.2 List of the major EC-funded interventions  
The field team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in this specific country through a 
number of interventions. The table below summarises the major EC-funded interventions considered. 
Table 2 List of the major EC-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision Nr. 
Comment 
Decentralised programme for rural 
poverty reduction 
33,97 FED/2003/016-357 
The main decentralisation 
intervention of the EC/EU in 
Rwanda from 2003 to 2010. 
Especially the community 
support “Ubudehe” was seen as 
a crucial intervention for 
encouraging local participation 
and service delivery.  
Soutien à la politique de 
décentralisation en vue d''une inclusion 
communautaire, sociale et économique 
des personnes en situation de handicap 
vivant en 
0,6 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2007/019-
404 
 
Améliorer la particpation citoyenne dans 
les processus de gouvernance 
décentralisée 
0,6 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2008/020-
081 
 
The DPRPR from 2004 was initiated with an overall envelope of 40 million EUR. The focus was rural 
poverty reduction in the framework of administrative decentralisation: 1/ Support to participative 
planning process; 2/ Direct support to priority actions identified; 3/ capacity building of CDC, local 
administrative services, SMEs, local associations and the civil society; 4/ Support to labour-intensive 
public work; 5/ Budget support to districts. 
Under DPRPR and the broader context of poverty reduction, the EC/EU provided 1 million EUR 
funding in 2002 for the implementation of a pilot phase of Ubudehe in the former Butare Province. 
Subsequently, the EU has funded two further phases of the Ubudehe programme (2005-2006 and 
2007-2008), through its DPRPR (9th EDF), in addition to the project „Support to the Districts‟ 
(Programme d‟Appui aux Districts / PAD). 
The development strategy of Rwanda is currently based on the “Vision 2020”, the PRSP1 (2002-2006) 
and the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (EDPRS – 2008-2012). The Decentralised 
Programme for Rural Poverty Reduction (DPRPR) supported this strategy through two main 
components: 1) the "Ubudehe" component, addressing itself to the local rural actors (some 85% of the 
Rwandan population); 2) the “Support to the Districts”, itself divided into sub-components directed 
towards capacity building of the administrative and technical services of the Districts, and around 
construction/rehabilitation of small and medium sized infrastructures in the Districts, as well as 
targeted work with high intensity of labour.  
The EC/EU support has focused on priorities identified by the population, the authorities of the districts 
submit to the Common Development Fund (CDF) Community Development Plans (CDP) for funding. 
At the level of each local government (the nearest administrative unit of the population), people define 
its priorities and related projects, elect its representatives "Ubudehe" in charge of the execution and 
monitoring of projects and participated in the realisation of the latter. EUR 900 was awarded for every 
9165 cells in the country. The process is fully participatory and under control by the beneficiaries. 
Operating at the district level, the EC/EU supported Decentralised Programme for Rural Poverty 
Reduction (DPRPR) supported local priorities, particularly in infrastructure, and was implemented with 
participation of the people. In parallel, the authorities are trained in the proper management of small 
community projects. 
A detailed list is provided in Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs  
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national stakeholders in 
partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 1.3.1:  
All national stakeholders met had a clear understanding of the EC/EU approaches to DLG as 
pronounced under the DPRPR but could not mention any specific policies and/or strategies on 
decentralisation. So there was not a wider knowledge of any specific documentation that the EC/EU 
has developed.  
Ind 1.3.2:  
The donors in Rwanda are working together on a kind of coordinated funding approach to supporting 
the implementation of the Decentralisation Implementation Plan (DIP). Basket funding was briefly 
attempted but never really materialised in 2005/6. However, the EUD has been active in this group 
since its existence from about 2005 onwards but since 2007 only as a more passive member. The 
various Development Partners (DPs) in the group do see that the EC/EU have quit clear policies and 
strategies on DLG issues but that the division of labour exercise also limits some from taking more 
actively part in the DIP implementation. Over the past couple of years the EUD have had 
representatives who have attended meetings in the Decentralisation Working Group but not on a 
regular basis, which has frustrated a number of the other DPs, who see the EC/EU as a very important 
actor in the decentralisation field not least because of the larger sector support in key serviced delivery 
sectors.  
Ind 1.3.3:  
The EUD staffs were aware of many policy statements and documents that have come out of 
headquarters over the past 4-5 years and have attended regional and international meetings to 
discuss approaches and lessons learned.  
3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
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 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing with 
sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) or 
disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.1.1:  
Looking at the DPRPR and the implementation of the programme it is clear that the EC/EU tried to 
respond to the needs of the national partners and the redesign of the programme in 2005/6 is an 
example of this when the funds were channelled through the CDF. What is clear is that the EC/EU 
procedures in terms of auditing, accounting and use of funds proved to be very cumbersome for the 
national partner and almost jeopardised the intervention. A solution was found, as the national partner 
grew stronger capacity wise, and better able to live up to the EC procedural demands. However, now 
it seems that DLG is NOT a strategic issue for the EC/EU moving forward in the 10 EDF and with the 
division of labour exercise. So the EC/EU is not necessarily actively seeking out strategic partners in 
the DLG field.  
Ind 2.1.2:  
The dialogue internally at the EUD is very clear and active. Seems that the EUD often shares 
information of relevance to the various sectors and decentralisation issues.  
Ind 2.1.3:  
There is a Rural Development Cluster and one person is specially dealing with Decentralisation 
issues.  
Ind 2.1.4:  
There doesn‟t seem to be any specific incentives for risk taking in terms of decentralisation and local 
governance.  
3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.2.1:  
The EUD has had throughout the last 5-6 years a number of staff dealing with rural development, PFM 
and Governance issues. The last 1½ year there has been one person dedicated to decentralisation 
issues.  
Ind 2.2.2:  
Various meetings with the delegation staff dealing with decentralisation, rural development and PFM 
issues showed that they have an active team with many staff with knowledge of the issues relating to 
DLG. The issue of local PFM problems and relating to the decentralisation reform process were 
discussed actively in the group.  
Ind 2.2.3:  
It was not clear how many of the staff had attended training in decentralisation related issues but 
some had been involved in the earlier forum on the Internet (2006) and found it an interesting exercise 
with good overall discussions.  
3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) or 
systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, issues 
papers…) 
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 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote the 
effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.3.1: The decentralisation donors have through the working group a M&E system where key 
aspects of the DIP are monitored every year.  
Ind 2.3.2:  
No information 
Ind 2.3.3:  
One can‟t talk of a “driver of change” agent within the EUD system but as mentioned above there are 
staff that are dedicated to follow the decentralisation field in terms of developments and issues and 
feed this back into the various programming areas of particular concern to EUD in various sectors not 
least the Agricultural sector where a larger sector budget support programme has recently been 
developed and which encourages a fiscal decentralisation approach with funds being sent directly to 
district level for implementation of agricultural activities.  
3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies? 
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational procedures 
related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds to 
LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant CSP sections on decentralisation and local governance 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.1.1:  
There is a discussion of the decentralisation process but not an in-depth analysis of the policies and 
strategies in the CSP. However, the EC/EU programme DPRPR and especially the later Mid-Term 
Evaluation (MTE) of the DPRPR included a very elaborate analysis of the decentralisation process 
and the reform issues. 
Ind 3.1.2:  
The MTE of DPRPR proposed radical and they were based on the remaining funds of about EUR 15 
million being used under different modalities. This led to a change in funding modality for Ubudehe 
and District Support for which went through Sector Budget Support to CDF. The objective of the 
support was to enable the GoR to deliver its PRS through increased means, improved macroeconomic 
stability, and increased focus on result-based policy making. This will be monitored through a number 
of specific key performance indicators (at macro and sector level). 
Ind 3.1.3:  
Quality of the dialogue is high and very intense. This can be seen from the very active sector-working 
group on decentralisation and local governance and other relevant sector working groups especially 
for PFM issues and general governance as well.  
Ind 3.1.4:  
The 2002-2007 (9
th
 EDF) CSP talks briefly about decentralisation and rural development. Interestingly 
enough the 2008-2013 CSP only makes reference to rural development and does not mention 
decentralisation and the decentralisation reform process with one word, which is understandable since 
it‟s not a priority of the EC/EU, but is worrying since it is one of the largest and most important on-
going reform processes in the country and one which has potentially a lot of influence on especially 
implementation of sector programmes within agriculture, governance, health and education.  
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
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 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as “How should existing interventions best evolve?” are addressed 
in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.2.1:  
The evidence is discussed elsewhere but under the DPRPR there was focus on both top-down 
approach of support to selected districts and bottom-up approach via the Ubudehe to local 
communities and based on local community priorities. This became clearer when the funding modality 
was changed under the DPRPR to better fit with the GoR‟s preferred transfer mechanism to local 
governments under the CDF. 
Ind 3.2.2:  
As an example of the evolving fiscal decentralisation situation the EC/EU has recently started to 
channel an amount of 20 million EUR (SBS) through a grant system over a period of 4 years in the 
agricultural sector. Financing is provided directly by MINECOFIN to the 30 districts using the existing 
earmarked transfer mechanism for the agricultural sector. Earmarked transfers are distributed 
following an allocation formula, which includes environmental, economic, and socio-economic 
indicators. Districts will be free to choose the activities they would like to fund using the earmarked 
grant, within the framework spelled. While MINECOFIN is responsible for monitoring the compliance 
with financial rules and regulations, MINAGRI is responsible for evaluating district progress reports 
and approving the release of the different tranches.  
3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support decentralisation 
and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme to 
be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as “When 
and how to use sector budget support?” or “what are the risks related to the”) are addressed in 
project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid delivery 
methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.3.1:  
This is discussed elsewhere. From Project to Programme and Sector Budget Support has happened 
over the last 10 years of EC/EU support to the decentralisation process.  
Ind 3.3.2:  
There were no examples found where inflexibility has led to non-adjustment to changing situation 
within DLG. However, the DPRPR was revised to accommodate the changing funding surrounding 
districts. First the programme only targeted some few districts but changes to the approach midway 
meant that a countrywide approach was adopted for the community support part (Ubudehe).  
Ind 3.3.3:  
Extent of emphasis on decentralization/LG issues is present as specific indicators also in monitoring of 
GBS. The Decentralisation, Community Participation, Empowerment, Transparency and Accountability 
(DCPETA) Sector Working Group deals with many issues of governance. However, it is not clear how 
this is being coordinated with decentralization/governance focal points in ministries and in other sector 
working groups and what role EC/EU staff play in this process 
Ind 3.3.4:  
The EC/EU has been discussing the various support modalities but especially under the latest CSP 
(2008-2013) various support modalities are discussed from GBS, over SBS to Project support.  
3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of the 
role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
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 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.4.1:  
There was no evidence of any specific studies that have led to the EC/EU support strategy for 
DPRPR. The EC/EU response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned with 
national policies. The partners are responding to Governments' priorities / activities under the DIP and 
the fiscal decentralisation strategy and PFM capacity needs, all of which EC/EU support to some 
degree. The choice of entry points and aid delivery methods have been appropriate to national 
contexts and have developed over time from project to programme and now in the form of SBS also 
(Agriculture and Social Protection). 
Ind 3.4.2:  
The main actor for the DPRPR was the MINALOC, which is the responsible ministry for 
decentralisation and local governance issues. The focus on funds for districts and UBUDEHE being 
transferred through CDF focused on the local actors at district level and involved also CSOs, and 
communities.  
3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarities 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance issues 
among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor approaches, 
when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.1.1:  
Regular meetings with other donors take place in the framework of the Budget Support Harmonisation 
Group, the Development Partners Coordination Group, the annual Development Partners Retreat and 
Development Partners Meeting, monthly EU Heads of Cooperation and Heads of Mission meetings, 
ad hoc Political Officers meetings and at different sectoral working groups (the EC/EU is particularly 
active in the transport, justice, public financial management, agriculture, and decentralisation working 
groups).  The EC-chaired informal network of donors on elections met on a very regular basis for the 
2008 elections and the issuing of a draft electoral code for the forthcoming elections. 
Ind 4.1.2:  
No records found on any resolution of any inconsistencies.  
Ind 4.1.3:  
The EUD played a key role in the harmonisation and alignment area. It participated actively in the 2 
Joint Budget Support Reviews and is leading a task force to develop a new multi-donor partnership 
framework for budget support. It co-chairs the Transport sector-working group with GoR. It co-
ordinated policy dialogue through joint EU policy statements at the Development Partners meetings, 
and by regularly convening EU meetings to coordinate political dialogue in accordance with Article 8 of 
the Cotonou Agreement. The EC/EU is a financing partner in 4 basket funds but will face some 
challenges as basket funds are increasingly managed by and in accordance with recipient's 
procedures where EC/EU participation would require four-pillar audits. However, there is not basket 
funding in the DLG area.  
Ind 4.1.4:  
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The question is why the EC/EU has not selected to fund a programmatic approach to decentralisation 
process through the DIP. But other donors have consistently taken the lead on decentralisation issues 
– earlier on it was DFID and the Dutch and the Germans, now it‟s the Dutch and the Germans still 
taking the lead. However, funding for decentralisation is ad hoc and linked to various area-based 
programmes of donors and/or capacity building funds used in a strategic way especially by GIZ.  
3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarities between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and other 
donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finance decentralisation programmes with Members States and major donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes and 
policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.2.1:  
The dialogue is anchored around the DIP and is conducted mainly through the decentralisation sector 
working group with GoR but mostly in terms of exchange of information.  
Ind 4.2.2:  
The local development/Governance portfolio is important in EC/EU and increasing support to DLG 
issues over the evaluation period can be seen. The EUD did not initially dedicate specific staff 
resources to DLG (shared) but later part of evaluation period 1 full time staff member. The EUD has 
not been focal point in the sector working group established in 2005/6 but have attended meetings 
sporadically and even though not a decentralisation donor in division of labour exercise recently 
conducted EUD DLG focal point attends meetings more regularly now. 
Ind 4.2.3:  
This is not the case. There is some coordination but not a basket funding of the DIP. This is clearly the 
wish of some donors and the GoR but until now it has not been possible. There is more incremental 
funding and donors with programmes/projects as vehicles of support.  
Ind 4.2.4:  
N/A  
3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors such 
as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment into 
decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1:  
The coherence has become more evident when the funding of DPRPR went through CDF and as 
SBS. The latest developments are that the EUD has developed a fiche for SBS for the agricultural 
sector with funding through the CDF and for all districts. The EUD has been part of the DLG 
coordination mechanism with major donors and GoR but not as the most active partner. The EC/EU 
DPRPR was a district and area based programme from the beginning and only later in 2006 did 
aspects of the UBUDEHE become more national in approach. But other aspects of DPRPR support to 
districts labour-based infrastructure development where for a limited number of districts. However, the 
EC/EU support to UBUDEHE was seen as crucial and significant for the survival of this countrywide 
initiative. Aspects of the programme had sector focus as well especially within agriculture and health 
where the limited amounts to communities could be used for improvements for the community in these 
fields.  
Ind 4.3.2:  
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There is no evidence that the crosscutting issues have played a major role in the decentralisation 
support to districts and communities. The focus has been more on labour-base infrastructure 
development and on small-scale support to communities with clear local governance support focus.  
Ind 4.3.3: 
The EC/EU support to decentralisation processes is generally coherent with other (sector and GBS) 
activities, and is now given more prominence in support to various programmes. The harmonisation of 
donor activities is more clearly prominent but still a long way to go in terms of joint action plans, 
revised fiscal decentralisation strategy with less earmarked or conditional funds at local level, and 
more programmable or unconditional funds. But M&E of the decentralisation process is included in the 
GBS indicators.  
3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to implement 
decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.1.1:  
The RDSF, adopted in August 2007, provides the basis for furthering the decentralisation process 
from 2008 to 2012 in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. The RDSF outlines five strategic 
areas to boost the decentralisation process and further empower Local Government Authorities. It is 
aligned to the national EDPRS. The DIP has been elaborated by the GoR to implement the RDSF and 
addresses all the strategic areas of the RDSF. Its goal is to reach “sustainable economic growth and 
social development” and its purpose is to achieve “equitable, efficient and effective pro-poor services 
and local development in an environment of good governance”. 
Ind 5.1.2:  
The Program Steering Committee (PSC), chaired by the Minister of MINALOC, steers, oversees and 
supervises the implementation of the DIP. It provides guidance to the National Decentralisation 
Implementation Secretariat (NDIS) on priorities and strategic decisions that shall be implemented for 
the smooth implementation of the DIP. The main mission of the PSC is to provide strategic advice and 
support for coordination and harmonization of all stakeholders‟ contributions to DIP execution. The 
PSC serves as the decision-making body for DIP implementation. The NDIS reports to the PSC and 
provide secretariat services to the PSC. NDIS is exclusively responsible for day-to-day management 
and coordination of DIP implementation in close collaboration with central Government ministries and 
local government authorities. The NDIS, being statutorily part of MINALOC, works in close 
collaboration with the Directorates of the Ministry. The NDIS focuses on supporting local governments, 
in order to organize, implement and monitor the attainment of DIP objectives. 
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.2.1:  
Phase One (2001-2004): The first phase (four years) was meant to institutionalize decentralized 
governance by articulating the policies and the legal frameworks, putting in place the necessary 
administrative structures, systems, and mechanisms; holding the grass root and local government 
elections, undertaking institutional and human resource (especially the elected) capacity building 
activities, and extensive sensitization of the population on the legal and administrative aspects of 
decentralized governance. Notably, relevant policy and legislative frameworks were formulated, and 
the CDF was established and democratic elections for local leaders held during this phase. 
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Phase Two (2005-2009): The second phase covered five years ending 2009 and aimed to 
institutionalize decentralised local governance by having it deliver on its promises to the population. 
Focus was on enhancing public service delivery through decentralisation of public services from the 
Central Government to the districts. Most of the gaps identified and lessons learnt from 
implementation of the first phase formed basis for enhancing the policy and strategy implementation 
plan in the second phase. The key output of this phase was the development of suitable statutory 
framework that; 
i) Facilitates greater participation of the citizens in decision making, planning and 
implementation of their development programmes and projects;  
ii) Facilitates greater allocation of resources to the Local governments and grass root structures 
for their use in the processes of self liberation from the poverty traps, increasing their 
productive capacities, plus enhancing their access to health services, education, information 
and above all, ensuring that they have enough to eat;  
iii) Gives greater linkages to other political, social, judicial, administrative and economic reforms; 
and 
iv) Allows better co-ordination of stakeholder interventions in the decentralisation programme and 
activities to create synergy in interventions and progressively shift from project support to 
programme support that would best bring about even development throughout the whole 
country as well as help to raise the national capacities to manage the reform process.  
Phase Three (2010): This phase has started and its main aim of enhancing the decision-making 
mechanisms of public administration. It will focus on: fiscal decentralisation to promote local 
development; and strengthening the capacity of the devolved units of local governance (District, 
Sector, Cell and Village) to implement the RDSF.  
Ind 5.2.2:  
The laws determining the State Finances for each financial year, and as submitted, discussed and 
approved by parliament, normally contain two annexes as follows: Annex I providing an overview of 
Income and Annex II providing the budget of expenditure, whereby the latter, for 2008, is presented in 
6 different manners as follows: 
 Annex 2.1: Summary overview of total budget by sector (16) and sub-sectors (49) 
 Annex 2.2: Summary overview of recurrent and development budget by budget agency. There 
are 55 budget agencies, including 15 ministries, the presidency, parliament, the judiciary, 4 
provinces and 30 districts. 
 Annex 2.3: Summary overview of the total budget (for three years) by budget agency. 
 Annex 2.4: Total budget, by budget Agency by programme. 
 Annex 2.5: Recurrent Budget by budget agency (85), programme and sub programme 
 Annex 2.6: Development Budget by Budget agency (17); The 17 budget agencies that have a 
development budget are mainly the ministries. The provinces, but more importantly, also the 
districts do not have a development budget. 
In 2007, Annex 2.5, the sub programmes were further sub divided into chapters and paragraphs, 
which made the budget law 2007 to be twice as voluminous as the budget for 2008. Apart from the 
advantage of a slimmer budget, the real advantage is that it makes reallocation within the sub-
programmes easier as it does no longer require parliamentary approval. For their own internal 
budgeting, however, budget agencies still use the chapters and paragraphs. All programmes and sub 
programmes as included in the budget, are defined by the respective sector / ministries as part of the 
EDPRS. Hence, in principle, the budget is objective and output (rather than input) oriented. The link 
between the objectives-driven programmes and sub-programmes and the more input guided chapters 
and paragraphs, however, is not always evident. It sometimes appears that, when the programmatic 
budgeting was introduced, existing budget lines were placed under the best fitting (sub) programmes 
without a real change in implementation or choice of activities. One of the focus areas of DIP III (2011-
15) will be to harmonise sector legislation and programming with the RDSF. This work has and is not 
being supported by the EC/EU. 
3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
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 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total public 
expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes and 
increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.3.1:  
With the reformed local government administrative system in 2006 and the creation of the 30 new 
districts, each district now has an elected council, an executive office, headed by the elected mayor 
assisted by two deputy mayors and a chief executive who in turns is heading the administrative staff of 
around 35 people at districts level, plus a staff of five persons in each administrative sector. It was not 
possible to get a full overview of all staff working at LG level as many are deconcentrated and 
volunteers do many other services.  
Ind 5.3.2:  
The Government launched the Decentralisation Policy with the aim of strengthening the practice of 
good governance and promoting the mobilisation and participation of the people in determining their 
own well-being. To achieve this, the Government passed four decentralisation laws relating to 
provinces, districts, the city of Kigali and urban authorities. Under these laws, the four provinces 
remain arms of the central Government, administered by provincial governors approved by the Senate 
in respect of proposal made by the Cabinet and comprising an integral component of the central 
Government, whilst districts and cities now exercise budgetary autonomy. Whilst law No. 17/200218 
assigned taxes and fees to sub-national levels of government, revenues from these sources are 
insufficient to cover the operating requirements of sub-national governments, let alone carry out 
functional responsibilities assigned or delegated to them, and service delivery relies largely on grants 
from central Government. Since the launch of the decentralisation policy the Government has been 
developing mechanisms to clarify and improve the predictability of the flow of resources to district 
governments. There are currently three main flows of resources from the central Government: a block 
grant (un-earmarked) from central Government; grants earmarked for the delivery of specific public 
services at sub-national level; and revenues from the CDF. The relative importance of these three 
main sources reflects the current status of the decentralisation process. Whilst the long-run objective 
is to devolve services, which are currently delegated to local government level (which implies a 
progressive decline in the use of earmarking), the requisite capacities of local governments and the 
associated mechanisms for managing devolution have yet to be established for this in the majority of 
sectors. However, in sectors like health and administrative governance, most service delivery has 
already been devolved, while in others like education efforts for full devolution are already under way. 
This has a clear bearing on the staff working at LG level, as most are still fall under the sector 
ministries and not the District.  
Financing of most Rural District Councils shows that: (1) More dependant on central government (CG) 
transfers - 10% of total annual funding comes from internal sources while 90% is from external 
sources especially CDF (demand driven) and sectoral transfers from the CG; (2) The sectoral/ 
Earmarked transfers are meant for infrastructure development; (3) Main sources of internal funds 
include: Service based fees at sector level (markets, slaughter house fees), levies on construction 
materials (sand, concrete, ballast etc); (4) Transfers 10% of its total budget and 50% of total internal 
income to the sectors; (6) Procurement is done by the council; and (7) MINALOC provides technical 
support through capacity building programmes in public financial management.  
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that are 
discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in HRM: the extent to which LGs can hire and fire or otherwise 
manage personnel. 
 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local governments 
degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.4.1:  
The CDF was established in 2002 under Law 20/2002, with the intention of providing support to 
districts for development purposes. MINALOC acts as the parent ministry to the CDF and also 
provides the president of the board for the CDF. The major source of funding for the CDF comes from 
the Government budget, which is meant to channel an amount equivalent to at least 10% of the 
previous years domestic revenue collection to the fund. The donor community also provides funding 
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for the CDF. At the outset, the allocations from the CDF were effectively formula-driven in that the fund 
was divided equally among districts. This method of allocation was replaced in 2005 with a dedicated 
formula, proposed by the Board of the CDF and approved by the Cabinet, based on population size, 
geographical area and indicators relating to household welfare and access to basic infrastructure 
within each district. Access to CDF funds, however, requires district governments to go through a 
project preparation process and to submit documents related to this before disbursements become 
effective. Whilst district government access to CDF resources from the Government budget is formula 
driven, allocation of funds provided by donors is not. In practice, most donor assistance to districts 
through the CDF is earmarked to specific districts (and therefore simply uses the mechanism of the 
CDF). The block grant for sub-national governments, access to Government resources provided 
through the CDF and allocation of a major proportion of earmarked resources for service delivery, 
therefore, are (explicitly) formula driven. The remainder of the transfers are allocated according to a 
transparent criterion (i.e. the total allocation is divided by the total number of districts and allocated to 
each accordingly). Data from MINECOFIN for the 2007 Budget show that over 80% of earmarked 
transfers are allocated according to rules based and transparent formulae, with the remainder 
allocated according to the transparent and rule of dividing the total by the number of districts. 
Ind 5.4.2:  
The HRM management at district level is still hampered by most staff working directly for the larger 
sector ministries. The districts are being encouraged to develop HR plans and strategies for their own 
staff but this is proving a challenge. The EC/EU has only to a limited degree focused on HRM plans of 
LGs but more on increased resources for local governance and infrastructure investments. A number 
of capacity building (CB) initiatives have been implemented during the last 5-6 years (DIP II) by 
various stakeholders (MIFOTRA, MINALOC, PSCBS, RALGA, RIAM, MINECOFIN, CEPEX, Line 
Ministries, donor-supported projects). However, recent assessments and evaluations have 
emphasized persisting gaps for local governments in fulfilling their devolved roles and responsibilities 
due to their limited financial and technical capacity to plan, organize, implement, monitor and evaluate 
large and complex investments. In addition, there is not a proper coordination of CB initiatives 
resulting in unclear linkages between the DIP and CB activities at different levels, lack of synergies 
and unclear division of responsibilities for those institutions charged with CB. EUD conducted training 
at LG level for planning - 50,000 people have been trained on Ubudehe concepts and procedures in 
terms of participation, planning and management of the collective and individual initiatives. EC/EU 
support's focus has been on PFM training at all levels through MINECOFIN support and not through 
the DPRPR. 
Ind 5.4.3:  
Law No 29/2005 of 31/12/2005 determining the administrative entities of the Republic of Rwanda, 
which determines that the country is covered by four Provinces and the town of Kigali, which are 
divided into 30 Districts, which in turn encompass 416 Sectors that in turn are divided into 2,150 
Province is a de-concentrated administrative level (without a council), all other levels (district, sector, 
cell, and the Umudugudu) could be considered local government levels, as they have a council that is 
mandated to take decisions pertaining to their mandates. According to Law 08/2006 of 24/02/2006 
determining the organisation and functioning of the District, the district council is considered the 
primary level of Local Government, while the other levels (sector, cell, and Umudugudu) are 
considered subsidiary levels. Whereas the mandates for the district are broadly described in the 
aforementioned law, the responsibilities of the sectors, cell and Umudugudu are set by presidential 
order (and hence not by law). Although there are discussions to consider in the future the sector as 
the main service delivery point, and subsequently also make direct central government transfers to 
sectors, for the time being, and considering capacity, for the near future, districts are likely to be the 
focal point for local service delivery, with the executive secretaries as accounting officers. 
3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and reform 
implementation activities effectively 
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 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & CSO) that capacities of key central government 
bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation have improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of M&E system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.1.1:  
MINALOC/NDIS staff has been formulating and in control of the RDSF from the beginning and have of 
course increased their capacities over the evaluation period considerably. This has also to some 
degree been supported by EC/EU but not as the main and most active of partners.  
Ind 6.1.2:  
The perception of the CSOs and NGOs is that the capacities of central government agencies have 
improved considerably over the past 10 years. This is born out by the development of Decentralisation 
Strategic Framework and the subsequent Decentralisation Implementation Plans (DIP) that is now in 
phase 3.  
Ind 6.1.3:  
See 6.2.4 below 
Ind 6.1.4:  
The figure gives an overview of the implementation framework for the DIP. It clearly shows that inter-
governmental and inter-ministerial relations have increased and improved under the DIP 
implementation arrangements.  
Figure 1 DIP Implementation Framework  
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3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local  
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
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 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of information 
produced at local level 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.2.1:  
PFM reform is backed by a strong political will, clear visioning process, dissemination and sensitization 
of planning guidelines at central and sub-national government levels and a clear and consultative 
budgeting process. The Decentralisation Policy and Fiscal Decentralisation policies and the 
subsequent laws governing intergovernmental fiscal relations continue to generate great impetus for 
deepening of economic and governance reforms including PFM reforms, through improved 
coordination of planning and budgeting processes. Further, PFM reforms are heavily supported by the 
donor community through, but not limited to, provision of direct budget support, technical assistance 
and being part of the consultative processes that have led to aid harmonization, alignment and birth of 
the PEFA assessment framework. Weak systems of financial control at local level are a major 
constraint on devolving further powers to the districts. One of the key challenges facing the GoR is the 
limited capacity of budget agencies to produce regular financial and fiscal reports on revenues, 
expenditure, borrowing and inter-governmental fiscal resource utilisation on a regular basis. The 
EDPRS includes measures to strengthen these systems and to put in place a more robust 
accountability framework, which incorporates the monitoring of both physical outputs and financial 
indicators (PEFA June 2008). 
Ind 6.2.2:  
Local planning has improved over the past years by becoming more participatory and more 
comprehensive. This has been supported by EC/EU through the DPRPR both through the district 
support and through Ubudehe. The Rwandan model emphasises a strong mobilization of the 
population in planning and accountability, which has the effect that the administration must react to ad-
hoc requests for information, participation of leaders in government meetings and the need for multiple 
explanations or defence of administrative decisions. However, the participatory approach has put 
strain on the administration staff, which simply doesn‟t have time and resources to respond to the 
aforementioned requirements. But the administrations of a district with its small number of staff (part of 
the personnel are under the control of central Government) is not able to ensure effective 
administration and at the same time contribute to achieve a broad and deep participation of the people 
at all levels. 
Table 3 The Ubudehe Fund Allocation and Utilisation Process 
The training of trainers was conducted at different administrative levels (Umudugudu / village, sector, 
district and national level). These trainers are responsible for monitoring, while the population led by 
trainers at the village level analysis of poverty situation of the village, is a prioritization of needs, 
identifies and categorizes the poor. This is done using a social map of the village using local symbols. 
These maps are plotted on tissue stored in the coordinator of the village.  
After the participatory analysis of problems of the village, village members are developing a 
community project at the village level where the document contains a list of households and their 
categories of poverty and housing, prioritization of projects the village, the details of the logical 
framework and budget priority project showing the local contribution, support and asked that their 
regulatory frameworks in the event of implementation of the project.  
Aware of this process, the population also chooses the poorest household, but having the ability to 
move from one category below the poverty category. Supported by village-level trainers, this 
household is also developing a project using the methodology mentioned above. The programme 
finances the subproject Ubudehe household on condition that they promise to the village a real 
contribution in economic development activities at village level.  
After this process, funds are disbursed from the account at the BNR Ubudehe to accounts of the 
districts, which, in turn, transfer them to open accounts in the villages for this purpose in the local 
credit unions. The amount given to the various villages and poor households is the same throughout 
the country (respectively nearly 1.000 EUR and 100 EUR).  
The village council elects a committee for financial and technical management. This committee is 
responsible for tracking the use of these funds to the village and report to the executive committee of 
the sector that sends these reports to the district with a letter. The reports outline areas for districts 
are developed by trainers across sectors (agricultural sector) that are responsible for monitoring and 
other technical Ubudehe in all villages in the area, through the Community Development Committee ( 
CDC) sectors and cells.  
In the follow-up, trainers provide training areas at village level by grouping cells especially with regard 
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to monitoring data updates villages. There are also briefings, at the sector / district, on the use of 
funds. 
Ind 6.2.3:  
There is a greater focus on improved HRM and capacity building needs assessments have been 
conducted recently. The EC/EU has not been involved with this.  
Ind 6.2.4:  
The introduction of annual local government performance contracts (Imihigo) is the most recent 
initiative to increase the accountability of local governments to central government. The local 
government performance contract is an implementation device for the District Development Plan 
(DDP), which includes a mix of national and local priorities. A district mayor and the President of 
Rwanda sign each contract and open meetings are held annually to discuss the outcome of the 
contract. Line ministries offer districts a choice of performance indicators for inclusion in District 
Performance Contracts (imihigo) and allow districts to set their own targets. In practice, many districts 
select indicators, which are not on the list, and are, therefore, not closely linked to earmarked 
spending allocations. Work is currently underway to achieve a closer alignment of DDP indicators with 
the pattern of local spending, so as to improve the monitoring of the EDPRS. The Imihigo is a GoR 
process and no specific support for this from the EC/EU.  
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.3.1:  
RALGA was established early 2000s and has developed into an organisation with increased staff and 
resources. They are playing more and more a strategic role in the analytical work being done 
especially in terms of capacity building strategies for LGs. They are also part of the evolving 
international and regional local government association structures. The EC/EU has not supported 
RALGA directly but in-directly as RALGA applies for funding under the “Non-State Actors and Local 
Authorities in Development” Thematic Programme (NSA-LA)2.  
Ind 6.3.2:  
Discussions with various partners show that CSOs do not understand their mandate as 
representatives of citizens. They also have weak organizational capacities and maintain limited 
linkages with other CSOs. In addition, the majority of CSOs are faith-based organizations that are 
interested in service delivery rather than engaging in governance and civic participation. Furthermore, 
civil society organizations have no structured engagement mechanisms with which to interact with 
citizens in their constituencies. It was also recognized that CSOs in Rwanda do not have the skills or 
information for meaningful engagement in the budget and other development issues. They also have 
limited skills or structured processes to inform citizens and engage in advocacy. Generally, the 
concept of civic participation and holding the government accountable appears to be a new concept in 
the Rwandan society. The CSOs were found, however, to assist local authorities in areas such as 
citizen information campaigns and education as well as data collection processes. The EC/EU is 
supporting this area through the above-mentioned programme, which is mainly funding for strategy 
papers and action programmes for community actions.  
Ind 6.3.3:  
Research institutions in Rwanda have increased and have done considerable analysis on issues of 
local governance. The EC/EU has through its local grants for governance, accountability and research 
tried to create an interface between NGOs/CSOs/LGs (JADF) and small project funds (see above) – 
2007-2009: 1 million EUR – meaning that different partners worked together to develop local 
collaboration.  
                                                     
2
 entered into force on 1 January 2007 in the framework of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI); 
replacing the “Co-financing with European NGOs” and “Decentralized Cooperation” budget lines. 
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3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.1.1:  
Local elections have taken place but due to the process of reconciliation after the 1994 genocide the 
local elections are not yet fully democratic and based on the principle of full democratic representation. 
The local election process has not been supported by the EC/EU.  
Ind 7.1.2:  
The Ministerial Instruction No. 04/2007 established the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) at the 
district and sector levels. The Forum is meant to be a consultative body for information dissemination 
and promotion of cooperation among actors supporting local socio-economic development and social 
welfare of the population. The Forum aims at coordinating activities of all development actors so as to 
promote coordination of efforts and efficiency, as well as avoid duplication of efforts in development 
actions. In addition to its main responsibilities, the JADF is a vehicle for implementing the DIP. By its 
nature, the JADF is made of diverse local organizations, capacities, and personalities. In order to 
ensure participation and effectiveness in the implementation of the DIP, the JADFs may organize 
themselves into task teams who will contribute to specific activities implementing the DIP at LG levels. 
The councilors are elected by citizens directly and are expected to represent the views and opinions of 
the electorate. However, discussions with key stakeholders revealed that councilors at district level 
have limited knowledge to engage in effective planning and effective discussions and yet through 
established commissions are mandated to discuss and as legislators approve the district budget. 
Furthermore, it was highlighted that some district councilors tend to be incorporated in the LG 
authorities‟ activities instead of playing accountability duties to the citizens. At sector level it was 
indicated that councilors participate in identification of the imihigo activities without participation in 
prioritization and planning processes. Generally, district and sectors councilors have limited resources 
available to facilitate citizens‟ engagement and participation. 
The EC/EU support to increased local participation in local development planning was clearly an aim 
of UBUDEHE support and to some degree achieved, as the priority of DPRPR was to further develop 
capacities at local level for planning and budgeting as well as PFM related issues. This means that the 
EC/EU support has been important for the relationship between local development planning, 
community development and strengthened collaboration between district administrations and 
communities as emphasised by the Ubudehe approach, and what the JADF should be working with.   
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens 
(notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards etc) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.2.1:  
JADF is a great platform to engage district stakeholders in the decision-making, planning and 
budgeting processes. There has been no specific support from the EC/EU to the JADF‟s but members 
of JADFs have been able to access funds under the NSA local authorities support funding from the 
EC/EU. The JADF coordinates and monitors all interventions of stakeholders working in the district. 
The diagnostic process highlighted that the establishment of JADF structures is a ministerial order and 
that there is no legal policy governing the institution. Findings also indicated that although the structure 
exists at the district level, it is not fully operational in many sectors. In addition, as partners in 
development, JADFs do not have any mechanisms for receiving feedback from citizens and reporting 
back to them. There is also no structured process for them to make inputs to the budgets and 
implementation of interventions. Finally there are no systems for regular monitoring and evaluation to 
assess the progress of funding and implementation of service delivery within a district. 
Although the Ministry of Finance has explained that full budget documentation can be obtained on 
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demand by interested parties, local financial institutions stated that they were unable to obtain the 
documentation at the time of the budget and, therefore, relied on media coverage of the budget 
speech for analysis of budget decisions. Full media coverage of the Minister of Finances budget 
presentation and the plenary discussion of budget documents does take place and some of this 
information is also posted on the government website. A complete set of budget documents has not, 
however, been available to the general public at the point of their submission to the legislature. The 
mission was not informed of the use of notice boards at district level for budget transfer information. 
However, the Imihigo system of accountability does in principle have service delivery targets that the 
Mayor/Councils have to live up and are fixed targets, which are reported on yearly to the public and 
especially the President.  
3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) provided 
to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.3.1:  
Se 5.3.2 above.  
Ind 7.3.2:  
Whilst it is possible in principle for members of the public to request information on what resources 
have been allocated to particular service delivery units there are no specific provisions in place to 
facilitate the provision of such information. There is no general provision at local or national level for 
issuing public information on resources available to primary service units other than through "Public 
Accountability Day" - a public meeting where local governments issue general budget information to 
the public. It doesn‟t seem to be a focus area of the EC/EU.  
3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) in 
local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.1.1:  
Especially after 2006 LG budgets have grown in total numbers (see table below) but LG share of 
national budget is constant 12% over the period 2006 to 2011 and is not projected to grow either in the 
near future as projections for 2012/13 it remains at the same level. This does not necessarily mean 
that the administrative budget versus the service delivery budget has grown since most services are 
delivered though line ministry budgets but it does show that LGs do not have much control over the 
service delivery budget as such.  
Figure 2 National versus District Total Budgets 
M CFW 2006 2007 2008 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Districts 34.703.770 68.154.550 84.660.910 134.737.526 110.059.002 128.532.235 137.023.702 
Nat. budget 
total 
281.539.806 419.701.400 521.135.190 988.304.673 984.022.047 1.068.684.952 1.141.509.690 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Rwanda; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
21 
District % 
share 
12% 16% 16% 14% 11% 12% 12% 
Source: MINECOFIN 
Service delivery improvements at LG level more centrally driven than locally – earmarking and 
programme approach in sectors. Improved and sustained economic growth averaging 10% p.a in the 
recent years - has encouraged socio-cultural development and significantly reduced poverty. Baseline 
surveys that informed development of the EDPRS 2008-2012 give background evidence that national 
statistics (trends) justify the engendered impact of decentralisation during the period (2001-2009) in 
form of, reduced unemployment rate3; improved GDP4, increased access and utilization of land 
(agricultural production). Rates of poverty reduction since 2000 have been modest (though not fast 
enough to meet either the targets set in Vision 2020 or the MDGs)5.  
Ind 8.1.2:  
This is work underway. The revised Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy clearly aims at increasing the 
needs based formula driven allocation of funds for districts in future. Until now it has been very 
conditional and linked to sector allocations with little or no flexibility in allocation and execution by the 
districts.  
Ind 8.1.3:  
This is a developing issue in Rwanda but not one that the mission could find a lot of evidence on. 
However, as stated before volunteers deliver many services especially within health. The GoR 
encourages this as part of the wider civic duties of the citizens in Rwanda. Once a month all citizens 
are asked to participate in cleaning their neighbourhood and working for environmental improvements.  
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.2.1:  
The mission could not complete a detailed analysis of this aspect. The EC/EU supported labour 
intensive small infrastructure projects under the CDF for districts are maintained by the operational 
budgets of the districts. The 2010 evaluation report noted that district did maintain the projects. It was 
not possible to get a full overview of LG budgets.  
Ind 8.2.2:  
The mission could not complete an analysis of this aspect. One aspect that has been addressed under 
EC and other donor funding is that water points are maintained through user payments/fees.  
3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for vulnerable 
groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 8.3.2 Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.3.1:  
                                                     
3
 According to the EICV 2007 results, levels of declared unemployment are very low in Rwanda but under-
employment is high. There has been diversification of household income sources as the proportion of the 
employed labour force engaged in agricultural occupations fell by 9% nationally to 80% between 2000/01 and 
2005/06, with most of the decline occurring among men. The share of the labour force working in formal 
employment increased from 5% to 10% over the same period or an estimated 1.25 million people of working age 
(15 to 70). Young people and women more often perform unpaid work than men. 
4
 GDP grew from an average of 6.4% in 2006 to about 10% p.a in 2009 
5
 Average poor person‟s consumption is at about RWF 150 per day, increased by over 2% since 2001. 
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The evaluation of Ubudehe in 2010 found that effectiveness within the Programme estimates that at 
least 1.4 million6 people have been direct beneficiaries of the Ubudehe Programme. This is actually a 
very low estimation, which is based on an average of only 10 beneficiary households per project per 
village. According to the sample, the number of beneficiaries for a Community project can actually 
vary, ranging from 5 – 6 households in the case of a cow livestock project, to a few thousand in the 
case of a road or a health centre project. It would not be an exaggeration to estimate that probably at 
least 20% of the population of Rwanda has benefited from the programme, including potential indirect 
beneficiaries to the scope. In terms of empowerment, community participation and ownership, the 
Ubudehe objectives have been successfully achieved. In addition, it was noted that unplanned and 
unintended changes also occurred, notably through the creation of temporary and more long-term 
jobs, as well as new activities, initiated through Ubudehe projects. 
Other aspects addressed under the DPRPR are building of market places and access to water. 
Therefore a number of people have improved access to services but this is also the case with other 
donor projects/programmes in the districts. However, the mission could not get exact numbers. 
Ind 8.3.2:  
Improved service delivery to the citizenry through: consultative planning and budgeting processes; 
increased budgetary allocations to the districts and sectors. According to the SNV Rwanda Annual 
report 2009 and various sector reports, there has been improved service delivery in key development 
sectors such as Health (reduced mortality, morbidity, increased child birth rates, etc) education, 
agriculture, enterprise /micro financing7, Water and sanitation. Recent gender assessment reports8 
indicate that both women and men have enjoyed benefits accruing from decentralised governance 
through qualitative improvements in service delivery in the above-mentioned areas.  
                                                     
6
 Estimation that at least 1.4 million people have been direct beneficiaries of Ubudehe, EUD budget for Ubudehe 
(23,338,883 €) the investment would represent the equivalent of 16 € per final recipient and this targeted the most 
vulnerable and poorest segments of the districts. 
7
 In Rwanda, women run an estimated 41% of businesses. Over the years women‟s membership and participation 
in cooperatives and associations has been increasing. 
8
 Rwanda Gender Assessment: Progress towards improving women‟s economic status by ADB Group, Human 
Development Department (OSHD), November, 2008 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Rwanda; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
23 
4 Conclusions concerning the hypotheses to be tested and main 
challenges to be discussed in the synthesis phase 
 
What is the policy dialogue between the EC/EU and the Government of Rwanda surrounding 
the decentralisation reform process? 
In summary, the EC/EU has been actively involved in the policy dialogue with GoR surrounding the 
decentralisation policy framework and the implementation of the DIP. The discussions have centred 
around the support given through the DPRPR, which was two fold, both in terms of community 
development projects of an infrastructure nature for selected districts based on labour-intensive 
methods and then the community development projects under the Ubudehe approach. The dialogue 
seems in the last 3-4 years to have centred around aspects of SBS in agriculture and GBS in terms of 
DLG issues that are of importance to the overall poverty reduction strategy of the GoR, and therefore 
also relevant for district development and decentralisation reform. However, most of the constructive 
dialogue for local governance has been surrounding the Ubudehe approach as a participatory 
approach to poverty alleviation in all cells of the districts. 
The EC/EU changed its approach to funding the DPRPR when it accepted in 2005/6 that the improved 
capacity of CDF for good management of the funds at its disposal, and in accordance with the general 
desire of the Government. This was also done in collaboration with a number of other DPs who were 
channelling their funds for decentralised development support through projects and programmes and 
then decided to go through the CDF. In general, the amounts provided by the EC/EU to the CDF were 
sufficient for achieving the expected works under the DPRPR and the Ubudehe. Usually, the CDF 
have done the advance payment on the basis of the annual action plan of the District and paid the 
remaining funds as the works progressed. The activities were conducted within the time expected and 
the results achieved on schedule and according to the technical specifications. Furthermore, the 
DPRPR evaluation found that activities seemed to have been subject to an effective planning and 
monitoring and the follow-up of the projects properly realised by the staff of the CDF. The EC/EU 
support is therefore highly relevant and coherent with the needs of the GoR own poverty reduction 
strategy.  
Why has the EC/EU selected not to prioritise support to decentralisation and local 
governance? 
In general the EC/EU has over the evaluation period shown a high degree of interest in the 
decentralisation agenda but it seems that the overall local governance interest has been in the rural 
development area with a focus on food security, labour intensive small-scale infrastructure 
development and agricultural development. It does not seem to be the decentralisation agenda and 
the need for overall decentralisation reforms at district level that has occupied the EC/EU other than 
as a reform that does influence the funding of LGs. This was also the reason for the change of funding 
through the CDF in 2006 and onwards for both aspects of the DPRPR. It seems that the EC/EU has 
made a decision to support rural development as the engine for agricultural and local economic 
development and paid less attention to the decentralisation reform process as such.  
But having said that the EC/EU has been active on local governance issues as shown above but also 
through funding for NSA activities at local level and through support to research and studies for 
reconciliation and poverty reduction at local level. So while the EC/EU has not been involved in the 
direct development and support for the decentralisation reform process and policy formulation per se, 
it has actively supported initiatives that have improved the funding channels and the local governance 
issues through participatory community development programmes, namely the district infrastructure 
support and the Ubudehe support. All stakeholders found that the EC/EU support to especially 
Ubudehe as being highly relevant and pertinent to the development agenda at local level.  
What has the outcomes of the EC/EU support been in terms of improved service delivery from 
local councils and capacity of key government institutions? 
It is very difficult to get exact data and budget overviews from the districts in Rwanda. This makes any 
analysis of service delivery improvements over the past 10 years rather academic and non-utilitarian 
because of lack of baseline data as well as concrete data evidence of improvements. The below is 
based on the findings of the 2010 DPRPR and Ubudehe evaluations both carried out for the EC/EU.  
From the Final Evaluation Report of Ubudehe (June 2010): Furthermore, in a country where some 
85% of the population’s livelihood is dependent on agriculture and livestock, one of the more efficient 
methods to reduce poverty in Rwanda is to increase the purchasing power of farmers. An increase in 
purchasing power would have a ripple effect on the sectors of trade, production and processing 
enterprises, handicrafts and services, which are all currently under-represented in Rwanda. The 
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development of rural areas can thus be regarded as the overall outcome for the development of the 
whole economy in Rwanda and Ubudehe can most certainly contribute towards this. As an overall 
conclusion, we would like to emphasize that Ubudehe is one of the best achievements we have 
observed during the past 25 years of collaboration with the European institutions. Ubudehe has won 
the prestigious UN Public Service Award due to the participation and ownership of millions of citizens 
and the strong support of the Authorities of Rwanda for poverty alleviation. As such, the price that was 
awarded seems totally justified. This success was no coincidence, but the result of work, often unique, 
made by all project stakeholders, led by the Rwandan government and the constant support provided 
by the European Union, Action Aid and other donors who participated in the programme. 
The Evaluation of Ubudehe in 2010 concluded that there was a particularly high relevance of the 
Ubudehe programme towards beneficiary‟s needs (which is attributed to the participatory approaches, 
leading to a strong ownership of the actions to be undertaken for responding to those needs, as well 
as the EDPRS and the Millennium Development Goals priorities, which all are guiding reform 
initiatives being undertaken by the government of Rwanda. 
Regarding efficiency, some weaknesses were observed in terms of management of the Programme. 
Particular areas of weaknesses included: financial management (not mismanagement, but heavy 
procedures and difficulties due to the scope of the programme) during its first phase and the lack of 
human resources provided to the CDF for a proper management and operational follow-up of 55.000 
funding; obvious gaps in the information chain between the field (Sectors) and the upper levels 
(Districts, CDF, ministries); a lack of impact assessments and related lessons learned; and the 
inadequacy of EDF financial procedures to such a complex programme. 
Nevertheless, at local level, good governance is noted and has largely contributed to the success of 
the programme. In addition, improvements are noticeable between the first and second phase of 
Ubudehe. The CDF had in fact progressively established a complex follow-up system, even if not 
perfect. The weak point actually remained the reporting and documentation throughout the 
programme. 
In conclusion, the EC/EU support has contributed to service delivery improvements especially through 
small infrastructure investments but also to local economic development through a focus on 
community agriculture and husbandry projects. The EC/EU is also a big donor in terms of GBS and 
overall some economic improvements and sustained economic growth averaging 10% p.a in the 
recent years has encouraged socio-cultural development and significantly reduced poverty. Baseline 
surveys that informed development of the EDPRS 2008-2012 give background evidence that national 
statistics (trends) justify the engendered impact of decentralisation during the period (2001-2009) in 
form of, reduced unemployment rate (according to 2007 survey results); improved GDP (GDP grew 
from an average of 6,4% in 2006 to about 10% p.a in 2009), increased access and utilization of land 
(agricultural production). Rates of poverty reduction since 2000 have been modest (though not fast 
enough to meet either the targets set in Vision 2020 or the MDGs) as an average poor person‟s 
consumption is at about 150 RWF per day, increased by only over 2% since 2001. Over 90% of poor 
people still live in rural area with an increasing urbanisation putting strain on services in the urban 
areas.  
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5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: The list of people interviewed 
Name Function Institution Date 
ZURDO Diego  
TECCARELLI Daniele  
TILLESSEN Achim   
KUBACH Tarik  
Séraphine Mukankusi 
DE BOER Vincent  
Rural Development 
Cluster 
EUD Rwanda 23/05 -2011 
Mr. Cyrille TURATSINZE Permanent Secretary MINALOC 24/05 
Mr. Egide RUGAMBA  DG MINALOC, 
Planning, M&E 
MINALOC 24/05 
Mr. Musiime James RURANGA 
 
Monitoring & Evaluation 
Facilitator, 
Decentralization Sector 
MINALOC 24/05 
Mr. Stephan KLINGEBIEL DCPETA Co-Chair KFW 24/05 
Ms. Marcelline MUKAKARANGWA  DCPETA Co-Chair 
Advisor 
KFW 24/05 
Mr. Apollinaire MUSHINZIMANA Coordinator NDIS (National 
Decentralisation 
Implementation 
Secretariat) 
25/05 
Mr. Yves NTABANA Acting Director General RIAM (Rwandan 
Institute of 
Admninitration and 
Management) 
26/05 
Ms. Marie-Ange INGABIRE H.  Ag. Director 
NAO Support Unit 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
MINECOFIN 26/05 
Mr. Leonard RUGWABIZA Director General 
National Development 
Planning 
MINECOFIN 26/05 
Mr. Elias BAINGANA  DG National Budget 
Unit, Fiscal 
Decentralisation 
MINECOFIN 26/05 
Mr.David LAHL Conseiller Technique 
Décentralisation 
GIZ 27/05 
Mme Laetitia Nkunda Director  CDF 27/05 
Mr. KARAKE Théogene 
Secretary General/ Faustin Serubanza 
(Programmes Manager); Innocente 
Murasi (LED officer); Bosco 
RUSHINGABIGWI (communication) 
  RALGA (Rwandese 
Association of Local 
Government 
Authorities) 
27/05 
Ms. Nadine RUGWE Governance Advisor Embassy of 
Netherlands 
30/5 
Mr. Laurent MESSIAEN Governance/ 
decentralisation officer 
Belgium - CTB 
30/05 
Mr. Pierre LEBRUN Governance/ 
decentralisation officer 
Embassy of Belgium 
30/05 
Mr. Edouard 
MUNYAMALIZA(spokeperson as of 
March 2011); Mr. Thaddée Karekezi , 
Permanent Secretary / Mr. Eugène 
RWIBASIRA (ex spokeperson) 
  Rwanda Civil Society 
Platform (PFSCR) 
/Plate Forme de la 
Société Civile 
Rwandaise 
30/05 
Mr. Paul WATSON  Country director TROCAIRE 30/05 
Mr. Naasson MUNYANDAMUTSA Deputy director  IRDP 30/05 
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5.2 Annex 2: The list of documents consulted  
 EC - Final Evaluation Report of Ubudehe (June 2010) 
 Document de Stratégie et de Coopération – Programme Indicatif pour de période 2002-2007 
 Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008-2013 
 Evaluation de la coopération de a Commission européenne avec la Rwanda – Evaluation de 
niveau pays. Rapport final, Nov. 2006, Vol 1+2 
 Decentralisation Implementation Plan (DIP II) 2008-2012 
 Decentralisation Implementation Plan (DIP III) 2011-2015 
 PEFA: Financial management and Performance report, June 2008 
 MINECOFIN: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2008-2012, September 
2007 
 MINECOFIN: Fiscal Decentralisation in Rwanda, Review of the Existing Grant Allocation 
Practice and Guidelines for Streamlining of Allocation Formulae for Block Grants and Sector 
Earmarked Grants, Final Report February 2009 
 MINECOFIN - GoR PFM Reform Strategy [2008-2012], Abridged Version 
 MINECOFIN, Ubudehe Concept Note, March 2003 
 MINELOC: Mid Term Evaluation of the 9th EDF Decentralised Programme for Rural Poverty 
reduction (DPRPR), November 2005 
 Impact of decentralization on service delivery in Rwanda, MINALOC/World Bank, PPT May 
2005  
 MINALOC Making decentralised services delivery work, discussion paper, Sept 2005 
 MINALOC institutional analysis and assessment, 2005; 
 EC - Evaluation et analyse ECOFIN conjointes des programmes d'appui à la réinsertion 
économique et sociale des démobilisés de la ville de Kigali (PARES) et de la partie "haute 
intensité de main d'œuvre" du volet "Soutien aux districts" du DPRPR »; June 2009 
 Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2006 Establishing a Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation 
 EC – NSA-LA Programme Mid-Term Review, Final Report December 2009 
 Devis-programme (soutien aux districts) du 15 juillet 2005 au 14 janvier 2007, FCD  
 Loi nr 20/2002 portant sur la création, organisation et fonctionnement du Fonds Commun de 
Developpement des districts, villes et la ville de Kigali, 1er aout 2002  
 Manuel de procédures du CDF, novembre 2004  
 CDF Annual Report 2004, March 2005 
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Table 4 Detailed list of EC-funded interventions related to decentralisation  
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry point 
Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid 
modality 
Main contracting 
party 
Decentralised programme for 
rural poverty reduction 
2003 - 2010 33,97 33,8 FED/2003/016-357 Bottom up L 
Grant to 
GoR 
Government, 
Republika Y U 
Rwanda 
Soutien à la politique de 
décentralisation en vue d''une 
inclusion communautaire, sociale 
et économique des personnes en 
situation de handicap vivant en 
2008 - 2013 0,6 0,2 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2007/019-
404 
Bottom up N/L Grant 
Government, 
Handicap 
International 
Association 
Améliorer la participation 
citoyenne dans les processus de 
gouvernance décentralisée 
2009-2011 0,6 0,2 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2008/020-
081 
Bottom up L Grant 
Private 
companies/ Dvpt 
agencies, Trocaire 
Indirect interventions 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
 CRIS Decision Nr     
Appui technique & logistique au 
min.finances & planification 
economique 
2005-2006 0,03  FED/2000/015-184     
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
5.4.1 Intervention 1 
Title: Decentralised programme for rural poverty reduction 
Budget: EUR 33.972.633 
Start date: 2003 
 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective:  
DPRPR aims to reduce poverty in the programme zone through support to activities within the 
framework of the decentralisation process implemented by the Rwandan government, which should 
help local populations participate fully in the decision-making process with the local administration.  
 
Project purpose: 
DPRPR will empower local women and men to establish their own development priorities. It will train 
their elected officials and their local service providers to oversee a process where local firms and 
associations deliver the social, environmental and, particularly, the economic infrastructure prioritised 
by the people, and provide skills and new technologies for income-generating activities. By DPRPR's 
end, the skills learnt and systems put in place will allow the process to continue using funds from 
central government and the district's own tax revenue. A higher proportion of market-oriented 
agriculture 'and profitable off-farm businesses will raise incomes for poor farmers. . Rural public works 
- and subsequent maintenance - will provide work preferentially for the poor, thus reducing poverty 
and improving infrastructure. 
 
Expected results:  
DPRPR will produce four broad results: 
 The population of the programme zone adapts its economic activities, particularly agriculture, 
from subsistence to a market-oriented economy. 
 Most of the population of the DPRPR zone lives above the poverty threshold. 
 Every district in the DPRPR zone has a CDP and can implement it because of skills gained 
through budgetary support alone. . 
 The entire population participates physically and intellectually in CDP implementation.    
 
Activities: 
Cell-level populations will define their development priorities, which their directly elected 
representatives will present at sector level. Sector-level priorities including, where possible, symbioses 
of priorities in different cells, will go to a sector plan and then to district level representatives will 
present at sector level. Sector-level priorities including, where possible, where they contribute to the 
CDP via a transparent process. The main outputs of the CDP will be a set of district priority activities, 
rolling three-year MTEF plans, and annual district-level work plans. DPRPR will support the 
implementation of prioritised activities at three levels. At the cell level, it will support ubudehe activities 
nationwide (9,176 cells) for the first year. At the sector and district levels, DPRPR will support activities 
funded through labour intensive public works (LIRPW). 3 
Ubudehe is a new twist on an old Rwandan tradition of mutual aid at the local level. Collection of data 
on cells' needs and participatory planning (for incorporation into the CDP) lead to quick funding of 
cells' pressing priorities and the injection of funds at the grassroots level to allow the community to 
work collectively to solve their priority problems, thus recapitalising the rural economy and rebuilding 
the fabric of cohesive local relations through economic activity. The population of the cell must 
partial1y match the funds they receive, either in cash or in kind. Importantly, all members of the 
community participate in the planning and in the works undertaken, including women, youth and other 
disadvantaged groups normally excluded from decision-making and collective action. Wide radio 
publicity will prepare the population for the community participation in ubudehe before it begins. 
DPRPRwill support the ubudehe approach throughout the country at cell level with funding of €IO 
million in the first year. For continuity, CDF funds will supply funding in later years. 
At sector and at district level, DPRPR will support local priorities to which the populations will have to 
contribute in cash or kind. DPRPR support will take two forms. Firstly, the programme will finance 
training to ensure that local administrative services have the necessary skills in organisational and 
financial management, participatory development and planning by objectives. Secondly, for year 2 and 
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3 it will finance LIRPW run by the local authorities, or collaboration with them to implement their 
annual plans. The DPRPR budget covers possible payments to other executing agencies but this cost 
will not account for more than 7.5 percent of the value of the works. These agencies will provide 
agricultural research and extension skills and SME support services. 
At national level, the EC strongly supports the principle of CDF. Over the course of DPRPR 
implementation, PMU and CDF will work closely together to co-manage the programme. PMU will 
work to boost CDF's technical and managerial capacity and, as a function of CDF's enhanced status, 
will gradually transfer to CDF full responsibility for all DPRPR's technical and managerial functions. 
One of the technical assistants proposed will support CDF in this area. The DPRPR Monitoring 
Committee will draw up a set of criteria for successive stages of transfer of this responsibility. 
A debate is underway on the future of the province. This administrative level could disappear when the 
districts have acquired sufficient capacity to manage their own development. Meanwhile, provinces 
play a coordinating role in the decentralization process, and so the proposed programme includes 
technical support at this level in each province in the programme zone. A provincial co-ordination 
committee will include all district mayors, representatives of civil society, the private sector, and all 
project-level projects and programmes (such as the proposed programme). This committee will 
manage problems beyond the scope of individual districts. 
Specific activities: 
For result 1: 
 Carry out a participatory diagnostic throughout the country and implement collective actions 
using the ubudehe approach, which the programme will support nationally in year 
 Develop a CDP in each district in the programme zone. 
For result 2: 
 Support to execution of LIRFW solutions to locally identified priority problems. 
 Monitoring and evaluation of this execution, while developing mechanisms that will allow a 
progressive evolution from programme support to budget support. 
For result 3: 
 Train the elected officials and the local administrative services in participative management of 
local development and in good governance: identification, planning, 
 Formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their own development, with a 
moral and physical commitment by the population. 
 Facilitate meetings between the different local-government levels (cells, sectors and districts) 
to ensure that each takes the others' participation and needs into account when planning the 
CDP. 4 
For result 4: 
 Use ubudehe and labour-intensive LIRPW to inject funds to the poor in the programme zone 
and to promote community relations through working together. 
 Ensure that all participate in the participative planning exercises at each level. 
 
5.4.2 Intervention 2 
Title: Soutien à la politique de décentralisation en vue d'une inclusion communautaire, sociale 
et économique des personnes en situation de handicap vivant en  
Budget: 600.000 EUR 
Start date: 2008 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective:  
Persons with disabilities living in rural areas gain access to quality rehabilitation care and a better 
community inclusion, economic and social prescribed in accordance with the law of Rwanda (priority to 
children and attention to the gender approach). 
Specific objective: 
The Ministry of Health leads and coordinates on the entire country the implementation of the 2008-
2012 PNRPH in order to develop further the provision of physical rehabilitation and to achieve 
concrete results in terms of school, community, social and economic inclusion, of persons with 
disabilities in the districts of Rusizi, Huye, Musanze, Kayonza and Ruhango. (with priority given to 
children and attention to the gender approach to reach 50% of women / girls) 
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Expected results: 
1. The Department for Rehabilitation of Physically Disabled "leads the PNRPH 2008-2012 by 
associating the various ministries and all stakeholders in the functional rehabilitation as well as 
local actors 
2. The rehabilitation professionals and health professionals in general (medical and paramedical) 
acquire new skills in the areas of functional rehabilitation and CBR to be able to take a key 
role in the network of resource persons for the inclusion of persons with disabilities. 
3. A device for Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR), relying on local institutions and 
associations, is implemented in the five rural districts of Rusizi, Huye, Musanze, Kayonza and 
Ruhango and working for the inclusion of persons with disabilities. 
Activities: 
For result 1: 
 Technical Support to the Department" "Rehabilitation of the Physically Disabled" for the 
control and coordination of actors involved in rehabilitation for the implementation of PNRPH 
Biannual meeting of the National Steering Committee PNRHP, 3-day workshop for validation 
"manual RBC" (25 participants), a national seminar of restitution (40 participants) " 
 Implementation and tracking of the Monitoring Committees of the PNRPH in 30 districts of the 
country and visits of support / advice from the department to the operators / services of 
disability rehabilitation and local authorities to facilitate the operational implementation of 
activities PNRPH (1 seminar of presentation of PNRHP to the authorities of the 30 districts (1 
day / 100 participants), 5 sessions of 3-day training of district authorities (30 participants per 
session), 3000 copies, awareness manual)  
 Advocacy and media coverage of the achievements of 2008-2012 PNRPH Radio spots, radio 
broadcasts, radio media, 2000 awareness posters, RV and print important activities of the 
project " 
 Establishment of a monitoring of indicators measuring the inclusion of persons with disabilities 
in their community (school children, including disabled persons' associations, sports clubs ...) 
Standardized monitoring "care" and the establishment of a monitoring "indicators of inclusion" 
- design and validation workshops " 
For result 2: 
 Elaboration and implementation of a continuing education plan in collaboration with the KHI 
and associations of professionals (physiotherapists and orthopedic) for the rehabilitation 
professionals serving. Skills Assessment for the development of 2 continuing education plans 
(physio and ortho), training sessions (physiotherapy and ortho) " 
 Introduction of modules relating to functional rehabilitation and to strategy RBC in initial 
training courses of the health professionals trained at KHI, the UNR and schools of nursing. 
112 lectures a half day in the 7 schools targeted - training syllabus in 1000 copies " 
 Capacity building of associations of rehabilitation professionals (external communication, 
research funding and advocacy), Developing a communication strategy for each association, 
duplicating a folder of presentation of each association (1000 copies), financial support for 
each of the three associations to achieve their communication strategy " 
For result 3: 
 Support to the establishment of the RBC committees in districts and RBC targeted sectors (1 
team training project + HVP Gatagara (7 weeks), 18 training sessions of 3 days for 40 
participants ") 
 Awareness sessions and training on the RBC approach aimed at health professionals and 
community health workers ("training of trainers") 10 training sessions of the professionals 5 
days (37 participants per session) 74 sessions of training community health workers (40 
participants per session)  
 Capacity building of elected of the local associations of FENAPH and of other structures of 
people with disabilities. 
 Support to the dynamic features of inclusion of persons living with disabilities (advocacy for 
inclusive education, access to vocational training, to sports and cultural support for the 
creation of income generating activities and the formation of cooperatives). 
 Support for the creation of "Homes Handicap Relay" within the administrations of the districts 
targeted. Establishment of 5 "Homes Handicap Relay" instead of 1 per district " 
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5.4.3 Intervention 3 
Title: Améliorer la participation citoyenne dans les processus de gouvernance décentralisée 
Budget: 600.000 EUR 
Start date:  
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: Improving citizen participation in the process of decentralized governance. 
Specific objective:  
 Awareness and facilitate participation of local people in the initiation, development, 
implementation and monitoring of the decisions and programs that affect them 
 Strengthen the capacities of the partner organizations in this project analysis and monitoring 
of the policies and development programs. 
 Strengthen networking and exchange of information at district level between the different 
development actors. 
Expected results: 
1. Target Groups and individuals contribute constructively to the local development process. 
2. Partner organizations prepared and equipped to contribute constructively to the development 
process at multiple levels. 
3. Establishment and effective operationalization of the mechanisms for exchanges and 
cooperation between different actors of completed and tested development 
Activities: 
Capacity building and information dissemination to target groups 
 Creating a reference document of citizen participation in the intervention districts. 
 Organizing six conference debates in each cell of a targeted area (areas: good governance, 
basic rights, basic principles, civic responsibility, opportunities for participation). 
 Media conference debate (newspapers, radio, posters, pamphlets). Organize a socio cultural 
event. 
 Training of the members. 
 Organize discussion sessions on draft laws / programs being developed. 
 Producing a documentary short film. 
Strengthening of the partner organisations' capacities  
 Mainstreaming of gender in the programs / projects. 
 Training on techniques for collecting and managing information. 
 Training on technical analysis and policy monitoring. 
 Training on analysis and monitoring of budgets. 
 Training on advocacy techniques. 
 Education of the trainers on the techniques of training of adults / group facilitation. 
 Understanding of laws, policies and programs. 
Implementation and effective operationalisation of the mechanisms for exchange and collaboration 
between different development actors 
 Establish a decentralized office of the platform in each district. 
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
5.5.1 Decentralisation in Rwanda 
5.5.1.1 Political Decentralisation  
The constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003 as amended to date, article 3, enshrines a 
constitutional provision „‟that the territory of Rwanda is divided into provinces, Districts, Cities, 
municipalities, Towns ,sectors, and cells.” Similarly article 167 of the same constitution as amended to 
date provides that “Public administration shall be decentralized in accordance with the provisions of 
the law” and that Districts, Municipalities, Towns and the City of Kigali are decentralized entities with 
Legal status and administrative and financial autonomy and the foundation of Community 
Development”.  
In launching the decentralization policy in May 2000, the government of National Unity then and the 
people of Rwanda recognized the impelling need to fight poverty at close range. The decentralization 
and mobilization of the people with regard to democratic governance and participation in the decision 
making process in activities that bear impact on their well being was and remains the underpinning 
raison d’être of the decentralization policy in Rwanda. The implementation of the decentralization 
policy is in addition expected to enhance peace and reconciliation through empowerment of the local 
population. 
In the national decentralization policy, May 2000, it is stated the policy was formulated with set 
principles guiding its implementation and respecting the following: 
 Ensuring national unity, indivisibility and even development 
 Ensuring local autonomy, identity, interest and diversity 
 Separation of political and administrative/technical authority work 
 Matching transferred responsibilities with the transfer of financial and material resources. 
Respecting these principles in implementing the policy, is anticipated to ensure, among others, 
citizens living in peace and harmony without national disintegration or discriminative development; 
enhancement of people‟s participation in identifying local needs and interests; infuse the culture of 
accountability in individuals; and match transferred responsibilities and functions while implementing 
decentralization with requisite financial; material and human resources. This ensures that 
decentralization is meaningful in giving local population the capacity to plan and manage their local 
development.  
This assessment therefore seeks to specify the mechanism through which decentralization might have 
distributional implications. For example new central government allocation criteria for resources, 
greater decentralization autonomy over resource allocation and public investment or service delivery 
decisions or changes in the institutions or groups participation in decisions made at local level. 
The implementation process of the decentralization policy since May 2000 to-date has thus been 
executed largely in two phases with first phase covering 2000 – 2005 and second phase covering 
2006-2010. The implementation of the decentralization process focuses on attaining the following 
specific objectives: 
 To enable and reactivate local people to participate in initiating, making, implementing, and 
monitoring decisions and plans that concern them, taking into consideration their local needs, 
priorities, capacities and resources by transferring power, authority and resources from central 
to local government and lower levels;  
 To strengthen accountability and transparency in Rwanda by making local leaders directly 
accountable to the communities they serve and by establishing a clear linkage between the 
taxes they pay and the services that are financed by these taxes;  
 To enhance the sensitivity and responsiveness of public administration to the local 
environment by placing the planning, financing, management and control of service provision 
at the point where services are provided and by enabling local leadership to develop 
organization structures and capacities that take into consideration the local environment and 
needs;  
 To develop sustainable economic planning and management capacity at local levels that will 
serve as the driving motor for planning, mobilization and implementation of social, political and 
economic development to alleviate poverty;  
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 To enhance effectiveness and efficiency in the planning, monitoring and delivery of services 
by reducing the burden from central government officials who are distanced from the point 
where needs are felt and services delivered. 
In phase one, a series of desirable institutional building actions and activities were initiated including 
local elections in March 2001 and presidential election in august 2003 and parliamentary elections in 
October 2003. These elections were in accordance with the national constitution promulgated in June 
2003. Political decentralisation process through the two phases has integrated the fundamental 
ingredients of effective decentralization such as Political will at the local government level and creating 
awareness on the democratisation and good governance processes. Political will at the Local 
Government level makes implementation of decentralisation policy easier. It is apparent from the 
consultations with key stakeholders and literature review, that implementation of democratisation and 
good governance initiatives at local levels in Rwanda benefited tremendously from higher level 
political goodwill. The President of the Republic of Rwanda gave his full endorsement and unqualified 
support to the process while officiating at the national consultative conference held from 2nd to 5th 
November 2001 to assess the achievements, the challenges and design the way forward for 
strengthening good governance for poverty reduction.  
During the consultations both at national and at local governance structures it was apparent that the 
media is positively mobilised, and makes a major contribution particularly in mobilising local people, 
and empowering them with information. The print and electronic media is noted to be continuously 
involved in tracing the progress of the democratization and decentralization process and activities. 
Through feature articles, editorials, announcements, commentaries and periodic coverage of 
democratic and decentralization processes and events, the media has played a critical role in ensuring 
the grass root communities have stayed abreast of all democratic and decentralization events. For 
example more than 90% of the people consulted were aware of all past and on-going (Presidential) 
political activities and programs. The media also provides a platform for national debate as people at 
grass root structures air their views through different private and community radio stations: HUYE, 
RUBAVU, and NGOMA.  
5.5.1.2 Administrative Decentralisation  
The implementation of the decentralization process has empowered the population politically, and 
created a platform for sustainable democratization and the needed environment for mobilizing the 
population to actively participate in tackling diverse concerns embracing poverty, security, peace, 
reconciliation as well as their individual and collective well fair.  
In phase two, 2006-2010, the focus has been to consolidate progress on national priorities i.e vision 
2020, and deepen the decentralization through enhanced effectiveness of service delivery to 
communities. This is focusing on increasing capacities at the levels of administration (villages, cells 
and sectors), promotion of integrated local economic development and fostering community 
participation at village level in planning and management of local affairs. 
This is reflected in the Local Administration Reform Policy of 2005 with the following specific 
objectives:  
 Promote and enhance the effectiveness of service delivery by making the sector a real service 
delivery focal point with adequate human, material and financial capacity, and to improve the 
collection of data and information at this level;  
 Streamline and strengthen the coordination of „public services‟ and local economic 
development at district level by providing more technically competent personnel as well as 
financial resources to the district in order to ensure sustainability of decentralized fiscal 
regimes;  
 Streamline and strengthen the coordination of development at the provincial level  
 Establish and strengthen coherent monitoring and evaluation systems as well as 
institutionalize accountability tools and systems.  
In Rwanda, the implementation process of the decentralization policy has proceeded through 
transferring powers; authority; functions; responsibilities; and the requisite resources from the central 
government to the local governments, mainly the districts. The implementation process is through 
three modes viz: deconcentration, delegation and devolution. This arrangement underscores the 
interactive nature of the respective units especially with regard to the flow of information, community 
participation in local development activities and monitoring and evaluation of economic activities at the 
grass-root level. This chart is complemented by information in table 2.1 which provides roles and 
responsibilities attributable to each of the decentralized governance units. 
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 Table 5 Responsibilities of each territorial sub division 
Level of 
administration 
Units before 
reform 
Units after 
reform
9
 
Roles and Responsibilities 
National 1 1  Policy Formulation: Develop policies, 
programmes and principles which govern the 
country; 
 Resource mobilization: Mobilise resources to 
enable implementation of the programmes; 
 Capacity building: Build capacity of the population 
and entities which implement programmes 
prepared at national level; 
 Monitoring and evaluation: Evaluate and monitor 
the implementation of set policies and 
programmes. 
Province 11 4   Co-ordinate District planning with sufficient 
budget to implement it; 
 Ensure Districts implement policies whose 
objective is governance that supports culture of 
peace, transparency and participation of citizens 
in decision making; 
 Ensure District governance and administration 
are in line with national policies, laws and 
regulations; 
 Ensure District development is based on scientific 
research. 
City of Kigali 1 1  Draw up city master plan and housing designs; 
 Strengthen City, Districts and Sectors capacity; 
 Determine and implement city development 
programmes; 
 Co-ordinate and analyse vital statistics on socio-
economic development; 
 Mobilise local and foreign funds to invest in the 
City of Kigali. 
                                                     
9
 Rwanda‟s Decentralization Governance Reform Policy, August 2005. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Rwanda; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
35 
Level of 
administration 
Units before 
reform 
Units after 
reform
9
 
Roles and Responsibilities 
District 106 30  Ensure urban, economic and demographic 
development and enhance “poles of 
development”; 
 Build the capacity of Sectors to enable them give 
better services to the population; 
 Develop and implement District development 
plans; 
 Co-ordinate and analyse vital statistics which 
indicate socio-economic development of the 
population; 
 Coordinate District development programmes and 
give better services to the population, delivered at 
Sector level; 
 Emphasize transparent management of public 
resources;  
 Mobilise funds to invest in the District; 
 Put emphasis on scientific research in the District 
development; 
 Promote ICT; 
 Promote the social welfare of the population; 
 Mobilise funds and other resources; 
Sector 1.545 416  Give basic services; 
 Analyse population problems and design 
development plans in which the population 
participate; 
 Solve population problems; 
 Collect basic statistics on which development 
activities shall be based; 
 Sensitise the population to implement 
Government policies and programmes and to be 
patriotic; 
 Ensure proper management of public resources; 
 Coordinate specific Government programmes 
such as Gacaca, TIG, reconciliation committees 
etc. 
 Promote ICT. 
Cell 9.165 2.148  Assist the “Umudugudu” realise its objectives; 
 Link the “Umudugudu” level of administration with 
that of the Sector; 
 Collect basic statistics and deliver them to the 
Sector; 
 Analyse population problems, co-ordinate their 
aspirations, prioritise them and take to the 
Sectors problems which are beyond the means of 
Cell; 
 Resolve conflicts, and fight injustice; 
 Promote education and good social behaviour; 
 Promote peace and security. 
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Level of 
administration 
Units before 
reform 
Units after 
reform
9
 
Roles and Responsibilities 
Umudugudu/ 
Villages 
14.975 14.975  Collect basic statistics and deliver them to 
institutions which analyse, utilise and keep them; 
 Promote ICT; 
 Promote peace and security. 
 
Section 5 of the National Decentralisation Policy, May 2000, indicates the process of decentralisation 
was envisaged to proceed through a phased approach of implementation. The first phase i.e 2000 – 
2003 but subsequently extended to 2005, was for deconcentration at the Intara (province) level and 
devolution at the Akarere (District) level. The second phase, presently covering 2006 - 2010 period, 
capacities at Akarere are to be raised such that functions and responsibilities at Intara are 
decentralised to the Akarere with corresponding resources. Some administrative functions at Akarere 
level are to be deconcentrated to Umurenge (sector) level. The third phase presume removal of Intara 
(Province) to reduce administrative tiers and corresponding administrative expenses. 
As indicated in chart 1 and table 1 on roles and responsibilities, the current decentralized 
administrative hierarchy embraces five legally instituted tiers including Intara, Akarere, Umurenge and 
Akagali and Umudugudu. This administrative structure has greatly facilitated the implementation of 
decentralization policy objectives and especially encouraging grassroot population to participate in 
public policy implementation and to influence or determine the nature of democratic governance 
through direct elections of leadership at the Cell and umudugudu levels by residents. According to 
democratic decentralization process, all the village (umudugudu) residents above 18 years constitute 
the Village council and this council directly elects its executive committee of 5 persons.  The councils 
at sector and district levels as well as at Kigali city are representatives of electoral bodies at these 
levels. 
The council at the District, Sector and Cell are empowered by law to make decisions intended to 
promote and improved community livelihoods but always ensuring such decisions do not contradict 
existing laws or instructions from higher levels of governance. The council at the village level is 
especially critical as the primary point initiating participatory involvement of the grass-root population 
in electing their own government and promoting community spirit that is essential for implementing 
decentralization policy and other government programmes.  
This politico-administrative framework has accordingly initiated promoting bottom-up planning where 
communities are facilitated to decide what their development priorities are and to participate in their 
design and implementation. In this context, development programmes are demand driven and 
expected to entrench the interest of the grassroot population and to appreciate the advantages of 
decentralization policy much better.     
5.5.1.3 Fiscal Decentralisation  
In Rwanda the law and formal procedures underlying fiscal and financial decentralization are 
enshrined in the Rwanda constitution 2003 and the National Decentralization Policy May 2000; as well 
as the Fiscal and financial decentralization policy as updated in may 2006. The Decentralization 
Authorities, general Provision Article 167 outlines 11 Districts, Municipalities, Towns and City of Kigali 
are decentralized entities with legal status and administrative and financial autonomy and are the 
foundation of community development. In section 2 sub sections 2.1. (iii) of the National 
Decentralization Policy May 2000 states „‟under devolution, the powers, authority, functions, 
responsibilities, services and resources (outlined in this policy) currently centralized at Central 
Governments will be devolved to the Districts which will be created by law as legal entities with powers 
to sue and be sued‟‟. 
Thus, according to section 6 on legal entities as local governments and administrative structures 
subsection 6.1 Rural areas „‟The Akarere will be a legal entity with powers to sue and be sued. It will 
therefore be referred to as a local government. The Intara, the Akagari and the Umurenge will be 
administrative divisions to serve the purpose of effective implementation of central government, local 
government and local community development activities and services provision‟‟ 
The goal of fiscal and financial decentralization is to ensure that the transfer of powers and 
responsibilities from the Central Government to the local governments is matched with corresponding 
transfer of budgetary resources to meet the arising expenditures at the level of local governments. 
This is expected to necessarily ensure effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of requisite 
services at the local and community levels. This arrangement has equally created a stronger 
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foundation for enhancing grass-root based socio-economic transformation and sustained growth and 
hence enhanced favourable development environment for reducing poverty in Rwanda. 
The execution of fiscal and monetary decentralization is jointly charged with MINALOC and 
MINECOFIN who are mandated to ensure matching funding to the responsibilities, equity, 
transparency, accountability, incentives and enforcement of professional practices to protect correct 
use of public funding at the local government levels. The MINECOFIN has since 2002 instituted 
elaborate public accounting systems for the local authorities, carried out related training and capacity 
enhancement programmes for the local authorities acquire appropriate skills in budgeting and correct 
procedures of using public funds and other resources. 
Under the fiscal and financial decentralization arrangements, the matching funds to transferred powers 
and responsibilities to the local governments are composed of „‟Intergovernmental transfers mainly to 
accomplish the following: 
 Provide the local government with means to carryout the functions and responsibilities that 
have been devolved to them 
 Correct the economic and social distortions that exist between districts. In this regard, districts 
are accorded greater role for the demanded service delivery across all sectors. 
The intergovernmental transfer is through the following means: 
 Bloc or unconditional grants. These cover administrative functions and discretionary funds that 
allow local government authorities a measure of autonomy to deliver services in line with local 
needs and priorities. 
 Earmarked grants. These are conditional already linked to specific central government 
projects, programmes and or activities. 
 Own resources. It is assumed with increased investment interventions in the local government 
areas, there should be possibilities to raise local taxes and other types of local revenues. 
However, the likelihood of Districts being able to mobilise own resources to provide a measure of fiscal 
and financial autonomy is far off given the existing low taxation base in the districts. 
5.5.1.4 Service Delivery 
Basing on the discussions conducted with Rwanda Government Officials; Development Partners 
involved in supporting the implementation of decentralization process; Civil Society among others and 
the literature consulted, it is generally evident that the heart of Rwanda decentralisation policy is 
“prioritisation of service delivery and reducing poverty in the country”. 
This is to urgently bring about accelerated development and reduction of poverty at the grass-root 
population. Thus, implementing the decentralization policy focusing on critical social and economic 
services to the grass-root population underpins a correct option to address poverty and economic 
growth concerns specific activities targeted include education especially for the young, improved 
health services to the rural and urban poor and to modernise agricultural production and to provide 
other services that are urgently in need by especially the grass-root population. 
The vision of public service delivery through the decentralized units, puts people at the centre and 
requires high standards of accountability in the use of public resources. Efficiency and effectiveness 
call for rapid acquisition of a wide range of skills in planning; fiscal and financial management as well 
as human resource management. Other skills emphasised in this regard include enhancing capacities 
and capabilities in statistical know-how i.e. data collection, analysis and report processing as well as 
skills in monitoring and evaluations. These professional attributes are correctly assessed to be at the 
heart of attaining efficient and effective service delivery to all the citizens including the grassroot 
population 
5.5.1.5 Local Governance Initiatives 
Imihigo 
The introduction of Imihigo in 2007 as indigenous tools enhancing service delivery under the 
implementation of decentralization programme was clearly timely. The concept is deeply rooted in 
Rwanda ancient times and revolves around trust and determination. 
This concept has been modernised and institutionalised as an effective tool for promoting service 
delivery that is well understood at all levels of governance and the population at large. Apart from 
enhancing attainment of certain service products linked to decentralization process (i.e. clean water, 
primary education spaces and health services to increasing number of users), it has also immensely 
contributed to better understanding of what decentralization policy is and entails. Intended goals to 
achieve are not only set by the heads of Districts, Sectors or Cells but also by individuals who have 
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embraced the tool to measure their own performance in target areas. 
The President of the Republic of Rwanda is manifestedly interested in this good practice, targets of 
service delivery especially at the District level are made to him as the head of State. Though, this has 
turned out to be a great success in accelerating service delivery at grassroots levels, there are some 
countervailing aspects. In this regard, it is necessary to ensure that the corposants of pledges conform 
to approve national plans and budget. 
The process of implementing the decentralisation policy in Rwanda during phases one and two 
extending through 2000 – 2010 period, has been strengthened by several initiatives that were 
instituted during this period. Several of these initiatives were grassroots based while a number of 
others are formally instituted to guide and deepen the understanding of the benefits of decentralization 
implementation. These have greatly assisted to enhance democratic governance and the promotion of 
several desirable socio-politico-economic values but especially local economic development, peace 
and reconciliation. 
Abunzi (Mediators) 
This is a conflict resolution arrangement or committee comprised of twelve residents of a sector who 
are persons of integrity and acknowledge for their mediating skills in a given community. According to 
the National Constitution 2003, they are elected by the executive committee and councils of sectors 
from among persons who are not members of decentralized local government or judicial organs for 
term of two years which may be extended. Parties to disputes can choose three of the mediators to 
whom they submit their case for mediation. 
This instrument of conflict resolution is rooted in the ancient times of the national culture and attracts 
positive responses and mutual respect at the community level. It assists build confidence in the 
country‟s legal system, a process that liberates local people from bad practices and promotes genuine 
socio-economic relations. Thus under this environment, decentralized programmes are beneficial 
individually and collectively to local communities. 
Gacaca Courts 
The Gacaca court is an adaptation from traditional cultural communal law that is effective in promoting 
healing and moving on with life. It was established in 2001 for the trial and judgement of cases against 
persons accused of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity in 1994. The Gacaca courts 
are recognised and incorporated in the constitution of the Republic of Rwanda. 
The significance of Gacaca operations and procedures in managing genocide cases at the community 
level is that it has largely enhanced the process of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence at the 
community and grassroot levels. This has enabled wider participation of the people enforcing the 
objectives of the on-going decentralization activities in such areas as local elections; community 
mobilization for participation in socio-economic activities and promotion of peace and reconciliation 
especially through engagement and collaboration in mutually beneficial income generating activities. 
This development at the community and grassroot levels has strongly assisted the local people to take 
advantage of several development programmes under the decentralized governance and to 
increasingly build their confidence in the system and to be aware of how their welfare is daily 
improving through self efforts and less dependency on others.. 
HIMO: Labour Intensive Methods10 
Labour-based technology is used in construction works production, transformation and maintenance 
works, which optimises the use and management of local resources. The optimal mix (the percentage 
of labour in relation to other sources or to the total construction costs) varies according to the type of 
work and is very much dependant on the level of salaries and the materials available locally and varies 
from country to country as well as from region to region. 
A number of studies consulted including the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(EDPRS), recent poverty analysis suggest that more than 90% of Rwanda population continue to be 
involved mainly in crop production and there is minimum diversity in the production of other 
agricultural products. 
Under different decentralization programmes especially the drive to modernise and diversify 
agricultural production with non-traditional agricultural products, the need for skilled labour both in 
agricultural production and supporting activities is increasing. This will not only raise the productivity in 
the sector but increasingly create new employment opportunities including related feeder roads and 
various types of construction works (stores, and agricultural facilities). 
The HIMO intensive skills formation and training as well as in house continuous intensive training 
focusing especially on human resource development in the rural areas and transformation of 
                                                     
10
 International Labour, MINALOC April 2008, National Labour Intensive Public Works Strategy (HIMO/LIPW) 
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agricultural production provide strong support to realising one of the key objectives of the 
decentralization policy i.e. local economic development and empowerment of especially the rural 
population.  
Ubudehe 
The Ubudehe program is a pro-poor rural centred poverty eradication initiative launched in 2001 as 
part of partnership between Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and Ministry of Local 
Government. The Interventions of this program largely funded by European Union are developmental, 
aimed to assist poor households move out of the vicious circle of poverty through income generating 
schemes and household projects. 
The Ubudehe being a community-based program is well rooted in the Rwandan Culture of mutual 
assistance and conviviality whereby people came together to address common problems and to 
ensure their communal security and survival. This traditional communal obligation to participate in the 
neighbour‟s house construction, bush cleaning for crop farming or excavating wells for the cows and 
other uses is adapted under the Ubudehe program to promote income generating activities for the 
poor household at the cell and sector levels. In the context of enhancing implementation of the 
decentralization policy, the activities of Ubudehe program directly addresses the need „‟to develop 
sustainable economic planning and management capacity at local levels that will serve as the driving 
motor for planning, mobilization and implementation of social political and economic development to 
alleviate poverty‟‟. It is to be noted that rural household development activities equally benefit from the 
existence of the „‟Umuganda‟‟ program focused on maintenance of infrastructures and improved 
environment. 
Households projects supported under „‟Ubudehe‟‟ intervention are across sectors with concentration 
on animal husbandly, education, water and to less extent tontines (village credit), offices, forests and 
energy. The program has in addition generated critically important information on wealth possession 
and types of life existence in the areas covered by the program. This categorises the object poverty; 
the very poor; the poor; the resourceful poor; the food rich and the money rich. This information is 
extremely useful particularly for planning purposes at the local government decentralized units in 
evolving investment programs prioritizing poverty reduction. The success of Ubudehe program is for 
the moment not widely replicated due to inadequate funding but also the existence of other competing 
schemes for the same source of financial support. Ultimately, there may be need to integrate all such 
community based schemes under one organisation with common operational rules of engagement 
and procedures so as to ensure their developmental interventions are sustainable in future.  
Umurenge SACCO 
The Umurenge SACCO is a government of Rwanda initiative that aims to increase access of financial 
services to all citizens but especially in the rural areas presently heavily unbanked. Establishing the 
Umurenge SACCO at every village is thus anticipated to bring commercial banking services within the 
reach of every Rwanda inhabitant particularly the poor and un-banked citizens.  
In the process, this is envisaged to promote a set of modern commercial banking practices including 
possession of individual bank deposits, savings and eventually overcome the local fear of borrowing 
from commercial banks in the place of money lenders at exorbitant interest rates. At the national level, 
this initiative is to provide a strong channel for mobilizing widely national savings and contribute 
significantly to the country‟s investments perhaps initially at the district. 
Presently, only about 21% of Rwanda population have access to financial services. As a result, this is 
a real constraint limiting the liquidity and bank credit in the national economy. The formal sector 
(monetary) was about 48% of GDP in 2008 while non-monetary informal sector accounted for a 
declining 20% of GDP same years. With effective and successful operations of Umurenge SACCO, 
this situation should be reversed so that the formal monetary sector increasingly absorbs the informal 
monetary and the informal non-monetary sectors and thus expand the monetary base of the economy.   
Membership of Umurenge SACCO is voluntary, not mandatory, but the Government and National 
Bank of Rwanda actively encourages all citizens including senior officials both at the central and local 
governments to register for membership of Umurenge SACCO to promote the expansion of its deposit 
base. 
Among several difficulties this grass-root based bank has to overcome is the wide spread fear that its 
operations may eventually fail like those of Cooperative Banks where many members lost money. In 
this regard, the participation of National Bank of Rwanda, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning in promoting the establishment of Umurenge SACCO bank gives 
assurance as required.   
The process of internalising democratic decentralization and ensuring participatory involvement in 
planning and management of socio-economic activities at the community and grassroots levels, three 
important institutions were initiated during phase one 2000 – 2005 to guide and facilitate effective 
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implementation of the policy. The three institutions include the common development fund (CDF) and 
the National Decentralization Implementation Secretariat (NDIS) jointly supported by the government 
and development partners. The third one i.e. the Rwandese Association of Local Government 
Authorities is a civil Society Agency initiated by its members (Local Governments) and in consultation 
with the central government. 
Common Development Fund (CDF) 
The Common Development Fund (CDF) is a central government owned fund instituted by the law 
No.20/2002 of 21/05/2002 and subsequently replaced by the new law No. 07/2007 of February 2007, 
determining the attributions, organisation and functioning of the CDF in conformity with the organic 
No.14/2004 of 26.05.2004 determining the general arrangements of the public institutions. 
The CDF supports implementation of the decentralization policy to achieve decentralized good 
governance through supporting sustainable socio-economic development and to effectively fight 
poverty at the lowest level of local government units. 
Since its inception in 2002, CDF interventions have covered the following areas: 
 Productive and income generating infrastructures. This enhances Districts and Kigali City 
financial capacities to finance (modern markets and slaughter houses; tax parks; development 
of swamps; storage facilities; sales points; agriculture products processing units; hostels; 
assembly halls etc. 
 Agricultural interventions 
 Transport infrastructures (Roads and bridges) 
 Water supply and sanitation 
 Energy projects (solar, hydroelectric, biogas 
 Environment protection 
 Rural telecommunication 
 Administrative infrastructures (new office space and old building rehabilitation) 
 Education infrastructures (classrooms, offices) 
 Health infrastructures (Health centers, health posts, clinics) 
 Project studies and supervision (project documents, tender documents, estimates, designs 
and works supervision)    
The interventions of CDF are deliberately oriented towards eradication of poverty at the household 
level (financing agriculture; small trade; handcraft and executed at the Umudugudu level (Village) in 
consonance with the UBUDEHE programme. The common development Fund, apart from certain 
constraints arising from its bureaucratic procedures; limited technical capacities and inadequate 
funding to satisfy long term development demand from 30 districts and lower levels, this 
notwithstanding, operations of the fund at the local government decentralized units has greatly 
influenced the process of acquiring desirable skills in planning, project processing and financial 
management at lowest levels of decentralization. This is in addition to being the only channel availing 
long term development financing at the community and village levels. 
The National Decentralisation Implementation Secretariat (NDIS) 
The NDIS began as a UNDP funded project under MINALOC. It was eventually formally established in 
2008 as a coordination secretariat responsible for the implementation of the decentralization policy 
pursuant to organic law No.29/2005 of 23/12/2005 determining the administrative entities of the 
Republic of Rwanda and this was by the Prime Minister Order No. 24/03 of 23/7/2008. 
The NDIS is accordingly a public service under the authority of the Minister in charge of 
decentralization and is financed and enjoy administrative autonomy within the framework of its 
mission. The NDIS mandate encompasses the following responsibilities: 
 To prepare and coordinate different activities related to decentralization 
 To ensure that objectives, principles, and strategies of the decentralization policy are clearly 
understood and implemented by all concerned agencies 
 To analyse the decentralization policy and advise government agencies on matters related to 
its implementation 
 To be a secretariat to the National Stakeholders forum responsible for the implementation of 
the decentralization policy and other related meetings 
 To advocate for the decentralization policy in various institutions 
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 To prepare and implement the five year decentralization implementation program and mobilise 
the necessary financial resources for its implementation 
 To assist and advise Districts and other agencies and departments involved in the 
implementation of the decentralization policy 
 To implement recommendations of the meeting of the consultation forum. 
The NDIS operates within the mandate of MINALOC and provides Secretariat Services to both 
National Decentralization Stakeholders Forum (NDSF) and to the program steering committee (PSC) 
and is exclusively responsible for day to day management and coordination with local government 
authorities. 
The activities of NDIS are crosscutting, integrating and coordinating all interventions and contributions 
from diverse bodies including the central government ministries, government agencies, local 
governments, development partners, civil society, private sector and academia so as to create 
integrated administrative and technical linkages within which to ensure progress in achieving 
decentralized policy objectives over time. 
Even though the pace of sectoral decentralization especially with regard to a number central 
government activities is yet to be harmonised, still, the overall awareness is that Rwanda 
Government is totally committed to ensure that this policy is successfully implemented both to 
attain poverty reduction and democratic governance. The socio-economic information originating 
from districts and lower levels reveal the general population is generally satisfied with these objectives 
and the level of welfare and public service delivery are improving, as is meaningful participation in 
policy discussions at the grass-root level.   
Figure 3 DIP Implementation Frameworks at Central Level.  
 
Source: Rwanda Decentralization Implementation Program 2008 – 2012 (DIP) 
 
Rwandese Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA) 
The Rwandese Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA) is an established and 
functioning organization under the law No.04/2001 of 13/01/2001 but later modified in the law 
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No.08.2006 of 24/02/2006. 
The mandate of RALGA includes: 
 Representation 
 Lobbying and advocacy 
 Capacity building 
This mandate is translated in the following objectives of the Association: 
 To establish and promote solidarity bonds between City of Kigali and the Districts of Rwanda; 
 To contribute to the improvement of local administration; 
 To promote socio-economic development of the Rwandan population; 
 To keep the population informed about  Decentralisation related decisions taken by Central 
Government, City of Kigali, and Districts; 
 To develop relations of cooperation with foreign Districts and their Local Government 
Associations; 
 To provide opinions on Decentralisation Policy and to advocate for it before competent 
Institutions; 
 To advise Central Government on Decentralisation related Programmes and Policies. 
In pursuance of its mandate and objectives, the RALGA as a civil society organisation has effectively 
assisted the local government decentralized unit acquire the requisite skills in management, planning 
and data analysis for these units to effectively and efficiently handle their decentralized tasks. In 
association with MINALOC and MINECOFIN, the RALGA handles induction training programs for the 
elected councillors at all levels of local councils to equip them with requisite know-how and skills. In 
particular, at these levels, councillors lack varying degrees of competencies to identify critical 
development needs of the communities, and grassroots population they represent. They are, 
therefore, trained on how to determine priorities and how to respond to emerging opportunities in time. 
These aspects are important in internalizing the benefits of decentralization at the district and lower 
levels. In this connection, the interventions of RALGA have, among other things, provided continuous 
follow-up of the progress of the implementation process of decentralization. 
The organization undertakes lobbying and advocacy on the behalf of its members, the local 
government, and makes known the requirements of the local governments to the central government 
for action. In this regard, RALGA strongly supports and promotes the process of decentralization and 
the empowerment of local authorities, which is essential to achieve sustained socio-economic 
development. 
The Association works closely with NDIS especially in coordinating specific capacity building programs 
for the local government decentralized units and in sustaining progress in implementing the 
decentralization policy. 
While all these initiatives have greatly contributed to the achievements attributable to implementation 
of decentralization one major constraining factor relates to decentralization management capacities 
(institutional, organizational, financial, material and human resources) severely inadequate.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons and to provide recommendations to help 
for opportune and timely support to decentralisation processes; it shall cover aid delivery over the 
period 2000-2009 taking into account the different entry points used by the European Commission 
(EC)/ European Union (EU) to deliver its support to decentralisation processes. This evaluation is 
partly based on a number of country missions to be carried out during the field phase.1 
The field visit to Sierra Leone had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. By no means should this note be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered at the single country level, as they are 
formulated to be answered on the global level using the whole information collected from the desk 
study and the different field phase country studies. 
The reasons for selecting Sierra Leone as one of the field studies were: 
 EC/EU has decided to allocate all resources for the Decentralisation Capacity Building 
Programme, (DCBP) into a trust fund managed by the World Bank to co-finance the 
Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Programme (IRCBP).  
 Sierra Leone has implemented a rapid approach to decentralisation where the Government of 
Sierra Leone (GoSL) planned to devolve almost al functions of central government ministries 
to newly established local councils within 5 years (2004 to 2008).  
 Sierra Leone is a fragile state coming out of a ten years‟ civil war in 2002. 
 The programme‟s budget is relatively large (Euro 10 million) compared to the total EC/EU 
portfolio for support to decentralisation during the evaluation period 
 The entry point to decentralisation in the EC/EU support is top down, i.e. reform 
implementation by the central government 
The field visit was undertaken between 16/05 and 23/05 2011. The evaluation team was composed of 
Philip Bottern (team leader) and Sullay Sesay (national consultant).  
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research focus 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Sierra Leone has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
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Table 1 Research focus 
Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
Clarity of EC/EU policy/strategies on decentralisation according to national 
stakeholders and other international donors 
1 
Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support to decentralisation – how were priorities 
made in the delegation? Did the general EC/EU framework for support to 
decentralisation facilitate decisions? 
2 
Appropriateness of World Bank (WB) Trust Fund as aid modality for decentralisation 
support; how has policy dialogue been affected? To what extent has 
decentralisation process and outcomes been affected, what has been the specific 
EC/EU contribution? 
3 
Coherence between major sector interventions (such as in education sector) and 
decentralisation support 
4 
Documented results of decentralisation process and the relative importance of 
EC/EU support - though the WB trust fund and other EC/EU funded interventions.  
5-8 
 
The following working hypotheses have been developed during the desk phase for Sierra Leone. It 
has been a part of the field visit to validate, nuanced or rejected the hypothesis:  
1. The EC/EU support to decentralisation as a joint agreement with the other donors (WB and 
Department for International Development - DFID) may have restricted the EC/EU‟s influence 
on programme development and policy dialogue with the government. In particular as staff 
with responsibility for decentralisation is limited in the delegation. 
2. A joint programme may have increased efficiency of programme resource as transaction costs 
are smaller and EC/EU, WB and DFID communication with the government is easier. 
3. Policy dialogue with the government can be clearer and more effective in a set-up with single 
donor programme. 
1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
development partners, as well as the overall decentralisation process in Sierra Leone (SL).   
During the field phase, the team, in addition to continued document review, also interviewed key 
persons in ministries and development partners with relevant and extensive knowledge of the IRCBP 
and decentralisation in SL. 
A few interviews were carried out as focus group meeting, but the preferred interview methodology 
was individual in-depth interviews focused on the relevant EQs and the working hypotheses. The de-
briefing, the final day of the mission, was arranged with participation of a large group of the key staff in 
the delegation2.  A list of people met can be found in Annex 1. The information deemed of critical 
importance was subjected to a process of triangulation to ensure validity and internal consistency. The 
team also benefited from their respective extensive experiences with decentralisation in SL since its 
re-activation in 2004.  
Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field phase, prioritisation was necessary 
and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ reviews/ monitoring missions that had 
already been undertaken. The team relied extensively on the related reports and their prior extensive 
knowledge from SL attempting to extract more general findings, trends and recurring themes that are 
of relevance to a broader audience. The dialogue also centred around distilling broader lessons and 
themes rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. To reiterate, this country 
note is thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of the overall portfolio of the 
EC/EU. Rather it is an attempt to learn from the Sierra Leone experience and to encourage wider 
reflections on how best to structure and focus EC/EU assistance to decentralisation processes. 
                                                     
2
 In the meeting the team‟s findings and different aspects of decentralisation including EU‟s evolving policy 
approach during the last 10 years were discussed as well as the coordination between EU sector programmes 
and decentralisation.  
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Statistics 
Getting reliable updated statistics in SL is difficult as time series are not updated regularly and surveys 
are not carried out as planned. The methodology for the Integrated National Public Survey (INPS) is 
currently under revision and the survey has not been carried out in recent years, hence recent basic 
statistics on social services and infrastructure and public opinions on service delivery is not available. 
Some of the newest data is therefore as old as 2005.  
The latest published comprehensive performance assessment of the local councils (CLoGPAS) is from 
2008. The results from 2010 will be published within the next 6 months3. This lack of statistical data 
has been a particular challenge to present reliable information for answering EQ 8 on service delivery. 
The IRCBP has developed a result framework (RF) with baseline information, which has been updated 
regularly. The IRCBP RF presents indicators for programme and decentralisation progress and some 
outcome indicators. The latest update from March 2011 has been used frequently in the present 
report. The total result framework is presented in Annex 6 to the report.  
 
                                                     
3
 The team received, however, some preliminary information on the results from 2010, which was applied for 
answering in particular EQ 5 and 6.  
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2 Short description of the country context and EC/EU support to 
decentralisation 
2.1 Short description of the decentralisation process in the country  
Brief background history 
SL has a long tradition with local governments since the independence in 1951 and also during the 
British Colonial Rule. The district councils‟ operations were, however, suspended in 1972 because 
incidents of corruptions were detected in some councils. Thereafter, the councils were changed to 
management committees with members appointed by the central government.  
After the restoration of peace in 2002 and the conduction of national elections, the decentralisation 
was reintroduced, and new local councils elected in 2004. Since then one of the most radical 
decentralisation reform has been implemented with devolution of almost all central government 
functions to local councils.  
National Actors in the Decentralisation process 
A strategic framework involving political, governance and administrative elements has been 
established to guide the implementation process of decentralisation. The key stakeholders are: 
 The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLG&RD) charged with ensuring 
the administrative elements of the decentralisation including the devolution of central 
government functions to local councils 
 Ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) charged with devolving functions to local 
councils and monitoring their performance as specified in the Local Government Act (LGA) 
2004 and 
 The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) tracking the local councils 
(LCs) spending and regulating the fiscal decentralisation process, i.e. expenditure 
assignments, local revenues and government tied and untied grants.  
Other key actors are the Parliament, which is engaged in the process of enacting and amending 
appropriate legislation, the Judiciary dispensing justice related to the decentralisation process, and the 
Auditor General‟s Office for auditing local councils‟ accounts and reporting all findings to the 
MLG&RD.  
Local Government Act and Decentralisation Policy   
The 1991 Constitution of SL deals only a little with decentralisation; and before 1972 decentralisation 
was based on statements in official documents and obsolete sector policies without laid down rules 
and regulations.  
After 2002 the decentralisation process took off with the Local Government Act (2004), approved by 
the Parliament in 2004. It addresses – inter alia – the devolution of functions from the central to local 
councils, criteria for the election of councillors and their disqualifications, local councils‟ revenues and 
financial management. As regards governance, a multi-stakeholder approach is engaged to promote 
participation in decision-making in particular in planning, which is also a part of the LGA.  
A National Decentralisation Policy has recently (2010) been endorsed by the cabinet and the LGA will 
now be revised for consistency with this and sectors laws4.  
2.2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions  
The evaluation team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in SL mainly through the 
IRCBP. The table below summarises the major EC/EU-funded interventions in support to 
decentralisation considered. 
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 In Annex 5 the LGA is presented in more detail including functions of the LCs.   
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Table 2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr. 
Comment 
Decentralisation 
Capacity Building 
Programme 
9,1  17038/194632 
All funds from the DCBP were transferred to a trust 
fund, managed by the WB, which finances the 
IRCBP. The contribution from the WB was 25 
mUSD. 
   
Decentralised Service 
Delivery Programme 
(DSDP) 
5.0 22211 
5 years (signed 16 September 2010). First tranche 
from EC/EU will be released 1 July 2011 to a trust 
fund managed by the WB. WB has allocated 
United States dollars (USD)  20 million. DFID may 
join. 
Non State Actors, 
NGOs and Local 
Governments   
61,4   
50 projects approved by Delegation of the 
European Union (EUD) in Sierra Leone from the 
budget line for Non State Actors (NSA) and Local 
Authorities. Three of these are implemented by 
LCs with a total budget of 1,3 mEUR while many 
other include local councils as actors.    
 
The IRCBP was implemented from 2004 and it deals with all aspect of the decentralisation reform in 
SL i.e. transfer of functions to councils, training and capacity building of central and local governments 
staff and local councillors, financial management, local revenue management and collection, planning, 
public participation and support to a local government association. 
The EC/EU support to decentralisation in SL cannot be separated to certain areas of the IRCBP and 
therefore the evaluation of EC/EU‟s support to decentralisation in Sierra Leone will deal with the 
results of the IRCBP as this is the only major EC/EU intervention for decentralisation apart from three 
minor projects implemented directly by the local councils. 
Note: a detailed list is provided in Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs 
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national stakeholders in 
partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 1.3.1 
The beneficiaries from IRCBP are not aware of any particular EC/EU approach to decentralisation. 
The ministries and others met during the mission appreciate EC/EU‟s support highly but see the 
IRCBP only as a programme financed by the WB co-financed with the EC/EU. They question the 
rationale behind the EC/EU‟s financial input into the IRCBP with very little follow-up on activities and 
results. 
“I just wonder why the EU doesn’t want to know how its money is spent” (government official). 
In particular, officials form MLG&RD encourage more involvement and encourage the EC/EU to be 
more visible and follow up on decentralisation issues.  
It should also be mentioned that some non-senior actors met during the field mission were not fully 
aware of the EC/EU‟s participation in the funding arrangement for the IRCBP. Moreover, all 
government officials met noticed the very limited participation of EC/EU officials in arrangements in the 
MLG&RD.   
Ind 1.3.2 
Other stakeholders including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have the 
perception, that EC/EU basically has adopted the policy of the WB and does not have a particular 
policy itself.  
Ind 1.3.3 
The present EUD staff are not aware of the EC/EU decentralisation policy documents from 2007 and 
2009. Interviews with various stakeholders confirm that the EC/EU entered into the trust arrangement 
in 2005 with consultations with the EC/EU but without referring to any particular EC/EU documents on 
decentralisation. 
The EUD has used approaches for decentralisation developed by the WB, which are consistent with 
those of the EU according to the EUD. 
Recently, during 2010, the EC/EU decided to support the second phase of the Decentralised Service 
Delivery Programme (DSDP) after a request from the WB. This funding will begin from July 2011 and 
again the EC/EU will follow the WB approach. EC/EU funding will be directed towards the new 
programme‟s first component on local development grants although the funding cannot be traced 
separately as it will also be channelled through a WB managed trust fund.  
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3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing with 
sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) or 
disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.1.1 
In the preparation for the EC/EU "DCBP", the EUD analysed various options for how the support 
should be allocated. During that process it was realised that the WB already had implemented a large 
reform programme with the GoSL and funding was needed to prolong the programme. The operative 
EC/EU procedures did not hinder the EC/EU to join this new arrangement within a trust fund with the 
WB, DfID and GoSL as partners.  
EC/EU procedures have also permitted the establishment of a partnership with the DfID which 
resulted in a joint EU/DfID CPS 2008 to 2013.   
Ind 2.1.2 
The coordination is mainly done by the relevant staff, who arrange meetings or have informal 
sessions, when this is necessary. Within the EUD no formal mechanism is established to secure 
coherence between different EC/EU interventions in sectors and decentralisation.   
Ind 2.1.3 
From 2005 to early 2010 and again from early 2011 one staff member is responsible for 
decentralisation. This has not resulted in enough capacity in the delegation to be active with the 
government in discussions on decentralisation. On the other hand this has hardly been a priority of the 
EUD as the communication with the government on decentralisation has been left to the WB, when 
funds were allocated to the IRCBP.  
Ind 2.1.4  
No particular incentives/disincentives have been observed by the mission for risk taking within 
decentralisation.   
3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.2.1 
The EUD has no specific unit dealing with decentralisation – this is done by an individual. The present 
staff member with responsibilities for decentralisation started in 2011 and since the former 
decentralisation staff member left in early 2010, no staff member has been fully responsible for 
decentralisation.     
The EUD‟s human resources are too scarce to follow the IRCBP closely and once funding is provided 
to the WB managed trust funds, the EUD has decided that the WB manages the funds. However, 
some criticisms were launched on WB procedures by the EUD staff members during the de-briefing 
meeting - in particular on WB information sharing  of the aide memoires from the implementation 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Sierra Leone; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
8 
support missions and also the problem that decisions on changes in programme implemented can 
only be taken, when the support missions from the WB is present in SL. 
Recommendations to the government from the missions, in particular on the institutionalisation of the 
programme, in the Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec) in the MLG&RD and Local Government 
Finance Department (LGFD) in the MoFED have been raised to GoSL by the WB and supported by 
the EC/EU.   
Ind 2.2.2 
The staff members in the EUD have only limited knowledge about decentralisation support 
programmes, their design and functioning. When the former staff member with responsibilities for 
decentralisation, who had gained capacity on decentralisation by working with the WB missions and 
the IRCBP, left in 2010, knowledge was lost and the delegation needs now to build up the knowledge 
about decentralisation again.  
Ind 2.2.3 
The present and the former staff member with responsibilities for decentralisation in the EUD have not 
received specific straining on decentralisation5 – it is a learning-by-doing process. Nor has other staff 
members in the EUD. 
3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) or 
systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, issues 
papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote the 
effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.3.1 
There is no specific monitoring system for decentralisation in the EUD. Monitoring of the EU DCBP, 
(which provides all its funds to the IRCBP) is done via the EC/EU Result Oriented Monitoring (ROM) 
system. While the IRCBP is monitored with the aide memoires from the IRCBP implementation 
support missions and the progress reports from the IRCBP secretariat. These documents are read and 
archived in the EUD.  
The four projects financed by the budget line for Non government Organisations (NGOs) and local 
authorities are not monitored by the delegation.  
Ind 2.3.2 
There is no particular mechanism for joint learning systems in the EUD for decentralisation – 
knowledge about decentralisation is shared occasionally at informal or formal staff meetings in the 
EUD. At the de-briefing meeting, the acting head of the EUD suggested nominating an EUD 
decentralisation coordinator, who will be responsible for dissemination of experiences for 
decentralisation and coordinate with EC/EU sector activities. 
3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies?  
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational procedures 
related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
                                                     
5
 The EUD staff had not participated in capacity building for sectors either. All EUD staff members agreed that it is 
a learning-by-doing experience within the sectors and decentralisation.   
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 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds to 
LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant CSP sections on decentralisation and local governance 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.1.1 
EC/EU support to decentralisation has followed the approach suggested by the WB in the IRCBP 
including the analysis of national strategies and policies when the programme was prepared. EC/EU 
did not carry out a genuine analysis of decentralisation in SL on its own or with consultancies. DfID 
and officials from MLG&RD agree that the response by the EC/EU is aligned with the national 
priorities. 
Ind 3.1.2 
The EC/EU trusted that the WB procedures were aligned with the GoSL policies, strategies and 
funding arrangements. The IRCBP has itself designed transfer mechanism with support to the LGFD 
and the mechanism for transfer of functions to the local councils following the existing set-up in 
MoFED. Interviews with government officials confirm that procedures in the IRCBP were developed 
with the MoFED and aligned with already existing procedures i.e. those in the LGA from 2004. 
Ind 3.1.3  
The dialogue with the government has been led by the WB after each of the bi-annual/annual 
implementation support missions for the IRCBP. The dialogue has according to MLR&RD and the 
EC/EU been of good quality but the issue on the institutionalisation of the programme‟s results has not 
been solved although this has been raised continuously since the mid-term review in 2006. Since early 
2010 the EUD‟s participation in activities in the MLG&RD has been limited to a few meetings and 
working groups. The EUD was more active before 2010 but mainly during the implementation missions 
for the IRCBP.    
Ind 3.1.4 
The joint CSP 2008 to 2013 has specific reference to decentralisation and local governance and it 
presents some comments on the decentralisation reform process in SL and how this can be 
supported. The document is of good quality and the conclusions are in coherence with observations 
from other donors and the GoSL. 
The CSP 2003-2007 included support to institutional strengthening of government institutions in the 
reform process including decentralisation actors, i.e. it was a more open strategy document, which did 
not say specifically that the EC/EU would support decentralisation.  
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as “How should existing interventions best evolve?” are addressed 
in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.2.1 
By supporting a comprehensive reform managed by the WB, the EC/EU has followed the top-down 
entry point to decentralisation. The programme is well designed according to the national context, 
where the decentralisation system was not defined until the approval of the LGA in 2004 and it was 
necessary to continue in a comprehensive reform process with gradual devolvement of functions to 
LCs. 
Elements of bottom-up entry are also seen by the projects in specific districts financed by the EC/EU 
budget line for Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in development with applications directly to the 
EUD. The EUD mentioned in particular three projects (see table 3 below) with districts as project 
implementers. The EUD sees these projects as a good supplement to the top down approach. 
MLG&RD, on the other hand, would like to be more involved/ informed during the implementation of all 
projects at district level to coordinate these with government programmes.     
Ind 3.2.2 
The EC/EU decided to follow the IRCBP‟s intervention logic, which were designed by the WB. As a 
consequence, the EC/EU did not carry out a separate analysis on the intervention logic of the 
programme and how it should evolve over time.  
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3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support decentralisation 
and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme to 
be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as “When 
and how to use sector budget support?” or “what are the risks related to the”) are addressed in 
project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid delivery 
methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.3.1. 
The EC/EU has supported decentralisation since 2004 and followed the WB approach in the IRCBP. 
The approach has evolved during the implementation following recommendations from the IRCBP 
implementation support missions, which have been carried out annually or semi-annually. According 
to MLG&RD the responses have been appropriate.   
Ind 3.3.2 
The IRCBP has been designed well and national context had not changed substantially during the 
course of the programme. Stakeholders met during the mission or ROM reports do not report on 
incidences, where efficiency was lost.  
Ind 3.3.3 
The EUD assessed that a sector budget support (SBS) modality could not be used in 2004 as the 
EC/EU at that moment had substantial problems with the introduction of a general budget support 
(GBS), which was introduced from 2004. The GBS modality was difficult to introduce as the 
government should understand the mechanism and its implications. Furthermore, the EUD would like 
to join the IRCBP and this had already been implemented in a trust fund modality, which is the 
preferred modality of the WB. . 
Ind 3.3.4. 
The EUD considered that joining a WB managed trust funds would be the best and most efficient way 
to support decentralisation in particular as the WB funding of the IRCBP only lasted to mid 2008. The 
additional funding from EC/EU and DfID had made the continuation up to June 2011 possible. This 
decision was taken after it has been assessed in a consultancy if the EU‟s DCBP could finance other 
activities within decentralisation. The analysis concluded that the IRCBP already covered most 
activities and other areas i.e. policy formulation and specific district programmes were covered by 
UNDP, United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ).      
It was accepted that the funds from the EC/EU could not be traced separately and this is accepted 
fully in the EUD including the fact that some stakeholders might not know that EC/EU is supporting the 
trust fund.   
3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of the 
role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.4.1. 
Decentralisation analyses and strategies are mentioned in the CSP 2008 to 2013. Other analyses on 
decentralisation have been left to the WB during programme formulation and implementation support 
missions.    
Ind 3.4.2. 
The WB was the obvious partner as it had already started the IRCBP with similar objectives as the 
EC/EU programme (DCBP). EC/EU had also established cooperation with DfID as the other major 
donor in decentralisation and it was therefore logical to join DfID in the IRCBP.  The UNDP/UNCDF 
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also suggested that EC/EU could support their programmes at district level, but support to national 
decentralisation process was more important for EC/EU as the IRCBP would stop from 2008 without 
the support from EC/EU and the DfID.  
Regarding EC/EU support channelled through NGOs, three local councils (BO, Bombali, Kailahun) are 
supported by the EC/EU from the budget line for Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in 
development with specific projects. Other projects financed from this budget line do also involve some 
LCs to some extent but not as implementer of the project (see Annex 3 for an extensive list). 
Table 3 Projects with local councils as implementers financed from the EC/EU budget line for 
non state actors and local authorities in SL 
Project District   Dates of 
implementation  
Amount (Euro)  
Sustained monitoring of Government of 
SL's new free health care programme 
Bombali District 
Council 
NA 443.327,00  
Capacity Building of the Bo District and 
City Councils for Good Governance, 
Effective Aid Delivery, Health, Water and 
Sanitation Services  
Bo District 
Council, Bo 
2008 - 2012 450.000,00  
Building capacity of Peripheral Health 
Units (PHUs) 
Kailahun District 
Council 
 NA 449.933,00  
Total local councils   1.343.260,00 
Source: The EUD 
3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarity 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance issues 
among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor approaches, 
when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind. 4.1.1 
Among EU countries: DfID and EC/EU have established a close cooperation in SL during the last 10 
years, which materialised fully with the publication of the Joint CSP for 2008 - 20136. From 2004, the 
EC/EU and DfID coordinated their action on decentralisation, when DfID decided to support the trust 
fund for the IRCBP and DfID recommended EC/EU to follow this approach during the formulation 
phase of the EU DCBP. 
Apart from this cooperation with DfID, EC/EU accepts fully that the WB leads all coordination on 
decentralisation.    
Ind 4.1.2 
No records exist of EUD solving problems of inconsistencies between EU member states support 
programmes. 
Ind 4.1.3 
EC/EU has not taken a leading role instead cooperation has been established with the only other 
major donor in decentralisation from (WB, DfID) and UNDP. 
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Furthermore, the EC/EU has adjusted fully to the WB approach in the IRCBP and has left the leading 
role for decentralisation and programme management to the WB.  
Ind 4.1.4 
The alignment with the WB programme shows a high level of flexibility for reducing transactions costs 
and improves efficiency and willingness to lose control of the programme‟s implementation.   
However, the EC/EU could not adjust fully as three ROM reports have been produced for monitoring 
of the DCBP during the implementation of the IRCBP although aide memoires are produced after each 
of the implementation support missions reports for the IRCBP and quarterly progress report from 
IRCBP including a results framework with indicators (see Annex 6 for the latest).  
According to the EUD, the ROM reports are, however, still useful and they complement information 
from the other reports. Furthermore, the monitoring with ROM reports is seen as a standard procedure 
for all EC/EU programmes by the EUD staff members – procedures that cannot be changed easily.  
3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarity between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and other 
donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finances decentralisation programmes with Members States and major donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes and 
policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.2.1 
During the programming of the CSP 2008 to 2013, the EC/EU had regular contacts with the DfID and 
this ended up with a joint CSP: “The Joint Country Strategy (JCS) for Sierra Leone (SL) has been 
drafted jointly by the government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), the European Commission (EC) and the 
United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DfID) with inputs from in-country EU 
Member States. The joint exercise in Sierra Leone sets a unique example of joint programming and 
marks an important step towards fulfilling the EU’s commitments on harmonisation of donors’ 
activities, as expressed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005”7.  
Coordination for decentralisation with other EU donors is minimal. 
Ind 4.2.2 
Within decentralisation only a limited number of development partners are active and therefore the 
coordination is not complicated. Three donors have agreed to support the reform process with the 
IRCBP and other donors (JICA, GTZ, UNCDF etc) work with district programmes. This is not an 
organised division tasks but more a result of different interests by the donors.  
Ind 4.2.3 
The IRCBP and the new DSDP are financed jointly with DfID and the WB. This has maximised 
coordination between the EC/EU and other donors – minor overlaps exist with activities in some 
districts funded by JICA and UNDP/UNCDF.  
Ind 4.2.4 
From the interviews held, it appears that that the EUD since 2010 has had limited participations in 
activities and meetings about decentralisation in MLG&RD, while presence was larger up to early 
2010, i.e. during coordination meetings and missions of the IRCBP. Many in MLG&RD encouraged the 
EUD to be more active in the activities of the MLG&RD. 
The EUD staff has only participated in a limited way in the semi-annual/annual implementation support 
missions for the IRCBP. The staff member responsible for decentralisation from 2005 to 2010 
participated normally in the wrap up meetings by the end of the mission and sometimes also in a few 
other meetings during the mission.  
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 Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008 to 2013, EUD (introduction). 
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3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors such 
as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment into 
decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1. 
Apart from decentralisation EC/EU mainly supports sectors i.e. agriculture in SL. The team has not 
come across larger inconsistency between different EC/EU programmes in sector and decentralisation 
areas. A recent example is the new EC/EU agriculture programme, where the mission did not observe 
inconsistencies based on an interview with the responsible in the EUD, who informed that the new 
agriculture programme is coordinated with the EC/EU intervention in decentralisation. 
Ind 4.3.2 
A gender strategy has been developed by the MLG&RD (IRCBP RF indicator 2.3). EUD has not 
promoted any specific EC/EU priorities during revisions of the IRCBP. According to the MLG&RD, 
DfID has promoted some DfID priorities occasionally. 
Ind 4.3.3 
For 2008 and 2010 an indicator for decentralisation is included for the GBS i.e. the size of government 
transfers. However, this has been eliminated in 2011 as it was difficult to provide reliable statistics for 
this, e.g. due to delays in the transfers it was difficult to track the transfers to the correct year. The 
indicator for decentralisation is in 2011 the increase in the government‟s expenditure for health and 
education, which is a rather indirect measure as it depends on central government funding. The 
indicators for the GBS for decentralisation from 2008 to 2011 are presented below: 
Table 4 Indicators for Decentralisation in the Assessment Framework for General Budget 
Support 2008 to 2011 
Year Indicators 
2008 
i) "The budgetary funds actually transferred to local councils in 
2007 expressed as a share of total discretionary non-salary, non-
interest recurrent spending, will be within 4 percentage points of 
the budgeted share for 2007" and  
ii) "Actual spending as a share of budgeted allocations for health 
and education will meet or exceed the benchmarks set for each 
year".  
2009 
"Percentage of textbooks transferred from local councils to schools in 
scholastic year 2007/2008 increases on 2004/2005 results (>89%)" 
2010 
i) "Transfers to Local Councils in fiscal year (FY) 10 adhere to the 
quarterly disbursement schedule published in the beginning of 
each fiscal year"; and  
ii) "The variance between available resources and executed LC 
budgets should not be more than 10 percent in FY 2010" 
2011 
i) "Actual non-salary non-interest spending for health as a share of 
budgeted allocations in fiscal year 2010 will exceed the 
benchmark of 94.08% for fiscal year 2009 by at least 2%." 
ii) "Actual non-salary non-interest spending for education as a 
share of budgeted allocations in fiscal year 2010 will exceed the 
benchmark of 95.64% set for fiscal year 2009 by at least 2%" 
Source: EUD 
3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
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3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to implement 
decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.1.1 
The Cabinet approved the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) in 2010 after a long process 
supported by the UNDP and also the EC/EU through the IRCBP (IRCBP FR indicator 2.1). The NDP is 
now a national document to be disseminated. It is agreed among the stakeholders that the policy has 
been lacking, that the document is of high quality and that it should have been prepared before the 
local government act (LGA) in 2004.  
Ind 5.1.2 
An inter-ministerial committee (IMC) headed by the vice-president was set up in 2004 to coordinate 
the decentralisation process. The IMC has, however, lacked a technical support unit as a secretariat 
and decision making and coordination have therefore been impossible.  
Instead, the DecSec, supported by EC/EU and the IRCBP, has taken care of the coordination of the 
decentralisation process with sector ministries. As the support to DecSec will end by June 2011, the 
coordination is in jeopardy unless the IMC is revitalised or MLG&RD takes up the responsibility.  
While national government institutions (sector ministries and their departments and agencies, MoFED, 
MLG&RD) are likely capable of continuing the reform process a key issue by mid 2011 is the 
institutionalisation of the IRCBP and LGFD into the MLG&RD and MoFED respectively. In the latter, 
the ministry has assumed the expenditures for salaries and office costs for the LGFD – but a budget 
for its activities in the field does not exist. For the DecSec the MLG&RD had not yet taken serious 
actions – only a draft organisational chart with two departments.  
In synthesis the inter-governmental system is not yet capable to carry out a reform process without 
support from development partners.      
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.2.1 
The LGA was prepared in 2003 mainly with the support of UNDP and before the EC/EU entered into 
support to decentralisation. It has however been clear – almost since its approval - that the LGA 
includes contradictions with sector laws and also with the law and regulations on the chiefdoms e.g. 
on the collection and distribution of the local tax and marked dues. The revision has however awaited 
the approval of the National Decentralisation Policy and it is now under revision supported by the 
IRCBP. 
Ind 5.2.2 
Some inconsistencies exist between sector laws and the LGA. This was noticed by some EUD staff 
i.e. the inconsistency between some of GoSL‟s interventions in sectors and decentralisation during the 
devolution process, e.g. for health and for maintenance of feeder roads, where ministries on one hand 
support sector ministries, while MLR&RD supports councils‟ management of the same functions. 
These inconsistent actions are even sometimes supported by different donor programmes.  
3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments’ fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total public 
expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes and 
increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.3.1 
Before 2004 district administrations did not exist and today all councils are now staffed with minimum 
eight core staff (chief administrator, finance officer, accountant, planning officer, procurement officer, 
monitoring and evaluation officer, engineer etc.), which all respond to the local councils. The core local 
council staff members mentioned above are, however, still paid by the central government, although 
they should have been devolved fully during the devolution process. As their location is within the 
councils‟ premises, they are primarily accountable to the councils and to a lesser extent their line 
ministries, which is completely opposite to the situation in 2004.  
The IRCBP has been highly involved with setting up the structures and guidelines for human resource 
development (HRD) in local councils.      
Ind 5.3.2 
Below is presented the actual and real development in the collection of local revenues from 2005 to 
2009. The table shows that the amount increased three fold from 2005 to 2007 to decline again, so the 
real increase from 2005 to 2009 is 106 percent.  
Table 5 Local councils' collection of revenues from 2005 to 2009 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual, Le 
millions 
5,109 6,326 18,110 15,476 16,170 
Actual, Le 
millions, 2009 
prices 
7,834 8,861 22,720 16,908 16,170 
Index 2005=100 100 113 290 216 206 
Source: LGFD and www.ecostat.com 
According to the IRCBP, 50% of all council collected in 2010 more than Le 2,000 or Euro 0.4 per 
inhabitant (districts) and Le 3,000 per inhabitant (towns) (IRCDP RF indicator 5.1). These figures and 
the data in table 5 above show that the amount collected is still very limited and progress is not 
satisfactory.  
The councils‟ revenue collection is a serious problem for the sustainability of their activities and the 
whole decentralisation process. Certain systems (e.g. within cadastre, registration of local taxpayers 
etc.) have been set up supported by IRCBP and UNDP/UNCDF, but revenue collection is still low in 
particular in the district councils, while some progress has been seen for the city councils. The main 
reasons for the low revenue collection are: Political interference, lack of will and incentives as funds 
are transferred from the centre and conflicts between the traditional paramount chief system and the 
local councils in the districts about collection and right to the local tax and marked dues. 
For all revenues, i.e. local revenues and transfers from the central government, a steady increase 
since 2005 has occurred with a real increase of 150 percent from 2005 to 2010.  
Table 6 Local councils’ total revenues 2005 to 2009  
 
Local Council total revenues 2005 to 2009 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual, Le 
millions   17,959 28,748 32,427 46,370 68,362 
Actual, Le 
millions, 2009 
prices 27,556 40,267 40,681 50,657 68,362 
Index 2005=100 100 146 148 184 248 
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that are 
discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in HRM: the extent to which LGs can hire and fire or otherwise 
manage personnel. 
 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local government’s 
degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.4.1 
The local councils are empowered to raise local revenues by the LGA (2004) and also to prepare their 
own budgets with the functions given by the LGA. The budget is prepared following guidelines from 
the LGFD. The IRCBP has supported the development of manuals for revenue collection and 
management and also the guidelines for budgeting, which are used by the LCs. 
Ind 5.4.2 
The Guidelines for human resource management/development (HRM/D) in the local councils (2006) 
have not been implemented yet. They specify the LCs right to manage, hire and fire their own staff 
and the guidelines gives LCs high autonomy for HRM/D at the decentralised levels. The IRCBP 
supported the development of the guidelines for HRM/D.   
Ind 5.4.3 
Generally, the system for local government is well defined and structured; however, some unclearness 
exists on the division of responsibilities for functions between LCs and ministries. During the 
devolution process sharing of information has also been a problem as ministries were not always 
informed about the devolution of their functions to LCs e.g. when maintenance of feeder roads were 
transferred to LCs.  
Furthermore, some ministries have been against the devolvement of functions to LCs. According to 
the LGA and the regulation on devolution from 2005, 80 functions should have been devolved from 
ministries to local councils by 2008 but by 2011 only 46 functions have been devolved (IRCBP RF 
indicator 3.1)8. The LGA and the phased devolution plan were prepared before the EC/EU started its 
support to decentralisation.  
3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and reform 
implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (local government - LG & civil society organisation - CSO) 
that capacities of key central government bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and 
implementation have improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.1.1 
The key ministry for decentralisation reform, the MLG&RD, is still dependent on external assistance for 
policy formulation and reform implementation, but during the recent formulation of the National 
Decentralisation Policy (NDP), it has had a larger importance than previous (in 2003 during the 
formulation of the LGA) because of the institutional building by the IRCBP, but also support from 
UNDP to the formulation of the policy.   
Ind 6.1.2 
Mayors and officials met from two LCs agreed that the policy framework and implementation for 
decentralisation have improved, but there are still many issues left in particular for transfers of 
remaining functions and finances to LCs. 
 Ind 6.1.3 
At national level MLG&RD has implemented a functional performance assessment system for all local 
councils (CLoGPAS) measuring their performance in key areas e.g. councils meetings following the 
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 Compared with devolution processes in other developing countries, 46 functions devolved in 7 years is actually 
an impressive result.  
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LGA, functioning of planning with proper participation of the citizens, financial management, project 
management, procurement procedures and followed etc. Assessments exist for 2006 and 2008, but 
the progress was very limited. The assessment for 2010 will be published approximately August 2011. 
The system is however focused on processes in the LC administration and the MLG&RD with support 
from UNCDF intends to establish a system with focus on results of the decentralisation process. 
Ind 6.1.4. 
The IMC for coordination of the decentralisation headed by the Vice President established in 2005 has 
not been functional and the inter-ministerial coordination is still very weak.   
Instead the decentralisation has been coordinated by the DecSec in the MLG&RD and the fiscal part 
by the LGFD in MoFED. As the DecSec will be mainstreamed in the ministry until mid 2011, no strong 
coordination unit will exist unless the inter-ministerial body takes up its role. The IRCBP has supported 
the coordination function of the decentralisation secretariat in MLG&RD included its ability to 
encourage the functioning of the IMC. The IMC has not been supported directly as it is headed by the 
vice-president.    
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local councils 
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of information 
produced at local level 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The IRCBP has worked intensively with capacity building for the LCs in particular with financial 
management and revenue collection. The IRCBP has a staff member (coach) in each LC, who is also 
supporting the councils in the planning process and on M&E. Further the programme has occasionally 
financed staff in the LCs e.g. procurement officers,  
Ind 6.2.1 
By 2010-2011 all 19 local councils fulfil the LGAs requirement for financial accountability and 
transparency compared to none in 2004 (IRCBP RF indicator 0.1). 
All councils are able to implement investment projects with satisfactory financial and contractual 
management compared to 14 in 2008 and only app. five in 2005 (IRCBP RF indicator 6.1). 
Ind 6.2.2 
Most councils were in 2010 able to prepare their 3 years development plan following the official 
guidelines and with involvements of councils and wards development committees (WDCs). Before 
2004 local development plans did not exist as district councils were not established and cities were 
managed with centrally appointed management committees. 
Ind 6.2.3 
The core staff of local governments (chief administrator, finance officer, accountant, planning officer, 
procurement officer, monitoring and evaluation officer, engineer, etc.) are still paid by the central 
government ministries, but they are now accountable to the councils instead of the line-ministries they 
responded to before the devolution.  
Ind 6.2.4 
An M&E system for the local councils planning system exists and training is ongoing but it has not yet 
been implemented with data and for information use.  
According to the Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec) the technical part of the monitoring of project 
implementation in local councils is not working well in some local councils. This is shown by slow 
implementation of investments projects and sometimes a low quality of the final works. 
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
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Ind 6.3.1 
The Local Council Association Sierra Leone (LoCASL) was founded in 2004 and supported by the 
IRCBP in 2005. The local councils are represented by the councils‟ chairmen and the mayor of 
Freetown. The chairman for LoCASL is elected for a two years period and is from 2011 to 2012 the 
chairman of Porto Loko.  
The LoCASL is supposed to meet monthly but the frequency of meetings with all chairmen present 
has been irregular depending on funding and events (funded by other organisations or the 
government). Most interviewed staff agreed that it seems like the LoCASL has been addressing the 
interest of the chairmen more than the councils. 
“It (LoCASL) has turned into a Mayors Club” (development partner) 
Some councillors started to establish the councillors‟ association as well as some chief administrators. 
The LoCASL is now working on how to integrate councillors and chief administrators (CAs) as well and 
set up different sections within the organisation.    
The IRCBP supported the drafting of the LoCASL‟s constitution and financed some meetings of the 
LoCASL. 
Ind 6.3.2 
It is certain that a large number of NGOs are active in the districts/cities working and running health 
clinics and other services within the local councils‟ functions. The activities are to a large extent 
uncoordinated with the councils and their development plans although the government encourages all 
NGOs to coordinate with the councils. IRCBP has not been active in this area. 
Ind 6.3.3 
No research in local government issues takes place and no independent organisations carry out 
research in this area.  EC/EU support has not focused on this issue, nor was it included in the IRCBP. 
3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.1.1 
The second local council election in 2008 was carried out without any irregularities and the candidates 
were better prepared than in 2004. According to stakeholders met, citizens are now more active in 
local decision making and are also critical to councillors‟ actions. IRCBP was not directly involved in 
the election process, but its focus on planning processes and local accountability has certainly helped 
improving the set-up for elections.   
Ind 7.2.1 
The local government planning system is of a bottom-up type with full involvement of the ward level, 
where councillors are elected9. Almost all councils have prepared development plans following the 
national guidelines in 2010 according to the DecSec in MRD&LG. This is a result of the efforts of the 
IRCBP capacity development activities and the direct support with a staff member from the IRCBP 
(coach) located in each council administration. A large number of actors, including NGOs, GTZ, JICA 
and UNCDF are also active at district level to support planning and public participation.  
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens 
(notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.2.1 
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The WDC headed by a councillor function as the inter-link between the council and the grass root 
level. Democracy has spread out and citizens are much more active and involved according to most 
people meet. The IRCBP has activities in planning and public participation and supported this together 
with other development partners (see also indicator 7.1.2 above).  
3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) provided 
to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.3.1 
As part of the IRCBP, the LGFD has developed formulae for tied sector grants to local councils and a 
council development grant. Grants are conditional and no flexibility exists for their sector allocation 
locally. The development of grants for sectors started in 2005 when the first functions were devolved 
from ministries to LCs. The principle is that the same finance formerly used at central level shall be 
transferred to the LC- followed transparent and fair formulae. The system is generally well accepted by 
stakeholders. 
Ind 7.3.2 
The councillors are informed of all grants for devolved functions and the development grant, and the 
councillors are supposed to inform their constituencies (the wards) on the allocation. Encouraged by 
NGOs and district programmes, the allocation of grants are sometimes also published in the national 
papers, other media and notice boards. EC/EU has not supported this part. 
3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) in 
local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.1.1 
As shown in table 6, the total revenues of the local councils have increased in real terms with 148 % 
from 2005 to 2009 to 68,4 bill Le (app. 13,4 mEuro), and the expenditures follow the same pattern 
according to LGFD. The figure shows clearly a substantial increase in LCs expenditure, which indicate 
more services provided10.   
Ind 8.1.2 
The economic principle behind the devolution process is that local councils should be given the 
amount that the centre formerly has allocated for the functions (vertical distribution) and the amount 
should be divided between the councils (horizontal distribution) following need based formulae based 
on population, age distribution, number of installation, enrolment rates, etc. This has already taken 
place since 2005 and should imply a better use of resources, more targeting and more local 
involvement. 
The IRCBP has supported the development of the formulae for transfers and also their size by 
financing the development grant.  
Ind 8.1.3 
Public-private partnerships related to the delivery of social services have not been developed 
according to the stakeholders met during the mission. The IRCBP has not supported this. 
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3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc.) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.2.1 
According to the LGFD, MLG&RD and some LCs budgets revised in 2010 by the team, the amounts in 
the councils‟ budgets for maintenance are very small and local revenues are for districts mainly used 
for administrative purposes while cities have implemented a few investments in infrastructure. The 
phenomenon of preferring new constructions instead of maintenance of the existing11 is still prevailing. 
IRCBP has supported councils‟ financial management and budgeting.    
Ind 8.2.2 
MLG&RD staff report of a few examples of councils‟ allocating more resources for operation of 
services - an example is Freetown City Council‟s additional spending for wage management12.   
3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for vulnerable 
groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 8.3.2 Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.3.1 
No separate data exist for access to services for vulnerable groups – only the more general indicators 
below. Improvement for vulnerable has however been identified and confirmed by interviews with 
development partners and government officials during the mission as well as field visits carried out by 
the mission team in 2010 and 2011, The implementation of investments are now more spread more 
out at the district level to cater for infrastructure for less favoured groups at ward level e.g. water and 
local markets and even a pre-schools (Kenema city). Some of these investments have been financed 
by the development grant from the IRCBP.  
Ind 8.3.2 
Below is presented some data for outcome indicators from the IRCBP result framework relating to both 
improved access and quality of locally provided services (see full matrix in Annex 6). The matrix has 
been updated regularly during the course of the programme and latest in March 2011. As the National 
Public Service Survey was last carried out in 2006 for some variables and in 2008 for others, the data 
only provides the information that citizens‟ perception of public services has improved from 2007 to 
2008.  
                                                     
11
 Kenema City allocated Le 12.5 millions for maintenance in the budget from 2010 to 2012, while Kenema district 
did not allocate any fund for this. .   
12
 This was mentioned by the Mayor of Freetown, although the need for additional funding is still urgent.   
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Table 7 Outcome indicators in the Result Framework for the IRCBP 
 Indicator Baseline Latest 
Ind 8.3.1  
Primary schools having at 
least one textbook 
35.5 % (2005) NA 
Health clinics having essential 
drugs 
32 % (2005) NA 
Ind 8.3.2  
Percent of population seeing 
improvements in health 
service 
56 % (2007) 84 % (2008) 
Percent of population seeing 
improvements in education 
service 
65 % (2007) 90 % (2008) 
Source: IRCBP result framework 
It is evident that many investments in local councils‟ infrastructure have taken place from 2005 to 2011 
but the total number of different installations, e.g. health clinics, schools, roads, water systems is 
presently not known. 
The quality of the investments in terms of service delivered is also not known and it is also clear that 
while new constructions have been established others have been demolished or been given up.  
Stakeholders agree that the available data is inconclusive on improved service delivery. All 
interviewees met share the view that some improvements are seen and good foundations have been 
laid now for the local council system.   
EU‟s contribution to this is the general support through the IRCBP and all its activities and the support 
to some particular projects in 3 councils. 
The real results will likely not be seen before the DSDP has been in implementation for some years, 
which will work directly with local councils‟ service provision.  
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4 Conclusion concerning the hypotheses to be tested in the field 
phase and main challenges to be discussed in the synthesis 
phase 
The first hypothesis developed during the desk phase for Sierra Leone is:  
1. The EC/EU support to decentralisation as a joint agreement with the other donors (WB and 
DfID) may have restricted the EU’s influence on programme development and policy dialogue 
with the government. In particular as staff with responsibility for decentralisation is limited in 
the delegation. 
The hypothesis has been confirmed by the findings during the field trip as the WB has managed the 
EC/EU support in the IRCBP and the WB has led almost all discussions with the government on 
decentralisation.  
It is also clear that the second hypothesis has been confirmed: 
2. A joint programme may have increased efficiency of programme resource as transaction costs 
are smaller and EU, WB and DfID communication with the government is easier. 
As transaction costs a lower, decision making easier and the coordination on support actions takes 
place within programme.  
The third hypothesis is confirmed partly by the findings during the field trip:  
3. Policy dialogue with the government can be clearer and more effective in a set-up with single 
donor programme. 
As, it may be that the policy dialogue could have been more effective if the EC/EU had been more 
active between the programme implementation missions of the WB. 
Other key findings from the field visit in Sierra Leone are presented below following the 8 EQs.  
EQ 1 Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation.  
The EC/EU policy documents and guidelines on decentralisation are unknown by EUD staff, ministries 
and development partners. Almost all stakeholders assume that EU‟s policy is the same as the WB.  
EQ2 The institutional capacity for decentralisation in the EUD 
The institutional knowledge about decentralisation is limited in the EUD and no institutional system 
has been set up to increase the capacity for decentralisation.  
It is possible that a reason for the limited capacity is that the support modality through the WB trust 
fund does not encourage learning about decentralisation within the EUD. 
EQ3: EC support to decentralisation processes’ responsiveness to national contexts and 
aligned with national regulations and policies  
The EUD‟s support to decentralisation has been aligned to the national context following the analysis 
in the CSP 2002-2007 and 2008 to 2013 and the approach to decentralisation developed by the WB. 
EQ 4 Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence 
Coordination within the EUD is done during staff meetings (formal and informal). The coordination with 
other donors in decentralisation is done by the IRCBP and the decentralisation secretariat in MLG&RD 
and EUD has not taken an active role for coordination of decentralisation. Likewise it is assumed by 
the EUD staff members that line ministries will coordinate they actions and programmes with the 
development in decentralisation. 
EQ5 Programme results on transfer of functions to local councils (EQ5).  
The IRCBP has been successful in establishing the overall framework (legal) for decentralisation with 
reasonable clearness of functions of LCs and the devolution process from ministries to councils. The 
fiscal part is also on track, with formula based transfers, while the local revenue is still limited although 
local revenue sources exist. When the EC/EU support to the IRCBP started the legal framework was 
already established but the further analysis of the legal framework and the development of formulae 
has taken place after the EC/EU joint the programme.  
EQ6 Programme result for capacity of stakeholders  
Stakeholders from DPs and officials from MLG&RD and others agree that the capacity of stakeholders 
(MLG&RD, LGFD and local councils) have increased, but they are still dependent on support from 
programmes. An example is the new Decentralisation Policy, where MLG&RD has been leading but 
with substantial support from the DecSec and UNCDF/UNDP. IRCBD has supported the capacity 
development of all stakeholders in the decentralisation process intensively.   
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EQ7 Programme results on local governance  
All stakeholders agree that local governance has improved. There is more participation in decision 
making in the councils, more actions to keep councillors‟ accountability, and the bottom-up planning 
system down to grass root level (ward) is functioning. The IRCBP has contributed to this, together with 
district projects funded by other development partners (JICA, UNDP/UNCDF, GIZ, etc.). The EUD has 
also contributed to this with the financing of three projects with LCs as implementers.  
EQ8 Programme result on service delivery 
For service delivery, results cannot be demonstrated clearly as national surveys on service delivery 
have been postponed since 2005/2008 depending on the data. However, it is the perception of most 
stakeholders met during the mission that service delivery has improved or a least a good foundation 
has been laid for the new Decentralised Service Delivery Programme (EU, WB, likely DfID), which was 
launched in July 2010.  
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5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: List of people interviewed 
Last name First Name Organisation Designations 
Date of 
interview 
1.Durieux Luc EUD Ag. Head of Delegation 17
th
 May 2011 
2. Hemberger Mathis  EUD 
International Aid/Cooperation 
Officer 
17
th
 May 2011 
3.Conteh Bockarie EUD 
Project Officer, Governance & 
Social Services 
17
TH
 May 2011 
4.Kanu Alhassan DecSec, MLG&RD Director 18
th
 May 2011 
5.Kalokoh Hadiru MLG&RD 
Deputy Minister of Local 
Government and Rural 
Development 
18
th
 May 2011 
6.Lebbie Aiah MLG&RD Director, Local Government 18
th
 May 2011 
7.George-Williams Herbert 
Freetown City 
Council 
Mayor 18
th
 May 2011 
8.Boweson  Philips 
Freetown City 
Council 
Chief Administrator 18
th
 May 2011 
9.Kanu Gibril 
Freetown City 
Council 
Deputy Mayor 18
th
 May 2011 
10.Carew Arthur 
National Authorising 
Office (NAO) 
Social & Economic Depart-
ment Head 
18
th
 May 2011 
11.Kargbo Adams 
Local Government 
Finance Department 
(LGFD) 
Director 19
th
 May 2011 
12.Fofana Munirr 
Port Loko District 
Council/Local 
Council Association, 
Sierra Leone 
(LOCASL) 
Chairman 19
th
 May 2011 
13.Rogers Sheku DecSec, MLG&RD M&E Unit Manager 19
th
 May 2011 
14 LADWIG  Achim EUD 
Head of Section Rural 
Development. 
19
th
 May 2011 
14.Bockarie Pious 
UNDP/Kenema 
District Economic 
Recovery Pro-
gramme (KDERP) 
Project Manager 20
th
 May 2011 
15.Sunderland Alison 
Commonwealth, 
MLG&RD 
Local Government Adviser 20
th
 May 2011 
16. Welham Bryn DfID Government adviser 
25th May 2011 
(Skype) 
17. Bellini Chiara  
EUD (Sierra Leone 
2005-2010) 
Governance section  E-mail 
18. Zhou Yongmei WB  
Former Team Leader for 
IRCBP Implementation 
Support Missions 
E-mail 
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EU Debriefing – Participants 
Last name First Name Organisation Designations 
Date of de-
briefing  
1.Durieux Luc EUD Ag. Head – EUD 23
rd
 May 2011 
2.Hemberger Mathis EUD 
International Aid/Cooperation 
Officer 
23
rd
 May 2011 
3. Audaz Gerald  EUD 
Head of Section, Economic 
and Trade 
23
rd
 May 2011 
4. Ramey Virginie  EUD Governance Officer 23
rd
 May 2011 
5. Priddy Michael EUD Project Officer Infrastructure 23
rd
 May 2011 
6.Conteh Bockarie EUD 
Project Officer, Governance & 
Social Services 
23
rd
 May 2011 
7.Dubois Mia EUD 
Project Officer Infrastructure 
23
rd
 May 2011 
8.Peignaux Quentin EUD Project Officer Infrastructure 23
rd
 May 2011 
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5.2 Annex 2: List of documents consulted  
NAO/EU (16 September 2010); Financial Agreement between the European Commission and the 
Republic of Sierra Leone for the Decentralised Service Delivery Programme   
NAO/EU (3 November 2005); Financial Agreement between the European Commission and the 
Republic of Sierra Leone for the Decentralised Capacity Building Programme   
EU (2007); Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative programme; 2008 to 2013. 
EU (2005); Decentralisation Capacity Building Programme; Financial Agreement 
EU (2006); 2007, 2009) Monitoring Reports Decentralisation Capacity Building Programme 
EU (2005); Project Synopsis, Decentralisation Capacity Building Programme 
EU (2005); Project Summary Decentralisation Capacity Building Programme  
DP/GoSL/World Bank; (Dec. 2010) Aide Memoires for the IRCBP Implementation Support mission.  
DP/GoSL/World Bank; (Dec. 2009) Aide Memoires for the IRCBP Implementation Support mission. 
WB (2005 and 2006); Sierra Leone Institutional Reform and Capacity Building (IRCBP) & GoBifo 
Projects Joint Implementation Support Missions Nov. 28-Dec. 18, 2005, Jan. 16-29 and Feb 6-26 
2006 - Aide Mémoire 
Integrated Project Management Unit (2011); Quarterly Progress Reports the IRCBP. 
Integrated Project Management Unit (Mach 2010); Sierra Leone – Institutional Reform and Capacity 
Building Project, Multi Donor Trust Fund. Report to DfID and EU 
DecSec (2011); Development Partner Support to Decentralisation: Multi-Donor (MDTF) Arrangement – 
The IRCBP Experience, Sierra Leone 
DecSec (2010); Progress Made in M&E since 2004 
UNCDF/UNDP 2010; Mid Term Review, Kenema District Economic Recovery Programme, Sierra 
Leone  
WB (2009); Decentralisation, Democracy and Development – Recent Experience from Sierra Leone 
MLG&RD/GoSL (2010); National Decentralisation Policy 
MLR&RD (2206 and 2008); Local Councils Performance Assessment, CLoGPAS  
GoSL (2008); the Agenda for Change, Speech of the President  
OEDC/DAC (2004); Lessons Learned from Donor Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance, 
Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, 
Network on Development Evaluation. 
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry point 
Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid 
modality 
Main contracting 
party 
Decentralisation Capacity Building 
Programme 
2006 - 2011 9,1  17038/194632 Top-Down N 
Multi Donor 
Trust Fund - 
MDTF (WB) 
Dvpt Bank 
Indirect interventions         
         
 
Current Projects supported by the European Union in Sierra Leone under the Thematic Budget Lines with NGOs and Local Authorities 
All Projects 
Distribution by thematic areas No. of Contracts Section in Charge Total (Euro) 
Sub Total Agriculture Projects  10 Rural Development 28.120.916 
Sub Total Health Projects  27 Governance 26.399.028 
Sub Total Human Rights  Projects  9 Governance 2.836.568 
Sub Total Education Projects  4 Governance 4.029.000 
Grand Total  50   61.385.513 
 
Project NGO Name & Address 
Dates of 
implementation 
Amount 
Agriculture Projects 
Sustainable Agriculture Development 
in Koinadugu District (SADev) 
Stichting Care Nederlands,   
03/12/2008 - 
01/01/2015 1.342.545 
Food Security and Economic 
Development in the Bo, Pujehun and 
Kenema Districts (FoSED) 
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe eV-  03/12/08 -01/02/14 
2.000.000 
Bonthe Food Security Project Christain Aid.  02/12/08 - 01/04/13 
1.500.000 
Peri and Urban Community Action for 
Food Security Programme (PUCAFS) 
Concern Worldwide  
02/12/2008 -
01/02/2014   1.499.484 
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Enhancing Food Security and 
Development Opportunities for 
Disadvantaged groups in Freetown by 
supporting technological, 
organizational and institutional 
innovations in Urban Agriculture 
Associazione Cooperazione Internazionale 
(COOPI) 
05/12/2008 -
01/01/2013   
1.415.139 
Urban and Peri-Urban Safety Net 
interventions in response to high food 
prices   
World Food Programme 
19/10/2009 -
01/05/2011   
2.700.000 
Response to high Food Prices - Food 
Crisis  
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
15/05/2009 -
01/08/2011   10.263.748 
Response to high Food Prices - Food 
Crisis  
World Food Programme 
26/05/2009 -
01/08/2011   
5.400.000 
Food Security  Concern Worldwide  2011-2013 1.000.000 
Building Resilience and Community 
Engagement (BRACE) 
Concern Worldwide 2011-2013 
1.000.000 
Sub totals      28.120.916 
Health Projects  
Enhancing Livelihood in Serabu Axis 
Arch Diocesan Development Organisation 
(ADDO) 
2008 - 2012 
906.036 
An Integrated Approach to Health 
System Strengthening with a Primary 
focus on Reproductive and Child 
Health 
International Rescue Committee 2008 - 2012 
771.400 
Kailahun Child Survival and 
Development Project 
Plan International UK 2008 - 2012 
750.000 
Bonthe District Community Watsan 
and Health Development Project 
Jersey African Support Services 2008 - 2012 
497.577 
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Capacity Building of the Bo District 
and City Councils for Good 
Governance, Effective Aid Delivery, 
Health, Water and Sanitation Services  
Bo District Council, Bo 2008 - 2012 
450.000 
Support to Maternal and Child Health 
Care  
CORDAID 2008 - 2012 
783.660 
Reducing Maternal Mortality and 
Morbidity in the Port Loko District  
St. John of God Catholic Hospital 2009 - 2012 
477.023 
Working Together for Sustainable 
Health, Water and Sanitation in 
Pujehun 
CHRISTIAN AID LBG 2009 - 2012 
574.690 
Strengthen the capacity of Civil 
Society Organisations to participate in 
defining and implementing poverty 
reduction and sustainable strategies 
in Health, Water and Sanitation  
ActionAid International Sierra Leone 2009 - 2012 
753.233 
Strengthening Local Governance for 
Sustained and Equitable Water and 
Sanitation Services for the Benefit of 
Vulnerable People in Koinadugu 
District 
OXFAM GB LBG 2009 - 2012 
395.043 
Access to Life: Social support and 
treatment of Tuberculosis and HIV 
affected people in Sierra Leone 
Bread for the World 2006 - 2011 
750.000 
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Promoting Behaviour Change and 
Building Capacity for Malaria 
Prevention and Treatment in 
Moyamba and Port Loko Districts in 
Sierra Leone 
Plan International UK 2006 - 2012 
750.000 
Child health and development in 
Moyamba District, Sierra Leone 
Plan International UK 2006 - 2011 
714.471 
Improving the sexual and reproductive 
health of uprooted  communities in 6 
district of Sierra Leone  
Marie Stopes International   2007-2012  
2.069.677 
A project to enable and empower 
women, men and young people in 
four districts of Sierra Leone to 
achieve sustained improvements in 
their sexual and reproductive health 
status 
Marie Stopes International - Email: 
Sebastien.Baurand@mariestopes.org.uk 
2006-2010 
749.547 
Strengthening health sector 
governance for effective service 
delivery in Kailahun District. 
Christian Aid    
965.236 
Service delivery and system 
strengthening – a two pronged 
approach to support free health care 
in Kenema district. 
International Rescue Committee   
958.548 
Improving health outcomes through 
strengthening public and non 
governmental sector sexual and 
reproductive health services and 
education in 5 districts in SL 
Marie Stopes Society Sierra Leone   
897.872 
Sustaining rehabilitation services Handicap International   
577.582 
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Empowerment of  rural communities 
in Bombali District 
Inter Aide   
627.226 
Sustainable health actions through 
people's empowerment (shape) 
Concern Worldwide   
951.432 
Sustained monitoring of Government 
of SL's new free health care 
programme 
Bombali District Council   
443.327 
Preventing substance abuse among 
young people in Freetown 
GOAL   
330.675 
Building capacity of PHUs Kailahun District Council   
449.933 
Enabling access to mental health in 
Sierra Leone 
Global Initiative on Psychiatry   
764.836 
Strengthening the capacities SRH 
services and the communities of the 
Koinadugu District to improve the 
infant and maternal health and 
respond o gender based violence. 
Medicos Del Mundo   
1.440.000 
European Commission Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) project with United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) on 
Nutrition and procurement of drugs for 
the Free Health Care 
UNICEF 2010 - 2012 
6.600.000 
Sub totals      26.399.028 
Human Rights Projects (EIDHR)  
Human Rights Society Organisations 
and Communications in Sierra Leone 
(HRSOC) Association  
Institut Panos Afrique de l'Ouest  2006-2011  
240.000 
Strengthening civil society actors to 
work in greater cohesion with 
Government in implementing the 
Child Rights act  
The Save the Children Fund   2008-2011  
236.500 
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Community - based prevention and 
response to women's and children‟s 
rights violations in Kono and Western 
Area Districts 
Associazione Cooperazione Internazionale 
(COOPI) 
2009-2013 
309.127 
Breaking the Silence for Girls' and 
Women's Rights 
Plan International Deutschland 
16/12/2008 -
01/04/2012   300.000 
Strengthening civil society actors to 
work in greater cohesion with 
Government in implementing the 
Child Rights act  
Save the Children Fund UK 
11/12/2008-
01/01/2011    
236.500 
Community-based prevention and 
response to women‟s and children‟s 
rights violations in Kono and Western 
Area Districts 
Associazione Cooperazione Internazionale 
(COOPI) 
17/12/2009-
22/11/2013   
309.127 
Bringing the UNCRPD to life in Sierra 
Leone - Supporting young disabled 
people in Sierra Leone to be involved 
in and impact on the implementation 
and monitoring of the UN Convention 
of the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
Leonard Cheshire Disabilities 
30/12/2009 -
01/02/2013    
174.102 
Opening political space Search for Common Ground 2011-2013 564.960 
A National Conversation on Human 
Rights, Governance and Democracy 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World 
Service Trust 
2011-2013 
466.252 
Sub totals      2.836.568 
Education,  Livelihood and Training (investing in People)  
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Unblocking the Cocoa Value Chain 
through Informal and Formal 
Pathways to Learning in Eastern 
Sierra Leone 
BBC Wold Service Trust 
  960.000 
Advancing Technical and Vocational 
Capacities for Employment and 
Enterprise Development in Sierra   
Leone 
Hands Empowering the Less Privileged in Sierra 
Leone (HELP) 
  514.000 
From economic nuisance to economic 
empowerment; improving the 
livelihoods of vulnerable populations, 
including persons with disabilities, in 
Sierra Leone, using an inclusive 
approach.  
Handicap International 
  655.000 
Improve social inclusion and increase 
employment opportunities for disabled 
people in  Sierra Leone, Tanzania and 
Uganda  
Leonard Cheshire Disabilities 
  1.900.000 
Sub totals      4.029.000 
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
5.4.1 Main Intervention  
Title: Decentralisation Capacity Building Programme  
Budget: 9.100.000 EUR 
Start date: 2006 
 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective:  
The overall objective of the project is to provide efficient, transparent and accountable delivery of 
services to the poor through the establishment of local governance. 
 
Project purpose: 
The project purpose is to facilitate the devolution of functions and enable the local councils to carry out 
their mandate in accordance with the LGA and other applicable regulatory framework. 
 
Expected results:  
The strategy is to complement the capacity building activities kick-started by the IRCBP under the 
umbrella provided by the Administrative Decentralisation Framework, the Legal and Regulatory 
Framework, the Fiscal Decentralisation Framework, the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the 
Capacity Building Strategy 
1. Major inconsistencies between exiting laws and the LGA are resolved including clarification of 
roles and responsibilities between local councils and chiefdom authorities. The principle of 
decentralised governance is entrenched in the Constitution 
2. Policy-making and implementation, monitoring capacity, information management and 
communication at central level is strengthened for Decentralisation 
3. Local Councils are provided with the adequate infrastructure and equipment means to carry 
out their mandate 
4. Councillors and LC professional staff have acquired the competencies for the LC to assume 
the delivery of core local responsibilities. 
5. National and Regional Training Service Providers progressively able to formulate and 
implement training to Local Councils 
6. Local Councils have at their disposal discretionary development transfers enabling them to 
acquire and "practise by doing" their planning, budgeting, and management skills. 
7. Progress and impact of the Decentralisation process are monitored and evaluated. 
8. The trust fund is managed in accordance with applicable procedures and guidelines 
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sierra Leone gained independence from British Colonial rule in 1961 and celebrated its 50 years 
anniversary in April 2011 as an independent state.   
Its recent history is marked by the armed conflict, which started in March 1991 and ended in January 
2002. At least seven accords were signed by the GoSL and the anti-government forces comprising the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. Other 
parties involved in the restoration of peace in Sierra Leone included international organisations. The 
United Nations had seventeen thousand (17,000) United Nations Forces in Sierra Leone at the time to 
restore and enforce peace. The UN successfully brought together the government represented by the 
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDFs) to establish peace in round table 
conferences all around the country. The war was finally declared over in January 2002. 
Since then, Sierra Leone has been pursuing progress towards development and stability. Efforts 
towards development and stability were initiated through the disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration (DDR) programme for ex-combatants. 72,000 ex-combatants including child ex-
combatants were discharged in demobilisation centres country wide going through the NCDDR 
Programme. Some discharged ex-combatants preferred to return to their communities of origin, others 
preferred to return to communities of their choices for fear of reprisals if they returned to their 
communities of origin. Socio-economic reintegration options for discharged ex-combatants included 
counselling and short-term vocational training after which ex-combatants received start-up kits or were 
enrolled in apprenticeship workshops. The NCDDR Programme finally ended in February 2004. 
The country still faces many challenges and deep poverty remains throughout much of Sierra Leone. 
The 2003/2004 household survey shows that 70 % of the population lives below the poverty line of Le 
2000 (about Euro 0.5) per day and 26 % of the population lives in extreme poverty. Poverty manifests 
itself through different indicators: generalised hunger, life expectancy is 42 years (the second lowest in 
the world), adult illiteracy rate is at 79 % (among the highest in Africa), infant mortality is one of the 
highest recorded in the world.  
5.5.2 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
Sierra Leone is composed of four regions: The three provinces (Northern, Southern and Eastern) and 
the Western Area. The provinces are further divided into 13 districts, to which correspond 19 local 
councils (6 urban and 13 district councils) LCs constitute the main elected bodies at the decentralised 
level, having been re-established through the LGA (2004), and are required to operate under 
democratic principles. Local elections are held every four years for councils (since the new 2004 LGA: 
in 2004 and 2008) and functions and tasks are the same for all councils. 
Figure 1 Government structure of Sierra Leone 
 
Parallel to local councils, districts are sub-divided into chiefdoms (a total of 149) – each of them 
headed by an unelected paramount chief who is also represented in the competent local council – 
which constitutes a traditional, highly recognised and often competing source of authority in rural 
areas. „The relation – interaction and engagement between the new LCs system and the chieftaincy 
Government
4 Regions
13 Districts
19 Councils, 6 City councils and 13 District 
councils
149 Chiefdoms (traditional system)
Wards
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system is one the least understood dimensions of local governance in Sierra Leone as […] the initial 
design and implementation of the decentralised local government left many of the questions  
unanswered as to how these two systems would interact
13
. While chiefdoms still rank higher in the 
communities‟ perception of legitimate authority, the councils are gaining increasing recognition as 
important “development” actors at the local level.    
Councils are further subdivided into wards, which are led by WDCs. WDCs are a formal (but still 
partially functioning) variant of the variety of local development committees operating at the chiefdom 
and sub-chiefdom level through which the government is attempting to bring the development process 
back to local communities.  The chairman of a WDC is also councillor in the city/district council to 
assure the link between the WDC and the council.  
The central level of government consists of Parliament, Government, Ministries, Departments and 
Agencies (MDAs), which have decentralised branches at each district level. The Ministry of Internal 
Affair, Local Government and Rural Development (MIALGRD) are responsible for local councils and 
related legislation. 
5.5.3 THE 2004 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 
In 2004, the government re-established local councils and started an ambitious decentralisation reform 
programme, which aimed at reversing the long period of centralisation and rural deprivation, as well as 
empowering the rural population. The decentralisation process has made gradual progress since its 
taking off in 2004.  
The cornerstone of the reform is the LGA (2004), which was approved and enacted into law by 
Parliament in March 2004. The act aims to consolidate and streamline the law on local government to 
give effect to decentralisation and devolution of powers, functions and resources. It provides for local 
elections, the political and administrative set-up of local councils, local council financing and 
decentralised decision making to ensure good governance, democratic participation and control of 
decision making by the people. 
This LGA was passed to ensure that local governance and the decentralisation process were 
politically recognised. The act defines “local government” and “local council‟ as a unit of governance 
that should consider the highest political authority in the designated locality”. 
The act addresses: 
 Election and composition of local councils as well as term of each local council (four years). 
 Qualifications for becoming a councillor, which focuses on being a resident of the locality. 
 Procedures for electing a mayor (Freetown) and chairperson (all other councils) as well as 
removal from office. 
 Procedures and processes to conduct the first business of councils after its constitution (post 
elections) 
 Convening and conduct of meetings with regard to the relevance and use of standing orders.  
 Powers of local councils to make and execute byelaws. 
 Facilitation, mediation, and co-ordinating roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development and of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, which must be consulted on all fiscal decentralisation matters. 
The LGA 2004 specified the first four years as the transition period for implementing the new 
relationships between central and local governments. During this time, authority and corresponding 
resources for a defined set of functions were to be transferred to local councils.  
The local governance and decentralisation process was piloted by the GoSL through the former 
MIALGRD now MLG&RD.  
5.5.4 THE DEVOLUTION OF FUNCTIONS  
Apart from the central ministries of defence and finance, all others are essentially devolving the 
administration of infrastructure and services provision to local councils. This encompasses a broad 
range of issues from almost all central line MDAs including road maintenance, community 
                                                     
13
 „‟Decentralisation, democracy and development: recent experience from Sierra Leone‟‟, the World Bank, 2009. 
The LGA did not fully address the relationship between these two levels of local governance, simply affirming that 
they would work in parallel. The authority to fix local tax rates and define shares of revenues, for example, 
theoretically belongs to local councils, actual tax administration remains in the hands of chiefs.  Land 
management and local courts do also pertain to the chiefs‟ administration.  
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development, enterprise development, local level planning, and most agricultural development 
functions. 
Despite challenges emerging from the decentralisation process and the LGA, the devolution of all 
MDA functions started in 2005 and has continued since. Below are presented what have been 
devolved up to 2010.  
The Ministry of Health and Sanitation devolved the following main functions: 
1. Registration of births and deaths. 
2. Public Health Information, education and communication. 
3. Environmental health care. 
4. Maintenance of non-technical equipment. 
5. Primary health care. 
6. Facilities management.  
7. Procurement of equipment and medicines. 
8. Secondary Health Care. 
Most important functions devolved by the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Gender Affairs 
include: 
 Family case work. 
 Probation. 
 Disability issues. 
 Child welfare. 
 Community-based organisations 
 Gender issues. 
The Sierra Leone Roads Authority devolved maintenance of primary feeder roads and maintenance of 
chiefdom roads/tracks while the Ministry of Information and Communication devolved Information 
Services and sale of Gazettes and Receipts. Other devolution activities executed by the Ministry of 
Mineral Resources include the establishment of management of Community Development Funds, the 
ordination of mining licenses and rehabilitation of mined-out areas. For the Ministry of Fisheries and 
Marine Resources, the licensing of small canoes and attendant fishing gears and the establishment 
and management of fish ponds and inland lakes were devolved.  
Other MDAs that have devolved their functions include the Administrator General‟s Department, the 
Ministries of Youths and Sports, Works, Housing and Technical Maintenance, Lands, Country 
Planning and the Environment, Education, Science and Technology, Tourism and Culture, Energy and 
Power, Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations, Development and Economic Planning, 
Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security.  
As of early 2011, the MLG&RD estimated that app. 34 of 80 functions have not yet been devolved 
from the central government. Among the MDAs, that have not yet devolved their central functions are: 
1. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children‟s Affairs. 
2. Sierra Leone Roads Authority. 
3. Ministry of Mineral Resources. 
4. Administrator Generals Department. 
5. Ministry of Works, Housing and Technical Maintenance. 
6. Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment. 
7. Ministry of Tourism and Culture. 
8. Ministry of Energy and Power. 
9. Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations. 
10. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.    
5.5.5 THE DECENTRALISATION POLICY (2010) 
When decentralisation was enacted in 2004 by the Local Government Act and its regulation with the 
devolution plan 2004 to 2008, no policy framework was formulated and this serious oversight has 
caused some set-backs in the decentralisation process. This issue is now being addressed with the 
decentralisation policy. Extensive consultations with major stakeholders and the lessons gained from 
the implementation of the system since 2004 served as useful tools in the formulation of the policy. 
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After Parliamentary approval in 2010, the Decentralisation Policy was printed and launched in 
September 2010. The document was afterwards distributed amongst different stakeholders including 
NGOs, MDAs and the development partners.  
According to the NDP, the Government is committed to a policy of decentralisation by devolution, 
characterised by the following principles: 
1. The transfer of power, authority and resources from the centre to the democratically elected 
local councils anchored within the national Constitution and articulated in law, promoting 
autonomy without prejudice to the sovereignty of the national Government; 
2. Bringing political, administrative and fiscal control and responsibility over services closer to the 
people where they are actually delivered, in line with the principle of subsidiarity; 
3. Engendering people‟s ownership of their local development agenda; 
4. Ensuring that holders of public offices locally are held accountable for their actions to the 
public;  
5. Guaranteeing transparency  and openness in the conduct of local council affairs;  
6. Creating an environment for participatory democracy that will enable greater involvement of 
the people and their representatives in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluation of 
development projects and local economic development in their localities;  
7. Stimulating economic growth in local communities, including public-private partnerships; and, 
8. Promoting inclusiveness and equality of all citizens within any locality regardless of gender, 
origin, religion or political persuasion.  
Goal and objectives  
The goal of Sierra Leone‟s decentralisation is to ensure that the local people and their communities 
are empowered and fully involved in political and socio-economic development processes and actually 
formulate and implement development plans, while governments working in collaboration with the 
private sector and civil society provide the enabling environment, oversight and effective management 
of national and local development. 
Policy objectives 
To achieve the above goal, the following objectives will be pursued: 
 To firmly establish the legal and regulatory framework for embedding the policy of 
decentralisation by devolution while defining roles, responsibilities and functional relationships 
therein;  
 To improve local governance by shifting political, administrative and fiscal responsibilities 
closest to the areas where services are delivered;  
 To devolve service delivery functions to local councils systematically and in a coordinated  
fashion together with  the MDAs; 
 To strengthen capacities of key stakeholders involved in the decentralisation process, 
especially the local councils, to be able to carry out their mandates effectively and efficiently; 
 To build local ownership and operational efficiency of the decentralisation process through 
effective development planning and budgeting, financial management, monitoring and 
evaluation, and other managerial functions, and to provide an effective link between national 
development priorities and local level development initiatives; 
 To strengthen local councils to effectively harness local revenue potentials to complement 
other revenue sources, including inter-governmental  fiscal transfers for the funding of their 
development  and  administrative programmes; 
 To mainstream gender perspectives in the entire decentralisation process especially in the 
operations of the local councils and to promote inclusiveness for all societal groups; 
 To effectively sensitise the citizens about decentralisation, mobilising solid support for its 
growth and emphasising good stewardship; 
 To promote transparency and accountability in local governance by making local councils 
directly accountable for their actions to their citizens and nationally, while adhering to the best 
practices of open government; 
 To devolve local economic development promotion functions and their related resources to 
local councils in a systematic and coordinated manner with the MDAs; 
 To devolve the required functions and resources to enable local councils to explore all 
opportunities to promote equitable local economic growth and service delivery through the 
mobilisation of local resources in tandem with the private sector and civil society; and 
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 To harmonise donor support towards strengthening the decentralisation process avoiding 
unnecessary duplications and overlaps. 
5.5.6 CHALLENGES TO THE DECENTRALISATION PROCESS IN SIERRA LEONE- 2011 
As of May 2011 when the IRCBP is coming to an end, the decentralisation process faces some 
challenges for its continuation and stability some of these are presented below: 
Coherence between LGA and sector laws 
From an early stage after 2004 it became clear that the LGA conflicts with other laws that were in 
existence before its enactment. This means that there is a duplication of some functions or in other 
words unclearness on the division of functions between MDAs and local councils. For instance, the 
LGA provides for councils to raise their own revenues through taxation, issue of licenses etc, but there 
are other laws in existence which empowered other institutions to collect these revenues like the 
National Revenue Authority Act, 2002. Other laws which conflict with the LGA are: 
 The Administrator of Estates Act, 1960 (Cap. 45) 
 The Education Act, 2004 (Act No. 2 of 2004) 
 The Hospital Boards Act, 2003 (Act No. 6 of 2003) 
 The Development of Tourism Act 1990(Act No. 11 of 1990) 
 The Minerals Act 1994 (Act No. 5 of 1994) 
Therefore, the government is now in a process of reviewing the LGA to straighten out inconsistencies 
with other laws and foster a smother implementation of the decentralisation process. 
Timely transfer of funds 
Under the LGA, the central government transfers administrative and development grants to local 
councils periodically so that the work of the council can be financed. However, the disbursement of the 
grants is sometimes delayed which make implementation at the council level difficult. 
Local revenues 
As stipulated in the LGA and the financial regulation, LCs are also responsible for collecting their own 
revenue, i.e. the local tax, property taxes, licenses, fees and different dues. Only very limited progress 
has, however, been registered in this area and LCs still rely heavily on funding from the government 
and development partners. 
The challenges for local revenue collection are several:  
 Political will of councillors to collect revenues  
 Interference from central government politicians and citizens who e.g. question LCs right to 
collect taxes.  
 A dispute between local councils and chiefdoms on effective collection of revenues and the 
division of the revenues collected between the chiefdoms and the LCs for in particular the 
local tax and market fees. . 
 Understanding of the legal framework for local revenue of councillors and LC staff 
 Registration, system and procedures to collect revenues e.g. property register, register of 
business, taxpayers for local tax etc. 
 Finally, there is a need for continued sensitisations of citizens about revenue collection and 
associated development projects. Citizens‟ interest in local government affairs is inadequate, 
partly because information and education about the decentralisation process is equally 
inadequate.  
Human resource management 
One major function of the local council is to recruit its own human resource. The urban councils were 
forced to maintain staff, which before 2004 worked in the management committees. This has led to 
friction between such workers and the urban local councils. Paying these workers out is costly and the 
councils lack fund for this as well as funds for recruit and retain competent core council personnel. The 
approximately 8 core staff members in the councils are also still finance by the MDAs in contrast to 
what was planed for in 2004.  
Sustainability of the decentralisation process 
Finally, sustainability of some of the institutional achievement since 2004 is a concern as the 
Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Programme, which finances the reform secretariat in 
MLG&RD: DecSec and LGFD in MoFED, is coming to an end by 30 June 2011. The MoLGRD has so 
far not been able to mainstream the decentralisation process into the Ministry and it has not yet shown 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Sierra Leone; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
40 
the ability to retain and maintain the staff of the DecSec. MoFED has absorbed the LGFD, but financial 
resources for the departments‟ are very limited compared to the normal activities of the department.  
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5.6 Annex 6: Result framework for the IRCBP, March 2011 
  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
0.1 All  19 elected local 
councils  continue  to meet 
the transparency and the 
financial management 
accountability requirement 
as per Local Government 
Act 2004 (Section 107, 81, 
105) (RECAST) 
2004: None 19 19 Condition Met: 
Achievement of this 
indicator has been 
sustained for the past two 
years according to the 
LGFD assessments for 
2009 and 2010.  
19 19 Condition Met: 
Achievement of 
this indicator 
has been 
sustained for 
the past two 
years according 
to the LGFD 
assessments 
for 2009 and 
2010.  
LGFD 
0.2 Number of Local 
Councils meeting all 
minimum conditions on 
CLoGPAS (NEW) 
2006: None 15 CLoGPAS 2011 has 
been conducted and 
data entry complete. 
Summary tables on 
the results will be 
available in early 
May. (Actual was 12 
in 2009) 
Likely to be Met: 
According to the 2008 
assessment which data 
was used to update the 
2009 targets, the target of 
all 12 Local Councils 
meeting all MCs was 
achieved. The reasons for 
the 7(seven) LCs not 
meeting the MCs were 
treated as capacity gaps 
for which capacity building 
activities were designed 
and implemented by the 
Capacity Building Unit of 
DecSec during the 2010 
implementation period. It 
is anticipated that the 
target will be exceeded 
owing to the positive 
impact of the activities. 
N/A     DecSec  
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
0.3 Number of Local 
Councils meeting the 
threshold 70 % of the total  
for the performance 
measures bonus of 
CLoGPAS. (NEW) 
2006: None 18 CLoGPAS 2011 has 
been conducted and 
data entry 
completed. Summary 
tables on the results 
will be available in 
early May. (Actual 
was 12 in 2009) 
Likely to be Met: 
According to the 2008 
assessment which data 
was used to update the 
2009 targets, the target of 
16 Local Councils meeting 
the threshold 70 % was 
achieved. The reasons for 
the 3(Three) LCs not 
meeting the threshold 70 
% were also treated as 
capacity gaps for which 
capacity building activities 
were designed and imple-
mented by the Capacity 
Building Unit of DecSec 
during the 2010 
implementation period. It 
is anticipated that the 
target will be exceeded 
owing to the positive 
impact of the activities. 
N/A     DecSec  
0.4 Percent of general 
population seeing 
improvements in health and 
education services (NEW) 
National 
Public 
Services 
Survey 
2007 
(Health : 
56%  and 
Education : 
65% ) 
Health : 84 %; 
Education : 
90 %  
INPS Survey 
instrument is being 
revised and the PHU 
mapping is on-going. 
This will be 
immediately followed 
by a piloting of the 
revised instrument 
using personal data 
assistants (PDAs). 
Actual field work is 
expected to 
commence in May. 
(In 2008, Health: 65 
% and Education: 75 
%) 
Likely to be Met: This 
judgment is based on the 
updates for 2008 where 
targets were achieved 
way above the 2007 
baseline results. In 2009 
data was not available 
due to the non conduct of 
the survey  
N/A     DecSec 
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
Intermediate Outcome 
Indicators 
Baseline Target Actual Remark Target Actual Remark Responsibilit
y for Data 
Collection 
1.1 Number of primary 
schools having at least one 
core textbook per child 
(NEW) 
National 
Public 
Services 
Survey 
(NPS) 
2005(35.5%
) 
65 % INPS Survey 
instrument is being 
revised and the PHU 
mapping is on-going. 
This will be 
immediately followed 
by a piloting of the 
revised instrument 
using PDAs. Actual 
field work is 
expected to 
commence in May. 
This cannot be 
determined now until after 
the conduct of the INPSS 
particularly due to the 
unavailability of data for 
both 2008 and 2009. 
      DecSec 
 1.2 Percent of clinics 
having  essential drugs.  
Primary 
Health Care 
Survey 
2005 (32.0 
%) 
50 % INPS Survey 
instrument is being 
revised and the PHU 
mapping is on-going. 
This will be 
immediately followed 
by a piloting of the 
revised instrument 
using PDAs. Actual 
field work is 
expected to 
commence in May. 
This cannot be 
determined now until after 
the conduct of the INPSS 
particularly due to the 
unavailability of data for 
both 2008 and 2009. 
      DecSec 
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
2.1 Decentralisation policy 
is formulated and submitted 
to Cabinet. (NEW) 
2008: No 
Policy 
elaborated 
Submission of 
draft 
Decentralisa-
tion Policy to 
Cabinet 
Policy approved by 
Cabinet in 
September 2010 and 
launched by the Vice 
President in 
February 2011. 
Dissemination of the 
policy to key 
stakeholders is on-
going. Sensitisation 
by the print and 
electronic media at 
the regional level is 
in progress. 
Condition Met: The 
Policy has been adopted 
by Cabinet as a national 
document 
      DecSec 
2.2 The LGA 2004 is 
amended in line with 
Decentralisation Policy and 
sections of the Education 
Act, Hospitals Board Act, 
SALWACO Act and Local 
Tax Act that are in conflict 
with the LGA 04 are 
repealed. (RECAST)         
2009 : 
Contra-
dictions in 
legislation 
LGA and 
other Acts 
amended. 
A Task Force has 
been set up by the 
Ministry of Local 
Government and 
Rural Development 
for the assignment. 
The Task Force has 
met four times and 
has prepared an 
issues paper. 
Regional level 
consultations as the 
next step are 
scheduled to 
commence in May. 
Not Met: The achieve-
ment of this target was 
hinged on the achieve-
ment of the achievement 
of IOI 2.1 which was not 
achieved until towards the 
end of the year. This has 
now been rolled over to 
2011. 
Enactment of 
legislation  
    DecSec 
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
2.3 A Gender Strategy and 
Policy developed  in support 
of decentralisation. (NEW) 
2008: No 
Policy 
Gender 
Strategy in 
support of 
decentralisa-
tion 
developed 
and 
implemented 
The strategy has 
been developed and 
submitted to Minister 
of Local Government 
and Rural 
Development. 
Sensitisation of LCs 
on the strategy is far 
advanced. 
Condition Met: The 
strategy was developed 
and plans and provisions 
made for popularizing the 
strategy and build 
capacities in its 
implementation in 2011. 
N/A     DecSec 
3.1 Number of outstanding 
functions fully devolved 
according to revised 
Statutory Instrument 
(RECAST) 
2004: 
Devolution 
pending on 
basis of 
Statutory 
Instrument 
70 functions So far 46 functions 
have been devolved 
Partially Met: Only more 
than half the target was 
devolved.  
80 functions 46 functions 
devolved so far. 
Partially Met: 
Functions 
devolved so 
far are over 
the half mark 
by just 15 % 
DecSec 
4.1  Number of LCs with fit-
for-purpose con-
structed/renovated office 
buildings (RECAST) 
2004: 
Freetown 
and Bo 
Cities only 
12 more LCs 
(including 
rehabilitation 
of FCC) 
9 more LC office 
buildings completed 
and handed over 
(excluding FCC as 
the date of 
completion of the 
rehabilitation has 
been deferred to 
March 2011) 
Partially Met: The target 
was not achieved, the 
actual was less 3 
completed buildings and 
the rehabilitation of the 
FCC. 
All 19 LCs 9 more LC office 
buildings 
completed and 
handed over. 
Office buildings 
for Koinadugu, 
Bombali and 
Koidu/New 
Sembehun City 
Council (KNSCC) 
are almost 100 % 
complete 
awaiting final 
inspection before 
handing over. 
Office buildings 
for the two 
Bonthe councils 
are the finishing 
stage whereas 
those of Bo, 
Kenema and 
Kambia District 
Councils are at 
the roofing stage. 
Targets Will 
be Met: All 
indications 
are that these 
structures will 
be completed 
before the 
June 30 
deadline 
DecSec 
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
Rehabilitation 
work at the FCC 
is at the finishing 
stage 
5.1 Number of Local 
Councils meeting own 
revenue generation targets 
(Le 2000 per capita per year 
for rural councils and Le 
3000 per capita per year for 
urban councils). (RECAST) 
2004 : None 8 10 Condition Met: According 
to the LGFD 2010 
assessment, the target 
was exceeded by two 
more LCs. 
12 LGFD to assess 
the performance 
of LCs by mid to 
end July for the 6 
months 
programme 
implementation 
period for the 
2011 FY 
Likely to be 
Met: 2010 
targets were 
exceeded by 
2 and this 
trend is 
expected to 
continue. 
LGFD 
6.1  Number of LCs 
complete projects included 
in LGDG work plan with 
satisfactory financial and 
contract manage-
ment.(RECAST) 
2008 : 14 
LCs 
19 19 Condition Met: According 
to the LGFD 2010 
assessment, all 19 LCs 
completed projects 
included in LGDG work 
plan with satisfactory 
financial and contract 
management. 
19 LGFD to assess 
the performance 
of LCs by mid to 
end July for the 6 
months 
programme 
implementation 
period for the 
2011 FY 
Likely to be 
Met: 2010 
targets were 
achieved and 
this trend is 
expected to 
continue. 
LGFD 
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
7.1    Number of Local 
Councils with elected and 
trained Ward Committees 
(NEW) 
2008 : All  
ward 
committees 
elected 
Training in 
final six LCs 
Training completed 
in final six LCs since 
May 2010. These 
are: FCC, Bo District, 
Bo City, Tonkolili, 
Port Loko, Kenema 
District Councils. All 
Ward Committees of 
the 19 LCs have now 
been trained with 
top-up training in 
M&E and 
development 
planning provided. 
Additional support 
includes the 
provision of bicycles 
to aid their work. 
Condition Met: For 2010, 
all LCs had elected and 
trained Ward Committees. 
N/A     DecSec 
7.2 IEC Strategy for 
Decentralisation is in place. 
(NEW) 
2008:None Merging of 
the two 
strategies to 
constitute a 
National IEC 
for 
Decentralisa-
tion Strategy 
Excerpts from 
strategy prepared 
under IRCBP 
merged into UNDP 
funded strategy for 
the ministry. The 
merged strategy has 
been validated but is 
yet to become official 
and effectively 
implemented. 
Partially Met: The 
validated version of the 
merged strategy is now 
available. Implementation 
of the strategy is not 
effective. 
N/A     MIALG&RD; 
DecSec 
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
8.1  Assessment from 
available sources (e.g., 
GoBifo), of the extent to 
which decentralisation has   
rekindled social cohesion 
and addressed the needs of 
marginalised groups. 
(RECAST) 
  Measurable 
improvements 
identified 
INPS Survey 
instrument is being 
revised and the PHU 
mapping is on-going. 
This will be 
immediately followed 
by a piloting of the 
revised instrument 
using PDAs. Actual 
field work is 
expected to 
commence in May. 
This cannot be 
determined until after the 
conduct of the INPSS 
particularly due to the 
unavailability of data for 
both 2008 and 2009. 
Measurable 
improvements 
identified 
    Gobifo 
8.2 Number of LCs with 
regular (including random) 
audits of financial 
management, procurement, 
and contract management. 
(RECAST) 
2007: 
Sample 
audits only 
up to 2004 
completed 
by Audit 
Service 
Sierra 
Leone. 
LCs submit 
their final 
statements of 
Accounts for 
FY 2009 to 
Audit Service 
not later than 
31 March, 
2010.  
2009 final 
statements of 
accounts for LCs 
were submitted to 
Audit Service on 
time. Audit of the 
accounts has been 
completed and 
management letters 
issued to all LCs to 
be responded to 
within thirty (30) days 
from the date of 
receipt which has 
now expired. 
Opinions are now 
being finalised to be 
issued by end of 
week of Monday 20
th
 
Dec, 2010. 
Condition Met: The 
achievement exceeded 
the target. Beyond 
submission by the 
statutory date, audits were 
also completed and 
Management Letters 
issued by the Audit 
Service Sierra Leone. 
        
8.3 Develop guidelines for 
integrated Sector and Local 
Councils planning and 
monitoring and evaluation. 
(NEW) 
2005: None Guidelines for 
integration of 
District M&E 
into Local 
Council M&E  
Terms of Reference 
for consultant 
prepared and 
submitted to IPAU. 
Consultant to be 
engaged to support 
review. Rolled over 
to 2011 
Condition Not Met: The 
process for selecting the 
consultant in accordance 
with World Bank 
guidelines is still in 
progress. RFPs sent out 
to short-listed candidates. 
N/A 
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
9.1    Respective organisa-
tional charts reflect new 
disposition as   identified in 
Management & Functional 
reviews. (NEW) 
2009: No 
Action 
Agreed 
approach  
effected 
Organisational chart 
developed and 
submitted to Public 
Sector Reform Unit 
for review and 
approval. Ministry is 
yet to receive 
feedback from the 
PSRU. 
Condition Not Met: As 
noted in the December 
2010 ISM Aide Memoire, 
none of the substantive 
actions included in the 
2010 work plan under 
Sub-Component 1.6 was 
achieved. However, 
preliminary meeting on the 
organisational chart held 
with the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry. 
N/A 
    
MIALG&RD 
;DecSec 
9.2 Appropriate staff 
recruitment/deployment of 
civil servants effected. 
(NEW) 
2009: No 
Action 
Agreed 
approach  
effected 
Not done Condition Not Met: As 
noted in the December 
2010 ISM Aide Memoire, 
none of the substantive 
actions included in the 
2010 work plan under 
Sub-Component 1.6 was 
achieved. The Ministry 
has contacted the Human 
Resource Management 
Office (HRMO) to explore 
ways of expediting the 
process. 
N/A     MIALG&RD 
;DecSec 
9.3   Staff/systems 
development programme 
elaborated (NEW) 
2009: No 
Action 
Agreed 
approach  
effected 
Not done. Ad-hoc 
system in place 
Condition Not Met: As 
noted in the December 
2010 ISM Aide Memoire, 
none of the substantive 
actions included in the 
2010 work plan under 
Sub-Component 1.6 was 
achieved. The ministry is 
currently in discussion 
with the UNDP for TA to 
strengthen the systems in 
the Ministry. 
N/A     MIALG&RD 
;DecSec 
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  2010 2011   
Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Remarks Target Actual Remarks 
Data 
Collection 
9.4 DecSec/LGFD coaching 
and mentoring of identified 
Ministry staff conducted in 
accordance with schedule. 
(NEW) 
2009: No 
Action 
Agreed 
approach  
effected 
Not done Condition Not Met: As 
noted in the December 
2010, ISM Aide Memoire, 
none of the substantive 
actions included in the 
2010 work plan under 
Sub-Component 1.6 was 
achieved. Counterpart 
staff  members are yet to 
be identified by the 
Ministry. 
N/A     MIALG&RD 
;DecSec 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development, Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project, Quarterly progress Report January to Mid April 2011.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons learnt and to provide recommendations 
for future support to decentralisation processes; it covers aid delivery over the period 2000-2009 
taking into account the different entry points used by the European Commission (EC)/ European Union 
(EU) to deliver its support to decentralisation processes. The overall thematic evaluation is partly 
based on a number of country case studies to be carried out during the field phase and the present 
report is a summary of findings from a field visit to South Africa.1 
The field visit to South Africa had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. This note should by no means be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered foremost at the single country level, but have 
been formulated for use at the global level and are a subset of the findings using the full set of 
collected data from the desk study and the different field phase country case studies. 
The reasons for selecting South Africa as one of the field studies were: 
 The decentralisation support has increased in importance over the evaluation period. 
 Considerable amounts of funds have been giving to Local Economic Development (LED), 
which has had as key targets to enhance local governance and job creation at local levels. 
 South Africa figures as one of the top recipients of Decentralisation and Local Governance 
(DLG) support over the evaluation period.  
The field visit was undertaken between 01/06-09/06/2011. The evaluation team was composed of 
Hans Olsen and Paul Forsyth.  
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research foci 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to South Africa has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
Table 1 Research focus 
Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
Area based programmes – policy dialogue with central government 1 
Local Economic Development as key entry point 5 
Coherence between major sector interventions and decentralisation support 5-6 
Capacity building as key aspect of area based programme 6-8 
 
The main questions to pursue during the field visit are: 
1) What have been the main reasons for the specific EC/EU choice of entry points and support 
modalities (in support of decentralisation) in South Africa? Why doesn‟t EC/EU support 
mainstream decentralisation reform issues? 
2) Has the focus on LED outcomes been consistent with decentralisation and local governance 
issues and has it led to enhancement of local development planning and improved service 
delivery? 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
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Working hypotheses 
 An overview of donors reveals the widespread presence of EU partners in nearly all 
economic and social areas relevant to development. Major donors are found side by side in 
key sectors such as education, health, including the fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and 
economic development. A serious challenge for bilateral programmes faced by donors and the 
host country is that they have been too fragmented and not always well coordinated thereby 
reducing the potential impact of projects. This situation has led the EU to focus on local 
economic development and not decentralisation per se. 
 The key reform issue for the Government of South Africa is economic development and 
especially local economic development in terms of a strategy of combating the relatively high 
youth unemployment in rural areas.  
1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
development partners, as well as the overall decentralisation process in the country. This review 
concentrated on the various LED support programmes and the Ethikwini Municipal project in Durban. 
In addition to studying the documentation, the team also interviewed key informants with relevant 
knowledge on the chosen interventions, as well as informants offering broader insights into the 
evolution of the decentralisation context in the country. A host of government and donor partners 
where interviewed (see full list of people met in Annex 1). The Team also had the chance to travel to 
Kwazulu Natal Province and meet key project and programme stakeholders in Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg.  
The information deemed of critical importance was subjected to a process of triangulation to ensure 
validity and internal consistency. Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field 
phase, prioritisation was necessary and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ 
reviews/ monitoring missions that had already been undertaken. Rather the team relied extensively on 
the related reports and attempted to extract more general findings, trends and recurring themes that 
are of relevance to a broader audience. The dialogue with informants also centred around distilling 
broader lessons and themes, rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. To 
reiterate, this country note is thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of the 
overall decentralisation and local governance portfolio of the EC/EU. Rather it is an attempt to learn 
from the South Africa experience and to encourage wider reflections on how best to structure and 
focus EC/EU assistance to decentralisation processes. 
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2 Short description of the country context and EC/EU support to 
decentralisation 
2.1 Short description of decentralisation process in the country  
The South African Constitution adopted in 1996 established three levels of government: a national 
government, nine provincial governments and 284 local governments. The main aim of 
decentralisation in South Africa is to improve the efficiency of service delivery by aligning sub-national 
government expenditure with regional and local priorities. 
The Constitution defines the major functions and powers of various levels of government. Major 
functions of the national government include protection services, higher education, national roads, 
public works, water affairs, foreign and home affairs and policy functions. Provincial governments are 
responsible for school education, health, social welfare, housing and provincial roads. However, while 
provincial governments are responsible for implementation of these functions, the national government 
is responsible for policy. Moreover, with the exception of roads provinces do not have significant 
exclusive budgetary functions. Local government receives significant grant funding directly from 
central government through funds such as the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) and other 
instruments. Local authorities‟ functions consist mainly of user fee-based services such as electricity, 
water and sanitation besides provision of other public goods like municipal and household 
infrastructure, streetlights and garbage collection.  
It is important to note that the South African Constitution obliges the three levels of government to 
work cooperatively. Accordingly, numerous intergovernmental bodies, such as the Budget Council and 
the Budget Forum, have been established in order to facilitate consultation and cooperation in the 
budget process. It is also worth noting that all the public servants employed by the national and 
provincial governments have uniform terms of services and that they are highly unionized. A timeline 
of major policies and legislation is given below: 
1993 Local Government Transition Act 
1994 Democratic Elections 
1996 New Constitution 
1998 White Paper on Local Government 
1999 LED fund 
2000 Municipal Systems Act, LED Guidelines 
2002 Draft LED Policy 
2005 Policy Guidelines for Implementing LED 
2006 National Framework for LED (2006-2011) 
2007 Project Consolidate 
2009 State of Local Government in South Africa 
Report, Local Government Turnaround Strategy 
2011 Jobs Fund 
According to the analysis carried out by the Government itself in the 2009 State of Local Government 
Report there have been a number of other government initiatives and programmes to advance service 
delivery and institutional support. These include the former Planning and Implementation Management 
Support (PIMS) Centres, the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) and 
Urban Renewal Programme (URP) nodal programmes, the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) 
analysis and training weeks, the Bucket Eradication Programme, Siyenza Manje, the Ilima project (Old 
Mutual), and the donor supported Consolidated Municipal Transformation Programme (CMTP) as well 
as LED programmes. The Government also undertook a Policy Review on Provincial and Local 
Government. Numerous other smaller programmes and projects have also taken place, largely in the 
local sphere of government. 
According to the same report whilst all of the support programmes have assisted in specific ways, it is 
still clear that a number of stubborn service delivery and governance problems have been identified in 
municipalities over a number of years. These remain consistently at the forefront of government‟s 
developmental challenges. These priority areas include: 
 Huge service delivery and backlog challenges, e.g. housing, water and sanitation; 
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 Poor communication and accountability relationships with communities;  
 Problems with the political administrative interface;  
 Corruption and fraud;  
 Poor financial management, e.g. negative audit opinions; 
 Number of (violent) service delivery protests;  
 Weak civil society formations;  
 Intra- and inter-political party issues negatively affecting governance and delivery; 
 Insufficient municipal capacity due to lack of scarce skills. 
The Local Government White Paper (1998) defined some of the challenges facing municipalities and 
provided the mandate to local municipalities to deal with these challenges such as distorted settlement 
patterns, backlogs in service delivery and spatial segregation. The White Paper introduced the 
concept of “developmental local government”, defining it as: “Local government committed to working 
with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic 
and material needs, and improve the quality of their lives. [...] The powers and functions of local 
government should be exercised in a way that has a maximum impact on the social development of 
communities – in particular meeting the basic needs of the poor – and on the growth of the local 
economy”. 
The Local Government Transition Act of 1993 provided some direction to municipalities in dealing with 
these challenges by introducing the IDP process that promotes economic development and addresses 
spatial and transport planning, infrastructure development and regulation with appropriate funding 
mechanisms. 
Under the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, which replaced the Local Government Transition Act, all 
local authorities are required to prepare annual and five year Integrated Development Plans that set 
out the development targets with detailed projects and programmes. 
In 1999, the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) launched the LED Fund (LEDF) 
as part of government‟s overall poverty alleviation strategy. The Fund provided support to 
municipalities for up to Rand 1,5 million for projects that would lead to poverty alleviation and job 
creation within their localities. Municipalities would apply to the DPLG for funding of projects such as 
provision of business facilities, promotion of agro-industry, tourism initiatives, and human resource 
development programmes. The Fund failed to deliver long-term sustainable LED and resulted in a 
number of small, unsustainable projects scattered around the country. Main reasons of this failure 
have reportedly been a diffused lack of understanding of what LED was about, and some conditions 
set out in the Fund, were not conducive to sustainable economic development. Moreover, poor 
support was provided in terms of strategic guidance, interaction, monitoring and evaluation of the 
projects. This resulted in poorly thought out business plans and lack of feasibility assessments in most 
projects. It has been observed that instead of creating long-term sustainable LED, the approach often 
resulted in poorly managed projects, dependent on funds to secure a future. 
2.2 List of the major EC-funded interventions  
The evaluation team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in this specific country 
through a number of interventions. The table below summarises the major EC-funded interventions 
considered in the analysis. 
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Table 2 List of the major EC-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision Nr. 
Comment 
SA/1003/000 - Local Economic Develop. 
In Northern Province 
29,5 AFS/2001/004-712 
This was the first 
intervention in support of 
LED. Sustaining capacity 
within the provincial 
government after the 
programme appears to 
have been an issue. 
SA/1007/00 - Urban Dvp Support To The 
Ethikwini Municipality 
35 AFS/2002/004-555 
Started as project 
support, this later 
became sector support 
which enabled the 
intervention to achieve 
some sustained impact 
SA/1009/00 Local Economic Dvp Support 
Programme In Kwazulu Natal 
33,72 AFS/2002/004-557 
This has resulted in the 
development of capacity 
within provincial 
government. The 
intervention is now 
sustained and funded by 
the province 
Local Economic Development Support 
Programme in the Eastern Cape Province 
27,35 AFS/2006/018-372 
 
Transparent Local Governance - A Toolkit 1,2 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2007/019-
413 
 
Local Leadership for Growth 0,9 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2007/019-
413 
 
 
The main support from the EU in terms of local governance and decentralisation during the evaluation 
period has been the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) LED support programme, which was a six-year programme 
designed to support the provincial Department of Economic Development (DED) and a broad range of 
other stakeholders to more effectively implement LED that achieves equitable economic growth in the 
Province. Furthermore three larger interventions, namely the LED in Northern Province, the Urban 
Development Support to the Ethekwini Municipality, 2003-2008 and support to Urban Renewal 
Programme in Eastern Cape are the main support to decentralisation and local governance. Other 
minor support also focuses on local economic development and capacity building at ward level.  
A synopsis of some of the main interventions is provided below. With the exception of the Ethikwini 
Area Based Management project (which received sector support), all experienced significant problems 
in implementation because of the inflexibility of the project modalities applied by the EU2. 
Local Economic Development in Northern Province 
This was the first of the local economic development interventions directed at local level and 
coordinated and managed by the Limpopo Provincial Government. Its impacts may not have been 
sustained coherently within provincial government. However it has resulted in the creation of the 
Development Facilitation and Training Institute at the University of Limpopo, which conducts research 
and training and capacity building around local economic development. 
Local Economic Development Support Programme in Kwazulu-Natal (Gijima KZN) 
This appears to have been implemented and sustained relatively effectively by the provincial 
Department of Economic Development and Tourism. The programme generated some 4.500 jobs and 
created partnerships with the private sector (particularly in the sugar industry), and with the main 
                                                     
2
 EC Evaluation: LED Support in Limpopo Province: Final Evaluation, July 2010 and several interviews with LED 
stakeholders in KwaZulu Natal Provincial Administration in Pitermaritzburg and in Durban Municipal Council and 
Durban Chamber of Commerce.  
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financial institutions. The entire project management structure was replicated within provincial 
government, and provincial government now funds the continuation of the project. Measures to 
develop sustainable LED capacity are reflected in the diploma and postgraduate courses for officials 
developed with the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The Learning, Monitoring and Research Facility 
component of the project was not deemed to have been successful. 
Local Economic Development Support Programme in the Eastern Cape Province (Thina 
Sinako) 
The programme in the Eastern Cape has generally seen as efficiently and rapidly implemented. The 
project was coordinated by the Office of the Premier in partnership with the provincial Department of 
Economic Development & Environmental Affairs, the Eastern Cape Development Corporation, the 
Department of Local Government & Traditional Affairs, and the Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development.  
Urban Development Support to the Ethikwini Municipality (Area Based Management) 
The EU support to the Ethikwini municipality arose out of support it provided to the Cato Manor 
informal settlement project spanning a period of about 10 years. This led to thinking around an Area 
Based Management approach for the provision of services, infrastructure, the development of 
capacity, and the deepening of democracy. It was started as a typical EU project, but later became a 
sector support to the Ethikwini (Durban) Municipality. The project was seen as successful and that 
Area Based Management interventions had made significant impact in providing access to services. 
The experience of the project was such that the city has internalized the approach. 
Expanding and Strengthening Community Based Participation in Local Government (CBP) – 
Development of Ward Committees 
The project was aimed at developing Ward Committees in all 283 municipalities in the country. It 
entailed capacity building of Ward Committees in 3,895 wards resulting in the training of some 42,000 
people on the functioning of local government and making the voice of communities heard at local 
level. The national Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) 
implemented the project. Training was aligned with national accredited qualifications standards.  
A detailed list is provided in Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs  
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporates decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national stakeholders in 
partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international donors 
 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 1.3.1:  
The staff of the EUD stated that EU policy statement and documents are clear on support areas within 
decentralisation and local governance but have not necessarily been actively used in the SA context. 
This is due to the Government of South Africa (GoSA) that does not support decentralisation as a 
development term but rather use local government development in the context of a unitary state where 
the central government retains greater leverage over service delivery. The current staff at the EUD 
dealing with LED are either specialists in LED or private sector specialists and therefore not 
necessarily with much experience or knowledge of DLG issues also within the EC system. However, 
Sector Budget Support (SBS) to decentralisation through the Area Based Management and 
Development Programme (ABMDP) in Durban has been used successfully and also for LED in line 
with GoSA policies has been extensively supported. 
Ind 1.3.2:  
The Team discussed the issue with several donor representatives also having experience from other 
countries. It was generally found that the EU approach to decentralisation and local governance has 
developed rapidly over the past 10 years and that policy documents are clear enough.   
Ind 1.3.3:  
The EU policy guidance has supported decentralisation through its various programmes, whether 
through sector support or through individual projects. Between 2000 and around 2006 this was mainly 
because there was a natural harmony between the policies of the South African government and the 
EU. The 1998 White Paper of Local Government was explicit in its policy on decentralisation and used 
the term clearly and explicitly to define the role of local government which resonated well with the EU‟s 
concept of decentralization of support. However, by around 2006 it was becoming increasingly clear 
that local government was in crisis. At the political level and at national government there were 
increasingly assertive interventions at local level by central government. By 2009 the National 
Framework for Local Economic Development in South Africa 2006 – 2011 appears to have been all 
but abandoned. Apartheid local government consisted of over 1.200 racially based local authorities. 
Local government was transformed in two phases: In 1995, 843 transitional municipalities were 
created. The second phase, in 2000, was characterized by the incorporation of urban and rural areas, 
reducing the number of local municipalities to 284 (47 Districts, 6 Metros, 231 Local Municipalities). 
Each municipality has to develop a 5-year IDP, which guides all investments at local level. 
3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
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3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing with 
sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) or 
disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.1.1:  
In the context of classical projects, the very limited flexibility of some procedures and rules for 
contracting continues to seriously hamper the quality of overall reform implementation, detracting from 
a results-oriented approach. To avoid micro-management, an appropriate balance needs to be found 
between procedures that safeguard the EC‟s financial interests/fair competition and the need to 
facilitate the smooth implementation of projects with the necessary flexibility. In particular, the rigidity 
of Financing Agreements (often drafted some years before the implementation actually starts) 
prevents EUD staff from adapting implementation modalities to field realities and focusing on results. 
This was a constant theme in discussions with partner organisations.  
Ind 2.1.2:  
The Mission was informed that frequent meetings internally in the EUD coordinates and exchanges 
information from various sectors. 
Ind 2.1.3:  
There is no specific unit for decentralisation in the South African EUD. The Government is not keen on 
the word decentralisation for historical reasons and therefore the EUD has focused on LED activities. 
However, up to 3 programme staff deal with LED projects/programmes and attend various donor 
meetings on behalf of EUD in both the economic and governance clusters.  
Ind 2.1.4:  
N/A 
3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.2.1:  
As mentioned above the EUD has had a number of staff dealing with LED and local development over 
the period – maybe 2-3 at any given time. The turnover of EUD staffs every two or three years means 
that institutional knowledge is not always retained. 
Ind 2.2.2:  
There seems to be good knowledge and understanding of local development issues with the staff met. 
During the evaluation period a number of staff in the EUD has been occupied with rural development 
projects, area based municipal projects, LED projects and capacity building projects all focusing on 
the local levels. However, the Government has never had an overall support programme for 
decentralisation, as it is a sensitive area and one jealously guarded from too much donor influence. 
This means that the EUD has first and foremost concentrated on LED as a vehicle for local 
development.  
Ind 2.2.3:  
None of the staff met had had any training in DLG issues and they had no information on this issue of 
the staff pre-2008/9 when they joined the EUD in South Africa. 
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3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) or 
systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, issues 
papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote the 
effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 2.3.1:  
Engagement with other donors has been frequent and at times more in-depth than at the moment; 
however, not in the Decentralisation Working Group but rather under the Governance Working Group. 
Therefore very little, if any, joint Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems have been implemented, 
and mainly M&E linked to individual donor supported projects/programmes. However, under the 
General Budget Support (GBS) there is a common results framework and indicators.  
Ind 2.3.2:  
Sharing of information across the various sectors is often done at the weekly management meetings 
and also during frequent evaluation, assessment and review mission from headquarters or through 
missions.  
Ind 2.3.3:  
There was no evidence at all of any “drivers of change” agents in the EUD fro DLG issues. The LED 
focal points were however very active and knowledgeable on the issue in South Africa.  
3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies? 
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational procedures 
related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds to 
LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant Country Strategy Paper (CSP) sections on decentralisation and 
local governance 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.1.1:  
There is no evidence of EC/EU documentation from the period in question regarding deeper analysis 
of the DLG area. However, this can also be explained from the mere fact that the Government itself 
has good documentation and analysis of the situation throughout this period, and the decision to put a 
lot of funds into LED was and is based on it being a top priority of the Government.   
Ind 3.1.2:  
The choice of entry points and aid delivery methods have been appropriate to national contexts and 
have developed over time from project to programme and now in the form of SBS also (ABM, LED and 
Employment etc), and these are therefore increasingly aligned to national procedures and transfer 
mechanism. Especially the experience with SBS in Durban Municipal Council was a positive one, 
which gave the Council the funds for implementing local development in their strategic areas in a 
flexible way and very much aligned to their own IDP. This was done after the programme had started 
in a very traditional project modality, and with lots of implementation problems especially with EC/EU 
demands for constant reporting and auditing in its own formats. It took quite some changing to rewrite 
the programme mid-term and introduce SBS into the programme.  
Ind 3.1.3:  
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All indications are that the quality of dialogue between the EUD and Government and beneficiaries is 
intense and of high quality when it comes to LED. However, since decentralisation is NOT considered 
a discussion point this is also not taken up with the GoSA in policy discussion forums by EUD staff.   
Ind 3.1.4:  
There are references in the CSP to local development and especially LED issues but also in general 
to local governance issues.  
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as “How should existing interventions best evolve?” are addressed 
in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.2.1:  
As mentioned above, the approaches and entry points have changed over time according to the 
national context and increasingly been driven by the need for national implementing agents to have 
more flexibility and control over the funding and results.  
Ind 3.2.2:  
There was no evidence found of this in the documentation reviewed.  
3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support decentralisation 
and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme to 
be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as “When 
and how to use sector budget support?” or “what are the risks related to the”) are addressed in 
project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid delivery 
methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.3.1:  
The following is an extract from an External Assistance Monitoring Report (EAMR) report of 2006: In 
2005 all disbursement targets on SBS were fulfilled. This modality certainly increases the efficiency of 
the work of the Delegation.  However, new skills not previously required by Delegation project officers 
will need to be acquired.  Furthermore, the learning process in many South African (SA) departments 
is slow and considerable effort needs to be made in the initial stages to come to a common 
understanding. Close contact with the thematic support unit on budget support (BS) in EuropeAid Co-
operation Office (AIDCO) is therefore necessary.  This clearly demonstrates that the EUD is constantly 
trying to adapt its approaches to the national context and the problems faced.  
Ind 3.3.2:  
No examples of this were found during the mission.  
Ind 3.3.3:  
Same as 3.3.1 above.  
Ind 3.3.4:  
These kinds of assessments are made continuously in the EAMR reports.  
3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of the 
role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 3.4.1:  
The EC/EU response strategies in the area of local government/DLG have been aligned with national 
policies but not a very significant support in terms of DLG per se but more in LED. The partners are 
responding to Governments' priorities / activities under the various GoSA policies and strategies and 
Public Financial Management (PFM) capacity building all of which EUD support to some degree. The 
focus is on service delivery and job creation at local level and this challenge is what the EUD has 
responded to. The various actors and their relative capacity is analysed and presented in the various 
documents.  
Ind 3.4.2:  
The EUD has chosen to work with both national and provincial administration to introduce LED. This is 
the right entry point for DLG issues. LGs have also been the recipients of this support through the 
programme funding but it‟s the provincial authorities that work directly with the LGs. The focus on 
funds for districts on Area Based Management and LED was good but alignment to national 
procedures was difficult (lack of robust M&E systems, auditing and procurement requirements). 
3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarities 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance issues 
among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor approaches, 
when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.1.1:  
To set the ground for the conceptual discussion among stakeholders, the EUD launched a number of 
preparatory studies in areas likely to become “focal” in 2005/6: the economic cluster, the social cluster, 
and human rights/governance, the latter two including the burning issues of service delivery capacity 
at local level. The first one of these studies, on the economic cluster, was delivered in November 
2005, and the other ones were delivered during the first quarter of 2006.  All studies were validated 
during workshops with Development Partners (DPs), GoSA and others partners including non-state 
actors. This is just an example of the analytical work carried out by the EUD but there seems to be 
frequent exchange and interaction between key stakeholders.   
Ind 4.1.2:  
N/A 
Ind 4.1.3:  
The six EU+ Working groups (S&T, health, education, employment, governance, housing) have 
ensured a platform for exchange of information and sharing of good practices between main partners 
(EU and non EU incl. UN system, World Bank etc). The EUD has encouraged regular participation of 
lead departments in those groups. This means that the EUD has often taken the lead in coordination 
and complementarities of donor interventions also in the DLG field, which has fallen under the 
Governance working group.  
Ind 4.1.4:  
N/A 
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3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarities between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and other 
donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finance decentralisation programmes with Members States and major donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes and 
policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.2.1:  
Donor coordination and division of labour is there but no specific sector-working group on 
decentralisation/local governance. It falls under both Governance and Economic Cluster groups. 
GoSA is not keen on usage of decentralisation as concept – it prefers local government and the 3 
spheres of government (Unity principal). On aid effectiveness, the dialogue between Government and 
donors on the follow up to the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) has continued with several meetings 
in 2009. Development partners are encouraging Government to take forward the AAA through a 
national action plan for 2010 onwards. South Africa has been co-chairing (together with Germany) the 
Cluster C working group on aid effectiveness in the OECD DAC. A recent Mid-Term Review (MTR) of 
CSP/MIP examined aid effectiveness and EU coordination issues and concluded that there is good 
complementarity and improving division of labour between EC/EU and member states programmes. It 
was also in this connection recommended that donors should maintain a judicious mix of budget 
support and project based approaches at EU level, seeking stronger dialogue at EU level on poverty 
reduction, in particular with the new Government. 
Ind 4.2.2-4:  
N/A 
3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors such 
as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment into 
decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 4.3.1:  
Sector budget support programmes receive more and more attention due to their increasing 
dominance within the portfolio of the development programme. In South Africa, these need to be 
designed and implemented in an innovative and tailor-made manner. In general, the Government of 
South Africa provides sound sector policies and a public finance management level that certainly fulfils 
criteria normally set for sector budget support. Challenges lay in policy dialogue, additionality and 
donor co-operation. All the newer SBS programmes follow fully the EC/EU guidelines and foresee 
fixed and variable, performance based tranches. EUD support to local development processes is 
generally coherent with other (sector and GBS) activities, and is given more prominence in support to 
LED and employment creation but challenges exist. The harmonisation of donor activities is now more 
clearly prominent but still long way to go in terms of joint action plans and linkages between sectors 
and local economic development. 
Ind 4.3.2:  
Since there is no decentralisation support programme, it obviously doesn‟t address these issues but 
the LED programmes do encourage that project proposals for LED support submitted by local 
governments do contain gender specific information as well as an assessment of the environmental 
impacts of the economic activity being proposed.  
Ind 4.3.3:  
National Treasury maintains indicators aligned on GBS aligned to national policy 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - South Africa; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
13 
3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to implement 
decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.1.1:  
There is no doubt about the quality of the national policies and strategies in the DLG field and that the 
GoSA has its own strategies in this field. The Government has ample capacity to formulate these. 
What is lacking is the capacity and will to implement certain key policies throughout the country. The 
EC/EU has not contributed any substantive analysis. 
Ind 5.1.2:  
The national governmental systems are there in the unity government set-up – national, provincial and 
local government levels and while capacities at local government level often are relatively weak, there 
is no lack of capacity at provincial and central government levels. The EC/EU supported 
Strengthening Local Governments in Mpumalanga and Northern Province. This programme 
came to an end in September 2005. The evaluation showed that the programme delivered tangible 
results at the level of municipalities but it was not sufficiently integrated into the implementing 
department (dept of local government and housing). This programme is an example of the challenge 
to find good implementation structures in the crucial area of local government through central 
departments.  
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.2.1:  
The national constitution provides a very clear framework for the decentralisation of powers and 
provides a development mandate for local government. The Municipal Systems Act of 2000 provides 
the legislative framework for oversight, control and accountability for local government. The 2006 
national framework for local economic development provides sound and clear policy and guidelines in 
respect of the role of local government. The constitution, legislation, policy frameworks and guidelines 
provide clear guidance and supporting mechanisms for the decentralisation process. The issue is not 
the lack of legislation or policy frameworks in support of decentralisation, but rather the capacity at 
provincial, and particularly at local level, to give effect to the framework. Provincial government is not 
always able to provide the bridge between national policy and local level implementation. There may 
be a role for institutional support outside of government that bridges this divide in respect of 
implementation. The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) does provide this role to a 
certain extent, but in other ways is constrained by its direct accountability to national government. No 
major support in this area from the EC.  
Ind 5.2.2:  
South Africa is strong on legislation and policy in respect of local development / decentralisation. The 
overall framework is clear and coherent. There is a high level of alignment between national and 
provincial government. As noted above, the ability of local government to implement in terms of the 
legislative and policy frameworks is constrained. The EC/EU has not been active in supporting the 
development of the policy framework.  
3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
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 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total public 
expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes and 
increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.3.1:  
Local government has developed significantly since 2000. The Municipal Systems Act of 2000 
provided clear guidelines to local government. This saw the appointment of staff at local government 
level to planning functions around the mandatory IDPs, and to local economic development through 
the appointment of LED managers and officers in most municipalities. The issue is not always that 
human resources are available, but that these resources are sufficiently competent and skilled, and 
that they have the material resources to effect implementation of plans. The EC/EU contribution has 
been indirect through mainly the LED programmes and the focus on enhancing the numbers and skills 
of the human resources at local level.   
Ind 5.3.2:  
The Division of Revenue Act provides for the equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the 
national, provincial and local spheres of government. The Municipal Infrastructure Grant supplements 
the funding of infrastructure programmes funded from municipal budgets to enable municipalities to 
address backlogs in municipal infrastructure required for the provision of basic services. Other 
instruments include the Integrated Housing and Human Settlement Development Grant, the Integrated 
National Electrification Programme Grant, and others. All transfer is worked out according to a 
formula, and all allocations made must be included in municipal Integrated Development Plans. The 
Development Bank of Southern Africa provides loan and development financing to local government. 
In respect of financial sustainability, key challenges faced by municipalities often relate to the size of 
the tax base and their ability to collect revenue. In rural areas the tax base is usually very low. A 
number of municipalities have negligible revenue bases and are not sustainable without direct 
transfers. The EC/EU supported Local Government Toolkit explains the functioning of local 
government and provides tools for community members to help them engage substantively with local 
government. Likewise the Ward Capacity Building Project trained Ward Committee members around 
the functioning of local government in an effort to stimulate bottom-up participation. 
Box 1 Fiscal Decentralisation  
South Africa compares well with other developing economies regarding expenditure 
responsibilities and autonomy of Sub National Governments (SNGs). Sub-national expenditure in 
developing countries rose from 12.7 per cent of total public expenditure in 1980 to 19.6 percent in 
1998 (Shah and Thompson 2004). Similarly, education spending by SNGs increased from 21 per 
cent of total public sector education expenditure in 1980 to 40 percent in 2000 while health 
expenditure increased from 22 per cent in 1980 to 57 percent in 1999. Although the trends vary 
widely across countries, there are areas of shared responsibilities among central and sub-
national governments in almost all countries. On average expenditure autonomy, i.e. percentage 
of sub-national expenditure financed from own-source revenue, in developing countries was 58 
per cent in 2000. 
Provincial governments‟ revenue amounts to about 50 per cent of total public sector revenue in 
South Africa. But on average 96 per cent of provincial revenue is in the form of transfers from the 
national government to provinces. Approximately 70 per cent of the transfers (in 2002-2004) are 
in the form of equitable share and the rest conditional grants. Tax receipts represented on 
average 49 per cent of own-source (and 2 per cent of total) provincial revenue during 2001-2004. 
Main taxes include Casino taxes, motor vehicles licenses and horseracing. Other sources of own 
revenue include sale of goods and services, sales of capital assets, fines, penalties and forfeits, 
interest and dividends and financial transactions in assets and liabilities. 
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that are 
discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in human resource management (HRM): the extent to which LGs 
can hire and fire or otherwise manage personnel. 
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 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local governments 
degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 5.4.1:  
In principle, the local governments only have limited autonomy on local revenue as these only 
constitute about 3-4% of local budgets and the rest being transfers from central government. EC/EU 
has not contributed to enhancing powers and functions of LGs but to some degree to increased 
resources for local governance, services and infrastructure investments. Some smaller municipality 
structures still weak but improvements have been seen from the administrative reform onwards. 
Ind 5.4.2:  
The right to hire and fire rests with LGs in South Africa and HRM is the responsibility of the various 
levels of government.  
Ind 5.4.3:  
The various levels of government are clearly spelt out in the Constitution and other legislation and the 
principle is the unitary form of government with clear top-down approach to governance and less 
devolution.  
3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and reform 
implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & civil society organisation - CSO) that capacities of key 
central government bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation have 
improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of M&E system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.1.1:  
There is no doubt that sufficient capacities exist within the government but the EC/EU has not worked 
on this level with these issues during the evaluation period.  
Ind 6.1.2:  
The perception is that the central government is capable and has resources for policy formulation. The 
big issue in South Africa is the service delivery in marginalised local governments and the apparent 
non-success of the African National Congress (ANC) government to effectively reduce the service 
delivery gaps that exist not only between urban and rural municipalities but also the inherited income 
disparities.  
Ind 6.1.3:  
Generally speaking the M&E situation in LGs is much weaker than within the central and provincial 
governments. However, PFM has improved both centrally and locally over the past 10 years and 
central government M&E of LGs has also strengthened. This work has been supported by the EC/EU 
but mainly under the PFM support to the National Treasury.  
Ind 6.1.4:  
N/A 
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
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 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local  
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of information 
produced at local level 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.2.1:  
The Delegation (with support of an international team of experts) initiated and implemented jointly with 
National Treasury a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessment for South Africa.  
Using the internationally agreed methodology this assignment was conducted in 2008.  This was the 
first Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment undertaken in the country, 
which focused on the current status of the PFM system on national / central government level.  The 
SA PFM system was found on the whole to be approaching best international practice. Weaknesses 
were identified in relation to public procurement, accounting for tax arrears and reporting from front-
line service providers and especially at LG levels. In addition, the report highlighted the poor 
predictability of donor flows and weaknesses in mutual accountability. The PEFA initiative furthermore 
served as a platform for the re-launch of focused dialogue between the Government and donors going 
beyond PFM. High quality PFM is a key determinant in delivery of cost-effective social services. A 
MTR of the ongoing PFM Improvement programme found that the programme is delivering good 
results in terms of the development of diagnostic tools and capacity building in areas such as 
budgeting, internal control and risk management. Pilots have also been conducted with a view to 
rolling out PFM improvements in provinces and municipalities. Human resource capacity weaknesses 
particularly at the lower levels of Government present a formidable challenge. Government has now 
embarked on a 'clean audit 2014' campaign so as to focus attention on the task ahead. The mid-term 
review of the Water and Sanitation Programme known as Masibambane III concluded that EC/EU 
support had been highly effective in assisting Government to reduce the backlog of water and 
sanitation service provision at local government level. Some 90% of poor households now benefit from 
free basic water provision.  
Ind 6.2.2:  
The EC/EU and other donors have focused a lot of attention on increased capacity at local level in 
planning and especially through the LED programmes. Municipalities are required by law to produce 
annual IDPs. Release of funding is contingent on these plans. These now include local economic 
development plans. These are subject to review and evaluation by central government. The EC/EU 
has supported the development of this planning capacity through the Education and Training Unit 
(ETU) Local Government Toolkit, the Capacity Building Grant (CBP) Ward Committee capacity 
development. The three provincial LED programmes provided support for the development of IDPs, 
LED plans, and other planning initiatives at local government level.  
Ind 6.2.3:  
The availability of suitable skilled and qualified personnel at local level is a continuing problem. There 
are HR systems, procedures and guidelines. Annual Auditor-General audits monitor HR appointments 
as well as financial matters. The effectiveness of HRM may not be monitored. While the EC/EU has 
not worked directly with HRM issues at local government level there has been support to HR issues 
both through training of councillors at ward level and through larger sector programmes, which were 
not reviewed during the mission. EC/EU support has meant training at LG level for planning, LED and 
other issues – concepts and procedures in terms of participation, planning and management of the 
collective and individual initiatives. EC/EU focused on PFM training through Treasury.  EC/EU support 
ABM and LED has had significant impact on capacities at municipal levels but often the capacity 
building was not sustainable due to usage of contract based staff who leave when contract terminated. 
Ind 6.2.4:  
Municipal IQ is a national monitoring system for local government which provides high level indicators 
of municipal performance and flags vulnerable municipalities. At local level the collection and analysis 
of data for monitoring and evaluation purposes is often weak. Such systems exist in the metropolitan 
areas and in some of the larger municipalities. Within the smaller and rural municipalities such 
systems are often entirely lacking. No EC/EU support on this subject was found.  
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
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 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 6.3.1:  
SALGA is a well functioning and quite large association with capacity to work in a unified and 
concerted way to advocate for DLG issues. It is however dominated by ANC and therefore doesn‟t 
have a clear independent profile in political terms. EC/EU has been working with SALGA in terms of 
the LED strategy and implementation issues but not through a formalised support programme. SALGA 
has technical assistance (TA) from German Development Assistance (GIZ) among others.   
Ind 6.3.2:  
Governance is a very broad description of a number of different sub-sectors – human rights and 
democracy, legislatures and representation justice, safety and security. Current EC/EU programmes 
focus on the first areas, involving government/state institutions as well as civil society actors. For the 
future it is intended to continue in theses fields and to this end the modalities and methods of working 
are under discussion. In the 2009 the EUD itself noted: “Negative sentiments about EC aid were 
provoked as a consequence of major recovery orders against both public entities (critical press 
coverage) and CSO’s (EC procedures perceived as anti-developmental). While it should be said that 
the major recovery orders have in the main been issued against older projects designed pre-2000 and 
to a lesser extent pre-2005, it is becoming urgent to restore the EC’s image notably with civil society. 
The Delegation will devise capacity building initiatives for, inter alia, civil society organizations and 
engage in more regular coaching of partners, for example, on procurement and financial reporting 
issues, as soon as the Finance and Contract section of the Delegation has been strengthened.”3 
Ind 6.3.3:  
South Africa has a very active and vibrant research community (especially a number of first class 
universities) also supported by the EC. Historically, much of the findings based on local research have 
been directed at national level in an effort to influence national policy. 
3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.1.1:  
Local government elections have existed since 1994 and supported by EC/EU through overall election 
support. The most recent elections in May 2011 highlighted service delivery problems. Elections are 
held under the jurisdiction of the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) and have been deemed to 
be free and fair. 
Ind 7.1.2:  
The EC/EU has been supporting a ward capacity building project over the recent years focusing on 
increased transparency, accountability and participatory planning processes. EC/EU support to 
increased local participation in local development planning was clearly an aim of ABMDP support and 
to some degree achieved as the priority to further develop capacities at local level. There is often a 
tension between planning on the part of officials, and participation. Political interference in the part of 
elected (and paid) party councillors is a feature of municipal life. The fact that Ward Committee 
members are paid a stipend in an environment where resources are scarce may also contribute to the 
maintenance of a party patronage system. 
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens 
(notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards etc) 
                                                     
3
 External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) 2009. 
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Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.2.1:  
South Africa experiments with all these service delivery and accountability mechanisms such as 
citizen report cards and Service Charters. Obviously the press in South Africa is more free and fair 
than in many other parts of Africa, and an active reporting on service delivery riots and misuse of local 
funds is reported and analysed.  
3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) provided 
to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 7.3.1:  
The emphasis on enhancing PFM capacity of national, regional and local level is a priority of EUD 
support within the governance sectors (PFM capacity remains weak at local level). Local accountability 
of local governments still weak – involvement in this area is very weak as most are focused on service 
delivery and not advocacy. Increased transparency in fund allocation is evident in terms of SBS and 
contributions to local budgets. How much the larger population shares this is not clear. Fund utilisation 
and accounting of these has increased considerably over the evaluation period also driven by EC/EU 
rules and regulations. The National Treasury is a very strong and powerful organisation that – 
supported by Department for International Development (DFID) and EC/EU – is very active in setting 
formula for transfers to provincial and local governments.  
Ind 7.3.2:  
There is a clear system for the division and allocation of revenue from national Treasury to local 
government. The Division of Revenue Act, and the Municipal Systems Act, guide this division. Annual 
audits by the Auditor-General are mandatory. The performance of municipalities is reflected upon 
within national parliament and within provincial parliaments. Data is respect of financial transfers 
allocations and use are publically available at local government council meetings, online on 
government websites, and through the media. The extent to which the public at large is aware of or 
able to analyse this information is however unclear. The EC/EU has been active in giving TA to the 
National Treasury but mainly for PFM issues.  
3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) in 
local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.1.1:  
Eliminating backlogs in basic service and infrastructure delivery is a South African national priority. 
While much has been achieved, many remain without basic municipal services in water and sanitation, 
solid waste removal, electricity connection, and provision of housing. Improved governance has 
increased the availability of government and donor funding. There are three broad streams of national 
transfers to local government: the equitable share as well as infrastructure and current transfers 
(conditional grants). According to Treasury's 2005 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement the 
equitable share in 2005/06 comprised R10578 million, infrastructure grants R6130 million and capacity 
building and restructuring grants R749 million (see Table 5). The percentage of transfers in total 
municipal budgets (or rather: the dependency rates) varies enormously: from 92% in 
Bohlabela/Bushbuckridge (Limpopo) to 3% in Cape Town (Western Cape). 
Ind 8.1.2:  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - South Africa; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
19 
During the period 2000 to 2009 considerable thought and application has been devoted on how to 
provide services to deprived communities and to address the backlogs that exist. The overall 
approach has been to target and direct service delivery by decentralising responsibilities to local 
government. A variety of instruments have been developed including the Municipal Systems Act, the 
Integrated Development Plan, the Municipal Infrastructure Grant, etc. The purpose of IDP is to foster 
more appropriate service delivery by providing the framework for all public resources of the three 
spheres of government behind common goals and within a framework of municipal support. While the 
framework is in place, getting it work effectively and efficiently remains a challenge. Interventions such 
as Project Consolidate in 2006/7 that targeted specific ailing and failing municipalities are evidence of 
persistent and pervasive capacity weaknesses at local level despite targeted interventions and 
support. Provincial budgets totalled R 215,2 billion in 2005/06, comprising national transfers of R 
209,3 billion (97,3% of total provincial revenue) and own revenue of R 5,9 billion. The equitable share 
allocation is divided among provinces using a redistributive formula. The current structure of the 
formula contains an education share (51%, based on the size of the school-age population (5-17) and 
the average number of learners (grade R to 12) enrolled in public ordinary schools for the past three 
years), a health share (26%, based on the proportion of the population with and without access to 
medical aid), a basic share (14%, derived from each province's share of the total population of the 
country), an institutional component (5%, divided equally among the provinces), a poverty component 
(3%, reinforcing redistribution in the formula) and an economic output component (1%) or proxy for 
revenue raising capacity based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by region data. The formula is 
reviewed and updated every year with new data, taking into account the recommendations of the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). 
Ind 8.1.3:  
National Treasury produced details guidelines and procedures for the establishment of Public-Private 
Partnerships. These were aimed at large partnerships, were onerous and meant that such 
partnerships were slow to emerge. At local level the concept of public-private partnerships is a 
relatively new concept. The EUD support local economic development programmes in Limpopo, 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape made funding available contingent on the establishment of 
partnerships. Partnerships were imposed on beneficiaries. Often these proved to be flags of 
convenience to secure funding, while the weaker partner did not always benefit. It has not been 
possible to quantify the extent to which weaker partners have been empowered. Many partnerships 
did not appear sustainable. However, in the instances where such partnerships were established (e.g. 
with the sugar industry in KwaZulu-Natal), they have yielded positive results, mainly in job creation 
and the sustaining of small enterprises.4 
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.2.1:  
In 2002 the Institution of Municipal Engineering of Southern Africa (IMESA) undertook a survey of 
municipal infrastructure maintenance and found that South African authorities compare unfavourably 
with the international benchmarks in respect of strategic planning, asset accounting, and planning and 
making financial provision for improvement of infrastructure. A 2007 report by the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) found that in respect of financial planning and management 
many municipalities do not have even the basics in place, and there are gross shortcomings in 
maintenance policies and practice; and that there is a wide range of capacity and competence 
between these two extremes can be found in municipalities. 
Table 3 Municipalities capital projects vs. operations in 2003/2004 
 Percentage of total budgets 
Municipalities Operating Capital 
Metros  84,4% 15,6% 
Local and district  75,1% 24,9% 
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 Interview with key LED focal points in KwaZulu Natal Province.  
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All municipalities  80,6% 19,4% 
 
The report asserted that for the typical impoverished municipality, basic levels of water services have 
been provided, "subsequent lack of maintenance coupled with no control over the high levels of 
informal connections means that the majority of these schemes are no longer capable of providing a 
consistent daily basic water supply". It concluded that "at least 90” of these municipalities are not 
going to be able to provide services to their indigent communities without considerable financial 
support from national government. 
Ind 8.2.2:   
In many municipalities knowledge of even the extent and capacity of the infrastructure assets they 
possess can be patchy and unreliable. Many municipalities are not conforming to the requirements of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), Municipal Systems Act and other legislation that 
requires them to ensure that adequate provision is made for the long-term maintenance of their 
infrastructure assets. For example, in respect of electricity, no comprehensive national data on the 
condition and age of infrastructure exists. This makes maintenance at municipal level difficult. Similarly 
in respect of water reticulation it is estimated that losses due to lack of maintenance amount to about 
30% of supply.  Much of the finance for municipal infrastructure is provided by national government 
through the Municipal Infrastructure Grants. Trends indicate that between 2000 and 2008 
municipalities have not shown any marked progress in construction, maintenance and repairs of basic 
infrastructure5. 
3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for vulnerable 
groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 8.3.2 Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Ind 8.3.1:  
Service delivery improvements at LG level more centrally driven than locally – earmarking and 
programme approach in sectors. However, KZN visit shows some considerable improvements in 
serviced delivery through EC/EU supported ABMDP and LED initiatives (see the slides below for 
details). Figure 2 below gives details of the EUD supported LED programme in KwaZulu Natal and 
that over 90% of the projects have targeted improved service delivery. Table 4 also shows a strong 
link between LED investments and economic development in terms of multiplier effects on the local 
economy and a possible value added in economic terms for both rural and urban areas.  
                                                     
5 Jaya Josie, The Intergovernmental Context of Municipal Infrastructure Grants in South Africa (School 
of Government University of the Western Cape April 2008) 
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Figure 1 Total Estimated Value of LED Projects per Target 
 
Source: P Forsyth, Analysis of expenditure for the EU funded eThekwini Municipality Area Based Management 
Programme 2003-2008 (2009) 
Table 4 Gijima Programme Outcomes 
Gijima investment 
through direct grants 
Notional ‘strong’ 
multiplier effect 
Expected economic 
leakage out of rural 
areas 
Possible economic 
value added 
R129 million 2.5 40% R65 million 
Source: Gijima KZN, Report on the Performance of Gijima KZN against the Logical Framework 2005 to 2010 (July 
2010) – www.gijimakzn.org.za 
Ind 8.3.2:  
Since the provision of basic services is a main responsibility of sub-national government in South 
Africa, public finances emphasize budget spending towards the provision of these services. The 
national 2005 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) states that sub-national governments 
play a key role in the progressive realization of rights and the addressing of vulnerability and inequality 
through the improved delivery of basic social services. Public spending on education, health, welfare, 
housing and other social services now makes up about 60% of consolidated non-interest expenditure, 
which means an increase of 7% within one decade. On the provincial and local level, service provision 
is mainly financed through the equitable share allocations. The formulas for both, provincial and local 
equitable share take into account poverty aspects. Provinces spend nearly 82% of their total 
expenditure on social services, in particular in the fields of education, health, welfare, housing and 
community development as well as public works, roads and transport. The key priorities for local 
government include the provision of free basic services (water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal) 
to households not able to pay user charges, tackling backlogs in municipal infrastructure, job creation 
R 32.701.531; 1%
R 10.363.844; 1%
R 7.344.601; 0%
R 2.145.232.447; 93%
R 116.748.171; 5%
Total estimated value of projects
1. Different approaches to ABM operationalised and tested 
2. Enhanced capacity of ABM managers, municipal managers, staff, councillors, communities, and other 
stakeholders to play respective roles in ABM 
3. Democratic processes deepened  
4. Service delivery improved  
5. Economic development enhanced  
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via the Expanded Public Works Programme and the improvement of service delivery and sustainable 
financial management6. 
                                                     
6
 Anka Derichs, Christiane Einfeldt: World bank Seminar – Fiscal Decentralisation and Intergovernmental 
Relations in South Africa, January 2006 
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4 Conclusions concerning the hypotheses to be tested in the field 
phase and main challenges to be discussed in the synthesis 
phase 
 What have been the main reasons for the specific EC/EU choice of entry points and 
support modalities (in support of decentralisation) in South Africa? Why doesn’t EC/EU 
support mainstream decentralisation reform issues? 
South Africa is in the process of administrative restructuring in the post-apartheid period, as the 
severe levels of inequality remain one of the archetypical characteristics. Local government 
development is the preferred term as decentralisation is seen as too politically loaded an expression 
(meaning that ANC guards its central powers and sees stronger opposition held municipalities as a 
long term threat to that power base). Regarding LED, South Africa has an advanced legal and policy 
context and nearly 15 years of experience in that field. Indeed, LED has a very high profile in the 
country. In retrospect, the contribution of all those projects is – as broadly agreed by the stakeholders 
interviewed – not that impressive but with some impact seen especially in the KwaZulu Natal 
programme.  
The strategy for national planning is just being designed at the top political level. Until now there has 
not been a coherent framework overarching the sectoral approaches in the country and this has to 
some degree hampered e.g. initiatives like LED. There is a large variety of planning mechanisms and 
sectoral policies, most of them of high quality, but they lack synergies and a clear vision of what 
should regional/local-planning lead to if properly done and integrated.  
EC/EU interventions in 3 provinces is clearly oriented to Local Economic Development (using a grant 
approach) as an instrument for development and management. The EC/EU is currently financing 
many projects related to regional development in the country. The programmes aim at improving 
service delivery and access to economic opportunities, capacity building and governance of different 
stakeholders. They combine programme-led infrastructure development, both communications (roads) 
and facilities, and service provision improvements. In Eastern Cape, the focus is on LED together with 
civil participation through the empowerment of rural stakeholders to use the Integrated Development 
Planning process to select programmes that address their priorities.  
At first sight the description of the LED programmes financed by the EC/EU is striking in terms of the 
similarities they share with the overall objectives pursued by EC/EU Regional Policy in terms of trying 
to reconcile growth, cohesion, competitiveness and employment, but also in terms of the 
decentralisation policies and the subsidiarity principle. Their big question arises in terms of how far 
you can go as a donor (to promote an impact in national policies) if those local interventions are not 
transcending their limited policy sphere. There seems to be a political debate now, which emphasises 
the need for greater coherence between various administrative levels and sector policies and 
development.  
One issue, which was pointed out, is that there is a need to institutionalize LED approaches, tools and 
instruments, which are, for the moment, far too much inward looking, isolated, not sustainable and not 
integrated within regional development plans. This would enable a move away from the more isolated 
project focus to programme focus on a longer time perspective, and to focus on key lessons learned in 
the more successful regions.  
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Figure 2 Jobs Created by Economic Sector in KwaZulu Natal LED Programme 
 
Source: Gijima KZN, Report on the Performance of Gijima KZN against the Logical Framework 2005 to 2010 (July 
2010) – www.gijimakzn.org.za 
 Has the focus on LED outcomes been consistent with decentralisation and local 
governance issues and has it led to enhancement of local development planning and 
improved service delivery? 
A national LED framework has been put in place but remains theoretical and does not provide either 
accurate guidelines concerning the projected minimum contents of a LED strategy for local 
municipalities nor adequate policy documents. LED was never designed to be the vehicle for overall 
improvement of LGs‟ functioning nor for regional development or planning innovations. However, it 
has been a consistent reply from the EUD to the economic and developmental challenges facing 
South African local governments. This raises questions in regard to the expected role of LG: should 
municipalities become the implementing agents of projects associated with a LED framework or 
should they rather create the enabling environment through planning tools at their disposal (such as 
incentives, land use rights, specific services)?  
The figure above shows that jobs have been created under the LED Programme in KwaZulu Natal and 
therefore that this has contributed to increased service delivery and also planning as this is a kep 
aspect of the LED approach.  
The experience of the field visit shows that virtually none of the interventions analyzed have either 
scaled up into national level or expanded into other parts of the country articulating better the 
economic possibilities of different (even neighbouring) areas. The LED programmes apparently vary in 
outputs and outcomes and some success can be seen in places but not an overall positive trend. 
They have grown in isolation responding to specific local needs or plans. While a few may have 
maintained the activity at the level it was designed for, many of them have actually led to very little or 
disappeared. Connection between LED projects and national policymaking remains very poor (isolated 
projects on a territory even if very well designed). In South Africa, it is particularly striking how there is 
an insufficient linkage between local projects and the construction of national policies. The sectoral 
approach remains the rule, both at national and cooperation level, and this creates a significant barrier 
to design a long-term consistent process of change through the different levels of territorial 
governance. And the duration of the projects on LED is one of the most evident barriers to the 
sustainability of what they are intending to achieve. The low rate of success of LED projects must lead 
to a serious re-think of the value of the current approach. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - South Africa; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
25 
5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: The list of people interviewed 
Last name First name(s) Organisation 
Date of the 
interview 
Pienaar Gerhard 
LED Advisor, Delegation 
of the European Union to 
South Africa 
1 June 2011 
Mgangira Catherine 
LED, Delegation of the 
European Union to South 
Africa 
1 June 2011 
Chesire Milly 
Private Sector 
Development, Delegation 
of the European Union to 
South Africa 
1 June 2011 
Carrim Yunus 
Deputy Minister, 
Cooperative Government 
and Traditional Affairs, 
COGTA 
2 June 2011 
Malada Brutus 
Programme Officer, 
Ministry COGTA 
2 June 2011 
Madurai David 
Chief Director, 
Development Planning & 
LED Department COGTA 
2 June 2011 
Diala Boitemelo 
Manager, Expanding and 
Strengthening Community 
Based Participation in 
Local Government (CBP) 
– Development of Ward 
Committees, COGTA 
2 June 2011 
Fritz Joachim 
GIZ Programme Manager 
Strengthening Local 
Governance Programme 
(SGLP)  
3 June 2011 
Naidoo Loshnee 
Senior LED Manager: 
Agency Development and 
Support Department, 
Industrial Development 
Corporation 
3 June 2011 
Cohen Douglas 
Programme Officer, South 
African Local Government 
Association (SALGA) 
3 June 2011 
Ziemann Britta 
International Advisor Local 
Economic Development, 
South African LED 
Network (SALGA) 
3 June 2011 
Laymann Andrew 
CEO, Durban Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 
6 June 2011 
Moonsammy S. T. 
Head, Ethikwini 
Municipality Development 
Planning Environment and 
Management (included 
whole dept. and about 10 
senior staff) 
6 June 2011 
Robbins Glen 
Researcher, Department 
of Development Studies, 
6 June 2011 
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University of University of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Smith Dudley 
LED Manager, Ingwe 
Municipality 
7 June 2011 
Mgutshini Barbara 
Manager, Special 
Initiatives Business Unit  
Department of Local 
Government and 
Traditional Affairs, KZN 
7 June 2011 
Persad Ranveer 
General Manager Local 
Economic Development, 
Department of Economic 
Development and 
Tourism, KZN 
8 June 2011 
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5.2 Annex 2: The list of documents consulted  
Anne Stanton - Decentralisation and Municipalities in South Africa: An Analysis of The Mandate to 
Deliver Basic Services, PhD Thesis 2009 
EC Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2006 
EC Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 
Local Government Transition Act, No. 209 of 1993  
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 
Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) – Stimulating and Developing Sustainable 
Local Economies, National Framework for LED 2006-2011. 
DPLG, The White Paper on Local Government, 9 March 1998 
COGTA, State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report National State of Local 
Government Assessments (Working Documents, COGTA 2009) 
C Patterson, Country Report, Local Economic Development in South Africa March (GTZ, 2008) 
G Smith, The role of a province in the new local government dispensation: a Western Cape case study 
(LLM thesis, 2002)  
Christian M Rogerson, Input paper for the DPLG Review of Local Government (Isandla Institute, 2007) 
Christian Rogerson - Strategic Review of Local Economic Development in South Africa, Final Report 
Submitted to Minister Sicelo Shiceka (DPLG) Commissioned by the DPLG and AHI 
Chris Albertyn & Associates - Finding new pathways on familiar ground: Effecting Transformation 
Through Area Based Initiatives in eThekwini, An independent review of the first five years‟ of the Area 
Based Management Development Programme, Final Report March 2009 
Anka Derichs, Christiane Einfeldt: World bank Seminar – Fiscal Decentralisation and 
Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa, January 2006  
EC - Mid-Term Review of The GIJIMA KZN LED Support Programme Local Economic Development 
Support Programme in KwaZulu Natal (SA/73000-02-04), May 2007 
SALGA LED Position Paper - Key Issues in Local Economic Development in South Africa and a 
Potential Role for SALGA, March 2010 
EC - LED support in the Limpopo Province: final evaluation, Final Report, 18 july 2010, Kevin Lyonette 
and Gregory Pearson, AGMIN Italy 
EC - “Review of the national framework for local economic development in South Africa (2006-2011)”, 
Evaluation report December 2010, Agriconsulting Consortium 
Web links visited 
EU External Action: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/south-africa/south-
africa_en.htm  
EU Delegation in RSA: http://www.eusa.org.za/en/index.htm  
Local Economic Development Support Programme to Limpopo Province – www.limpopoled.com 
Local Economic Development Support Programme to KwaZulu-Natal - 
http://www.gijimakzn.org.za/home.aspx  
Local Economic Development Support Programme to Eastern Cape - 
http://www.thinasinako.co.za/home  
Sustainable Rural Development Programme (SURUDEC) - http://www.ruliv.org.za/surudec/  
The Department of Cooperative Governance   
http://www.dplg.gov.za/index.php/documents/cat_view/202-lgtas.html   See the State of Local 
Government Overview Report and the various briefings regarding the Local Government Turnaround 
Strategy  
The South African Local Government Association: http://www.salga.net  
The SA LED Network: http://www.led.co.za  
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Table 5 Detailed list of EC-funded interventions related to decentralisation in the Country 
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry point 
Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid modality 
Main contracting 
party 
SA/1003/000 - Local Economic 
Develop. In Northern Province 
2002 - 2008/2009 29,5 27,26 AFS/2001/004-712 Bottom-up L 
Grant to the 
Northern 
Province 
Government, 
Republiek Van 
Suid-Afrika 
SA/1007/00 - Urban Dvp Support 
To The Ethikwini Municipality 
2003 - 2010 35 35 AFS/2002/004-555 Bottom-up L 
Grant & 
Budget 
support to 
GoSA/ 
eThikwini 
Municipality 
Authority 
Government, 
Republiek Van 
Suid-Afrika 
SA/1009/00 Local Economic Dvp 
Support Programme In Kwazulu 
Natal 
2003 - 2010 33,72 30,25 AFS/2002/004-557 Bottom-up L 
Grant to 
GoSA 
Government, 
Republiek Van 
Suid-Afrika 
Local Economic Development 
Support Programme in the 
Eastern Cape Province 
2007 - 2009 27,35 18,95 AFS/2006/018-372 Bottom-up L 
Grant to 
Eastern 
Cape 
Government, 
Republiek Van 
Suid-Afrika 
Transparent Local Governance - 
A Toolkit 
2008-2011 1,2 0,36 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2007/019-
413 
Bottom-up N 
Grant to a 
Consulting 
firm
7
 
Other, Sveriges 
Kommuner Och 
Landsting Ideella 
Foreningar 
Local Leadership for Growth 2008-2011 0,9 0,25 
DCI-
NSAPVD/2007/019-
413 
Bottom-up N 
Grant to a 
Consulting 
firm 
Other, Sveriges 
Kommuner Och 
Landsting Ideella 
Foreningar 
The EC also financed a number of interventions indirectly supporting decentralisation: 
                                                     
7
 SKL International – the Swedish company works on this project with local authorities association in 3 countries: South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. 
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Indirect interventions Start year 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Provision of consultancy services 
to assist with the development of 
an Overseas Development 
Assistance Framework in the 
sphere of Local Government 
2000 0,18 AFS/2000/000-704 
Feasibility and Design Study on 
EC Support to Public 
Participation in Local 
Government in South Africa 
2002 0,13 AFS/2002/002-492 
Sustainable Rural Development 
in the Eastern Cape (SURUDEC) 
2006 10,01 AFS/2006/018-372 
Standard Chart of Accounts 
specific to Local Government 
2006 0,14 AFS/2006/018-367 
Expanding and Strengthening 
Community Based Participation 
in Local Government (CBP) 
2006 5,31 AFS/2006/018-379 
Support to Urban Renewal 
Programme in the Eastern Cape 
2006 29,62 AFS/2005/017-636 
Water for Growth and 
Development 
2008 107 
DCI-AFS/2007/018-
884 
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
 
Intervention 1 
Title: SA/1003/000 - Local Economic Develop. In Northern Province 
Budget: 29.497.820 EUR 
Start date: 2002 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall Objective:  
To reduce poverty through pro-poor economic growth, Lower poverty levels, higher employment 
levels, income growth, higher human development index, greater participation, gender equity, reduced 
social inequalities, greater economic engagement of marginalised groups 
 
Project Purpose:  
To stimulate job creation and income generation in the Northern Province 
 Stakeholders engaged in LED process and capacitated to develop effective strategies and 
projects; 
 LED environment strengthened; 
 Enterprise growth facilitated and pro-poor investment increased; 
 Local government has become increasingly developmental;  
 Mechanisms for learning, knowledge exchange and replication have been established and are 
working; 
 Sound operational management established 
 
Expected results: 
1. Sustainable community economic development. 
2. Business development, retention and expansion. 
3. Enhance LED-enabling environment appropriate planning policy environment 
4. Increased capacity of institutions to facilitate LED outcomes.  
5. Effective management and coordination of the program 
Activities 
For result 1: 
 Supplement existing LED Fund for disbursement in NP;  
 District LED Fund desk officers (X6) 
 M&E of LED Fund projects to evaluate project developmental impact;  
 M&E capacity building in DPLG; and  
 Facilitate access to existing budget lines to finance additional projects 
For result 2: 
 Establish non -financial business support: 
o "mentoring" service between established and emerging entrepreneurs 
o Other business support services (funding existing LBSCs or new LED Units) 
o Support local business organizations 
 Project "Facilitation Fund" provides technical and financial support to enterprise: 
o “winning" initiatives  
o Linkage program around formal enterprises  
o Encourage socially beneficial initiatives from established enterprises 
 Analysis of investment criteria, constraints and perceptions of national partners (NP) in 
financial institutions 
 Facilitate access to other existing financing opportunities 
For result 3: 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - South Africa; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
31 
 Financial support to implementation of LED strategy (i.e. economic infrastructure, other 
funding sources) 
 Technical support to LED aspects of IDP planning through PIMS centers in two pilot areas 
 Technical support fund to enhance enabling environment in local areas; and  
 Place marketing initiatives  
For result 4: 
 Support to national LED Unit at DPLG sphere 
 Support to the Provincial LED Unit 
 Support to two pilot District LED Units  
For result 5: 
 Establish provincial LED Unit;  
 Carry out feasibility studies for each result area;  
 Based on feasibility studies, establish a detailed implementation plan and a precise 
methodology (including M&E) for each result area 
 Implement the project.  
 
Intervention 2 
Title: SA/1007/00 - Urban Dvp Support To The Ethikwini Municipality 
Budget: 35.000.000 EUR 
Start date: 2003 
 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: 
The overall objective of this programme is to contribute to ·the achievement of the EMA's goal of 
improving the quality of life of all its people and to Contribute to the further development of the national 
urban development strategy. 
Programme purpose: 
The purpose of the programme is to strengthen EMA's capacity to provide basic services and to 
stimulate job creation and income generation by introducing Area Based Management and 
Development practices in five selected learning areas. To achieve this purpose the programme has 
been designed to: 
 strengthen EMA.'s capacity to introduce ABMD 
 improve urban management practices within EMA 
 improve urban governance practices within EMA 
 introduce innovative ways of delivering services to poor people in EMA 
 introduce innovative ways to stimulate local economic development in EMA 
It is important to stress that the programme is not the EMA's comprehensive program for Area Based 
Management, It is instead a support programme - designed specifically to support the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the EMA´s programme. 
 
Expected results: 
1. Different approaches to ABMD operationalised and tested 
This result area includes the successful implementation and testing of a variety of different 
approaches to ABMD in a variety of different contexts with a view to helping the city learn about ABMD 
and facilitate its incremental implementation. The result area also seeks, through learning gained via 
practical implementation, to clarify the relationship between the EMA's transformation process and 
ABMD . .A further sub-result is the strengthening, ABMD, of social capital in the areas. 
2. Capacity of ABMD managers, ward councillors, communities, and other stakeholders to play 
their respective roles in ABMD is enhanced  
This result area deals with the building of capacity of all pertinent role players to play a meaningful role 
in the ABMD programme (including ABMD managers, other EMA staff, councillors. ward councillors, 
communities and other stakeholders). Moreover a key sub-result Is the design and implementation of 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - South Africa; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
32 
a Training. Learning and Research (TLR) facility and an operational Management support (OMS) 
facility to provide the capacity building and management support for the EMA's ABMD programme. . 
3. Democratic processes deepened 
This result area is focused on counteracting some of the alienating impacts of centralization by 
focusing on mobilization of communities and improving transparency via improved communication. 
Bottom-up civil society mobilisation area partnerships introduction of more participatory planning 
approaches and enhanced area based communication between the Municipality and the communities 
are the main expected outcomes  
4. Service delivery improved 
Besides addressing service backlogs this result area focuses on the improvement of customer 
sensitivity in service delivery (often by better integration) as well as the formation of partnerships in 
such delivery. Also covered here is deriving lessons about how to improve customer access to city 
services via one-stop shops. 
5. Economic development enhanced 
This result area incorporates the role of ABDM in promoting economic development. and particularly 
its role in assisting the urban poor. It includes lessons en the role of ADMD in promoting regeneration, 
in promoting opportunity for those involved in informal micro-l activities, in utilizing pro-poor area 
strategies to simultaneously promote the external positioning of the city. It also includes the promotion 
of linkages between areas and labour and commodity markets. 
 
Activities: 
For result 1:  
• build and support ABM structures in each learning area: 
• examine and clarify the relationship between ABMD and emerging transformation policies and 
practices; 
• examine and test different institutional arrangements for ABMD areas and sub-areas of 
various sizes ; 
• identify and clarify roles of various players within the ABMD process ; 
• facilitate and strengthen networks with shared norms and values. 
For result 2: 
• establish training and management support facilities; 
• design and provide on the job ABMD training to a cadre of area managers and key personnel 
of the municipality ; 
• design and provide ABMD training and support to municipal councillors and community 
leaders 
• design and provide ABMD training to other programme stakeholders. 
For result 3: 
• facilitate the mobilization of area and city wide partnership; 
• provide seed funding for partnerships; 
• stimulate wider use of participatory project planning techniques; 
• improve communication between municipalities, communities and others.  
For result 4: 
• test customer-sensitive and partnership based service delivery approaches; 
• devise and implement innovative and area-based service delivery projects; 
• improve access to EMA service delivery information and pay points; 
• demonstrate the possibilities for integration of service delivery via ABMD 
For result 5: 
• • devise and implement economic regeneration projects for key economic areas 
• • design and implement support projects for survivalist enterprises, 
• • establish two job shops to strengthen labour market linkages 
• • strengthen linkage between the learning areas and commodity markets. 
• • develop and implement skills development programmes tailored to labour market trends 
• • develop a "corridor of excellence" along Victoria Street. 
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• • design and implement a revitalisation strategy for the fashion industry in EMA . 
 
Intervention 3 
Title: SA/1009/00 Local Economic Dvp Support Programme In Kwazulu Natal 
Budget: 33.715.456 EUR 
Start date: 2003 
 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective:  
An improved quality of life for the people of KwaZulu-Natal 
Project purpose:  
To achieve equitable economic growth starting initially in selected “learning areas” and replicating LED 
across the province. 
 
Expected results: 
1. Stakeholders combine in partnership to develop and implement sustainable employment 
generating investment and enterprise growth plans with pro poor outcomes 
2. Grants enable public sector stakeholders engaged in LED related processes to create and 
operate an enabling environment for LED and pro-poor development. 
3. Sustainable mechanism for learning, knowledge exchange, information dissemination training 
and replication have been established and are working. 
4. Effective LED management functions established and operational at provincial and area levels  
5. Support to DPLG at national level for strengthening of the LED environment through 
operationalising the national LED. 
 
Activities: 
For result 1: 
 LCF promotion, preliminary and development 
 Develop a coherent LED approach, and strategy, for the learning areas 
 Identification and development of additional funding resources 
 Develop and implement strategy to ensure that economic growth takes place in area ROP5 
 Identify and train LCF evaluation committee 
 Implement LCF stage 1: pilot phase 
 Review of first round of LCF projects and evidence lessons learnt by project and by local 
partnership 
 Implement LCF stage 1: second call 
 Implement LCF stage 1: third call  
 Implement LCF stage 2: first call 
 Implement LCF stage 2: second permanent call  
 Training in strategic review and partnership development introduced as part of the review and 
update of LED strategies  
 Review existing initiatives in the prevention & treatment of HIV/Aids and tuberculosis (TB) in 
the workplace  
 Development of policies to combat HIV/Aids in the workplace and along the business supply 
chain 
For result 2: 
 Design development an promotion of the Business Enabling Fund (BEF) grant system  
 Implementation of the BEF pilot phase 
 Formal review of the first round of BEF applications specifically examines lessons for local 
government  
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 Implementation of the BEF phase 2 
 BEF third call  
 BEF fourth call 
 Training and mentoring for the development & review of LED strategies for the learning areas 
 Review and evaluate existing provision of business support services and finance 
 Technical assistance on best way to improve enabling environment for business at district and 
local municipality level 
For result 3: 
 Terms of Reference (ToRs) develop for Monitoring, Learning, and Research Facility (MLRF) 
and contra let 
 ID LED stakeholders and assess capacity and training needs  
 Establish and implement measures to monitor the LED programme  
 Develop and establish document best practice and lessons learnt 
 Establish provincial LED forum to exchange best practice from within Republic of South Africa 
(RSA) and internationally to capture international best practice in LED 
 Establish knowledge sharing network at provincial level, by month 12, initially bringing 
together stakeholders from the learning areas and later to all areas of the province. 
 Training needs analysis of local government LED staff executed 
 Development of capacity building plan and programme for LED personnel (mentoring 
partnership development, networking between LED groups strategic development and so on) 
 Focused study tours within South Africa an overseas, arranged as part of the capacity building  
 Agree and implement marketing and communication strategy to ensure activities and 
achievements of the programme are widely understood throughout KZN 
 Database of constraints to LED established and updated 
For result 4: 
 Establish programme office 
 Brief and train PCU staff 
 Establish finance administration and logistics 
 Evaluate availability of additional funding  
 Development of additional funding from other sources 
 Establishment & development of Programme Steering Committee 
 Establish and capacitate programme offices in learning areas 1,2,3,4 
 Establish capacity and systems for the rest of the province 
 Establishment of the MIS - including a programme monitoring and evaluation system - across 
all learning areas and central office 
 Training for PCU an DED staff on MIS 
 Plan mobilise and train counterpart staff at head office and regional levels 
 Capacity building - including Participatory Appraisal of Competitive Advantages (PACA) 
training - completed in ROP5 
For result 5: 
 Appoint long-term experts  
 Identifying and testing feasible approaches, concepts and instruments 
 Enhancing institutional and human capacities 
 Information processing, co-ordination and dissemination  
 Policy development  
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
Local government transition, 1993 
The Local Government Transition Act of 1993 envisaged the restructuring and transformation of local 
government. It provided for the replacement of white councils by democratically elected ones. It 
provided a period for stability, and a regulated transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes at 
local level. 
New constitution, 1996, and the White Paper on Local Government, 1998 
The new constitution of 1996 clearly defined three separate but inter-connected spheres of 
government.  This was followed by the White Paper on Local Government in 1998. This envisaged 
greater decentralisation and local government as „a sphere of government in its own right and no 
longer a function of national or provincial government.‟ Local government was given a distinctive 
status and role in building democracy and promoting socio-economic development.8 
The White Paper was an expression of the government belief decentralisation of a special type in the 
context of three spheres of government, which were required to govern in a cooperative manner.9 
The concept of Developmental Local Government put forward a vision of local government, which 
worked with local communities to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve the quality 
life. Four characteristics of developmental local government were described: 
1. It exercised municipal powers and functions in a manner which maximised impact on social 
development and economic growth 
2. It played an integrating and coordinating role to ensure alignment between public and private 
investment within the municipal area 
3. It built social capital by providing community leadership and vision,  
4. It sought to empower marginalised and excluded groups within the community.10 
Local government capacity at local level outside the metropolitan areas, particularly in rural areas was 
weak. Given such constraints, the vision for developmental local government was ambitious.  
The LED fund, 1999 
The LED Fund was launched in 1999 in order to direct support to municipal projects intended to 
address poverty. This created the impression with many local officials that LED was simply about 
poverty alleviation and community-based projects. The proven un-sustainability of many of the 
projects and the subsequent abandonment of the LED Fund damaged perceptions of LED and of what 
it could achieve. Following an adverse evaluation on its effectiveness the fund was closed. 
New dispensation for local government, 2000 
The elections of 2000 saw the creation of what was referred to as a new democratic municipal 
dispensation. An emphasis was placed on providing people with better access to basic services and 
more opportunities for participation in the economy at local level. 
The role of provinces was defined as monitoring the financial status of municipalities in terms of the 
Municipal Finance Management Act. This provided a monitoring, management and oversight role to 
the provincial treasury, and provided substance to the linkages between two of the three spheres of 
government. It stressed the principle that "Although competencies are divided among National, 
Provincial and Local Government, it is important for all three spheres to realise that they serve the 
same customer, the South African citizen. Situations still exist whereby national government will, for 
example, implement a project without understanding the plans of provincial and local government. 
This creates confusion and sometimes duplication and wastage… We need to realise that all 
development is, in the end, local"11 
Local Economic Development Guidelines, 2005, LED framework 2006 
Growing within national government was a greater emphasis upon the strategic national coordination 
of LED as part of long-term economic development. However, analysts noted with concern that LED 
was still not well embedded in municipal practice in many localities and that results were not being 
seen on the ground. 
                                                     
8
 Mohammed Valli Moosa, Minister for provincial affairs and constitutional development, Forward to White Paper 
on Local Government, 1998. 
9
 Pravin Gordhan, Forward to White Paper on Local Government, 1998. 
10
 See Executive Summary to White Paper on Local Government, 1998. 
11
 G Smith, The role of a province in the new local government dispensation: a Western Cape case study (LLM 
thesis, 2002)  
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On the ground the results of LED remained mixed and there were no monitoring mechanisms for 
evaluating it. Other concerns were made about the seemingly undefined role of provincial 
governments as agents in LED. Academic observers were highly critical of the limited successes 
associated with national LED policy. In the view of some, the absence of clear „success stories‟ was a 
reflection of national government‟s failure to introduce clear guidelines for municipalities as to what 
LED meant and how it was to be undertaken.12 
The 2006 DPLG Framework stated that „it needs to be recognised that in large areas of the country 
many communities have very limited capacity to contribute in a conventional manner to the alleviation 
of poverty in general and to solve their own immediate socio-economic challenges.‟  Research showed 
that 28% of municipalities required basic institutional and administrative infrastructure to be 
established before they would be ready to undertake, manage and drive a proper IDP, let alone be the 
agent for local economic development.13 
Project Consolidate, 2007 
The growing crisis in local government led to Project Consolidate. This was a bold and high profile 
central government intervention aimed at rescuing ailing and failing municipalities. It intended to 
intensify support to municipalities by deploying support personnel from within government, State 
Owned Enterprises, and the private sector to render infrastructure investment, financial management 
and other technical support to municipalities. This was intended to complement the Project 
Management Units established under the MIG programme. Project consolidate saw municipalities 
being placed under administration, or having officials deployed by national government. It reflected an 
increasing impatience on the part of national government in the performance of local government 
under the decentralized framework of government.  
Local Government Turnaround Strategy, 2009 
The 2009 Government Programme of Action committed to build a developmental state, improve public 
services and strengthen democratic institutions. Project Consolidate may have some limited impact, 
but the fact of the matter was that local government continued to show signs of distress, dysfunction 
and lack of basic capacity. This was manifest in: 
 Huge service delivery and backlog challenges, e.g. housing, water and sanitation; 
 Poor communication and accountability relationships with communities; 
 Problems with the political administrative interface; 
 Corruption and fraud; 
 Poor financial management, e.g. negative audit opinions; 
 Number of (violent) service delivery protests; 
 Weak civil society formations; 
 Intra - and inter-political party issues negatively affecting governance and delivery;  
 Insufficient municipal capacity due to lack of scarce skills14 
The Local Government Turnaround Strategy has been acknowledged not have worked well. Indeed, it 
appears that national government perceives the process of decentralization, so strongly promoted 
since 1994, has led to inertia on the part of both national and provincial governments.15  
The realisation that there was a crisis in local government led to increasingly „top-down‟ interventions 
from central government and the effective abandonment of the 2006 – 2011 strategy. 
Jobs Fund, 2011 
The poor performance and what appears to be increasing dysfunctionality at local government level 
has become a matter of grave concern. The 2011 local government elections saw a reduced majority 
for the ruling ANC, and a mandate to rule which some saw as conditional and grudgingly given. 
Continued dysfunction is now being seen as a threat to democracy16. Interventions by central 
government under the banner of „state led development‟ appear to be increasingly favoured. 
In the face of 26% unemployment government launched the Jobs Fund in February 2011. This 
provided R9 billion in grants from direct from central government to individual private sector 
enterprises in order to create jobs. Provinces and the entire local government sector were apparently 
                                                     
12
  See C. M. Rogerson, Input paper for the DPLG Review of Local Government (Isandla Institute, 2007) 
13
  DPLG, National Framework for Local Economic Development (LED) in South Africa (2006 – 2011) 
14
  COGTA, State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report National State of Local Government 
Assessments (Working Documents, COGTA 2009). 
15
  Interview, Yunus Carrim, Deputy Minister, COGTA, 2/6/2011. 
16
 Ibid. 
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completely excluded from the process. Significantly, the grant-making concept used was based on the 
EU supported Gijima KZN local economic development project implemented effectively at provincial 
level. 
Within the context describe above, the EU has provided support to local development through the 
following, mainly project-based initiatives. More recently however, it has allocated €100 million through 
sector support for skills development and job creation via the national government‟s economic cluster. 
The main entry point for the EU in South Africa in support of decentralization of support has been 
around local economic development. The main interventions are summarized in chronological order 
below. The support to Water for growth and Development has been excluded: 
 
Intervention Start Year Commitment 
 
Provision of consultancy services to assist with the 
development of an Overseas Development Assistance 
Framework in the sphere of Local Government 
2000 € 17 963 
Local Economic Development in Northern Province 2001 € 29 497 820 
 Feasibility and Design Study on EC Support to Public 
Participation in Local Government in South Africa 
2002 € 129 105 
Urban Development Support To The Ethikwini Municipality 
(Area Based Management) 
2002 € 35 000 000 
Local Economic Development Support Programme In 
Kwazulu-Natal (Gijima KZN) 
2002 € 33 715 456 
Local Economic Development Support Programme in the 
Eastern Cape Province (Thina Sinako) 
2004 € 27 346 602 
Local Leadership for Growth 2008 € 900 
Sustainable Rural Development in the Eastern Cape 
(SURUDEC) 
2006 € 10 098 019 
Standard Chart of Accounts specific to Local Governments 2006 € 140 
Expanding and Strengthening Community Based 
Participation in Local Government (CBP) – Development of 
Ward Committees 
2006 € 5 309 081 
Support to Urban Renewal Programme in the Eastern Cape 2006 € 29 620 479 
Transparent Local Governance - A Toolkit 2008 € 1 200 000 
Total  € 171 935 565 
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The European Union is South Africa‟s largest source of donor funding. The R1 billion Annual 
Development Co-operation Budget spans areas as diverse as education, water and sanitation and the 
entrenchment of a human-rights culture, and Local Economic Development. The EU is a major player 
in international co-operation and development aid. The EU‟s support to the South African government 
in terms of local economic development has been focused on three provinces: KwaZulu Natal, the 
Eastern Cape and Limpopo Province. 
The Gijima KZN Programme is a six-year programme designed to support the provincial DED of 
KwaZulu Natal and a broad range of stakeholders to more effectively implement LED to achieve 
equitable economic growth in the province. The programme was initiated in 2003 and will receive 
funding of Euro 37 million over the six-year period. Gijima KZN particularly focuses on harnessing 
creativity at a local level through a demand-led approach with the centrality of a partnership approach. 
The programme objectives are to: 
 Promote pro-poor local economic development Build the capacity of local government in 
managing LED Increase local competitiveness through the building of partnerships 
The programme is designed around a number of funds under which applicants can apply for financial 
assistance. The first fund is the Business Enabling Fund (BEF) that assists provincial and local 
government to create an enabling environment for local economic development by clarifying the 
legislative and regulatory requirements and strengthening the enabling role and performance of 
provincial and local government. 
The primary emphasis of the second fund, the Local Competitiveness Fund (LCF), is to encourage 
partnerships that facilitate private sector investment in sustainable local economic development 
projects. The LCF provides partnership groups with support to establish integrated projects to 
encourage a base of infrastructure and services to provide a platform for increased competitiveness 
The objectives of the third Fund, the Networking & Co-operation Fund, is primarily to establish a 
provincial MLRF that is currently in place; as well as to provide LED institutional support and marketing 
and communications for the programme. 
The Limpopo Local Economic Development Programme is being implemented through a partnership 
between the EU and the Limpopo Department of Local Government and Housing (DLGH). The EU‟s 
funding contribution is EUR 34 million and supports a wide range of projects in rural areas of Limpopo. 
The main objective of the programme is to support pro-poor economic growth through an integrated 
approach through five core areas of: 
 Supporting Sustainable Community Economic Development; 
 Strengthening local competitiveness of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs)  
 Enhancing the LED environment 
 Strengthening LED capacity 
 Management, monitoring and coordination 
The programme supports LED projects through three funds:  
1. The Local Government Support Fund (LGSF) supports local governments by improving the 
local business environment and developing local capacity around LED.  
2. The Marginalised Community Fund (MCF) supports small scale initiatives in poor rural areas 
and helps to integrate marginalised communities and the mainstream economy  
3. The LCF supports a range of competitiveness activities linked to SMME and cluster 
development (such as business plans and feasibility studies) 
In addition to the three funds, the Limpopo LED programme is also undertaking a LED Capacity 
Building Programme and the establishment of a Limpopo LED Centre with Rand 8,6 million, which will 
form part of the Turfloop Graduate School of Leadership at the University of Limpopo. 
The EU LED Programme in the Eastern Cape, known as the Thina Sinako Programme, is a five-year 
programme which began in 2005 and is financed by the European Union amounting to €30 million. 
The programme is a partnership between the EU and four participating departments, which include the 
Office of the Premier, Treasury, Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs, and Economic 
Development and Environmental Affairs. The Office of the Premier is responsible for the overall 
programme coordination. The value of this Programme lies in its support of the larger Provincial 
Growth and Development Plan 2004-2014 (PGDP) to significantly reduce poverty and unemployment 
In supporting the PGDP. The Thina Sinako Provincial LED Support Programme aims to stimulate 
innovation in how LED is promoted, facilitated and supported. 
The Thina Sinako Programme rests on three key pillars:  
 Grant funds for practice-driven demonstration of LED innovation and learning.  
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 Institutional development and capacity building for long term LED efficiency and sustainability. 
 Learning and networking to create awareness and sharing of experiences and best practices.  
The Thina Sinako provides financial support through three funds. 
1. The LGSF supports municipalities to create an enabling environment for enterprise establishment 
and growth through initiatives that align with the PGDS as well as national policy. Furthermore the 
programme aims to improve systems for economic governance and strategic management and 
improve capacity in local government to understand and manage LED initiatives. 
2. The LCF has been designed to help local role players to capitalise on the opportunities identified 
in the PGDP and the emerging Provincial Industrial Development Strategy. The key principle of 
the LCF is to support market-led development to ensure the creation of sustainable employment 
within vibrant local economies. In particular, the focus is on supporting the development of LED 
initiatives that use the competitiveness of the area of the Eastern Cape within which they are 
located. 
3. The Financial Innovation Fund is divided into two Windows. The first provides support to small and 
medium enterprises that are part of partnership groups supported under the LCF. The second 
Window of the Fund is a standard grant fund, that targets financial service providers in South 
Africa to support the development of innovative lending and borrowing products, processes or 
services. This part of the FIF is intended to contribute to the implementation of the Financial 
Sector Charter, by improving access to finance by categories of people who have historically been 
excluded from such access, improving efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of financial 
services, and promoting the use of the competitive advantage of areas where such advantage has 
not yet been tapped 
The three EU assisted LED programmes have reached a number of milestones in terms of 
capacitating the various provincial and local government departments by providing improved 
institutional arrangements and integration of systems to more effectively lead, facilitate and support 
local economic development. Through the support of these three programmes, there are a number of 
examples of successful LED projects on the ground within each province where local stakeholders are 
engaging in LED across all sectors of the economy. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain key relevant lessons and to provide recommendations to help 
for opportune and timely support to decentralisation processes; it shall cover aid delivery over the 
period 2000-2009 taking into account the different entry points used by the EC/EU to deliver its 
support to decentralisation processes. This evaluation is partly based on a number of country missions 
to be carried out during the field phase.1 
The field visit to Tanzania had the following objectives:  
 To test hypotheses formulated during the desk phase; 
 To collect additional information in order to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and 
Judgement Criteria (JCs); 
 To asses if there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the synthesis report, 
and in particular the sections on conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of the note is to summarise the findings from the field visit in order to feed into the 
synthesis report. By no means, this note should be considered as a country evaluation or a self-
standing impact evaluation. The EQs are not answered at the single country level, as they are 
formulated to be answered on the global level using the whole information collected from the desk 
study and the different field phase country studies. 
The reasons for selecting this country as one of the field studies were: 
 Importance of the country portfolio in terms of EC/EU support to decentralisation (the EC/EU 
disbursed around 23mEUR for direct support to decentralisation over the period 2000-2009); 
 The EC/EU supported decentralisation in Tanzania via a mix of entry points, including sector 
support programme supported in an increasingly decentralised context; 
 The EC/EU supported decentralisation in Tanzania via a mix of financing modalities, including 
General Budget Support. 
The field visit was undertaken between 13
th
 and 20
th
 April 2011. The evaluation team was composed 
of Per Tidemand and Nazar Sola.  
1.2 Focus of the analysis and data collection methods  
1.2.1 Research foci 
Besides collecting additional evidence related to answering the EQs, the field visit to Tanzania has 
specifically looked into the following aspects: 
Table 1 Research focus 
Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
Clarity of EC/EU policy/strategies on decentralisation according to national 
stakeholders and other international donors 
1 
Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support to decentralisation – how were priorities 
made in the delegation? Did the general EC/EU framework for support to 
decentralisation facilitate decisions? 
2 
Appropriateness of GBS as aid modality for decentralisation support; how has policy 
dialogue been affected? To what extent has decentralisation process and outcomes 
been affected, what has been the specific EC/EU contribution? 
3 
Coherence between major sector interventions (such as in education sector) and 
decentralisation support 
4 
                                                     
1
 The field phase is following a desk phase during which the Evaluation Team has drawn preliminary findings from 
a first set of data collected mainly from interviews, documentary reviews and an on-line survey to the EU 
Delegations. 
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Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
Documented results of decentralisation process and the relative importance of 
EC/EU support (though LGDG, GBS, NGO support and sector (education etc) 
interventions. 
5-8 
 
1.2.2 Data collection methods used 
Prior to the field visit the country field team undertook a desk review of available literature, both 
specific to EC/EU supported interventions, as well as broader documentation regarding other 
development partners, as well as the overall decentralisation process in the country. This included 
analysis of the specific LGDG documentation (general progress reports, results of the annual 
assessments since 2005, the Mid Term Review of the LGSP/LGDG in 2007, the Value For Money 
Audit in 2009 etc), analysis of the wider decentralisation process (e.g. reports from REPOA, the LGRP 
evaluation in 2007 etc) and broader assessments of development in Tanzania (MKUKUTA Review 
etc). Additional documents were compiled during the field visit. A full list of documents reviewed is 
included as Annex 2. 
During fieldwork the team interviewed key informants with relevant knowledge on the chosen 
interventions, as well as informants offering broader insights into the evolution of the decentralisation 
context in the country. For an evaluation of this sort where an extensive time period is reviewed (2000-
2009) it is obviously a challenge to find resource persons who have followed the process throughout, 
as most EUD and DP staff only stay in-country for typically 3 years at a time. Many central government 
officials have also been transferred between ministries. However, during the fieldwork in Tanzania, the 
team managed to interview selected PMO-RALG staff that have followed the reforms since 1995, just 
as the EUD contact person has been working on-off with decentralisation as an area of responsibility 
since 2005. 
A few focus group meetings were held but otherwise the preferred interview methodology was 
individual in-depth interviews focused on the relevant EQs and the working hypotheses. A list of 
people met can be found in "Annex 1: The list of people interviewed". The information deemed of 
critical importance was subjected to a process of triangulation to ensure validity and internal 
consistency; this typically included review of various types of documentation (official Government 
reports, internal DP documentation and independent research reports) and interview of different types 
of stakeholders (representatives from different DPs, different ministries etc) The work in Tanzania was 
eased by the long time local knowledge of the reforms by the consultant team (where both the 
international and local consultant has worked with LG reform and decentralisation issues since 2001). 
Given the resource envelope (especially time-wise) for the field phase, prioritisation was necessary 
and the field team thus had no ambition of re-doing evaluations/ reviews/ monitoring missions that had 
already been undertaken. Rather the team relied extensively on the related reports and attempted to 
extract more general findings, trends and recurring themes that are of relevance to a broader 
audience. The dialogue with in-formants also centred around distilling broader lessons and themes, 
rather than focussing on the minute details of the selected projects. To reiterate, this country note is 
thus not a judgement of the performance of individual projects, nor of the overall decentralisation and 
local governance portfolio of the EC/EU. Rather it is an attempt to learn from the Tanzania experience 
and to encourage wider reflections on how best to structure and focus EU assistance to 
decentralisation processes. 
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2 Short description of the country context  
2.1 Short description decentralisation process in the country  
The current phase of local government reforms has been ongoing in Tanzania since 1995; major legal 
reforms took place around 1997 that significantly reduced the previous all important deconcentrated 
regional administrations, in subsequent years (1999) legalisation was passed that enabled elected 
local governments to play a more significant role in local service delivery. 
Below is an overview of the governmental system. (Please refer to Appendix 5 for further details). 
Figure 1 Intergovernmental Relations and the Local Government System 
 
Source: by authors based on various local government legislation 
A major donor funded (joint basket funded) local government reform programme started in 2000 to 
deepen the reforms through further legislative reviews, capacity building, and establishment of local 
financing modalities. The main institutional responsibility for implementation of the reforms within the 
Government of Tanzania has been assigned to the (current) Prime Ministers Office – Regional 
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) although the office also in periods has worked as 
independent Ministry and as an office within the President Office. The PMO-RALG has widely been 
considered as too overburdened and weak to lead the reforms so a dedicated team was established 
with contract-hired staff within PMO-RALG to lead the reform process. The main results and 
challenges related to the last ten years of reform programme implementation are further discussed in 
Annex 5, but briefly it can be concluded: 
 Local Governments (LGs) capacities in terms of staffing and fiscal resources have been 
significantly strengthened – today around 70% of all public employees in Tanzania are 
employed by approximate 114 Districts and Municipalities and their subunits (village local 
governments etc), 
 The LGs play today a very significant role in local service delivery and the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation (measured as LG share of total public expenditures) is at around 25% among 
the highest in Africa, 
 The level of local participation in LG affairs has increased significantly over the last ten years, 
 The degree of autonomy of LGs has however not changed much over the decade: the central 
government and ruling political party exercise significant control over LGs – in particular 
regarding their staff (that effectively is centrally managed) just as central government exercise 
major controls over local budget priorities. 
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2.2 List of the major EC/EU-funded interventions  
The evaluation team has analysed the EC/EU support to decentralisation in this specific country 
through a number of interventions. The table below summarises the major EC/EU-funded 
interventions considered in the analysis. 
Table 2 List of the major EC-funded interventions 
Intervention title 
Budget 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision Nr. 
Comment 
Support to the Local Government 
Grant Scheme 
22,70 FED/2007/019-633 
Main EC-funded intervention directly 
supporting decentralisation  
Poverty Reduction through the 
Participation of Vulnerable People in 
Decentralised Development Planning 
and Budgeting in Tanzania 
0,75 
ONG-PVD/2005/017-
215 // Contract 
118910 
NGO support at LG level. 
Support to Education Sector Reform 43,25 FED/2007/018-888 
Sector programme implemented in 
a decentralising context 
Poverty Reduction Budget support 
programme (at least 2 financing 
decisions during the evaluation 
period: 2003-2006; 2006-2008) 
98,60 
80,94 
FED/2003/016-313 & 
FED/2006/017-917 
Two main GBS were financed by 
the EC/EU during the evaluation 
period. 
 
Note: a detailed list is provided in Annex 3.  
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3 Findings by EQs and JCs  
3.1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy framework that 
facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to decentralisation? 
3.1.1 JC1.1. EC incorporate decentralisation in its cooperation with third countries 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU was not part of the original group of DPs supporting the Local Government Reform 
Programme (LGRP) in Tanzania from 2000, however it was from around 2002 decided to explore 
opportunities for engagement in support of the reforms through an additional intervention. The 
particular proposal (formulated in 2003) was later rejected in favours of co-funding of the Local 
Government Development Grant (LGDG) through the LGRP Basket Fund. This intervention is the 
main direct EC/EU contribution to local government reforms in Tanzania and direct financial 
contributions were only made from 2007 to 20082. Since 2008 the EC/EU has not been directly 
engaged in the ―local government sector‖ except through participation in the wider governance sector 
group.  
The Aid harmonisation agenda has been given very significant attention in Tanzania recent years – 
this has been reflected in strong Government prioritisation of General Budget Support, efforts for 
progressing of division of labour among DPs and the establishment of an elaborated institutional aid 
management architecture.  
A number of EU member states have taken a lead among DPs to support and coordinate support to 
decentralisation and local governance: this has over the evaluation period included foremost the 
Netherlands, but also Irish, Finnish, German and lately Swedish embassies.  
In the 10
th
 EDF significant emphasis has been given to General Budget Support that include some 
elements of decentralisation reforms in the PAF, but assessment of e.g. progress of decentralisation 
reforms is largely left to the above mentioned ―decentralisation lead‖ DPs. EC/EU support to 
decentralisation is therefore deliberately and effectively being phased out as part of the agreed aid 
harmonisation process. 
EC/EU support to NSA includes a number of projects that are ―locally‖ implemented (such as the 
earlier mentioned ―Poverty Reduction through the Participation of Vulnerable People in Decentralised 
Development Planning and Budgeting in Tanzania‖). However, such support was not in any away 
strategically linked to decentralisation and ―local governance‖. Other DPs (notably the Dutch, USAID 
and SIDA) supported in a more strategic manner NGOs to play a significant role in local governments 
(enhancing NGOs capacities for local accountability etc). The NGO network, the ―Policy Forum‖ 
established a dedicated group of NGOs working with decentralisation and local governance issues 
(http://www.policyforum-tz.org/groups/lgwg) - the EC/EU is not among the supporting DPs.  
3.1.2 JC1.2. EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are comprehensive 
and coherent 
N/A for the field visit. 
3.1.3 JC1.3. EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its interventions in support 
of decentralisation processes 
Indicators: 
 Ind 1.3.1. Clarity of EC policy/ strategies on decentralisation according to national stakeholders in 
partner countries 
 Ind 1.3.2. Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other international donors 
                                                     
2
 Annex provides a brief overview of the lengthy formulation process for LGDG support. The financing agreement 
was signed in 2007 and already in March 2008 last disbursement of 1 million EUR was made. The EUD continued 
being active in the basket until the end of 2008 and still follow the work of the LGRP Development Partner group 
but through the wider Governance Working Group. The EUD still has not closed the actual commitment (contract) 
since the final audit report approved by the Steering committee hasn't been received yet. 
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 Ind 1.3.3. EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes according to EC policy and operational 
staffs 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU is not seen as a significant player in support to decentralisation in Tanzania – it is among 
national stakeholders (Government officials and NGOs) as well as other DPs seen as a deliberate 
choice not to engage directly by EC/EU in local government reforms as other DPs are taking the lead. 
EUD staff has not received training in ―decentralisation issues‖ and all expressed to be generally 
unaware of the various key EC/EU reference and policy documents related to decentralisation such 
as:  
 The EC/EU Reference Document (no 2, 2007): ―Supporting Decentralisation and Local 
Governance in Third Countries‖ is the most comprehensive guidance document on 
decentralisation, 
 The EC/EU Communication "Local authorities: Actors for Development" (2008) 
underlines the paramount importance of Local authorities in the Partner Countries as well as 
within EU, 
 The ―European Charter on development cooperation in support of Local governance‖ 
(2008) sets out principles and modalities for better effectiveness in cooperation in support of 
local governance and decentralisation in partner countries, 
 The recent EC/EU programming guide for strategy papers (programming fiche on 
decentralisation issued January 2009) gives guidance on how to address decentralisation in 
strategy papers.  
3.2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional capacity to 
support decentralisation processes? 
3.2.1 JC2.1. The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is suitable for 
appropriate support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.1.1. Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible approach to 
promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process support, identification and 
selection of adequate strategic partners and/or implementing agencies 
 Ind 2.1.2. Existence of dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing with 
sectors 
 Ind 2.1.3. Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with decentralisation 
 Ind 2.1.4 Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and innovative actions) or 
disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field of decentralisation (e.g. the possible 
negative effect of disbursement pressures) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
From the fieldwork it is clear that some parts of the institutional environment to a large degree have 
constrained EC/EU support to decentralisation in Tanzania. This is evident in the way the formulation 
of direct EC/EU support developed (see annex 6 for details): the EC/EU decided as early as 2004 that 
the most appropriate entry point for support to the reforms would be contribution to the LGDG but 
signing of the programme document could only take place in 2007 because of HQ concerns regarding 
use of basket funding arrangements.  
Support to Local Government. The FP for the support to the decentralization process in Tanzania 
was submitted in May 2005. It has been pending the approval of the Director of EuropeAid to include 
Tanzania on the list of pilot countries to allow basket funding for 9th EDF funds. This was confirmed in 
June and the FP was presented at the September EDF committee. The signing ceremony will take 
place early February 2007. 
Source: External Assistance Management Report 2006 
Within the EUD decentralisation was given rather limited priority from around 2006-7 as it became 
likely that other DPs were been designated to lead the support. However, it was still recognised that 
decentralisation reforms in Tanzania were important for the successful implementation of programmes 
in e.g. education, health, roads, agriculture, and infrastructure sectors at local levels.  
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3.2.2 JC2.2. The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal with local 
governance and decentralisation issues 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.2.1. Availability of adequate human resources in Delegations and Headquarters to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance 
 Ind 2.2.2. Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of decentralisation  
 Ind 2.2.3. Availability and use of training opportunities related to decentralisation issues  
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EUD decided around 2005 to assign the responsibility for ―decentralisation‖ to a junior programme 
officer. Although no formal decision at that time was made to ―exit‖ from direct support to 
decentralisation it can be seen as a pre-cursor for the later formal decision. The key staffing priorities 
were from around 2005 onwards given to strengthen the capacity of the EUD in areas related to GBS 
(expertise in PFM issues). 
EUD Staff (including staff working with sectors and GBS) actively engaged in various joint DP-GoT 
funded analyses of decentralisation issues – but the EUD never takes a lead as ―decentralisation‖ is 
defined as a sector with specific lead DPs.  
Staff had not participated in the EC/EU courses on decentralisation issues – but reform issues in 
Tanzania were probably also of a more advanced nature than what EC/EU courses could offer (with 
need for staff for more in-depth exposure to details of e.g. LG fiscal decentralisation issues).  
3.2.3 JC2.3. Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of experience related to 
EC support to decentralisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 2.3.1. Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes in relation to 
results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and programmes  
 Ind 2.3.2. Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, countries and regions) or 
systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. exchange of information, working groups, issues 
papers…) 
 Ind 2.3.3. Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a mandate to promote the 
effective implementation of decentralisation strategies and programmes 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Because of the nature of the direct support to decentralisation – basket funding of a LG fiscal transfer 
system, The EUD relied on the common agreed (among all participating DPs and GoT) M&E system 
that was quite elaborate. This included in relation to the LGDG support: 
 An elaborate system for annual benchmarking of all 114 LGs in areas such as PFM, planning, 
procurement, local accountability, and other ―good governance indicators‖3 – the results from 
these assessments were used to reward (and penalise) LGs with adjustments of their LGDG 
allocations – this provided a major incentive for LGs to improve their performance and gave a 
thorough overview of progress and challenges in building the capacities of the LGs,  
 Quarterly progress meetings held in the field (in one of the 21 regional HQs on a rotating 
basis) with the joint participation of key ministries (PMO-RALG, Finance, Education, Health, 
Roads etc), LG officials and DPs, 
 Quarterly and annual progress reporting – reporting on progress compared to planned 
activities, expenditures compared to budgets etc, 
 External reviews of overall programme every three years, 
 External reviews of selected areas of concerns e.g. the annual assessment procedures, value 
for money audits, procurement audits etc, 
In addition, wider assessments of decentralisation reform issues took place annually (or bi-annually) in 
relation to review of the overall MKUKUTA (the national poverty reduction strategy) and in relation to 
the annual GBS reviews where decentralisation was one among several key areas to be assessed.  
There was no ROM reporting found of LGDG support in CRIS. 
EUD staff highlighted in particular the positive experiences with the quarterly LGDG progress 
meetings held in field; they provided a rare opportunity for staff to gain field experience with 
implementation of local government service delivery in a broad sense (and not only narrowly 
implementation of LGDG) and therefore relevant for e.g. GBS staff.  
                                                     
3
 The manuals  and annual results of the assessments is available at http://www.logintanzania.net/documents.htm  
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3.3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been conceived 
in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national regulations and 
policies? 
3.3.1 JC3.1. The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned 
with the partner Governments' policies and procedures 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.1.1. Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and operational procedures 
related to decentralisation reform, including assessment of risks and constraints 
 Ind 3.1.2. Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in channelling funds to 
LA  
 Ind 3.1.3. Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
 Ind 3.1.4. References in relevant Country Strategy Paper (CSP) sections on decentralisation and 
local governance 
Main findings from the field mission: 
EC/EU support to decentralisation has generally been well aligned with GoT policies and procedures. 
The decision made by the EC/EU to support the merging national system for LG development funding 
through the LGDG was made at a critical time when most funding for ―local level development‖ 
through LGs was undertaken with support from multiple individual project interventions by various 
DPs.  
The support to the LGDG was in the beginning (2005) only support for a largely DP funded 
discretionary non-sector specific development grant in LGs. However, the system rapidly gained 
popularity and became the backbone of a general fiscal transfer system for all local development 
funding. In addition the annual performance systems incentivised LGs‘ adherence to GoT regulations 
(ion particular in areas of PFM)  
The analyses of GoT procedures and strategies that lead to the LGDG were primarily driven by the 
World Bank and various EU member states active in the LGRP basket 2003-04. EC/EU independent 
analysis initially suggested an alternative strategy (supporting a funding mechanism that would focus 
only on lower level LGs) – but this was rejected internally by EC/EU in an effort to harmonise with 
other DPs.  
The later decision by the EC/EU to exit from directs decentralisation support and focus largely on GBS 
(and Infrastructure and Trade) is fully in line with GoT strategy for aid harmonisation (see further 
below).  
3.3.2 JC3.2. The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or combination) reflects 
national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.2.1. Evidence of sequencing of approaches/entry points according to national contexts 
 Ind 3.2.2. Key questions such as ―How should existing interventions best evolve?‖ are addressed 
in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Prior to LGDG support, the EC/EU had supported local level interventions (micro projects) with some 
semblance of ―bottom up support‖ to decentralisation, just as the EC/EU initially (2003) considered an 
intervention piloting Village level funding rather that supporting the wider national decentralisation 
reforms (the LGRP) or pilot for national LG development grant system (the LGDG). In the end (around 
2004-5) a decision was made that LGDG was the most appropriate.  
The decision was largely made as a reaction to the wider developments of the LGRP and other DPs 
agreement to stop various bilateral interventions in favour of a common supported national system 
rather than as a deliberate EC/EU strategy.  
3.3.3 JC3.3. The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential combination) has 
been appropriate to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.3.1. Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support decentralisation 
and how they supported national specificities 
 Ind 3.3.2. Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of the programme to 
be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
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 Ind 3.3.3. Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid deliver methods (such as ―When 
and how to use sector budget support?‖ or ―what are the risks related to the‖) are addressed in 
project documents 
 Ind 3.3.4. Assessment by Delegations on relative strength and weaknesses of various aid delivery 
methods. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
In 2004 it was decided by the EC/EU that support to LGDG would the most appropriate direct support 
to decentralisation reforms. A Financial Proposal was prepared the same year and submitted June 
2005 to HQ, however rejected because of the proposed aid modality (financing the LGDG through 
LGRP basket funding). Annex 6 provides details on the formulation timeline, where internal EC/EU 
discussion focused mainly on aid delivery methods with concerns in HQ about basket funding. These 
problems prevented the EC/EU to take more of a lead role in decentralisation support and delayed 
funding decisions. 
Like other DPs, EC/EU also started increasing GBS while it was commonly agreed that some 
earmarked funding was required for a number of years to establish the LGDG system before it 
ultimately would be fully financed by GoT (through GBS and own revenue generation).  Most bilaterals 
preferred to provide such funding through a pooled arrangement using the existing LGRP basket fund 
mechanism. For the World Bank it was necessary to establish a separate project. In theory it would 
have been possible to fund the LGDG in an earmarked manner through SBS – but this would have 
been an added institutional arrangement that couldn't be agreed upon given the earlier engagement 
by bilaterals and WB. From GoT perspective (and from several of the participating bilateral DPs) the 
agreed basket funding arrangement was effectively seen as SBS since the funds after pooling in the 
basket were transferred to Treasury and from there disbursed directly to all 114 LGs using GoT 
accounting procedures only4.  
3.3.4 JC3.4. The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national contexts 
Indicators: 
 Ind 3.4.1. EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and institutional analysis of the 
role of the different actors in decentralisation and governance processes 
 Ind 3.4.2. Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve established 
decentralisation objectives 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The EC/EU includes in its CSPs political and institutional analysis of the role of the different actors in 
decentralisation and governance processes, however analysis is based on work lead by other DPs 
(leading the LGR). 
The EC/EU decided to join the LGDG and in this manner work mainly with PMO-RALG and MOFEA 
as lead partners. EC/EU didn't engage significantly with NGOs as e.g., the NGO working group on LG 
reforms and ALAT were supported by other DPs more actively engaged in LGR.  However, ALAT 
currently seeks assistance from a global EU Call for proposals to support LG associations. 
                                                     
4
 See the ODI analysis of Global SBS experiences where the Tanzanian LGDG is included as a case 
http://www.odi.org.uk/work/projects/details.asp?id=1013&title=sector-budget-support  
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3.4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and complementarity 
with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured coherence with EC policies and 
activities? 
3.4.1 JC4.1. The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing coordination 
mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on decentralisation support 
programmes at different levels) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.1.1. Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and governance issues 
among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.2. Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and 
member states ones or other donors ones 
 Ind 4.1.3. Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EU policy positions on decentralisation in 
partner countries 
 Ind 4.1.4. Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other donor approaches, 
when other donors lead mutual efforts to support decentralisation 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Coordination of support to decentralisation and local governance has since 2000 primarily been 
coordinated through the basket funded LGRP – led by GoT and basket funding partners but with the 
inclusion of non-basket funding DPs.  
The LGRP supported (up to 2004) mainly the ―soft‖ aspects of the decentralisation reforms: capacity 
building, institutional development etc whereas donor funding for local service delivery at that time 
primarily were channelled through various sector programmes (with basket or sector budget support 
arrangements in health and education and later also in agriculture, water and roads).  The budget 
allocations for the LGRP were therefore modest and below 10 millions USD annually. In addition to the 
LGRP, various DPs supported up to 2004 a range of bilateral program support for ―local governance‖, 
in particular in the form of various ―Area Based programmes‖: i.e. programmes that targeted selected 
districts with a combination of development funding for services (typically earmarked various capital 
investments in areas such as school construction, health centres, roads etc – but also frequently with 
some elements of ―budget support‖ to selected LGs).  
The decision by various DPs to fund the LGDG system provided them with an exit strategy from 
previous bilateral projects and enabled substantive aid harmonisation.  
The analytical works that led to the LGDG were the outcome of major joint DP efforts: in 2003 the 
LGRP basket decided to finance the required analyses that initially would lead to WB support for the 
LGDG. The WB managed the consultancies in cooperation with participating bilateral DPs.  
As discussed earlier, the EC/EU proved flexible (after extensive administrative delays) to adapt to the 
jointly agreed LGDG approach. The EC/EU financial contribution was significant (22 million EUR) and 
enabled the nationwide scale up of the system.  
3.4.2 JC4.2. There is complementarity between the interventions of the EC, the EU Member 
States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation arena 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.2.1. Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process 
 Ind 4.2.2. Evidence of clear division of tasks agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies and other 
donor agencies in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country  
 Ind 4.2.3. EC jointly finance decentralisation programmes with Members States and major donors 
 Ind 4.2.4. EC policy officials and EU delegations' personnel participate in joint programmes and 
policy forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The aid harmonisation agenda in Tanzania is in a very advanced state with significant emphasis on 
the use of GBS and elaborate institutional arrangements for division of labour among DPs.  
Support to decentralisation reforms is primarily coordinated through the basket funded LGRP although 
some separate projects are continued (by WB mainly in direct support to urban sector; by USAID and 
various bilateral DPs mainly supporting NSAs).  
The LGDG is co-financed by several bilateral EU member states, the EU and World Bank.  
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The aid harmonisation agenda has taken issues of ―complementarity‖ further as each main sector 
(including ―decentralisation‖) preferably is to be supported by only one lead DP and limited supporting 
DPs. As part of this aid harmonisation agenda EC/EU left decentralisation as a ―sector‖ and only 
indirectly follow sector developments through other lead DPs.  
3.4.3 JC4.3. EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other policies, 
programmes and activities 
Indicators: 
 Ind 4.3.1. Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors such 
as health, education, road infrastructure… 
 Ind 4.3.2. Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and environment into 
decentralisation programmes 
 Ind 4.3.3. Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Coordination between various sectors and decentralisation reforms has for long constituted a major 
issue in Tanzania. However, with the establishment of the LGDG system, it became possible to 
address many of these issues in a practical manner by mainstreaming sector funding into the LGDG 
system. In 2005 PMO-RALG produced a policy paper on how sector funding could be integrated into 
LGDG system, and the same year it was designed and later implemented for the agricultural sector 
(as part of the ASDP). The EC/EU participated constructively in the design process but has not lately 
been active in the ASDP basket. An evaluation has recently been conducted that have a very positive 
assessment of achievements of local agricultural development through the ASDP/Agricultural window 
of the LGDG5.  
In the Education sector funding to LGs continued for long to be slightly parallel to the LGDG system (a 
crash programme for class room construction was for instance implemented under PEDP) but from 
2007 funding for infrastructure development was largely integrated into LGDG system. The education 
sector is the financially most important for LGs; major issues persists in the sector related to facilitation 
of LGs including continued major inequalities of teacher allocations (that currently is centrally 
managed but from the LGR has been advocated as fully devolved and subject to equitable formula 
based financing) and inadequacies in capitation grant allocations to schools through the LGs. 
In the road sector districts and municipalities have been provided with approximately 30% of the 
nationally collected road funds for maintenance of roads under the responsibility of LGs. The financing 
modality is not fully integrated into LGDG system but does provide fairly reliable and equitable level of 
funding for LGs to maintain (and upgrade) local roads.  
The role of the EC/EU in work related to ensuring coordination between sectors and decentralisation 
reforms has however been relatively limited and largely lead by other DPs more active in the 
decentralisation reforms.  
Crosscutting issues like gender and environment have been integrated into the overall LGRP and 
addressed e.g. through planning and budget guidelines used by LGs when planning use of the LGDG. 
However, the EC/EU has compared to other DPs only played a marginal role in integration of such 
issues. 
Decentralisation issues have for long featured in the GBS dialogue. However, the importance attached 
to decentralisation has differed among DPs; until recently SIDA has as one of the few DPs had explicit 
performance tranche related to decentralisation. The EC/EU has until the most recent GBS agreement 
not had explicit performance tranches but relied on more holistic assessments. In the most recent 
agreement (MDG Contract 2009/2015 – CRIS TZ/FED/2009/021-300) that provides for 300 million 
EUR GBS from the EC/EU it includes a joint approach to GBS performance tranches with Denmark, 
Germany and Ireland. One out of five elements of the performance tranche criteria relates to 
decentralisation as the government is required to ―introduce regionally disaggregated targets for a 
number of key social indicators (health and education – at least one each) into PAF 2011‖. The 
particular wording of the indicator followed a long debate as many of the previous PAF indicators on 
decentralisation had been difficult to assess in an objective and mutually agreed manner. In particular, 
it had in past years been difficult to reach agreement between DPs and GoT on how to measure 
progress on fiscal decentralisation. One key policy reform under the LGRP had been attempts for 
transforming fiscal transfers to LGs towards a formula based system based on objective needs rather 
                                                     
5 Evaluation of the performance and achievements of the Agricultural Sector development Programme 
(ASDP) second draft April 2011.  
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than existing services (e.g. allocation of funds for education based on number of school age going 
children rather than existing number of teachers in a district). MOFEA had on several occasions 
disputed the interpretation of the policy objective (arguing that only OC and not PE should be subject 
to formula based allocations), and it appeared increasingly in recent years as if policy direction in the 
LGR was interpreted differently by the lead LGRP DPs, the LGRP and GoT. The introduction of 
alternative performance measures were by the EUD in part seen as a way out of this deadlock in 
policy dialogue.  
3.5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation of 
powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
3.5.1 JC5.1. National decentralisation policies and strategies have been developed 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.1.1. Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific devolution 
processes 
 Ind 5.1.2. Existence and quality of national government institutional arrangements to implement 
decentralisation reform 
Main findings from the field mission: 
As discussed in Annex 5, the Government of Tanzania has since 1995 pursued a decentralisation 
policy that since 1998 has been guided by a Local Government Reform Policy. The PMO-RALG has 
been the lead institution responsible for implementation and further update of the policy. The PMO-
RALG has since 2000 been supported by a dedicated Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) 
team funded by a range of Development Partners through a basket funded arrangement.  
The EC/EU support to the LGDG made some contribution to overall decentralisation policy and 
strategy as: 
 The LGDG itself became the main vehicle/GoT Strategy for devolution of the development 
budget, 
 Once the LGDG was established around 2004 it further developed into a strategy for 
devolution of sector development interventions starting with the design of modality for 
decentralised agriculture sector interventions (the Agriculture Development Grant under the 
ASDP) as a ―window‖ of the LGDG in 2005 – soon to be followed by windows for other sectors 
including health, water, education and urban environment.  
The EC/EU was one among several funding partners contributing to the LGDG. Although not a lead 
donor its contribution was nevertheless critical for the establishment of the system: The World Bank 
originally led the design of the LGDG but had suggested that the system first should be piloted in 30% 
of the Local Governments through a World Bank credit effective from 2004. The bilateral donors active 
in the LGRP basket urged for a more rapid implementation – not least because the introduction of the 
LGDG system also was seen as exit strategy for DPs supporting various ―Area Based Programmes‖. 
Especially the Dutch and Irish Embassies were keen to see this change happen soon because of 
recent poor assessments of their area-based programmes and because of the increasing demands on 
DPs for aid harmonisation. The EC/EU contributions of 23 million EUR made the upscale of the 
system on a national basis possible to achieve with co-funding from other EU member states (initially 
the Irish, Dutch and Belgians – later also Germany). 
3.5.2 JC5.2. National legislations supporting decentralisation processes (especially the 
transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.2.1. Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
 Ind 5.2.2. Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation policy 
Main findings from the field mission: 
A major weakness of the reforms in Tanzania has been the lack of comprehensive legal reforms along 
the principles outlined in the Local Government Reform policy (see Annex 5). The LGDG did not alter 
any aspects of this – nor did the dialogue around GBS. GBS dialogue included elements associated 
with local government reforms. The most pressing issues in that regard were policy issues related to 
implementation of fiscal decentralisation – in particular use of formula based allocations for more 
transparent and equitable allocation of resources to LGs.  
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The LGRP pursued legal aspects of decentralisation reforms including review of sector legislation – 
this largely failed. The particular EC/EU contributions to the reform (the LGDG) did not have any 
objectives related to legal reforms.  
3.5.3 JC5.3. Local governments fiscal and human resources have increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.3.1. Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human resources (e.g. 
number and quality of staff, share of public employees working in local governments as 
percentage of entire public service over last ten years) 
 Ind 5.3.2. Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level (e.g. LGs share of total public 
expenditures, prominent changes in fiscal transfers, changes in the assignment of taxes and 
increase in own revenue, increase in LG borrowing) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
As further discussed in Annex 5, it is evident that local government capacities in terms of human and 
fiscal resources have increased tremendously over the last decade. Main trends are summarised in 
the two tables below. 
Table 3 LG Share of total Public Employment 
  1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Central 108.363 101.074 97.146 92.393 92.951 91.407 90.928 92.436 90.708 91.950 97.775 
Regional 24.119 22.667 19.192 16.637 10.172 9.776 10.088 10.302 10.064 9.835 9.481 
Local G 163.255 163.297 156.842 155.397 169.285 168.490 177.812 189.979 187.149 204.606 219.573 
Total 295.737 287.038 273.180 264.427 272.408 269.673 278.828 292.717 287.921 306.391 326.829 
LG share 55% 57% 57% 59% 62% 62% 64% 65% 65% 66% 67% 
Local teachers     110.116 109.879 116.713 116.801 126.744 144.286 154.186 
Teachers share of 
all LG Employees     65% 65% 66% 61% 67% 70% 70% 
non-teacher LG     59.169 58.611 61.099 73.178 60.405 60.320 65.387 
Non teacher 
growth rate          -0.9% 4.2% 19.8% -17.5% -0.1% 8.4% 
Source: PSM HR and Payroll Database 
Table 4 LG Share of total Public Expenditure6 
Fiscal Year (FY) 
Total Recurrent Expenditure 
(TSH billion) 
LG share 
2001/02 1.253 18,7% 
2002/03 1.527 19,0% 
2003/04 1.834 17,7% 
2004/05 2.252 17,0% 
2005/06 2.875 18,6% 
2006/07 3.142 24,3% 
2007/08 5.452 21% 
2008/09 6.536 21% 
2009/10 7.991 28% 
                                                     
6
  Note that for 2001-2006/07 the data are actual expenses (but only from recurrent budget) as published 
by PMO-RALG (URT, 2007)—this is the last year of a published local government fiscal review and that data from 
subsequent years hasn‘t been published by PMO-RALG. Data from 2006/07-2009/10 is based on data collected 
from the LG DPG (2010). 
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LGs share of development funding is significantly less – but the recent increases are relatively more 
substantial as it increased from 7.9% in 2007/08 to 18.5% in 2010/117  
These substantive increases of development funding to LGs are a direct result of the LGDG system: 
from 2005 it was rolled out as a national system for all (qualifying) LGs with an average level of 
funding of 1.5 USD/capita – later additional ―windows‖ of the LGDG were introduced for agriculture 
sectors, urban environment, education, water, and health sectors.  
The EC/EU support contributed to the establishment of the LGDG system and overall increases in LG 
transfers partly by its direct contribution to the LGDG but also through GBS support where a key 
performance indicator was defined in terms of increased share of public expenditure as LG transfers. 
3.5.4 JC5.4. Local governments autonomy has increased 
Indicators: 
 Ind 5.4.1. Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share of funds that are 
discretionary, autonomy in budgeting without central government approval, etc) 
 Ind 5.4.2. Evolution of autonomy in human resource management (HRM): the extent to which LGs 
can hire and fire or otherwise manage personnel. 
 Ind 5.4.3. The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and the local governments’ 
degree of autonomy is well described in legislation. 
Main findings from the field mission: 
As further discussed in Annex 5, while the reforms in Tanzania successfully have increased the 
resources and capacities in LGs, then there has not been much change in the relative degree of 
autonomy of the local governments. The following shortcomings can be noted: 
 LGs depend largely on fiscal transfers from central government – they generate only 
approximately 5% of their total expenditures through own source revenue generation.  
 From 2004-05 a number of LG taxes were abolished by central government and LGs (ALAT) 
dispute the extent to which they have been compensated adequately for this, 
 The central government significantly earmark use of transfers to LGs: the transfers are mainly 
sector specific (health, education etc) and within each sectoral transfer there are typically very 
strict earmarking regarding the use of funds, 
 Central government continue to send instructions to LGs regarding how they are to prioritise 
spending on even own source revenue, 
 Human resource management in LGs has largely been even more centralised after the Public 
Service Act of 2004 (in spite of other intentions in the LGR Policy), 
However, there have also been a few improvements – in particular related to the LGDG system. While 
the LGs increasingly rely on fiscal transfers for their budgets and while GoT in many cases have made 
these transfers in a highly earmarked manner, then the LGDG provide an alternative model: funds are 
transferred without string earmarking: the LGs can decide to use the funds for water, education, 
health, roads or other local priorities. The LGDG has in this manner slightly increased local autonomy 
of LGs by empowering their local budget prioritisation process.  
                                                     
7
  Rapid Budget Analysis 2010 (GBS partners): Aggregate Analysis Background Note – Public Expenditure 
Review November 2010.  
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3.6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in partner 
countries? 
3.6.1 JC6.1. Improved management and administrative capacity of key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation (incl. 
activities of oversight and support to decentralised bodies) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.1.1. Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy formulation and reform 
implementation activities effectively 
 Ind 6.1.2. Perception by stakeholders (LG & civil society organisation - CSO) that capacities of key 
central government bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation have 
improved 
 Ind 6.1.3. Existence and use of M&E system 
 Ind 6.1.4. Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in support of 
decentralisation policy 
The extent to which central government stakeholders have improved capacities for implementation of 
decentralisation strategies is somehow debatable in Tanzania as central government increasingly is 
being criticised (by NGOs, by ALAT and some DPs) for being effectively implementing the reform 
policy. However, in some areas related to the LGDG system, improvements can be noticed: 
 Intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations have become more rule bound as LGs on the 
one hand have been granted formal autonomy in deciding in LGDG utilisation whereas central 
Government oversight role has been strengthened and operational through e.g. the annual 
assessment system, 
 M&E system has been strengthened by the annual assessment system that gives an up to 
date assessment of LG capacities and their adherence to GoT regulations, 
 A basic reporting system has been put in place that monitors fiscal transfers to LGs, their own 
revenue generation and expenditures8. 
Central government capacities (or political willingness) for decentralisation policy formulation is by 
many stakeholders considered weak – e.g. reflected in the critique by CSOs and DPs of Government 
policy formulations related to the latest LG Act amendments, the Public Service Act sections dealing 
with LG staff and recent Constituency Development Fund.  
3.6.2 JC6.2. Improved capacities of local governments for management of decentralised 
administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.2.1. Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
 Ind 6.2.2. Evidence of improved planning in local  
 Ind 6.2.3. Evidence of improved HRM in local governments 
 Ind 6.2.4. Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the use of information 
produced at local level 
Details are provided in Annex 5, but briefly the LGDG has contributed to improvements in areas of: 
 Improved financial management – clearly reflected in the improved audit reports from Auditor 
General and annual LG assessments, 
 Improved development planning: increased public participation, more comprehensive plans 
that are better linked to budgets – reflected in e.g. the results of the annual LG assessments. 
Some of the weaker areas of LG capacities include HRM (not significantly targeted by LGDG): 
however, the main constraint has also been the significant lack of policy commitment effectively to 
decentralise staff to LGs. 
Another weak area is development of consistent local M&E systems. Several systems have been 
introduced – most frequently through sector specific initiatives and frequently in an uncoordinated 
manner at LG levels. The quality of local data on many key issues are weak and not used in a 
                                                     
8
 Originally published at www.logintanzania.net and more recently www.pmoralg.go.tz  
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systematic manner for decision making – the LGDG however did not explicitly target this area for 
support although it included it as one of its annual performance criteria (see box below) and in this 
manner provided some incentives for LGs to use M&E systems. 
The PMO-RALG guidelines require LGAs continuously use the Local Government Monitoring 
Database (LGMD) in monitoring development outcomes so as to inform decision making and policy 
formulation at all levels. In FY 2008/09, 105 (83,7%) effectively used the system while 27 (16,2%) did 
not. It was reported in most LGAs that the LGMD system had broken down and was hence not 
functional.  
Source: Annual Assessment Synthesis Report, PMORALG 2010, page 21 
3.6.3 JC6.3. Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, etc) 
Indicators: 
 Ind 6.3.1. Establishment and improvement of performance of local government associations 
 Ind 6.3.2. Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local governments for service 
delivery and improved local governance 
 Ind 6.3.3. Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government issues 
Improvement of NSA was not an objective of LGDG or other EC/EU support to decentralisation. Other 
DPs have been more active in this area and a fairly strong network of NGOs working with LGs has 
been created under the NGO Policy Forum. The EC/EU support to NSA has not had ―decentralisation‖ 
of ―local governance‖ as a strategic focus but ha supported a number of NGOs working with local 
service delivery issues. 
Some DPs (in particular NORAD) have strengthened local research capacities (at REPOA) for 
research on LG issues. The programme (formative research on local government reforms) has 
published extensively and built local capacities for research on local government reform issues 
(http://www.repoa.or.tz/content/blogcategory/22/49/)  
The EC/EU has not been active in this area.  
3.7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability and transparency? 
3.7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.1.1. Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
 Ind 7.1.2. Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all phases of local 
government planning cycle 
Multi party elections were introduced in 1994 in LGs one year prior to national elections and have 
been undertaken with five years intervals in 1999, 2004, and latest in 2009. As further discussed in 
Annex 5, the electoral system has remained largely unchanged since 1994, although reform measures 
have been suggested in order to reform the system. Currently the dominant national party (CCM) 
dominates local elections totally because of the electoral rules (that inter alia prevent independent 
candidates). The various donor funded interventions (such as LGRP and LGDG) have failed to put 
electoral reform on the agenda9. 
Citizens‘ direct participation in LG affairs has on the other hand receiving significant attention from 
various DP funded initiatives – in particular support for ―participatory development planning‖. This has 
in recent years been institutionalised by PMO-RALG and rolled out as ―Opportunities and Obstacles to 
Development (O&OD) approach to participatory planning. Several DPs have also supported CSOs to 
engage with LGs for deepening local accountability.  
The EC/EU has through the LGDG boosted the effectiveness of such initiatives as the LGDG provided 
discretionary funding that effectively enabled LGs to budget according to local priorities, and thus has 
brought the participatory planning beyond merely wish lists.  
3.7.2 JC7.2. Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised units 
Indicators: 
                                                     
9
 The issue was discussed in 1994 prior to development of the LGR Policy but the Government rejected reform 
measures (personal communication with Ole Therkildsen, Civil Service Reform Advisor in 1994). Later years 
political dialogue and development assistance has focused mainly on national electoral issues.  
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 Ind 7.2.1. Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens 
(notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards etc) 
Main findings from the field mission: 
Other DPs than EC/EU have in recent years supported NGOs to strengthen community capacities for 
improved local accountability through use of citizen score cards, local public expenditure tracking etc.  
The EC/EU supported LGDG includes as part of its annual performance criteria indicators regarding 
the extent to which LGs publicize their annual budgets and accounts through use of notice boards. As 
a result, the majority of LGs today publicize budgets and accounts.  
3.7.3 JC7.3. Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Indicators: 
 Ind 7.3.1. Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based grants, etc. 
 Ind 7.3.2. Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their allocation) provided 
to the citizens 
Main findings from the field mission: 
The GoT has since 2003 begun to introduce a more transparent and equitable formula based system 
for allocation of fiscal resources among LGs. The system has been most successful for allocation of 
development funds – spearheaded by the LGDG. Funds for allocation of LGDG and related ―sector 
windows‖ of the LGDG are all shared among LGs according to simple formula based allocations 
(typically based on population and adjusted to poverty, land area etc). A similar system has since 
2004 attempted to be introduced for recurrent funding streams (salaries/PE and other charges/OC). 
As discussed further in Annex 5, this has in practice never been effectively implemented because GoT 
has resisted further devolution of staff management which in turn make fiscal allocation of PE on 
formula meaningless.  
Fund transfers are today to a large degree published in newspapers – especially funds from the LGDG 
system. The dissemination is however not yet systematic although LGDG has set a good example. 
The PMO-RALG has also established a website with overview of both transfers and expenditures at 
LG level. http://www.logintanzania.net/index.htm and www.pmoralg.go.tz  
3.8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes contributed to 
enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
3.8.1 JC8.1. Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources for local 
service provision 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.1.1. Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to administration) in 
local governments 
 Ind 8.1.2. Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based/ formula based allocations 
 Ind 8.1.3. Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of social service 
Main findings from the field mission: 
In section 3.5.3 we described the amazingly extensive overall increase in LG budgets has been: an 
incredible ten fold increase over ten years (from 0.2 billion Tshs in 2000 to 2.2 billion Tshs in 2009). 
This increase has largely been in the form of earmarked central government transfers for key services 
under local government responsibility such as: education, health, agriculture, roads and (to a lesser 
extent) water.  
Reliable data on LG expenditures for the entire ten-year period under review are not readily available. 
However, it is evident that most of budget increases have been earmarked for priority sectors (not 
least because almost 80% of the funds have been earmarked central government transfers for these 
sectors). Annex 6 provides a detailed overview: LGs would typically spend more than 50% on 
education services, some 14% on health with lesser allocations to various other sectors. Costs for 
administration (the political council and various non sector specific staff such as accountants, tax 
collectors, and administrative officers including village executives, ward executives etc.) were about 
13%. 
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Figure 2 Expenditure Patterns10 
 
 
Most of the increased LGs resources come from fiscal transfers (see Annex 5 for details) – in 
particular earmarked fiscal transfers for education and health, so the above expenditure patterns come 
as no surprise. 
The particular EC/EU contributions to these developments have foremost been the EC/EU GBS that 
has been a significant (but not sole) source enabling the GoT to increase its budgetary allocations for 
services such as education and health through LGs.  
The EC/EU contribution to the LGDG has also been significant for establishing an overall system for 
transfer of development funds to LGs. Development funds for LGs are today transferred on a formula 
basis. 
Public private partnerships (PPPs) are developing in all sectors, although private sector participation in 
some sectors has been under significant competition from a rapidly expanding public sector (in 
particular in health and education sector). In the agricultural sector more emphasis is paid to PPPs. 
For all infrastructure development, LGs have over the last 15 years largely abandoned past practices 
of direct implementation and instead outsourced construction works to the private sectors. The LGDG 
requires all LGs to outsource construction work. 
3.8.2 JC8.2. Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 Ind 8.2.1. Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and assessments of their 
adequacy 
 Ind 8.2.2. Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance (operational 
schools, operational water points, etc) 
Data on operation and maintenance of facilities in LGs are rather scarce in Tanzania, with the 
exception of road maintenance where data suggests that percentage of rural roads qualified as 
passable (good and fair) has improved from 50% in 2005 to 56% in 201011 – this modest improvement 
is primarily the result of support financed under the Road Fund. It is widely recognised that O&M of 
water facilities is poor, but LGs responsibilities also are vaguely defined (primarily community based 
O&M). Data on O&M of e.g. schools is almost non-existent: an enormous expansion (more than 
doubling of school infrastructure) took place in recent years at great speed that may constitute a major 
O&M burden in near future.  
The LGDG intends to strengthen LGs capacities for O&M; however the measures applied for doing so 
are weak. O&M issues are included in the annual assessments, but the analysis of O&M budgets is 
not very detailed (see box below with summary of annual assessments in 2010). 
It is prudent for LGAs to ensure sustainability of their investments. As such, the Assessment sought to 
establish if the LGAs make budgetary provision and practical executions for operation and 
                                                     
10
 See annex 6 for details.  
11
 Data from 2011 GBS PAF. 
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maintenance of investments. All the LGAs except Mwanga DC made budgetary provisions for O&M of 
investments for FY 2009/10. While all LGAs except Mkuranga DC, Chato DC, Kisarawe DC and Rufigi 
DC (3%) had no evidence of having executed the budgetary provisions in FY 2008/09. 
3.8.3 JC8.3. Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided services 
Indicators: 
 8.3.1. Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery esp. for vulnerable 
groups (quantitative expansion of services) 
 8.3.2 Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services 
Tanzania has witnessed marked quantitative improvement in access to services provided by LGs, in 
particularly in areas where LGs have received substantive fiscal central government transfers over the 
last 5 years – i.e. in particular in the sectors of education (the by far largest sector in local 
governments) and health, but it is increasingly recognised that quality of service provision is a major 
challenge12. It is broadly recognised that local government reforms have played a major facilitating role 
in this quantitative expansion of services, but also that the lack of certain elements of LG reform (e.g. 
regarding staff devolution and effective implementation of formula based fiscal transfers) have 
impacted negatively on the degree of equity in resource allocation and possible qualitative aspects of 
services. The major explanation of relative poor qualitative improvements in e.g. education sector 
relates however to sector specific issues such as inadequate attention to teacher training and 
motivation, inadequate allocation of school materials etc.  The trends for selected main sectors 
delivered by LGs can be briefly summarised as below13. 
Education 
Enrolment in primary education has improved significantly since 2003 and remains high, but has 
declined from 97,3% in 2007 to 95,9% in 2009 (Figure below). 
The MKUKUTA target of 99% by 2010 is still attainable; however, reaching the children not yet 
enrolled will be a significant challenge, since it implies enrolling the children who are the hardest to 
reach at the requisite age, including the disabled. 
Figure 3 Net enrolment rate (%) 
 
 
There has also been sustained progress in access to pre-primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
However, pass rates of the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) and the transition rates from 
primary to secondary school have deteriorated recently, highlighting the ongoing challenges of 
achieving quality in educational outcomes at all levels. 
                                                     
12
 For general analysis of trends in service delivery in Tanzania see Publications by the Research and Analysis 
Technical Working Group http://www.repoa.or.tz/content/blogcategory/35/67/#ph09 for excellent critique of 
problems related to Quality of services see e.g. http://www.twaweza.org/  
13
 The below section is large extraction from the Poverty and Human Development Report 2009 and in particular 
Brief 2 Progress Towards Improved Quality of Life and Social Well-being for All Tanzanians – available at 
www.repoa.or.tz   
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Children from all wealth quintiles have benefited from the expansion of primary and secondary 
education since 2000 as shown in the higher net attendance rates reported by HBS 2007 (Table 
below). However, data indicate that the least poor continue to benefit disproportionately from 
government spending in education, particularly in access to tertiary education. The proportion of 
young people from the poorest two quintiles of households who are attending tertiary institutions is 
only 4%, compared with 56% from the least poor quintile. Gender parity has been achieved in primary 
enrolment but only limited improvements are recorded at higher levels. 
Table 5 Primary and Secondary School Net Attendance Rates, by Wealth Quintile, 2000/01 
and 2007 
 
The wide variations in educational outcomes reflect persistent disparities in budget allocations to local 
government authorities (LGAs) for education. In 2008/09, the ten LGAs with the lowest budgets 
received on average TShs 21.000 for staffing per child, compared with TShs 161.000 per child for the 
ten LGAs with the highest budgets. In the 20% of districts with the highest budgets, the average pupil-
teacher ratio is 44:1; in the 20% with the smallest budgets, it is 70:1. In the 20% of districts with the 
highest budgets the PSLE pass rate is 57.6%, whereas in the bottom 20% of districts it is 43.6% 
(URT, 2008). Formula-based grants to LGAs were intended to improve equity in education funding, 
but are not yet fully implemented.  
Annex 5 provides more analysis of this issue. 
Health  
The continued decline in under-five mortality means that Tanzania is on track to meet the MKUKUTA 
goal in 2010 and the MDG for under-five mortality in 2015 (MDG 4) is also within reach (Figure below). 
 
Figure 4 Estimated and Projected Under-Five Mortality 1997 - 2015 
 
 
Water and Sanitation  
The latest survey data show a downward trend in access to clean and safe water in both urban and 
rural areas. In HBS 2007, only 40,5% of rural households and 79,4% of urban households reported 
access to a piped or protected water source (Figure 6). These data were collected prior to 
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implementation of the Water Sector Development Programme but the trend is nevertheless very 
worrying. 
Figure 5 Survey Data on Water Supply 
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4 Conclusions concerning the hypotheses to be tested in the field 
phase and main challenges to be discussed in the synthesis 
phase 
Research focus  Mainly related to EQ 
Clarity of EC/EU policy/strategies on decentralisation according to national 
stakeholders and other international donors 
1 
Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support to decentralisation – how were priorities 
made in the delegation? Did the general EC/EU framework for support to 
decentralisation facilitate decisions? 
2 
Appropriateness of GBS as aid modality for decentralisation support; how has policy 
dialogue been affected? To what extent has decentralisation process and outcomes 
been affected, what has been the specific EC/EU contribution? 
3 
Coherence between major sector interventions (such as in education sector) and 
decentralisation support 
4 
Documented results of decentralisation process and the relative importance of 
EC/EU support (though LGDG, GBS, NGO support and sector (education etc) 
interventions. 
5-8 
 
The following general lessons and key conclusions emerge from the Tanzania case: 
Clarity of EC/EU policy/strategies on decentralisation 
Global EC/EU policies for support to decentralisation are not well known in Tanzania; the strategies 
are primarily locally set. If the EC/EU wants to pursue decentralisation as a core area of support it will 
require a more significant effort for disseminating such a policy locally.  
Institutional capacity of EC/EU for support to decentralisation 
The Tanzanian Aid Harmonisation Agenda requires a strict division of labour among DPs, which 
required the EC/EU to focus on few sectors and for instance exit ―decentralisation‖ as a focal sector. 
The general EC/EU framework for support to decentralisation did not facilitate decisions as it was not 
clearly communicated to EUD staff. In theory ―decentralisation‖ becomes a ―cross cutting issue‖ within 
other support programmes (and GBS in particular – see below), but without direct engagement in the 
LGRP it is difficult for EUD to engage proactively in analysis and dialogue on decentralisation issues – 
this is by definition delegated to another group of DPs defined as ―lead DPs‖ in the sector.  
Coherence between major sector interventions 
The support to decentralisation, various sector support and GBS has in Tanzania been quite coherent. 
The practical efforts for harmonisation has in many sectors primarily taken place through 
harmonisation of LG financing modalities and the LGDG system have been central in that regard. 
EC/EU has played an indirect role through its participation in LGDG support, but has not been a lead 
among DPs to ensure such harmonisation.  
Documented results of decentralisation process 
The LGR in Tanzania have been implemented for more than a decade. Substantive achievements can 
be noted in areas of  
 LG capacity building (substantive increase in staff resources and capacities for e.g. improved 
financial management, planning and project implementation), 
 Increase in fiscal resources (more than ten fold over a ten year period), 
 Some improvement in local governance (participatory planning, transparency in resource 
allocation etc) – however no progress on the degree of relative local government autonomy, 
 Substantive quantitative expansion of services – but limited progress in several qualitative 
aspects of service delivery. 
Appropriateness of LGDG as modality for decentralisation support  
EC/EU support to the LGDG has made a significant contribution to the above overall achievements. 
The LGDG constitutes an international ―good practice‖ where  
 The system has served as instrument for aid harmonisation and building of national funding 
systems (rather than purely instrument for delivery of aid to LGs), 
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 An incentive system has been established for LGs to improve their performance, which 
combined with the inherent capacity building grants has proved effective for building LGs 
capacities, 
 Funding is provided in a manner that empowers local planning and budgeting (by being non 
earmarked, fully integrated into LG budgets and also with proviso for indicative budget figures 
for lower level LGs), 
 The model was initially fully donor funded but is increasingly funded by GoT and becoming an 
integral part of the overall Intergovernmental fiscal framework in Tanzania, -in future it will no 
longer be required to have dedicated DP support for LGDG but in the initial stages of the 
design and implementation it was critical to have direct / earmarked DP support.  
Appropriateness of GBS as aid modality for decentralisation support 
GBS has clearly been indicated as the preferred aid modality by GoT and has been critical for 
Tanzania‘s recent achievements in expansion of social sector service delivery (through LGs).  
Decentralisation issues have for many years been included as part of the overall PAF. The 
assessment of decentralisation issues has for several years been rather negative, largely because of 
lack of GoT progress on intended aspects of LGR that would provide LGs more autonomy and more 
equitable resource distribution through use of formula based grants. The recent EC/EU agreement on 
GBS has sought to circumvent some if the past years problems in policy dialogue by formulating 
indicators that are less ―intrusive‖ and yet target some of the same key problems (the unequal 
allocation of resources) – questions related to LG autonomy are absent in the agreement (but still 
included in wider PAF). GBS dialogue on decentralisation issues could probably have been more 
effective if technical support to implementation of fiscal decentralisation issues to a larger extent had 
been provided to MOFEA rather than PMO-RALG (that has limited mandate for such reforms). 
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5 Annexes  
5.1 Annex 1: The list of people interviewed 
Name of the person interviewed Organisation 
Date of the 
interview 
Enrico Strampelli  
Delegation of the European Union, Tanzania 
Head of Cooperation 
 
Stefan Schleuning  
Delegation of the European Union, Tanzania 
Head of Economic Section 
 
Kirza Buch Kristensen 
Delegation of the European Union, Tanzania, 
Governance  
 
Maria Iarrera  Delegation of the European Union, Tanzania  
Riika Torppa  
Delegation of the European Union, Tanzania 
(Programme Officer, Economics, Governance 
and Regional Integration)  
 
Robert Foote  
Belgian Technical Cooperation; Technical Advisor 
on Local Governance and head of DP local 
government reform group  
 
Frank Holtmeir  GTZ, Head of DP LGR Group   
Hans Raadschilders  
Dutch Embassy, for previous five years head of 
DP LGR Group  
 
Joseph Mallya 
PMO-RALG, LGRP Finance Outcome Manager 
(working on LGR since 1995) 
 
Ron McGill PMO-RALG, LGRP CTA   
Habraham Shamumoyo General Secretary ALAT   
Sadick S. A. Magwaya 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, EDF 
Programme Support Unit (Head of programmes) 
 
Dr. Florence Temu AMREF 15
th
 April 2011 
Eng. Koronel Mashalla Kema  AMREF 15
th
 April 2011 
Mr Wilfred Lema  AMREF  15
th
 April 2011 
Mr. Smart Daniel HelpAge International 15
th
 April 2011 
Necodimus Chipfupa HelpAge international 15
th
 April 2011 
Jarvis A. Simbeye Morogoro Municipal Council 16
th
 April 2011 
John Aloyce Morogoro Municipal Council 16
th
 April 2011 
Sidina Mathias Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
Nico S. Mwakibibi Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
Reuben Ndimbo.  Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
Penninah  R. Paul Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
Salome Gelege Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
Grace Lukagingira Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
Omari Jabah Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
Athumani S. Kambi Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
Hussein Mngata Morogoro Municipal Council 18
th
 April 2011 
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Samson Msemembo MOREPEO* 18
th
 April 2011 
Peter A. Mwita MOREPEO 18
th
 April 2011 
Godlight Lyimo MOREPEO 18
th
 April 2011 
Frank Rashid MOREPEO 18
th
 April 2011 
Evarad Wilson MOREPEO 18
th
 April 2011 
Adriani Kungalo MOREPEO 18
th
 April 2011 
 
*MOREPEO – Morogoro Elderly Peoples‘ Organisation 
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5.3 Annex 3: Detailed list of EC-funded interventions  
Table 6 Detailed list of EC-funded interventions related to decentralisation 
Intervention title 
Implementation 
period 
Planned 
amount 
(mEUR) 
Disbursed 
amount 
(mEUR) 
CRIS Decision 
Nr./Contract 
number 
Entry point 
Scope 
(National / 
Local) 
Aid modality 
Main contracting 
party 
Poverty Reduction through the 
Participation of Vulnerable People 
in Decentralised Development 
Planning and Budgeting in 
Tanzania 
2007 - 2012 0,75 0,4 
ONG-
PVD/2005/017-
215 / 118910 
 Bottom up L 
Grant to 
Private 
company, 
NGO or local 
association 
Private companies/ 
Dvpt agencies, 
Helpage 
International 
Support to Education Sector 
Reform 
2007 - 2012 43,25 33,94 
FED/2007/019-
633 
Sector N Grant to GoT 
Private companies/ 
Dvpt agencies, 
Tanzania 
Education Network 
Ltd 
Support to the Local Government 
Grant Scheme 
2006 - 2009 22,70 22,70 
FED/2007/018-
888 
 Bottom up N 
Common 
basket fund 
Government, 
Jamhuri Ya 
Mwungano Wa 
Tanzania 
Poverty Reduction Budget support 
programme (at least 2 financing 
decisions during the evaluation 
period: 2003-2006; 2006-2008) 
2003 - 2008 
98,60 
80,94 
98,60 
80,84 
FED/2003/016-
313 & 
FED/2006/017-
917 
 GBS N GBS 
Government, 
Jamhuri Ya 
Mwungano Wa 
Tanzania 
Indirect interventions         
n/a         
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5.4 Annex 4: Description of major interventions  
5.4.1 Intervention 1 
Title: Support to the Local Government Grant Scheme 
Budget: 22.700.000 EUR 
Start date: 2006 
 
Objectives and expected results:  
Overall objective: The overall objective of the project is to contribute to sustainable, viable and 
effective local authorities which will lead to improved public service delivery through good local 
governance and accelerate the poverty reduction efforts in Tanzania.  
Project purpose: 
The project will assist the government in achieving the objective of the grant system of creating a 
uniform, transparent and performance-based system for channelling development resources to the 
local government levels in order to improve capacity as well as service delivery. 
 
Expected results:  
The project intervention will have two overall results.  
The first is to enhance local authorities‘ capacity in areas of i) local government legislation, roles and 
responsibilities, ii) Management and leadership skills, iii) budgeting and budget management, iv) 
revenue mobilization and operation & maintenance budgeting, v) development planning and strategic 
planning, vi) Project preparation, investment, appraisal, environmental impact assessment and 
safeguard policies, vii) Project monitoring and evaluation, viii) Data collection, information 
management and record keeping and ix) Human resource management in local governments. This 
result is achieved by making available the Capacity Building Grant for all local government authorities 
to apply for. Two minimum criteria, Capacity Building Plan in place and timely reports on utilisation of 
the capacity building grant, determine whether the grant can be accessed. At the same time the 
capacity building will improve the chances of meeting the 16 minimum criteria (10 of which are 
primary) for access to the larger Capital Development Grant. Hence the capacity building also 
implicitly serves as an incentive for access to larger development funds.  
The second result is to expand the physical stock of new and rehabilitated infrastructure of local 
governments. This is achieved by making available the Capital Development Grant to all local 
authorities to apply for. Award of the grant is conditioned on complicity with, for the first year, minimum 
criteria, and in subsequent years also on assessment of performance within a range of nine 
governance measures, ranging from accountability to financial and human resource management. 
 
Activities: 
The main activities for both results relate to the yearly assessment cycle of the grant scheme. Local 
government authorities will provide plans and budgets for the two grants. Next step is the procurement 
and contract management of the capacity building, service or works supplied. This is succeeded by 
progress reporting. Before the final step follows an audit, and finally evaluation of the grant 
expenditures. The impact assessment will not take place until a couple of cycles have passed.  
5.4.2 Intervention 2 
Title: Poverty Reduction through the Participation of Vulnerable People in Decentralised 
Development Planning and Budgeting in Tanzania 
Budget:  745.279 EUR 
Start date: 2007 
 
Objectives and expected results: 
Overall objective: To contribute to the achievement of MKUKUTA's overall goals of growth and the 
reduction of income poverty, improved quality of life and social well being and good governance and 
accountability. 
Specific objective: To ensure that the concerns and entitlements of vulnerable people are 
incorporated into decentralised district planning and budgeting in order to support the achievement of 
MKUKUTA targets to improve the delivery of pro-poor services 
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Expected results:  
1. Increased capacity of partners, local government, and other CSOs to work with and through 
older people to improve the delivery of pro-poor services 
2. Local government development plans in 14 wards in 5 districts respond  to the needs 
prioritised by  vulnerable groups   
3. Improved delivery of services to vulnerable groups in 14 wards in 5 districts of Tanzania 
through partnerships between Local government, civil society organizations and communities 
4. Civil society monitor the delivery of key services and entitlements at local level and use 
evidence to influence policy formulation and implementation at ward, district and national 
levels. 
 
Activities: 
For result 1: 
 Introduction: Local government, INGO, CBO and FBO workshop 
 Orientation workshop:  financial, administrative and management orientation 
 Action Management Committee (AMC) establishment and meetings 
 Monitoring and evaluation 
For result 2:  
 Formation of Older People's Forums (OPFs) and Older People Monitoring Groups (OPMGs) 
 Meeting of OPMG members with Ward Development Council to influence village and ward 
level planning 
 Establish District Forums and a Multi District Review to influence planning at the district Level 
 Improve availability of data on vulnerable groups at district level 
For result 3: 
 Inform vulnerable groups of their entitlements to key services 
 Promote key service delivery for older people and their dependents in health, water, education 
and shelter in collaboration with CSOs, local government and the community 
 Providing identity cards to older people 
 Providing mosquito nets to older people and their dependents 
 Constructing water wells (spring box) 
 Providing school  uniforms and materials to OVCs 
 Map existing informal safety nets for vulnerable groups at village level.   
For result 4: 
 Train OPMGs in basic monitoring technique and progress tracking 
 Monitor target achievement by OPMGs 
 Evidence based advocacy at local, national and international levels 
 Advocacy capacity building for partners and OPMGs 
 Intervention in national and international events and processes to influence change in favour 
of older people. 
 
 
5.4.3 Intervention 3 
Title: Support to Education Sector Reform 
Budget: 43.250.000 EUR 
 
Start date: 2007 
 
Objectives and expected results: 
Through the EC contribution under the 9
th
 EDF, in line with the NSGRP objectives, greater attention 
wil1 be paid to equity and quality issues in the delivery of social services, recognising the role of Local 
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Government Authorities as the primary providers of services at the local level. The main objective of 
the sector programme will therefore be to 'improve the quality of education delivered to the public, 
while ensuring a more equitable and pro-poor access to effective and efficient education services'. 
This programme will focus on basic education'", especially through the indicators for variable tranches 
but without disregarding the other sub-sectors which will be part of fue policy dialogue between the 
EC, the government of Tanzania and its partners. 
 
Based on the current sector strategic documents (ESDP, PEDP and SEDP mainly) as well as the four 
main studies prepared to support the 2006 Education sector Review, the following expected results 
will be pursued by this programme: 
Result 1. Improved quality of Education 
 Increasing and strengthening in-service and pre-service teacher training 
 Strengthening regular and quality professional support from the Inspectorate. 
 Improving the assessment and examination systems 
 Rationalization of teacher deployment 
 Providing schools with sufficient quality teaching and learning materials as well as appropriate 
infrastructures 
 Strengthening governance in local authorities and at school level. 
Result 2: Increased equitable, pro-poor and pro-vulnerable educational services 
 Increasing enrolment of children and youth with disabilities, from other vulnerable groups (e.g. 
Orphans, street children) and from disadvantaged groups  
 Increasing performance and retention of girls throughout the education system 
 Encouraging equitable distribution of education institutions and resources In the territory 
 Preventing the re-emergence of schemes requesting (financial or in-kind) contribution from 
parents at primary level 
 Mitigating the impact of HN-AIDS on the education system (especially, development and 
implementation of a HIV-AIDS workplace policy or teachers), enhancing the role of schools and 
other education institutions in awareness campaigns 
 Expanding and improving the provision of vocational, adult, non formal, distance and out-of-school 
education, especially for women. 
Result 3. Strengthened Decentralization of service delivery in Basic Education: 
 Harmonizing the education grant system" and ensuring that it 1S channelled through the local 
government authorities transfer system. 
 Building capacity of local government authorities to allow them to abide by financial, technical and 
professional standards as set forth by the Ministry of Education. 
 Improving financial management (especially the reporting of expenditures), including procurement 
methods and practices. 
Result 4: An effective sector-wide and participatory decision making process Ensuring the 
development of the sector-wide approach, bringing all ministries involved in the sector as well as 
LGAs into cohesive planning and financing structures 
 A revised Education Sector Development Programme 
 A comprehensive financial framework officially endorsed by the government, consistent with 
national and departmental MTEFs, including donor support. 
 Ensuring the set-up of an effective ESMIS to allow a better evidenced based decision makmg 
process 
 Ensuring performance assessment measures feed back to education stakeholders, to Parliament 
and to beneficiaries 
 Promoting bottom-up planning, budgeting and monitoring processes with the involvement of non 
state actors 
 Promoting the participation of the Parliamentary Committee on Social Services in the education 
sector dialogue 
 Supporting the strengthening of NGOs' capacity to play an effective and innovative role in the 
promotion of education sector dialogue at central and local levels as well as their role in 
monitoring progress at school and community levels. 
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5.5 Annex 5: Detailed country context  
5.5.1 Decentralization in Tanzania14 
Tanzania (mainland) has for the last 20 years pursued a fairly well-articulated policy of 
decentralization by devolution that foresaw the transfer of powers, functions and resources to elected 
multifunctional local governments.15 It should be noted that the structure and history of the local 
government system differs significantly within the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) between 
Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar16. 
Local government reforms have been supported on the mainland since 2000 through a dedicated 
Local Government Reform Program (LGRP) that has aimed to support the reform process through a 
basket-funded program managed by a dedicated reform unit (the LGRP Team). LGRP has been 
implemented through three consecutive three-year medium-term plans and budgets, and the first 
major phase came to an end in 2009. A new phase of reform support is currently about underway.  
LGRP originally aimed to reform the legal framework and the local government finance and human 
resource management (HRM) systems, and enhance local participation and wider ―good governance‖ 
at the local level. In the later years, the program also included components for support of sector 
coordination and strengthening of the deconcentrated regional secretariats. The government with 
assistance, from DPs, introduced a development block grant for local governments (the LGCDG) in 
2004 in parallel with the LGRP. In addition, several of the service sectors undertook various sector 
reforms that interpreted the broader policy of ―decentralization‖ in numerous ways—in particular the 
education, health, water, roads and agricultural sectors were transformed in the last decade with more 
emphasis on decentralization (although not necessarily devolution).  
5.5.2 Historical Background 
The current reforms officially began with the adoption of the Local Government Reform Agenda in 
1996, within the framework of wider civil service reforms and the broader liberalization of the 
Tanzanian economy and polity. However, it is important to note that the system of local administration 
had undergone significant changes prior to that: reasonably well established democratic local 
governments in the early post-colonial period, the subsequent abolishment in 1972 of local 
governments, and their reintroduction in 1982.  
The reforms of the Tanzanian system of local government are presented in the following timeline: 
1. Pre-independence period: gradual introduction of local governments; 
2. 1962-1967: strong democratic councils; 
3. 1967-1972: gradual decline of local governments; 
4. 1972: deconcentration and abolishment of local governments;  
5. 1976–1982: reintroduction of local governments; and 
6. 1996: the second wave of devolution–Local Government Reform Agenda.  
5.5.2.1 Pre-Independence Period: gradual introduction of local governments 
The earliest experiences with elected local governments in Tanzania originate from the late colonial 
period where elected councils were gradually introduced. The move toward elected local governments 
with substantive functions and financial resources was strongest in the urban areas. The gradual 
democratization of the local administrations, in both urban and rural administrations, was in the same 
period tempered by the colonial administration‘s attempts to limit African control of these institutions 
through the reservation of European and Asian seats. Nevertheless, a basic architecture of elected 
local governments was largely in place at the time of independence in 1961. 
Dar es Salaam became a municipality in 1949, and the first town council was set up in Tanga in 1954. 
At the time of independence, 12 urban authorities were in place. They collected their own revenue, 
fixed property rates, made by-laws and provided a range of services.  
―Native Authorities‖ were established in the rural areas. They collected substantial amounts in local 
taxes and were made responsible for services such as primary education, dispensaries and village 
roads. The appointed district commissioner controlled the authorities, but there was a gradual 
                                                     
14
 This annex is based on extensive literature review and several years as ―participant observer‖ in the local 
government reform process as external consultants (Per Tidemand and Nazar Sola).  
15
  United Republic of Tanzania, 1998a. Emphasis of the policy is on devolution to municipalities and 
districts—see further discussion of the policy objectives in Section 2.3 of this report.  
16
 For details on the decentralisation reforms in Zanzibar see e.g. Tidemand and Sola (USAID 2011): Annex 6. 
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introduction of democratic elements in the latter part of the colonial period. Local authorities (chiefs) 
nevertheless continued to exercise substantial executive and judicial powers. The colonial 
administration sought, under the Local Government Ordinance of 1953 and in subsequent initiatives, 
to introduce a further gradual modernization and democratization of the authorities, but it was never 
effectively implemented in the rural areas. The new nationalist movement of TANU under the 
leadership of President J. Nyerere resisted the attempts of introducing racially segregated elections. 
The new councils would have jurisdiction over all residents in the area—rather than as previously, only 
―Africans‖. Elections were, on the other hand, to be organized in a manner whereby each eligible voter 
was to cast three votes: one each for an African, a European and an Asian. TANU wanted an 
immediate establishment of truly representative bodies based on the principle of ―one-man, one vote‖.  
Nevertheless, at the time of independence, a fairly well-developed system of autonomous and partially 
democratic local government had been put in place. Locally collected revenues from rural and urban 
authorities totaled more than £5 million, or some 17% of total public revenue in 1961. Their annual 
capital spending amounted to £1.25 million, or one-quarter of their turnover. While rural authorities 
were never fully established with elected councils, the basic legal framework of the functions and 
responsibilities of local authorities had been outlined in the 1953 Local Government Ordinance. 
Other pre-independence events of relevance to the existing system of local government administration 
in Tanzania include:  
 The establishment of the local government school in Mzumbe in 1953: solely to cater for local 
authorities and largely financed by the same; and 
 The establishment of the Local Government Association in 1956. 
5.5.2.2 1962-1967: Strong and Democratic Councils 
In 1962, soon after national independence was declared in December 1961, the new one-party state 
(TANU government) undertook significant changes of the local administration: 
1. Replacing the generalist administrative officers who previously headed the provinces and 
districts with political appointees: the regional and area commissioners; 
2. Removing all executive and judicial powers from the traditional chiefs; and correspondingly 
3. Extending modern district councils throughout the country, in place of the native authority 
councils, which still existed in most districts. 
Mawhood (1983) notes that the impact on elected local governments was mixed, since the rural 
administrations lost substantial lower-level authority through the removal of the chiefs, and the 
removal of administrative officers led to loss of administrative capacity. The initial years of 
independence nevertheless witnessed a short period of strengthened elected local governments. In 
particular, local authorities situated in the wealthier cash crop producing areas, such as Kilimanjaro 
District Council, saw their revenue increase substantially during the first years of independence, just 
as new and qualified staff members were brought on board. 
Central government transfers to local authorities that previously were extended to urban councils were 
also introduced to rural authorities. Some of the transfers sought to introduce incentives for particular 
local government authority (LGA) expenditures. Thus, road maintenance and recruitment of certain 
senior posts by the LGAs would be 50% co-funded by central government.  
5.5.2.3 1967-1972: Gradual Decline of Local Government 
A gradual decline of local authorities‘ capabilities occurred in the latter part of the 1960s; primarily due 
to a financial squeeze, declining revenues and increasing demands for financing of services, rather 
than a deliberate policy decision. 
The increase in local authorities‘ own tax collections topped in 1965-1966, largely because the central 
government imposed changes in the manner that local authorities were previously allowed to tax local 
cash crop production. The decrease in own-source revenue impacted on local authorities‘ capability to 
initiate capital projects. Central government simultaneously established a Regional Development Fund 
that increasingly administered the planning of new capital investments hitherto implemented by the 
LGA‘s own funds. LGAs, however, were expected to cater for recurrent cost implications of the 
investments.  
LGAs were, according to the national education plan, expected to finance an increasing share of 
primary education. As the number of schools rose dramatically after independence, this led to 
significant financial commitments—increasingly difficult for LGAs to meet. Rural health and road 
maintenance represented other areas of increasing service responsibilities assigned to local 
authorities without adequate funding.  
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Central government responded to the poor performance of local authorities primarily by tightening the 
control of LGA finances using earmarked transfers to special bank accounts at the LGA level and 
centralizing several important services. Mawhood (1983) points out, ―the Minister‘s budget speech in 
July 1969 delivered the death blow‖ by abolishing all important local taxes. A consultancy company, 
McKinsey and Co, was subsequently contracted to make recommendations on the local administrative 
set up most suitable for implementation of the Arusha policies of rural development.  
5.5.2.4 1972-1976: Deconcentration and Abolishment of Local Governments 
In May 1972, the government published its ―policy of decentralization‖. The recommended new 
structures were based on strengthened deconcentrated administrations at regional and district levels. 
Elected local governments had no role and were abolished. The reforms aimed at rationalization of 
some hitherto duplicate structures at the district level and strengthened the regions substantially by 
transferring very senior central government staff members and conferring ―ministerial status‖ upon 
regional commissioners.  
Consultative forums were established at regional and district levels—without any direct downward 
accountability, however; as the institutions were dominated by central government and party 
appointed members.  
Rural development featured particularly high on the government‘s agenda in this period. Ujamaa or 
villagization was a key component for the modernization of the rural areas. Legislation for village-level 
assemblies was passed in 1975 and the concept of ―village government‖ introduced and later carried 
over to local government legislation passed in the 1980s. 
5.5.2.5 1976-1982: Reintroduction of Local Governments 
The abolishment of urban local authorities was relatively short. In particular, the new structures proved 
ineffective for service delivery in urban areas, and a cholera crisis led to the relatively quick 
reestablishment of urban local governments as a policy decision was made to that effect in 1976 and 
an interim Act passed in 1978. The reintroduced urban local authorities had less autonomy than the 
old, as the region held substantial influence and as the local revenue-raising powers were rather 
curtailed. An Urban Development Policy was passed in 1980 for strengthening urban LGAs. 
CCM more generally included the reintroduction of local governments in their 1980 election manifesto, 
and in 1982, new legislation was passed that introduced a comprehensive system of local 
governments at district and village levels in rural areas, and at municipal and city levels in urban 
areas. Elected councils were empowered to enact by-laws, collect revenues, determine local budgets 
and plans, etc. These structures were given direct responsibility for service delivery in the areas of 
primary education, primary health, local water supply, local roads, and agriculture extension. In urban 
areas, they also became responsible for urban services, such as solid waste removal and street 
lighting. However, strong regional administrations remained, and they undertook a large number of 
development activities directly—in collaboration with, but not necessarily through LGAs—and 
controlled most of the local funding. Thus, while democratic local governments were introduced, they 
remained with no substantial resources or effective service mandates. Local administrations remained 
largely as deconcentrated structures at the regional level.  
5.5.2.6 1996: The Second Wave of Devolution—Local Government Reform Agenda 
The system of local government in Tanzania introduced in 1982 is legally not much different from what 
exists today. However, LGAs were not effectively the primary agents for implementation of the 
supposed service delivery functions. A large number of capital investments continued to be managed 
through strong regional administrations, and the financial and human resource bases of the LGAs 
were relatively weak.  
In the early 1990s, it was recognized that the system was in need of further reform. This has been 
referred to as the ―second wave of decentralization‖, which began as an element of the Civil Service 
Reform Program (CSRP) initiated in 1994.  
CCM included in its Election Manifesto of 1995 the promise of a substantive local government reform 
program. Interestingly, this took place after the first multiparty elections had been held in 1994 at local 
government level where several seats (although a minority) of new councilors went to opposition 
parties. The reform commitment had gradually been built and was based on various earlier analyses 
such as the Mtei Commission 1991.17 
                                                     
17
  Officially: ―Report of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Pubic Revenues, taxation and 
Expenditure‖; the report included two full chapters on the local government system and its finances and made 
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The decisive step toward further reform of the local government and intergovernmental systems was 
taken in June 1996, when the prime minister announced the government‘s decision to restructure and 
downsize regional administration with the objective of making local government more efficient and 
effective. The vision for the future local government system was formulated and endorsed at a national 
conference, ―Toward a Shared Vision for Local Government in Tanzania‖, held in May 1996. 
1.4  The Policy on Local Government Reform  
The most immediate changes of the reforms initiated in 1996 were found at regional level, where 
substantive retrenchments were undertaken and a substantial number of staff transferred to local 
government authorities. The changes were reflected in the 1997 Regional Act. The regions were no 
longer to play a major role in implementation of capital projects and direct delivery of services, but 
rather to facilitate and guide local authorities in doing so.  
The wider policy intentions were outlined in the ―Policy Paper on Local Government Reform‖ of 
October 1998, which outlines in greater detail the vision of a future reformed public service. The paper 
spells out how decentralization of government will include four main policy areas: 
1. Political devolution is devolution of powers and the setting of rules for councils and committees, 
chairpersons, etc. Political decentralization will include the integration of previously centralized or 
deconcentrated service sectors into a holistic local government system, installing councils as the 
most important local political bodies within its jurisdiction. Political decentralization implies the 
creation of real multi-functional governments at the local level within national legislation.  
2. Financial decentralization is based on the definition of principles of financial discretionary 
powers of local councils, (i.e., , powers to levy taxes and the obligation of central government to 
supply local governments with adequate unconditional grants and other forms of grants). The 
principle also allows local councils to pass their own budgets reflecting their own priorities, as well 
as mandatory expenditure required for attainment of national standards.  
3. Administrative decentralization involves the delinking of local authority staff from their 
respective ministries and procedures for establishment of a local payroll. Local governments will 
thus have and recruit their own personnel, organized in a way decided by the respective councils 
in order to improve service delivery. Administrative decentralization makes local government staff 
accountable to local councils. 
4. Changed central-local relations: the role of central government vis-à-vis local councils will be 
changed into a system of intergovernmental relations with central government having the 
overriding powers within the framework of the Constitution. Line ministries will change their role 
and functions to become: 1) policymaking bodies, 2) supportive and capacity-building bodies, 3) 
monitoring and quality assurance bodies within the local government legislation framework, and 4) 
regulating bodies (legal control and audit). The minister responsible for local government will 
coordinate central-local relations, and in particular, all initiatives from sectoral matters to matters 
relating to local governments.  
The subsequent sections of this chapter discuss the extent to which the policy intentions as expressed 
above have been affected as laws and regulations—and Government of Tanzania (GOT) experience 
with this process. Appendices 2 and 3 analyze the impact of reforms on fiscal and human resource 
decentralization. 
5.5.3 Legal Framework for Local Governments in Tanzania  
5.5.3.1 The Constitution  
The existence of local governments is entrenched in the URT‘s Constitution—but not in great detail. 
The Constitution rather briefly establishes in Chapter Eight (section 145) that ―there shall be 
established local government authorities in each region, district, urban area and village in the United 
Republic, which shall be of a type and designation to be enacted by Parliament or House of 
Assembly‖. Section 146 further stipulates that the ―purpose of having local government authorities is to 
transfer authority to the people‖.  
Thus, the nature of local governments—their functions, composition, roles, responsibilities and 
entitlements—are kept vague and to be determined by Parliament (on the mainland) and the House of 
Assembly in Zanzibar. This is comparable to, for example, many European Constitutions, but quite 
                                                                                                                                                                      
several recommendations for a general strengthening of the local governments including further transfer of 
resources and powers.  
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different from those such as the Ugandan Constitution that describes the local government systems in 
great detail. 
The Zanzibar Constitution further outlines the basic features of the local government system on the 
islands, just as Zanzibar has passed detailed local government legislation (see Appendix 6). 
The very general formulations of the Constitution have otherwise given the legislature a rather free 
hand in determining the most appropriate detailed legal framework for the local government system.  
While the Constitution mentions the establishment of LGAs within regions, it should be noted that no 
real local government body is present at the regional level—only a deconcentrated central government 
body to perform oversight and advisory functions vis-à-vis LGAs (see below). 
5.5.3.2 Main Laws and Overall Organization 
The current system of local government in Tanzania (mainland) is outlined in the following principal 
legislation: 
 The Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982; 
 The Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, 1982; 
 The Local Government Finances Act, 1982; 
 The Local Government Negotiating Machinery Act, 1982; 
 The Urban Authorities (rating) Act, 1983; and 
 The Local Authorities Elections Act, 1979. 
Furthermore, the functions and responsibilities of the regional administrations, in respect of oversight 
and interlinking central government and local governments, are spelled out in the Regional 
Administration Act, 1997. 
Immediately after the policy, some legal amendments were made (1999 and 2000) to the Local 
Government Act that abolished the concept of ―proper officer‖ at the regional level that otherwise 
previously had to approve LGA budgets. More general statements were inserted that reflect the 
principles and objectives of reformed LGAs, such as the rights of people to participate in the 
management of local affairs through LGAs, the need for democratization, increased autonomy and 
deepening transparency and accountability at the local level.  
Below is an overview of the governmental system. (Please refer to Appendix 4 for further details). 
Figure 6 Intergovernmental Relations and the Local Government System 
 
Source: by authors based on various local government legislation 
Central government ministries of relevance to LGAs are of two types: sectoral/line ministries (e.g., 
Health, Education) and inter-sectoral (e.g., Finance; Regional and Local Government.) Theoretically, 
the 1982 legislation made LGAs responsible for actual delivery in their areas of functional 
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responsibility (primary education and health, local roads, etc.) In reality, however, sector ministries 
have remained heavily involved at all levels in these sectors, while the inter-sectoral or coordinating 
ministries have exercised tight control over the allocation and usage of local government inputs (fiscal 
and human resources in particular.) 
The Policy on Local Government Reform (1998) envisages that LGAs will both assume greater service 
delivery responsibility and have more extensive control over their inputs. In general, it is intended that 
the role of the sector ministries will be limited to providing guidance on sectoral issues, setting relevant 
sector policies and guidelines for LGAs, determining sector-specific service delivery standards and 
monitoring performance. The inter-sectoral ministries will reduce the extent to which they determine 
the composition and allocation of the resources available to local authorities, with the President‘s 
Office-Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG) playing an overall coordinating and 
support role throughout the reform process. 
The 21 regional secretariats (RSs) comprise deconcentrated arms of central government. They are 
headed by centrally appointed regional administrative secretaries (RASs). The sector ministries linked 
to local service delivery (Health, Education, etc.) are all represented in the RSs, which are supposed 
to be the immediate points of referral for LGAs in their dealings with central government. Although 
they do not operate as superior organs of state in all respects, they do have certain oversight (e.g., of 
local budgets) and monitoring responsibilities regarding LGAs.  
Under the Local Government Laws, 1982 No.7 (District Authorities) and No.8 (Urban Authorities), 
LGAs have been assigned wide-ranging, but very broad and occasionally vaguely formulated 
functions, including the following:  
5.5.4 Basic Functions of LGAs 
 Maintain and facilitate the maintenance of peace, order and good government. 
 Promote social welfare and economic well-being.  
 Further rural and urban social economic development. 
 Control and improve agriculture, trade, commerce and industry. 
 Enhance health, education and the social, cultural and recreational life of their inhabitants.  
 Develop, mobilize and apply productive forces in the war on poverty, disease and ignorance.  
 The law stipulates that, in addition to the specified functions, it shall be the objective of the 
LGAs in performing their functions to: 
 Give effect to the meaningful decentralization in political, financial and administrative matters 
relating to the functions, powers, responsibilities and services at all levels of LGAs. 
 Promote and ensure democratic participation in, and control of, decision making by the people 
concerned. 
 Establish and maintain reliable sources of revenue and other resources to enable them to 
perform their functions effectively and to enhance financial accountability. 
According to the Policy on Local Government Reform, LGAs are to be responsible for the provision of 
basic public services, with a special emphasis on priority sectors that target poverty reduction. These 
include primary education, primary health, agriculture extension services, local water supply and 
roads. The clarity of the policy intentions is, however, yet to be fully reflected in legislation. The precise 
functions with regard to LGA responsibilities for provision of primary education are, for instance, not 
clearly stated in Section 111 (basic functions), but briefly mentioned in Section 118 with reference to 
the Education Act (Act No 25 of 1978). The clarity of required functions of urban authorities, such as 
for provision of street lighting and cleaning, solid and liquid waste collection and disposal, among 
others, are more explicit in legislation. In addition to the mandatory functions described in the 1982 Act 
and amendments, the first and second schedule of the Act outline optional functions, which are wide 
ranging. 
The Local Government Act is even more vague when it comes to the specific mandatory functions of 
lower-level local governments such as the village governments. Section 142 outlines the general 
functions as:  
 Do all such acts and things as are necessary or expedient for the economic and social 
development of the village. 
 Initiate and undertake any task, venture or enterprise designed to ensure the welfare and well-
being of the residents of the village. 
 Plan and coordinate activities of and render assistance and advice to the residents of the 
village engaged in agriculture, horticulture, forestry or other activity or industry of any kind. 
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 Encourage the residents of the village in undertaking and participating in communal 
enterprises. 
 Participate by way of partnership or any other way, in economic enterprises with other 
villages. 
Section 120 (1) of the Act stipulates that district councils may delegate any (non-executive or 
legislative) functions to lower-level local governments, but that the lower local government in such a 
case act as an agent of the district council and perform those functions as directed by the district 
council.  
5.5.5 Division of Tasks Across Levels of Government  
5.5.5.1 Local Government and Sector Legislation and Policies  
The Table below outlines the division of tasks and responsibilities between LGAs, central government 
and other stakeholders within key sectors.  
Table 7 Division of Task and Responsibilities according to Local government and Sector 
Legislation18  
Service Main responsible 
as provider 
Comments and legal issues 
Primary Education  LGAs  Section 118 of Local Government Act and stated in the 
Education Act (2004). However, parallel procedures for 
management of teachers (Teachers Service Commission). 
 The current education policy emphasizes decentralization to 
the lowest level: school committees.  
Secondary 
Education  
Central 
Government  
Until recently, no specific reference in local government legislation. 
However, noted that LGAs play a role in construction of secondary 
schools, as it until recently was a local unfunded priority.  
Primary and 
Preventive Health 
LGAs Need for clarification of role of standing LGA committees versus 
decentralized facilities. Health boards do not serve as effective 
mechanism for local accountability.
19
 
Hospitals LGAs (District 
Hospitals) 
The National Health Service Bill (2004) states that responsibilities 
for all health facilities up to district hospitals fall under LGAs. 
However, established health boards operate in parallel to LGA 
structures.  
Water Supply and 
Sewerage and 
Sanitation 
Urban areas: 
Autonomous 
Authorities 
 
Rural Areas: 
mainly LGAs 
 Implementation of new water capital investments in both urban 
and rural areas is largely managed by central government.  
 The water policy aims primarily at empowering users and the 
private sector.  
 Water boards in urban areas, and to some extent, water user 
associations are established for management of water supplies 
as parallel structures to LGAs.  
 Regional consultancy units are established parallel to the 
regional administration adequately to support the LGAs. 
Solid Waste LGAs No major legal issues, but problems of capacities in local 
governments with enforcement of laws, technical capacity for 
management of waste, problems of user payments for sustainable 
delivery of service.  
Roads  All districts and 
feeder roads, all 
streets in 
municipalities and 
cities 
 Main problems are with financing arrangements and technical 
capacities. 
 Some legal issues have been raised in relation to the drafting 
of a new Roads Act where the ministry wanted to establish 
regional roads boards for coordination of district roads. 
                                                     
18
 Based on Steffensen, et al., 2004 and Tidemand, Olsen and Sola. (2007). 
19
  Boon, 2007.  
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Service Main responsible 
as provider 
Comments and legal issues 
Agricultural 
extension  
LGAs In principle, no major legal issues regarding division between 
central and local governments. However, the transfer of some 7000 
extension staff to LGAs was made rather late compared to other 
sectors. The capacity of LGAs to deliver meaningful services is 
limited not least to unresolved division of work between the private 
and public sectors. Privatization and use of public funds managed 
through farmers groups raise some issues regarding legal basis for 
procurement and financial management. 
 
In summary the decentralization policy framework for Tanzania mainland is fairly elaborate with a 
reasonably clear assignment of major functions to local governments. The objective of the 
decentralization reform is clear in its envisaged emphasis on further devolution and strengthening of 
autonomous local governments. The key questions therefore relate to the practical implementation of 
the reforms discussed further in subsequent chapter. 
5.5.6 Intermediate Objectives  
The Tanzanian Local Government Reform Program has aimed to implement the policy of 
decentralization via devolution for more than 10 years. The reform aims to transfer authority to the 
LGAs, increase their relative autonomy and enhance both the downward (to local residents) and 
upward accountability (to central government/Parliament) and enhance the overall capacity of LGAs 
and wider national supportive system for decentralized governance.  
This chapter provides a summary discussion of the extent to which these objectives have been 
achieved. More details on the progress of fiscal and human resource reforms are provided in 
Appendices 2 and 3.  
5.5.7 Transfer of Authority to Local Governments 
Rather curiously, it can be concluded that the most significant transfer of authority to local 
governments in many aspects happened before the official launch of the LGRP in 2000. These grew 
out of the civil service reform that sought to ―right size‖ the central government and a genuine concern 
of the ruling party (CCM) regarding the need for strengthening local government structures (see 
Chapter 3 for details of CCM position). Thus, in the late 1990s, substantive retrenchments were 
undertaken at (deconcentrated) regional administrations and a considerable number of staff were 
transferred to LGAs. The changes were reflected in the 1997 Regional Act that completely changed 
the nature of the regions—they were no longer to play a major role in implementation of capital 
projects and direct delivery of services, but rather to facilitate and guide local authorities in doing so.  
In 1999, local government legislation was amended to provide an enabling framework for the 
decentralization reforms, which made the minister responsible for local governments ―guided and 
bound, by the need to promote decentralization and the devolution of functions powers and services 
from the central government to local governments‖.20 LGRP was simultaneously launched and sought 
initially to undertake the reforms in a geographically phased manner starting with approximately a third 
of the LGAs in Phase 1. However, as discussed in the next section, many of these initiatives failed to 
enhance LGAs‘ autonomy.  
The legal reforms up to 2000 did lead to a significant degree of decentralization of key functions to 
LGAs within sectors such as education, health, agriculture, roads, water and sanitation (see Table 1) 
just as fiscal and human resource capacities have been enhanced.  
Since 2000, LGRP has supported analysis of a number of key sector laws with a view of further 
harmonizing these with local government legislation. Studies have also been undertaken on the 
regional administration and local government legislation that recommended amendments for furthering 
the devolution process, including proposals for development of a unified local Government Law and 
constitutional amendments.21 However, virtually none of the recommendations have been 
implemented to date. On the contrary, it can be argued that some new laws and amendments have 
weakened the local government reform process. For instance, the Public Service Act (further 
discussed in next section) and the Local Government Laws Amendments Act 2006 (Act No. 8 of 2006) 
that strengthened the role of central government in local government affairs by creation of a district 
                                                     
20
  Section 4(3) of the Local Governments (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1999, no 6 as quoted in Shivji, 
2007.  
21
  See Shivji (2006) for an overview.  
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consultative committee (where LGAs are to consult with district commissioners) and gave way for 
central government appointment of up to three councilors in each LGA.  
5.5.8 Capacities of Local Governments  
LGA capacities have greatly increased over the last decade; this is reflected in the substantive 
increase of fiscal resources, increase in staff numbers and improvement in management capacities. 
However, capacities are rather uneven: some local governments are distinctly underserved compared 
to others. These trends are briefly summarized below, whereas more details on the fiscal aspects of 
capacities are presented as in Appendix 2.  
5.5.8.1 LGAs’ Relative share of public Expenditures  
LGA budgets have increased in both absolute terms as well as their relative share of public 
expenditure. However, the increase in 2006/2007 is explained by the increase in teacher numbers and 
salaries that constitute a large share of LGAs‘ recurrent budgets—the later increase in 2009 is 
similarly explained by the decision to transfer responsibilities for secondary school teachers to LGAs. 
Table 8 LGA Share of Public Expenditure (PE)22 
Fiscal Year (FY) Total Recurrent Expenditure (TSH 
billion) 
LG share 
2001/02 1.253 18,7% 
2002/03 1.527 19,0% 
2003/04 1.834 17,7% 
2004/05 2.252 17,0% 
2005/06 2.875 18,6% 
2006/07 3.142 24,3% 
2007/08 5.452 21% 
2008/09 6.536 21% 
2009/10 7.991 28% 
LGAs share of development funding is significantly less—in 2007 estimated as 17% of total 
development budget.23  
5.5.8.2 LGA Human Resource Capacities  
Local government staff numbers have also continuously increased in both absolute numbers and as a 
relative share of total public expenditures  
Table 9 LGA Share of Public Employment 
  1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Central 108.363 101.074 97.146 92.393 92.951 91.407 90.928 92.436 90.708 91.950 97.775 
Regional 24.119 22.667 19.192 16.637 10.172 9.776 10.088 10.302 10.064 9.835 9.481 
Local G 163.255 163.297 156.842 155.397 169.285 168.490 177.812 189.979 187.149 204.606 219.573 
Total 295.737 287.038 273.180 264.427 272.408 269.673 278.828 292.717 287.921 306.391 326.829 
LG share 55% 57% 57% 59% 62% 62% 64% 65% 65% 66% 67% 
Local teachers     110.116 109.879 116.713 116.801 126.744 144.286 154.186 
Teachers share 
of all LG 
Employees     65% 65% 66% 61% 67% 70% 70% 
                                                     
22
  Note that for 2001-2006/07 the data are actual expenses (but only from recurrent budget) as published 
by PMO-RALG (URT, 2007)—this is the last year of a published local government fiscal review and that data from 
subsequent years hasn‘t been published by PMO-RALG. Data from 2006/07-2009/10 is based on data collected 
from the LG DPG (2010). 
23
  URT, 2007. For details, see Appendix 2.  
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non-teacher LG     59.169 58.611 61.099 73.178 60.405 60.320 65.387 
Non teacher 
growth rate          -0.9% 4.2% 19.8% -17.5% -0.1% 8.4% 
Source: PSM HR and Payroll Database 
The functional capacities of LGAs in terms of quality financial management and planning has generally 
also improved during the last decade (e.g., reflected for instance in the quality of audit reports). 
5.5.8.3 Inequalities in capacities among LGAs  
Several remote and rural LGAs have problems in attracting and retaining staff. As discussed further in 
the next section, central government has taken this as a reason for centralizing human resource 
allocations. However, even this centralized system of resource allocation has failed to provide 
resource and staff equally among LGAs. Figure 2 illustrates how unequal allocations currently are in 
the education sector with per capita allocations ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 TSH per capita. These 
inequalities are also found in other sectors and lead to unbalanced developments - these inequalities 
are to a large extent also a result of central government‘s reluctance to devolve staff resources fully.  
Figure 7 Unequal allocation of resources—the case of Education PE24 
Allocation of PE education resources across LGAs, FY 2007/08 
Councils with the lowest, median and highest per capita budget allocations for education PE 
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5.5.9 Local Governments’ Autonomy  
Under the reform, LGAs were to be granted increasing autonomy—in particular for management of 
their staff and fiscal autonomy. Progress in this regard has been mixed, particularly in the lack of 
results for staff devolution. 
5.5.9.1 Autonomy for staff management 
At the onset of reforms in 1998, the system for HRM at the local government level was fragmented 
and centralized with six different appointing authorities. The Local Government Reform Policy of May 
1998 sought a radical change and is explicit in its vision regarding the anticipated features of 
decentralized local government personnel management as it states: ―The councils (city, municipal, 
town and district) will be fully responsible for planning, recruiting, rewarding, promoting, disciplining, 
development and firing of (all) their personnel‖.  
The Local Government Reform Policy anticipated an immediate and radical transformation toward a 
situation where each individual LGA would become the employer of its entire staff. Only for the council 
director it was stated that he/she ―in the interim may be posted by (Central) Government‖.  
The legal framework and actual practices are complicated, but in summary it can be concluded that 
staff management procedures have remained rather opaque: central government has maintained the 
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  See analyses in Boex (2003) and Tidemand (2010) and LOGIN data at www.logintanzania.net.  
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upper hand in management staff, but officially staff in LGAs are ―employees‖ of the local governments. 
This vagueness in encompassed within legislation (Public Service Act) but compounded by 
management practices: 
 Budget and establishment control has remained entirely centralized; local governments are 
consulted annually, but all decisions on staff budgets and numbers of approved staff are 
ultimately done by the President‘s Office-Public Service Management (PO-PSM); during the 
reform LGAs have not been granted additional autonomy within this area. 
 Staff salaries are almost entirely paid from central government transfers, where central 
government allocates funds according to filled posts rather than a formula as otherwise 
foreseen in the reform. 
 Career management has been partially devolved—but for senior staff, career progress 
continues to depend on the central government ministries.  
 Pay policy remains centralized, except that LGAs are allowed to establish local incentive 
schemes. In practice, this is unaffordable by LGAs—except for select staff categories in the 
more wealthy LGAs.  
Staff in LGAs consequently have dual allegiances; they have to satisfy both local governments (their 
official employer) and central government. Furthermore, senior staff are aware that their career 
prospects depend largely on satisfaction of the latter. Several LGAs have invested in capacity building 
of their staff and subsequently seen staff transferred to other LGAs or central government. This 
frustrates local capacity-building efforts as otherwise encouraged by the new system of providing 
LGAs with Capacity Building Grants. Transfers are undertaken without much consultation with LGAs 
and with late replacement of staff. Assessment field visits indicate that this is perceived by LGAs as 
the most frustrating aspect of current practices. 
Available data does not allow for a strict comparison of effectiveness of centrally deployed staff 
compared to locally recruiting. However, during field visits, both regional and district officials argued 
that, for instance, teachers who were locally recruited by LGAs were far more likely to continue work 
within their post than teachers that were centrally deployed by central government and sent to 
particular districts. In addition, it can be noted that central deployment of staff has generally failed to 
address the significant geographical inequalities of staffing levels in local governments. There remain 
significant and persistent problems in attraction and retention of (senior) staff in districts considered 
―remote‖ or marginalized.25 Similar problems are recognized for field staff and considered a problem 
within specific districts, as staff tends to cluster around district headquarters. The problem is generally 
recognized, but not fully quantified.  
5.5.9.2 LGA Fiscal Autonomy26 
The reforms aimed to strengthen LGAs‘ fiscal autonomy in two ways:  
1. Strengthening local government own-revenue collections through reformed local tax systems, 
and 
2. Reforming the way central government transfers are made to local governments by 
introduction of formula-based fiscal transfers. 
5.5.9.2.1 LGA Own Revenue Mobilization  
LGAs collect at present some 60 billion TSH from local taxes (mainly service levy and produce rather 
than property taxes for example). This represents only 7% of total LGA expenditures and thus 
indicates a high reliance on central government fiscal transfers. Revenue in rural LGAs has declined 
over recent years, whereas urban LGAs have witnessed some growth. Urban LGAs today collect more 
than four times as much as rural LGAs, and it is in urban LGAs that the most significant potential for 
further growth is found. The main reasons for the decline in revenue collections are abolishment of a 
range of ―nuisance taxes‖ in 2004, inappropriate tax designs and poor collection systems.27 
Table 10 Trends in LGA own revenue collections (in Million TSH) 
                                                     
25
  Valentine, Tidemand, Sola and Maziku, 2005. 
26
  For further details, see Appendix 2. 
27
  For detailed discussion, see separate REPOA report on LGA finance.  
 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 Overall 
Growth 
TSH Per 
capita 
Urban 23.113 25.569  28.656 23.728 28.139  36.271  36% 4,83  
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Source: PMO-RALG finance data – for most recent years available at www.logintanzania.net  
There is mainly scope for improvements of own revenue collection in urban areas (significant 
untapped potential for property taxation), but limited scope in rural areas. Reforms of central 
government transfers become so much more crucial in determining the relative degree of LGA fiscal 
autonomy.  
5.5.9.2.2 Reform of fiscal transfers toward greater autonomy and transparency? 
Since 2000, the reform program has sought to introduce a system of formula-based block grants to 
LGAs that would grant them more autonomy in their utilization and allocation of funds in a more 
transparent manner. As discussed in further detail in Appendix 2, the strategy has only partially been 
implemented.  
The most ambitious part of the intended reforms was to transform the ―recurrent‖ budget allocations 
(staff personnel emoluments and other charges) into a system of formula-based block grants for each 
the six main sectors (education, health, water, agriculture, roads and administration). The system, 
including detailed formulas, were in principle agreed to by the cabinet in 2004, but were never put into 
practice. It presumed government commitment to decentralization of personnel management—and 
this was never implemented.  
The reforms have been more successful in transformation of development funds transfers. Up to 2004, 
development grants to LGAs were miniscule and consisted mainly of small non-formula-based 
development grants such as the 5 billion TSH PO-RALG Development Grant.28 Most of LGA 
development funds were provided through discrete donor-funded projects, mainly through various 
―area-based programs‖, but also in the form of some sector support programs. In 2004, government 
and DPs agreed on establishment of the Local Government Capital Development Grant System 
(LGCDG). Under this arrangement, all LGAs receive a discretionary development grant of 
approximately US $1.5 per capita (a total of some 50 billion TSH) if they fulfill basic minimum 
conditions regarding the quality of their development plans, financial management, and degree of local 
transparency and procurement systems.29 The LGCDG system has been declared by government as 
the ―preferred modality for transfer of development funds to LGAs‖, and in addition to the 
approximately 50 billion TSH of core LGCDG funding, various sectors have started to transfer funds 
along the basic principles of the LGCDG system (see Appendix 2 for details).  
5.5.9.3 LGA Expenditure Patterns—Driven by local priorities?  
Recent data reveals several clear tendencies in local government spending:30 first, a large share 
(78.5%) of local spending is recurrent; second, most recurrent spending (56.6% of all local spending, 
or almost three-quarters of local recurrent spending) is spent on personal emoluments; and third, 
spending is heavily concentrated within just two sectors—health and education. Three-quarters of 
recurrent spending and two-thirds of all local spending is aimed at primary education and basic health 
services. Rather than being driven by local priorities and choices, it is clear that these local 
expenditure trends are driven primarily by the nature of the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system, 
which limits the spending discretion of local authorities between sectors and between spending type 
(PE, other charges [OC] or development).  
The LGCDG was intended to provide much-needed discretionary development funding to LGAs. 
However, there is evidence of increasing central government interference in local prioritizations—thus 
an increasing share of the LGCDG budgets are now funding secondary classroom construction since 
LGAs have received instructions to do so by the prime minster, regional commissioners and district 
commissioners since 2005—in spite of secondary education not being a legal mandate of LGAs.31 
5.5.10 Citizen Participation and Accountability  
In this section, we will explore the impact of the local government reforms on selected aspects of 
governance:  
1. Electoral participation; 
2. Direct participation: participatory planning and participation in meetings; and 
3. LGA accountability. 
                                                     
28
  See e.g., analysis in PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004.  
29
  For details see the URT, 2006.  
30
  As summarized in the URT, 2007.  
31
  For an example, see DEGE Consult, 2007b. Note that secondary education retrospectively was later 
made a mandate of the LGAs. 
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5.5.10.1 Electoral Participation 
Elections for local government councils are held in two distinctly different ways for the higher-level 
councils (districts and municipalities, etc.) and lower-level councils (villages, vitongoji and mitaa, etc.) 
respectively.32 The elections for village councils, vitongoji and mitaa are managed by the ministry 
responsible for local governments (PMO-RALG) and respective district council directors throughout 
the country—these elections are often referred to as ―grassroots elections‖. However, elections for the 
district (as well as municipal and city) councillors are held simultaneously with the national elections 
for Parliament and president, and are supervised by the National Electoral Commission.  
The latest grassroots elections were held November 2009 (one year in advance of the national 
elections). These were the fourth round of elections under multiparty democracy following the 1994, 
1999 and 2004 elections. The national and district council elections are held approximately one year 
later than the grassroots elections.  
PMO-RALG data on election results indicate that the ruling party increasingly dominates the 
grassroots elections and that the dominance in these elections is more substantive than in other types 
of elections (see table below). Thus while the opposition gained close to 20% of the votes in the latest 
presidential election, they only gained 3% of the seats in the grassroots elections later in the year.  
Table 11 CCM Dominance in Elections for President, Parliament and LGAs (1994-2009)33 
 1994/95 1999/2000 2004/2005 2009/2010 
CCM OPP CCM OPP CCM OPP CCM OPP 
1 Presidential (% votes) 61,8 38,2 71,7 28,3 80,3 19,7 - - 
2 Parliament (% seats) 80,2 19,8 87,5 12,5 88,8 11,2 - - 
3 Local Councils (% seats) 96,8 3,2 91,7 8,3 92,9 7,1 - - 
4 Village/Hamlet (% seats) - - 94,6 5,4 97,2 2,8 91,7 8,3 
Source: National Electoral Committee (www.nec.or.tz) and Chaligha (n.d., 2008). Summary calculations of the 
local council election data for 2005 were kindly provided by Therkildsen and Geeland of DIIS. For detailed results 
from latest grassroots elections, see Appendix 5. 
The substantive dominance by CCM in grassroots elections compared to the relative strength of CCM 
in presidential elections, for example, indicates that the electoral system of grassroots elections overly 
favor the ruling party, as only CCM has the required machinery for organizing such a large number of 
candidates. Table 7 illustrates the extremely high number of leadership posts to be filled.  
Table 12 Number of posts in the grassroots governance structures  
Position Number of Seats  
Hamlet Chairperson 55.242 
Village Chairperson 10.657 
Village Council 125.297 
Village Council (special seats for women) 76.430 
Mtaa Chairperson 2.515 
Mitaa Committee members (mixed seats) 8.938 
Mitaa Committee Members (special women seats) 5.420 
TOTAL 284.499 
Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) research indicates that a large number 
of seats are uncontested, as only CCM forwards candidates. The official election reports from PMO-
RALG do not publish the specific number of seats that were uncontested and fail to provide precise 
data on voter registration and voter turnout. Election monitoring reports based on samples indicate 
that approximately 50% of eligible voters register and only half of these participate—thus only a dismal 
25% of the eligible voters participate.34 The reasons for low turnout seem to be (1) lack of awareness, 
(2) cumbersome election procedures, and (3) lack of interest because real competition for posts was 
limited.  
                                                     
32
  The discussion of the grassroots elections is mainly based on the work by Amon Chaligha, 2008. 
33
  CCM : Chama Cha Mapinduzi – the ruling party since independence ; ―OPP‖ = Opposition parties.  
34
  Legal and Human Rights Centre, 2009 and LG DPG, 2009.  
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In Tanzania, only party members can stand for elections to Parliament, district and municipal councils 
as well as for the posts in villages, mitaa and sub-villages. In many other countries, independent 
candidates rather than party officials more frequently hold such positions of community leadership. 
The question of whether to allow non-party nominated (i.e., independent) candidates for grassroots 
elections has been discussed on several occasions but fiercely resisted by CCM. The issue was one 
of the few specifically resisted by CCM in discussion of the Local Government Reform Policy in the 
late 1990s35 and has continuously been resisted in spite of a High Court ruling in 2006 that argued that 
the requirements of party nomination was unconstitutional.36 
There has been some speculation regarding CCM‘s use of fiscal incentives to local governments that 
vote in their favor.37 This could not be verified through independent analysis of budget allocations, nor 
through interviews with staff and politicians—it appears instead that CCM primarily seeks to exercise 
control over election results through its control of the local government staff (and its directly controlled 
district commissioners).  
5.5.10.2 Direct Participation 
The REPOA local government surveys provide a fairly consistent picture of increased citizen 
participation in local affairs whether through local government institutions at the grassroots level or 
through other community institutions. 
Table 13 Indicators of Community Participation 2003-06 
Percentage of respondents who report that they or a 
household member is involved in 
Total 2003 
% 
Total 
2006 
% 
Change 
between the 
two surveys 
Member of village/ward leadership  17,3 22,9 32% 
Participation in full council meetings 24,2 28,1 16% 
School committee member 28,2 35,8 27% 
Water management committee 13,3 23,2 74% 
Preparation of village/ward plans 19,7 35,0 78% 
Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) project committee 1,9 13,7 621% 
Public works committee 8,8 19,1 117% 
Primary cooperatives/society/farmers association 8,7 12,1 39% 
Agricultural/livestock extension contact group 2,9 6,4 121% 
Source: REPOA Survey 2003 and 2006 
It is noteworthy that citizen involvement in particular has increased by participation in various sector-
specific user committees such as school committees, water committees, public work committees and 
farmer associations (in that order of relative importance).  
The most convincing indicator of increased participation in local government affairs may be the 
significant increase in respondents reporting involvements in ―preparation of village/ward plans‖. This 
probably reflects participation in the opportunities and obstacles to development (O&OD) planning 
processes facilitated by PMO-RALG, as well as other externally supported initiatives as supported by 
sectors. The relative high level of participation in ―planning‖ is confirmed by the 2007 Views of the 
People survey.38 
It appears from the 2003 and 2006 surveys that the increase in citizen participation is due in particular 
to increased participation by women and youth.  
2.4.3 LGA Accountability 
A key indicator of financial accountability in LGAs is the annual report from National Audit 
Office/Controller and Auditor General (CAG). The main results are summarized in Figure 3 below. As 
evident from the figure: since 1999, the number of LGAs with adverse audit opinions has fallen sharply 
from 45% to 0% in the latest audits, while in a similar manner the proportion of LGAs with clean audit 
                                                     
35
  As noted in interviews with consultants such as Ole Therkildsen involved in drafting the policy. 
36
  The government refused to adhere to the High Court ruling of 2006—and in 2010 the ruling was 
overruled by a court of appeal – see e.g., http://allafrica.com/stories/201006180404.html. 
37
  Weinstein, 2010 and Bueno de Mesquito and Smith, 2010.  
38
  Note that informants in ―Views of the People‖ were asked about their individual behavior whereas the 
REPOA local government surveys asked about whether ―you or a household member is involved in…‖ 
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reports has increased. This is a significant indicator of strengthened financial management 
capabilities, if not real accountability, in LGAs. Real local accountability will require stronger citizen 
involvement in scrutiny of budgets and accounts. This is, as discussed elsewhere, only slowly 
emerging. 
Figure 8 Summary of CAG Reports for LGAs 
 
Source: Data from Controller and Auditor General as summarized by LGRP.  
Notes: * In 2004, the FY for LGAs was changed to coincide with the central government FY from July – July. 
Previously LGA FY was on a calendar year basis. Thus, the year marked 2004* included only six months: 
January-June 2004. 
5.5.11 Conclusion  
Progress of the reform elements has been uneven; LGAs have generally been bestowed with 
significant service delivery responsibilities and provided with substantive staff just as their financial 
resources have increased substantively. However, their relative autonomy has not increased over the 
last decade. Probably because of the increasing amounts of fiscal resources controlled by local 
governments, there is some evidence of increasing local participation in local government affairs but at 
the same time also further contestation by central government and the ruling party.  
Reforms were intended to improve local governance in two fundamental aspects: (1) by empowering 
local government institutions (the district and municipal councils in particular); and (2) by enhancing 
the local accountability of the LGAs to citizens and increasing citizen participation in local government 
affairs. 
5.5.11.1 Reform of central–local relations  
The conclusion regarding the first objective it quite clear; since 2000, local governments have not 
been significantly empowered as autonomous institutions. Central government maintains considerable 
control over local government staff and budgets—the extent to which local governments can make 
budget or staffing decisions has not changed significantly. On the contrary, it can be argued that legal 
reforms have constrained local government autonomy, in particular regarding HRM, just as tax reforms 
have reduced local fiscal autonomy. 
The government and DPs plan for a second phase of the LGRP. Future reform work will be 
challenging and require renewed effort for reform commitment, which in turn may require clarification 
of reform scenarios—in particular regarding modalities for devolution of staff to local governments and 
(related) fiscal decentralization. 
5.5.11.2 Improving Local-Level Governance  
Conclusions regarding the second objective, to improve local level accountability and participation 
through local governments, are more complex. However, based on the various studies discussed 
above, the main trends can be summarized: 
 There is an apparent significant decrease in electoral participation in lower-level LGA elections 
(grassroots elections), but also limited real competition as CCM is so overwhelmingly 
dominant.  
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 There is evidence of increase in various forms of direct citizen participation in various local 
institutions; however, the increases have been more significant in user groups than in local 
government institutions. This indicates that the form of decentralization put in place has in 
practice been deconcentration or user-group strengthening driven by sector reforms 
(education in particular) rather than by strengthening of the core local government structures. 
 There has been a significant increase in citizen involvement in preparation of village/ward 
plans; however, at the same time, limited evidence regarding the extent to which this 
effectively is translated into district plans and budgets appears to be a reflection of national 
rather than local priorities. 
 Surveys appear to indicate increasing trust in local government institutions and local 
government reform initiatives as well as increasing trust in LGA political leaders—especially at 
the lowest levels, but a lack of trust in local government council staff. Surveys also indicate a 
perceived decrease of corruption in LGAs. 
 The above promising trends are contradicted, however, by data regarding significant problems 
with village and mitaa adherence to the required number of meetings and quorums, which is 
an indication of a wider problem of lack of mandate and possibly legitimacy.  
 Increasing citizen‘s access to information and empowering people to analyze and take action 
on available information still faces a number of challenges—for example, only a small minority 
(13%) have seen a local government budget posted. 
 A positive trend in the quality of LGA accounts as measured by reports from CAG is indicative 
of a wider trend of building systems in local governments that can provide a sound basis for 
deepening local accountability.  
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5.6 Annex 6: ―History‖ of EC Formulation of Support to LGDG  
History 
2003  Formulation of Capacity Building for Participatory Development to support Lower 
Local Government in limited districts, however, LGCDG under development by LGRP 
and other donors → decision to await this process and ensure consistency. 
2004  Update of FP (rename to Local Capacity Building Programme) to include support to 
LGRP through basket modality. 
June 2005  Submission of PIF. Decision not to allow basket funding. Reformulation to only 
support LGCDG through co-financing agreement w WB, however concern from 
NAO‘s office on fees. 
July/August 
2005  
Possible re-orientation from HQ to allow for basket. Decision to revise again, 
although maintaining the option of WB until official notice from HQ on basket issue. 
October 
2005  
No indication from HQ that this will be allowed any time soon, decision to move 
ahead to be able to commit the money. This is communicated to AIDCO E4. 
November 
2005  
Submission of revised PIF. 
January 
2006  
Comments are uploaded on intranet, subsequently all addressed in FP. However, PIF 
is rejected. 
February 
2006  
Email from AIDCO that note which may allow basket funding is still soon to come. 
March 2006  Complete u-turn from Commission, now contribution agreements are no longer 
acceptable and we should go for basket-option on a ‗case-by-case basis‘. 
May 2006  First submission of FP, QSG in June asks for clarifications. 
July 2006  Second submission of FP, QSG again asks more questions. 
July 2006  Third submission of FP, QSG in August approves. Scheduled to be presented at the 
October EDF Committee. 
 
Options pursued 
Basket funding: preferred option, however, is also not ―for free‖ – LGRP also has administrative costs 
just for operating the programme. In addition, included in the cost of implementing the LGCDG system 
is service costs paid to LGRP and LGSP which amounts to approx. 5%. 
Sector budget support: criteria have been analyzed and assessed and for several of the 7 specified by 
the HQ guidelines, it would be premature and at the same time hurried in this context: the LGCDG 
system is new and only fully operational from this fiscal year. Furthermore it would be adding funding 
streams/transaction costs at a time when PO-RALG is preoccupied with considerable institutional 
changes. 
Through World Bank: was not the preferred but the feasible option. Administration fee of 2% is very 
low compared to other organisations; UN for comparison operates with between 10-15%. 
The time left for commitments of 9
th
 EDF is also important to consider in this context. 
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5.7 Annex 7: Local Government Expenditure Patterns  
Table 14 Local government expenditure patterns 
 
Source: Table extracted from: PMO-RALG 2008: Local Government Fiscal Review 2007 - Measuring Progress on 
Decentralization by Devolution. 
5.8 Annex 8: LGDG Allocations (and introduction of sector windows) 
Table 15 LGCDG Grant Allocation FY 2004/05-FY 2008/0939 
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 Expenditure data from PMO-RALG progress reports as reported in the Mid Term Review of LGSP, Budget 
figures from respective PMO-RALG Guidelines for the Preparation of LGA Medium Term Plans and Budgets. 
Grant  
(Million Tshs)  
Actual 
2004/05 
Actual 2005 
/ 06 
Actual 
2006 / 07 
2007/08 
Budget 
2008/09 
Budget 
Capital Development 
Grant 
5.000 34.641 48.303 65.932 79.452 
LGDG to Non Qualifying 
Councils 
5.000 2.415 1.622 2.500 0 
Capacity Building Grant - 4.350 5.294 5.506 5.779 
Total Discretionary 
Grant 
10.000 41.406 55.219 73.938 85.231 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes;  
Final Report Volume IIc - Country notes - Tanzania; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
51 
Source: PMO-RALG LGSP Mid-Term Review 2008 and PMO-RALG Annual Budget Guidelines 2008 
 
Agriculture CDG - - 4.263 25.179 25.583 
Agriculture CBG - - 3.293 17.284 17.997 
Agriculture EBG - - - 8.981 9.439 
Total Agriculture Grants - - 7.556 51.444 53.019 
UDEM Grant - - - 1.334 3.351 
UDEM CBG - - - 2.293 2.470 
Total UDEM Grant - - - 3.627 5.821 
RW Grant - - - 65.915 59.614 
RW CBG - - - 3.730 2.772 
Total RWSS Grant - - - 69.645 62.386 
Primary education 
Development grant  
- - 5.000 5.000 5.250 
Grand Total Allocations 20.000 41.406 67.775 203.654 211.707 
